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INTRODUCTION
Universal Morality:
Contemporary Socio-Political and Philosophical Stakes
FERENC HÖRCHER
Th is essay provides an overview of the stakes of the globalised but disintegrating 
world of the 21 century. It argues that a hope for moral universalism, which 
was shared by both the Judeo-Christian tradition and the Enlightened secular 
view faces serious challenges aft er 9/11 and Charlie Ebdo. It distinguishes the 
socio-political and the moral philosophical stakes. As far as the fi rst ones are 
concerned it argues that in fact globalisation does not solve the problem of con-
testing cultures, and the world of identity politics does not off er much hope for a 
more moderate period in global politics. On the other hand, there are signs – for 
example in the reception of two important political philosophers, John Rawls 
and Jürgen Habermas – that moral universalism might be a shared platform in 
the Western intellectual world for both religious and secular views. But certainly 
contestation is present in this sphere as well, although the political programme 
of a multicultural cohabitation does not seem to be easily available anymore. 
Th at is why a reworking of the basic premises for and against moral universal-
ism seem to be very timely in the present political and intellectual context.
Socio-political overview: a risky, globalised but disintegrating world
If we try to make sense of our contemporary world – and, aft er all the technical details 
and terminological tricks, what else is the job of the philosopher? – it is almost impos-
sible to avoid bumping into debates about the need for and the ever recurring doubts 
about the possibility of a universal (i.e. universally valid) morality. One does not need 
to be a philosopher to see what makes the question topical. We live in a dangerous 
world: the offi  cial borders of the supposedly sovereign countries do not protect the 
population even from the most brutal forms of external infl uences, including (civil?) 
war, terrorism and war on terror. Th e dense network of the Internet connects desktops, 
laptops, iPads and smart phones all around the globe, and their owners or users also 
connect through these gadgets with the data providers. Television series, popular hits, 
movie stars and social celebrities, daily fashion, the novelties of information technol-
ogy and, more generally, the knowledge industry, global sporting events and cultural 
festivals link people tightly, whether they like it or not. Global industrial production 
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and the intercontinental fi nancial system secures that no part of the world remain 
untouched by the eff ects of global community, including the most disastrous fi nan-
cial crises. Environmental damages, the more and more extreme global climate and 
epidemics could help us to realise that we need to synchronise our moral vocabulary, 
moreover, to reconcile the morality of our actions. 
Th erefore, we know from fi rst-hand experience that this is a risky world, probably since 
the disassembly of the bipolar global (cold war or) security) system in or around 1990 and 
even more so since 9/11. For a moment, Fukuyama might have fallen into the illusion that 
history was over and the liberal paradigm of the West could become the default contem-
porary social-political arrangement.1 He thought that the modern Western model of gov-
ernmental organisation, civil societies and individual lives remained without any compe-
tent challengers. Th at national fury and religious passions came under control in a system 
based on the effi  ciency of industrial production, a widening realm of common market and 
the off ers of a globalised consumer society. Th at fi nancial crises could be avoided by the 
global community’s control over the excessive amplitudes of the fi nancial markets. 
However, Fukuyama’s illusion has soon been unmasked as such. Th e terrorist attack 
on 11th September 2001 against New York’s landmark architectural design, the Twin 
Towers, closely followed by other attacks on American targets, destroyed the philoso-
pher’s daydream. “But now all is to be changed. All the pleasing illusions, which made 
power gentle and obedience liberal, which harmonized the diff erent shades of life, 
and which, by a bland assimilation, incorporated into politics the sentiments which 
beautify and soft en private society, are to be dissolved by this new conquering em-
pire” of destruction and terror. 2 Edmund Burke, the 18th century author of these 
disappointed lines, gave a thrilling account of the spiritual chaos caused by the French 
Revolution. His words describe the disillusionment of a politician, always hoping to 
be able to domesticate wild political passions, when confronted with a situation where 
confl icting political interests and values caused the destruction of the whole moral or-
der of the community. But, incidentally, he was also the author of an aesthetic treatise, 
which presented in a rather innovative way the conceptual opposition of the aesthetic 
categories of the beautiful and the sublime. He described the latter category – which 
obviously fascinated him much more than simple beauty – the following way: 
Whatever is fi tted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that 
is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible 
objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the 
sublime; that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind 
is capable of feeling.3 
1 Fukuyama 1992
2 Burke 1790
3 Burke 1757
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Th e words of the young Burke were based on the assumption that the nature of 
human beings is universally determined, and this nature cannot be overwritten either 
by historical or cultural contingencies. Th is is because humans’ character traits are ac-
claimed to be equally resistant to the helping hand of the most benign creator and the 
intrusions of the most powerful political tyrants. A similar enlightened conviction of 
human nature’s universal (a priori) endowment led Immanuel Kant to the memorable 
formulation of his unconditional imperative of the dignity of the human being. 
What is related to general human inclinations and needs has a market 
price; that which, even without presupposing such a need, conforms with a 
certain taste, has a fancy price; but that which constitutes the condition un-
der which alone something can be an end in itself has not merely a relative 
value, that is, a price, but an inner value, that is, dignity. Morality, and hu-
manity insofar as it is capable of morality, is that which alone has dignity.4 
Both Burke’s description of passionate political destruction and aesthetic fascina-
tion with the experiences of terror and the Kantian teaching of the dignity of the hu-
man being and his assertion that the human being is the only creature capable of mo-
rality depends on whether there is such a thing as a universal moral order. If we want 
to see order in a chaotic world – and human beings are created in a way that makes 
that a returning wish – we seem to need this universal dimension for our beliefs, con-
victions and fi nal values. It is exactly this dimension that is under attack since 2001. 
Let us see in what sense.
Th e challenges of 9/11 and Charlie Hebdo – the socio-political stakes
If there has ever been a terrorist attack that was successful, it was 9/11. It caused a tre-
mendous shock not only to the American public but also, more generally, to the West-
ern world. It reconfi gured not only people’s perceptions of security and the risks of fun-
damentalism, but questioned a great deal people’s expectations of peaceful cohabitation 
in colourful multicultural societies. Since then, attacks in London, Paris, Copenhagen 
and other Western metropolitan centres led politicians to the conclusion that to keep 
control over the security issues of their country’s population they also had to redirect 
their political strategies in order to calm down people’s fears and anxieties. However, 
the only idea they had in that situation was to strengthen the political bonds on society, 
returning to the good old Hobbesian solution that order is to be achieved by guarantee-
ing the Leviathan further means to scare off  potential trouble-makers. It seems that the 
US had some success in that story, since the political culture of that huge country al-
4 Kant 1785/1996. 84-85 [cf. GS 4: 434-435]
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lows the federal authority to introduce harsh measures to track down potential security 
threats even by apparently unconstitutional, illegal (or, for that matter, amoral) means. 
US governmental secret agencies are entitled to do much more than in other Western 
legal systems, due to their diff erent political conception of secrecy and visibility. Th e 
European Union claims to run a legal system primarily based on a strict adherence to 
human rights (an issue which was fi rst utilised on the level of governmental policy in 
the US), that is why it cannot use political means to overwrite legal norms, as is repeat-
edly done in the US. Remember the public outcry when the media released that the US 
planted some of its camps for suspected terrorists on European soil. 
But the post-9/11 world is disconcerted in Europe too, in a number of other ways, 
and these challenges also question traditional European beliefs in moral universal-
ism. All the leading countries of the Union have – due to rather diff erent historical 
circumstances – a number of ethnic, religious and cultural groups on their territories 
who do not share parts of the society’s implicit social contract. Since the liberation of 
the Western public mind – to cut a long story short, as a result of 1968 – this situation 
(in eff ect, the break up of more or less centripetal social dynamics) was labelled mul-
ticulturalism, and politicians and social activists regarded it as one of the key achieve-
ments of European liberal democracy. In a way it seemed to resemble the melting pot 
metaphor used for the heterogeneity of civil society in the US. However, there seems 
to be a rather signifi cant diff erence between these two paradigms. While Americans 
were always proud of their uncommon origins – i.e. that it is a country of a histori-
cally, culturally, ethnically and religiously mixed society -, European societies used to 
have particular, characteristic, historically moulded identities. Th is does not mean that 
these societies were not segmented earlier, but that they had a comparatively strong 
communal bond, which seems to have been lost. We do not have to recover the post-
WW II history of these countries in order to capture the essence of this shift  away 
from communal cohesion to some sort of social disintegration. We do not even need 
to prove by numbers that the tendency is objectively there. What is required is, fi rst, 
to show that in these societies there is a perception of disintegration (including a fear 
of internal confl icts and even of internal terrorism driven by uncompromised inter-
nal social confl icts). Further, it needs to be shown that the confl ict is at least partially 
caused by the confl icting moral value systems of these internal groups or at least by 
the lack of an overarching (meta)ethical value system, which could have united these 
segregated groups and individuals.
In this respect let me take two events that might be used as historical verifi cations 
of the above description. First let me refer to the result of the last elections of European 
MEPs. Although fears of a dramatic landslide did not prove true, there is a frightful 
phenomenon to be considered seriously. In 2014 both in the UK and in France the 
voters’ fi rst choices were radical parties that built their success on the fears of exter-
nal migration and internal ethnic confl icts. Th e super-nationalistic rhetoric of hatred 
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and fear used by both the UK’s Independence party (UKIP) and France’s National 
Front is a realistic calculation on the part of its leadership that correctly estimates the 
propensity of the European electorate to vote for parties openly advocating a policy 
of anti-multiculturalism. Even in Germany there is by now a strong Anti-European 
movement that builds on the same electoral expectations: Alternative for Germany. 
Certainly, it is not surprising that in the European context the fear of alternative 
cultural, religious or social value-systems is construed against external enemies. How-
ever, it is noteworthy that the inner immune systems of these countries seem to be rad-
ically weakened by this internal scapegoat-mechanisms, which resembles in a number 
of ways earlier, rather frightful European phenomena, including ethnic, racial and re-
ligious confl icts. On the other hand, in times of economic and fi nancial crisis, when 
existential risks grow much higher than usual, these fears are expected to rise, so one 
should not overestimate the signifi cance of the phenomenon.
But the Paris terrorist attack against editors of the satirical weekly magazine Char-
lie Hebdo in early 2015 proves that the danger is imminent, and it is not simply a 
factually unsupported fear. Th e murder of the unarmed journalists show that the ter-
rorists think they have a moral cause which can overwrite the humanistic considera-
tions about killing unarmed civilians, accepted and honoured in all developed global 
civilisations, including the Islam world. Although both the political leaders and the 
media in the West expressed their solidarity with the journal, obviously there were 
voices that criticised the practice of the magazine, which has disregarded the religious 
sensibility of faithful Muslims when it published sacrilegious caricatures on the front 
page. According to its critics the journal should have taken into consideration that in 
the Islam world this sort of secular humour is taken as a personal insult against all 
true believers. Certainly, there is nothing in the sacred documents of Islam that would 
empower anyone to commit the sort of mass killing that happened in Paris. But a clash 
of civilizational values is obvious and should not to be denied by neither local, state 
or European authorities. Th is is not the place to reopen the debate between Fukuyama 
and Huntington, which is by now a bit outdated, still, the event seems to strengthen 
the popular position of Huntington.5 Surely, Western moral values are bluntly called 
into question by the attack. And no one can seriously question that it was directly in-
fl uenced by the “inspiration of the Islamic State” (IS) and other radical global Islamic 
organisations, that directly declared war on the West. While neutral experts of the 
teaching of the Islam claim that there is nothing comparable to this aggression in the 
teachings of the Quran, without a strong popular support in the Islamic world the ag-
gressors would not have been able to run their deadly attacks. 
It is in this context that we have to address the political and moral issues brought 
up by the well-known phenomenon of multicultural societies in Europe. While ear-
5 Huntington 1996
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lier liberal minded Europeans cherished the hope that their societies would not be 
weakened by the acceptance of parallel cultures within the confi nes of these societies, 
it is by now evident that the external challenge posed by the Islamic State against 
Western values did not leave untouched the sentiments and passions of parts of the 
generations of Islam believers who live inside the political body of certain European 
countries. Although I am unaware of the exact numbers of this political radicalisation 
caused with reference to Islam, I think that by now the phenomenon is too obvious 
to be disregarded. Politicians with a realistic vein did recognise it quite early – for 
example, Angela Merkel did pronounce multikulti to be dead already in 2010.6 As 
the BBC reported, Merkel took a rather strong position, claiming that “the beginning 
of the 60s our country called the foreign workers to come to Germany and now they 
live in our country.” She added: “We kidded ourselves a while, we said: ‘Th ey won’t 
stay, sometime they will be gone’, but this isn’t reality”, “the approach [to build] a mul-
ticultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other […] has failed, 
utterly failed.” Merkel describes the preferred alternative by the verbs “to integrate” 
and to “require immigrants to do more to adapt to German society.”7 Integration into 
and adaptation to German society is unquestionably a reference to the wish to return 
to a shared morality of basic values within the society. Th is wish is only achievable 
if Germans present their own value system as one with universal appeal, in order 
to gain moral ground for convincing immigrants to share the value system of Ger-
man society. Certainly, Germany was not the only country in which political leader-
ship turned away from the lukewarm liberal ideology of multiculturalism. Both UK’s 
Prime Minister David Cameron and French president Nicolas Sarkozy came to the 
same conclusion in early 2011.8 Cameron reminded his audience that “a genuinely 
liberal country ‘believes in certain values and actively promotes them’” and admitted 
that “We have even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run 
counter to our values.” President Sarkozy pronounced: “We have been too concerned 
about the identity of the person who was arriving and not enough about the identity 
of the country that was receiving him”. All these political pronouncements only mir-
ror the general public atmosphere that determines public discussion around Europe 
on matters of immigration and multiculturalism. It is in this context that debates on 
the recent demand for universal morality needs to be taken into account in contem-
porary Europe.
6 Merkel 2010
7 Th e survey referred to in the article mentions that “more than 30 % of people believed that the country 
was »overrun by foreigners«”. It also gives a calculation of about 16 million immigrants, out of which 2.5 
million is of Turkish origin among the 83 million Germans of 2010. 
8 See Cameron 2011 and Sarkozy 2011 
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Moral universalism in Rawls and his critics – the philosophical stakes
But certainly the debate was opened much earlier in the United States. As we have 
seen, Huntington has foreseen something like what later actually came true. But more 
generally, political theory in the US had to confront issues of meta-ethics in order to 
answer the basic questions of the time. Th ere is no space here to give a detailed ac-
count of the historical development of debates on the ethical dimensions of social and 
political theory. However, one needs to see, fi rst of all, that A Th eory of Justice (1971) 
by Rawls was indeed an eff ort to reshape universal morality along the lines of rational 
choice theory. Rawls must have had strong self-confi dence and a fi rm trust in his own 
profession when he initiated his programme of a search for the fi nal social structure 
of justice. Certainly, his whole enterprise is closely connected to post-1968 hopes of a 
global liberalisation programme in the name of progress and individual self-realisa-
tion, and the post 1945 birth of the discourse of universal human rights. In his later 
life Rawls seems to have realised that he might have gone too far in the universalist 
direction, projecting American values onto the global community, which is refi ned 
in his later works, specifi cally in Political Liberalism (1993), where he admits that his 
theory is not a “comprehensive conception of the good”. 
Rawls had a tremendous impact on political thought in the US in the last quarter of 
the 20th century and even in the early phase of the 21st one. But his work was seriously 
challenged, fi rst by the wave of authors usually labelled as communitarians. On the 
one hand, Alasdair MacIntyre, reworking the virtue ethical experiments of Oxford 
philosophers, claimed that the age is unable to produce a grand theory in ethics, and 
therefore there is a need to reintroduce the more traditionalist account of moral val-
ues as determined by practice and the virtues in the context of the cultural tradition 
of society.9 Th is may seem to be a compliance towards then fashionable cultural rel-
ativism, but, being an Aristotelian – later Th omist -, MacIntyre does not give up the 
hope of a realistic universalism, which however is not blind towards local traditions 
and other historically contingent determinants. Michael Sandel, on the other hand, 
famously criticised Rawls’s hope to arrive – through logical distancing from personal 
commitments – at the condition of the “unencumbered self ”, arguing instead in a qua-
si-Aristotelian fashion that human agents are necessarily connected with each other 
in a number of diff erent ways, and any serious accounts of social justice need to take 
those connections into account instead of trying to disconnect them.10 
Rawls’s biased universalism has also been criticised from a neo-republican, neo-hu-
manist viewpoint, represented by authors like Skinner and Petit, but there the conten-
tious issue had no direct link to universalism versus relativism. But there is a further 
9 MacIntyre 1984.
10 Sandel 1998.
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dimension of recent Rawls-criticism, which is usually referred to as the political real-
ism issue, and this might get back to the universalism question. According to its most 
oft en cited authorities, like Bernard Williams and Raymond Geuss, but also including 
fi gures like Richard Bellamy, Mark Philp and William A. Galston, political realism 
seriously questions the legitimacy of a search for universal values and unquestiona-
ble, good-for-all solutions in politics. Th ese authors deny the possibility and relevance 
of a theoretical discourse that looks at politics as a topic which can be approached 
with the help of an abstract, conceptual language, extracting from it everything that is 
agonistic, and ossifying it by presenting it as essentially legally predetermined. Also, 
mainstream liberal theory in the Rawls-Dworkin dialect aims at a non-dynamic rep-
resentation of politics, looking for a theoretical solution which, when found, would 
only need to be realised by politicians. For political realists, the realm of politics is an 
ever-changing arena of confl icts of power groups, who all strive to get hold of power, 
and for whom problems of justice or fairness are only “political products” that need to 
be sold, and sold at the highest possible price. In other words, political realists attack 
Rawls for being a moral universalist, who discounts the real nature of politics, and 
wants to homogenise political communities on a global scale.
Political theology and Habermas
9/11 gave a great impetus to a reconsideration of the connections between religion 
and politics. Th e terrorists attacking public buildings and individual human lives had 
largely relied on a religious language when they tried to legitimize their own activity, 
thus, there was an urgent need to reconsider Western theoretical standards from the 
perspective of the separation of Church and State. 
Th e towering fi gure behind the tradition of political theology is certainly Carl 
Schmitt. His central claim in his opus magnum, Political Th eology,11 namely, that most 
of the terms in our modern political vocabulary derives from theological concepts, was 
never seriously questioned. It is therefore telling to see their conceptual birth within 
the context of early modern theological debates, including the voice of Protestant crit-
ics of the close alliance of Th rone and Altar and the implicit theological inspirations 
behind the revaluation of the mental infrastructure of modern political agents (think 
especially of Max Weber’s fruitful insight into the birth and nature of a protestant eth-
ic). Th ere are well-known aspects of this reconstruction [see Charles Taylor’s Sources of 
the Self (1989)], including those cognitive operations that will result in what was going 
to be called secularisation, and the loss of the shared beliefs in an umbrella of universal 
religion. Th e internal schism within Christianity resulted in the birth of the modern 
11 Schmitt 1922/2005.
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independent individual, with her strong sense of identity, and with the potential to 
become her own God – the birth of radical subjectivism, the fi nal development in the 
Romantic period. Th is move away from the universal and shift  toward the particu-
lar individual was accompanied by the discovery of a radical historical asynchrony of 
diff erent communities, resulting on the part of European nations to conquer and rule 
over what they regarded as the barbaric world. It was in order to substantiate their 
claim to universal monarchy that European nations relied on notions like the law of 
nations and natural law. Th ink especially of Grotius, who worked out a theory of global 
rule based on assumptions of natural law, in competition with his Catholic rivals like 
the Salamanca school, and especially Francisco Suarez. While for Grotius and Suarez 
natural law was not independent from theological considerations, theorists in the next 
century worked on the tradition of natural law in order to purify their political theories 
from theological assumptions – in order to make them applicable even in the contexts 
of serious religious disputes or civil wars caused by asymmetric religious loyalties. In 
order to achieve this, the generation of Hobbes, Locke and Pufendorf disconnected 
natural law theory from its theological backbones, and arrived at an almost positivistic 
account of civil power. However, in order to make it more appealing, they presented it 
as modelled on natural science, lending it a global relevance. 
While as a result of the common enterprise of cosmopolitan humanist scholars and 
scholastic monks, on the one side was born a neutral science of natural law political 
theory, on the other side early modern man (basically long trade entrepreneurs and 
soldiers) had to realise historical relativity as a result of their journeys around the 
globe. While conceptual moral confl icts within the Christian camp could be handled 
by relying on natural law – or, for that matter, on a sort of natural religion, it was much 
harder to conceptualise a metanarrative to negotiate radical historical diversity around 
the globe. Although theoreticians of the Scottish Enlightenment – relaying on cer-
tain French authors of economic and social history – worked out a general (universal) 
scheme of social progress, called the four stages theory of human development, they 
had no clue how to negotiate civilised nations with the barbarians or savages. Th e only 
way to compromise them lead through culture and education – but this was a long 
road that did not promise immediate relief from the consequences of the lack of a 
unifi ed global moral framework.
It is to cure this illness that the end of the 18th century witnessed a radical reshape in 
the ideological landscape of the 18th century, fi rst due to the independence movement 
of American settlers which resulted in the secession of the newly constituted univer-
sal (or at least continental) republic from the United Kingdom, and secondly to the 
French revolution’s document of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Cit-
izen (1789), introduced by La Fayette under the infl uence of the American Founding 
Father, Th omas Jeff erson. Th e Americans legitimised their brave move towards self-
rule by the famous universalistic claim of the Declaration of Independence: “We hold 
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these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty 
and the pursuit of Happiness.” Apparently, this move was a sign towards a new era of 
universal values, called modernity, with its emphasis on universally valid individual 
human rights. Th is is the line that was taken up and institutionalised by the establish-
ment of the United Nations aft er WW2 and its own manifestos of individual rights. 
Yet there is something alienating in the language of universal humanism. In the 
writings of the political philosopher Leo Strauss there is deep dissatisfaction in the 
critique of the legalistic dialect of modern natural human rights. A Jewish German 
émigré in the United States, Strauss became one of the inspirational fi gures in post-war 
American intellectual life. Strauss’s criticism of the positivistic and relativistic tenden-
cies of modern thought, including some German philosophers’ position like Schmitt 
and Heidegger, was aimed at its disastrous consequences: he claimed that it led both 
to the brutal nihilism of totalitarian regimes and to the gentle nihilism of Western 
liberalism. Instead of reworking a grand theory of Natural Law, however, he opted for 
a return to the ancient ideas of political virtue and leadership.
An alternative criticism of 20th century rights-oriented liberalism is present in the 
late thought of the Frankfurt philosopher, Jürgen Habermas. Earlier an ardent partisan 
of the revolutionary ideas of 1968 he turned into a fi rm defender of the universalist 
assumptions of the Age of Enlightenment in his debate with both arch-conservatives 
and deconstructivist and relativist postmodern thinkers – in particular with Foucault 
and Derrida. At the turn of the century he seems to have found his new allies in the-
ologians, when he realised that secular universalism is a natural ally of (for example) 
Christian religious universalism. Th is insight was supported by the notable Böcken-
förde paradox, a common source of inspiration for him and Joseph Ratzinger. Accord-
ing to the well-known German constitutional lawyer, the moral resources required to 
sustain liberal democracy cannot be reproduced by the very same liberal democracy. 
In other words, liberal democracy falls back on external support, in particular on the 
experience of religious communities, which can share their practical knowledge of 
regenerating their own internal spiritual engines with modern Western societies. It 
was this hope of a common cause that led to the famous exchange between Habermas 
and Ratzinger on how to interpret the Böckenförde-paradox.12 In this dialogue the sec-
ularising tendencies of Western modernism seemed to rejoin the discourse of political 
theology in a hope to unite forces to defend commonly shared Western values in a 
risky world of terrorist cruelty and individualist self-indulgency. 
So we return to our starting point: there is a renewed scholarly and public interest 
in the intersection of politics and religion, aft er the crisis brought about by the terrorist 
attacks against Western targets and by other challenges to contemporary liberal democ-
12 Habermas – Ratzinger 2005/2006
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racies. Th is is perhaps one of the most remarkable unintended consequences of con-
fronting a new millennium in a rather feverish political mood. In this respect one might 
want to consult the thoughtful analysis provided in Mark Lilla’s work on the post 9/11 
intellectual climate in the West, including his remark “Today, we have progressed to the 
point where our problems again resemble those of the 16th century, as we fi nd ourselves 
entangled in confl icts over competing revelations, dogmatic purity and divine duty. We 
in the West are disturbed and confused. Th ough we have our own fundamentalists, we 
fi nd it incomprehensible that theological ideas still stir up messianic passions, leaving 
societies in ruin.”13 On the other hand, we seem to commit the opposite error as well. As 
we have seen, we also resemble the 16th century in our hope to rid ourselves from over-
arching moral claims – and this way we tend to give up hopes of arriving at somewhere 
near to a universal moral code as a conclusion of our discussions. Th e risks involved are 
the more visible from this part of the world, which experienced two totalitarian regimes 
in the twentieth century, and which had high expectations from joining the European 
community, and therefore is badly disillusioned from early 21st century realities, as far 
as fi nal values are concerned. Th is volume, therefore, appears as a good proof for the 
socio-political and moral stakes of our contemporary situation.
 
History, theory, and contemporary debates about moral universalism – 
writings in this volume
Th is volume – the joint eff ort of the research groups on practical philosophy and the 
history of political thought of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences – brings together scholarly essays that attempt to face the challenges of the con-
temporary situation described above. Th e authors come from rather divergent disciplinary 
backgrounds, including philosophy, law, history, literature and the social sciences, from 
diff erent cultural and political contexts, including Central, Eastern and Western Europe, 
and belong to diff erent generations. But they all share an interest to bravely answer the 
large topical issues concerning universal morality here and now. Th e volume consists of 
fi ve parts, all of them including 4 to 5 essays, connected by a general theme or focus point.
Th e fi rst part bears the title Religion and Morality. It is basically a part of the book 
dominated by theologians of diff erent religious backgrounds, including Catholicism, 
the Jewish religion and Lutheranism, picking out a theme to be answered from the per-
spective of their own religion’s theological doctrines. We also included in this chapter a 
paper on the original world of faith of a non-Christian preindustrial society.
Th e second and the third part provide a historical overview of the topic. In the sec-
ond part we have a selection of ancient and humanistic themes, including Epictetus, 
13 Lilla 2017. Se also his collected volume on the topic: Lilla 2007. 
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the Roman law, Saint Augustine and Renaissance Platonism. Th e third part gives a 
snapshot of the modern period, including the relevant ideas of Kant, Hannah Arendt, 
and the participants of the fi erce debate on animal dignity. 
Finally the fourth and fi ft h parts are analytical examinations of partial issues with-
in this larger contemporary philosophical framework. Issues dealt with in the fourth 
part, both meta-ethical problems and substantial points, include an analysis of eff orts 
to discredit morality, comparing values and principles, connections between morality 
and law, the chances of a contemporary hypothetical natural law, and two kinds of 
moral relativism. Th e fi ft h part scrutinizes particular cases of contemporary philo-
sophical relevance, related to multiculturalism, relativism, empathy in what is called 
the digital age and communication theory. 
Taken together, the editors fi rmly believe, these essays give an informative and 
thought-provoking picture of the state of the art of contemporary philosophy on mor-
al universalism.
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Is a Universal Morality Possible According 
to Jewish Tradition?
GÁB OR BAL ÁZS
Any attempt to defi ne the ultimate position of the Jewish tradition as a 
whole on any philosophical question is doomed to failure. Not only are the 
biblical sources ambiguous on almost all topics but also the post-biblical 
Jewish tradition, instead of clarifying “the” answers of Judaism, is posing 
even more questions, and off ers many – frequently incompatible – answers. 
Th is is hardly surprising if we take into account how diffi  cult it is to make 
any general declarations about a tradition which is more than three thou-
sand years old and includes an enormous variety of texts that were created 
in signifi cantly diff erent historical circumstances and that oft en advocate 
confl icting values and theories.
Disagreement in legal issues appears to be a basic element of Jewish law (Ben Men-
achem 2002), and the same holds true for matters of faith. Since an institution that 
would be similar to the Catholic synod does not exist in the structure of Jewish re-
ligion, there is no fi nal authority in issues of faith, nor can there be one.1 Although 
there have been – and still are – important trends within the framework of Judaism 
that tried to defi ne the principles of the Jewish faith that must be held by all Jews, these 
principles have never been universally accepted by all streams of Judaism and have al-
ways varied among the diff erent thinkers (Shapiro 2004). Th ese introductory remarks 
about the lack of agreement on most theological and philosophical issues are certainly 
true about the idea of the possible existence of a universal morality. If so, my goal must 
be a minimalist one – I aim to argue that at least a signifi cant part of Jewish tradition 
tends to accept the existence of universally valid ethical norms, but I will not claim 
that we cannot fi nd support for the opposite opinion in authentic Jewish sources. In 
order to clarify what I mean by universal morality, let me rephrase my claim: there are 
numerous classical and modern Jewish sources that suppose the existence of univer-
sally binding moral norms that are valid in all places and at all times. Th ese norms are 
rational, and their validity is independent of a divine revelation, that is, they would be 
morally binding even if God had never commanded them. 
1 About the absence of Jewish dogmatism see Kellner 2006, for the opposite opinion see Bleich 1983.
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Since it is a reasonable assumption that most readers of the present volume will not 
be experts in the Jewish tradition, it might be useful to add a short explanation to my 
selection of the sources.
Although Jews are generally perceived as the ‘people of the Book’, the very term is 
a misnomer, since the Hebrew Bible is not one book, but a collection of twenty-four 
books. But more importantly, the Jewish tradition is much more conclusively defi ned 
by the interpretation of the Hebrew Bible (traditionally called the Oral Law) than by 
the simple meaning of the biblical texts (called the Written Law). As Yeshayahu Lei-
bowitz, one of the most important Israeli philosophers, has noted: 
Historically, Israel never lived or intended to live by Scripture […] Israel 
conducted its life in accordance with the Halakhah2 as propounded in 
the Oral Law. […] Th e decision about which books to accept as Scripture 
was not made behind the veil of mythology or pre-history, but took place 
in the full light of history in the course of halakhic negotiation. […] Th e 
religion of Israel, the world of Halakhah and the Oral Law was not pro-
duced from Scripture. Scripture is one of the institutions of the religion 
of Israel. (Leibowitz 1992. 12)
As Leibowitz pointed out, human agents – namely the rabbis in the period of the 
Talmud – determined which ancient books could be considered to have Divine in-
spiration as their source and which could not. If so, “Th e Halakhah […], which is a 
human product, derives its authority from […] Scripture; at the same time it is the 
Halakhah which determines the content and meaning of Scripture.” (Leibowitz 1992. 
12) Th is situation may seem to contradict the Jewish canonization process, but it was 
never perceived that way by traditional Jews. 
Th e literal meaning of the biblical texts in the post-biblical Jewish literature is fre-
quently disregarded, but this disregard is usually seen in a positive light, as the search for 
the real, deeper meaning of the original, and it is not considered a disrespectful treat-
ment of the holy writings. Although the Hebrew Bible as a source of inspiration and as a 
permanent source of proof-texts was and is an extremely relevant cornerstone of Jewish 
thought, the reader who seeks to understand the Jewish sources as the Jewish tradition 
itself understands them has to keep in mind that the – oft en very unclear – “literal mean-
ing” of the Bible has very little relevance in the post-biblical Jewish tradition.3 
In the fi rst part of my essay I present apparently contradictory biblical sources that will 
clarify why it is an impossible mission to fi nd the “fundamental biblical answer” to the 
question posed in the title of my paper. In the second part I analyze classical Jewish legal, 
2 Halakhah is the Hebrew terminus for the complexity of the Jewish religious law, which in its most parts 
is a post-Biblical institution. 
3 For a philosophical analysis of the process and meaning of canonization see Halbertal 1997.
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homiletical and philosophical sources that can plausibly be interpreted as supposing the 
existence of universal morality. In a short addendum in the third and fi nal part I examine 
a diff erence of opinion among contemporary Israeli thinkers and rabbis concerning the 
validity of moral norms. Th ese sources are very diff erent in their literary style and in their 
historical and religious importance, but all of them are considered possible and legitimate 
voices of the Jewish tradition concerning the existence of a universal morality.
Th e ambiguity of the Hebrew Bible 
“Shall not the Judge of all the earth deal justly?” 
In the 18th chapter of Genesis, God informs Abraham about His plan to destroy Sodom 
because of the city’s wickedness. Abraham, in a very respectful but uncompromising 
way, protests and tells God: 
Will you sweep away the innocent along with the guilty? […] Far it be 
from You! Shall not the Judge of all the earth deal justly?4 
From Abraham’s reaction it seems that he supposes that there is a moral order with 
clear rules, namely not to destroy the good ones with the evil ones, and these rules are 
not only a general obligation on the human level but they also apply to God, who is the 
supreme moral agent. Abraham uses an implicit a fortiori moral argument – if human 
judges can be expected to act in accordance with the basic principles of morality (not 
to punish the innocent) then how much more so should the Judge of all the judges be 
expected to do the same?5 
From this biblical locus it seems clear that the basic supposition of Scripture is that 
there are certain universal moral rules that have a binding force, as it were, even on God, 
and furthermore one has a moral obligation to follow the example of Abraham and man 
has a moral duty to protest injustice, regardless of who commits it. But as I said before, 
we should not rush to make generalizations about the biblical world-view. Only a few 
chapters later we fi nd a diff erent story that would allow us to draw another conclusion. 
“Take your son” 
In chapter 22 of Genesis God appears again to Abraham and commands him: “Take 
your son, your favored one, Isaac, whom you love, and go to the land of Moriah, and 
off er him as a burnt off ering on one of the heights that I will point out to you.”6 Th e 
4 Genesis 18.23-25. (All the Biblical citations are from Tanakh 1985) 
5 For a detailed analysis of this Biblical story see a very relevant volume for the topic of ethical universal-
ism: Lipton 2012.
6 Genesis 22.2 
24  ¨  GÁB OR BALÁZS 
story of the Akedah, the binding of Isaac, is one of the most discussed topics in Jewish 
literature,7 and I will address only one aspect of it. According to the biblical narrative, 
God commands Abraham to kill his innocent son, and Abraham accepts the Divine 
imperative without any discussion or protest. Th is locus is far from being unequivocal, 
since it can support at least three very diff erent moral conclusions. 
Th e fi rst conclusion can be that moral relativism is right, since human knowledge is 
necessarily limited by the agent’s social and historical circumstances, therefore human 
moral understanding must be limited by nature. For example, in a culture where direct 
communication with God is seen as a commonplace, the killing of an innocent can be 
considered an ethical act. Accordingly, all moral conclusions will be viewed as condi-
tional, since a cultural convention (a divine imperative in our case) can override the 
moral force of any other convention from other cultures, and we have no way of com-
paring and ranging the values of the diff erent conventions. Even such an apparently 
evident moral imperative as “you should not kill an innocent person without a strong 
moral reason” has only very limited validity, since we can learn from Abraham that “I 
heard the divine voice” was a strong enough reason for him to obey this command. 
Th is conclusion renders universal morality impossible.8 
Th e second conclusion can be called the theory of the ‘confl ict between religion and 
morality’, and it is less pessimistic from the point of view of the possibility of the uni-
versal morality. Moral laws such as “you should not kill an innocent person without a 
strong moral reason” are universally valid, but in case of confl ict between religious and 
moral duties one should always follow the religious commandment. In other words, 
although there are universal moral norms, they can be overridden by a divine imper-
ative any time. It is important to see that an adherent of the theory of confl ict between 
religion and morality has to admit that morality has an independent status, since in the 
absence of an autonomous moral realm, religion cannot have a confl ict with morality. 
If so, this conclusion supports universal morality, but in the hierarchy of normative 
orders it ranks it lower than religion.9
Th e third conclusion can be labeled ‘Divine Command Morality’ (DCM), and upon 
fi rst glance it negates the possibility of moral universalism. God is an absolutely free, 
omnipotent agent who has no duties whatsoever. God can command anything, and 
any X action commanded by God immediately becomes not only a religious duty but 
also a moral one, since any act can be a moral duty – regardless of its content – merely 
7 An American scholar, Larry Laufman published a more than 800 page long bibliography on this topic in 
2013.
8 Nevertheless, even this rule can be brought to a universal form: Every moral agent has an intellectual 
duty to know that all moral imperatives have only conditional force. It would be an interesting logical game 
to play with the idea whether knowledge of the invalidity of moral rules can be a moral rule itself.
9 For a detailed discussion of the topic of confl ict between religion and morality see: Sagi and Statman 
1995a, part 3.
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because God commanded it. If so, the most important meaning of the phrase “a strong 
moral reason” in our rule “you should not kill an innocent person without a strong 
moral reason” is a Divine command. Divine commands are moral, not because there 
are convincing moral arguments in favor of them, but because the absolute free su-
preme moral agent, God commanded them. 
I will not elaborate the several serious concerns about what remains from the mean-
ing of the term ‘morality’ if we accept that, for example, torturing and killing newborn 
babies without any further moral argument can be a morally right act only because God 
commands it. Instead, I want to point out that the theory of Divine Command Moral-
ity – supposing and not allowing that it is a real ‘moral’ theory – is actually supporting 
universal morality. DCM supposes that every human agent should accept that God by 
defi nition is the supreme moral authority, and every act commanded by God is by defi -
nition a morally binding act, so although it denies the validity of basic rational moral 
principles when they are not in accordance with a religious commandment, this theory 
claims that universal morality is possible: everybody is morally obligated to obey God.10 
Th ese two biblical sources serve only as illustrations to my claim that the Bible is far 
from being an unambiguous source if we are to derive from it an answer to the ques-
tion whether Judaism accepts the possibility of universal morality. 
Natural Law and Judaism
Philosophers throughout the long history of ethics and philosophy of law provided 
numerous theories of natural law, but the common denominator of all these theories is 
that there are certain autonomous norms that are universally accepted as binding and 
rationally justifi ed.11 Since the Jewish tradition is basically a legal tradition, and since 
Jewish law is based on the claim of divine revelation, it is not self-evident that tradition 
can accept the existence of universally binding, rational and autonomous laws that are 
valid even without a Divine command. Indeed, there is a well-known debate among 
theorists of Jewish law and ethics about the acceptance of natural law theories.12 Be-
low I analyze three sources from diff erent genres of Jewish religious literature, each of 
which, according to my interpretation, clearly supports the existence of natural law 
and universal morality. 
10 About the status of DCM in Jewish tradition see Sagi and Statman 1995b. For a critique of the former 
source see: Harris 2003.
11 Th ere is an almost endless literature on the topic of Natural Law, the following entries are only a few 
classics on this topic: Finnis 2011, George 2002, Hörcher 2000, Weinreb 1987, 
12 For arguments for the existence of natural law theory in the Jewish traditions see: Novak 1998, Sagi 2000. 
For arguments against it see: Faur 1968, Fox 1971.
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A legal source in support of Jewish Natural Law theory
My fi rst source is from the Talmud. According to the accepted hermeneutical laws of 
the rabbinic tradition, when there is an apparent redundancy in the biblical text, the 
supposition is that the seemingly redundant part comes to teach a new law or a new 
idea. Th e following verse in Leviticus seems to be superfl uous: “My rules alone shall 
you observe, and faithfully follow My laws, I am the Lord your God”13, so the Talmud 
comes to clarify: 
Our Rabbis taught: ‘My rules [mishpatay] alone shall you observe’ (Le-
viticus 18:4), i.e. such commandments which, if they were not written 
[in Scripture], they should by right have been written and these are they: 
[the laws concerning] idolatry, immorality and bloodshed, robbery and 
blasphemy. 
And ‘and faithfully follow My laws [chukotay]’ (ibid) i.e. such com-
mandments to which Satan objects; they are [those relating to] the wear-
ing of sha’atnez14, not eating pork, the way of purifi cation of the leper […].
And perhaps you might think these are vain things, therefore Scrip-
ture says: ‘I am the Lord’ (ibid), i.e. I, the Lord have made it a law and you 
have no right to criticize it.15
Both Hebrew terms “mishpatim” and “chukot” mean laws; however, according to 
the talmudic interpretation, they are not simply synonyms. Th ese terms became the 
symbols of two types of religious law: those which would be valid even without a Di-
vine revelation, and those which are morally neutral and are obligatory only by force 
of the revelation. Th e laws which can be easily justifi ed in any human society by simple 
rational consideration belong in the fi rst category, and those laws which do not have 
any revealed reason, and seem to be arbitrary decisions of the Divine Lawmaker be-
long in the second. Th e Talmud emphasizes that both types of law are valuable and 
have obligatory force, since both of them are commanded by God, but there is still an 
important diff erence between them. In the fi rst case the Divine command comes only 
to fortify the already known validity of the rational obligations, and in the second case 
it seems that rational inquiry does not help at all. Th is talmudic locus appears to deny 
the theory of legal monism, and supposes that there can be two distinctive sources of 
authority in the same legal system, while the system still remains unifi ed. Certain laws 
13 Leviticus 18.4 
14 Shatnez is the name of the garments made of wool and linen, and a Biblical commandment (Leviticus 
19.19) forbids to wear these sort of garments. 
15 Babilonian Talmud, Yoma 67b (I used the Soncino translation, with slight modifi cations)
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are morally binding on all human societies by virtue of their rationality, and other 
laws have force only for a specifi c society, namely for the Jews. Th e non-Jewish soci-
ety acknowledges the rationality of certain Jewish laws, and has a problem only with 
the understanding of the purely ritual laws. Maybe this irrationality of certain com-
mandments is the reason why, through the Divine command, the Jewish legal system 
incorporates both types, but without annulling the rational force of moral laws. As 
explained above, these laws remain obligatory both because of their rationality and 
because of the Divine imperative, and they may serve as a kind of confi rmation of 
the laws which have only religious value: since the same Lawmaker commanded both 
types of law, it is rational to obey them. According to this interpretation, the Jewish 
legal tradition accepts the existence of natural laws, and universal morality.
A philosophical source in support of the Jewish Natural Law theory
As Abraham Melamed has pointed out, in the philosophy of Rabbi Judah Halevi 
there is a complex relationship between the law known by revelation and the law by 
rationality (Melamed 2011. 188-192). Judah Halevi’s philosophical classic Th e Ku-
zari narrates the imaginary story of the conversion of the Khazars to Judaism. Th e 
book is written in the style of a Platonic dialogue: the rabbi fi rst convinces the king 
of the Khazars that the truth of Judaism is built on the empirical evidence of a huge 
number of people who had had the direct experience of Divine revelation, so this 
truth is of a higher order than the speculative truth of the philosophers. In the fi rst 
stages of their discussion the rabbi claims that the revealed laws inform us about a 
higher level of truth than the rational laws, nevertheless he never claims that the 
former contradicts the latter. Aft er the Khazar king is persuaded about the truth 
of Judaism, converts and continues to learn about its detailed teachings, the rabbi 
explains that on the level of the basic truths the revealed law teaches the same as the 
rational commandments. Halevi uses the well-known Platonic example of the socie-
ty of the robbers (Politeia I, 343) in his explanation:
Th ese are the rational laws, being the basis and preamble of the divine 
law, preceding it in character and time, and being indispensable in the 
administration of every human society. Even a gang of robbers must have 
a kind of justice among them if their confederacy is to last. When Israel’s 
disloyalty had come to such a pass that they disregarded rational and so-
cial principles (which are as absolutely necessary for a society as are the 
natural functions of eating, drinking, exercise, rest, sleeping, and waking 
for the individual), but held fast to the sacrifi cial worship and other di-
vine laws, He was satisfi ed with even less. It was told to them: ‘Haply you 
might observe those laws which rule the smallest and meanest communi-
ty, such as refer to justice, good actions, and recognition of God’s bounty.’ 
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For the divine law cannot become complete till the social and rational 
laws are perfected. Th e rational law demands justice and recognition of 
God’s bounty. What has he, who fails in this respect, to do with off erings, 
Sabbath, circumcision, etc., which reason neither demands, nor forbids? 
(Halevi 1905)
Halevi’s position in this text sounds unambiguous: there are certain rational laws 
that are so universal that no human society can sustain itself without recognizing them. 
Human rationality compels all societies to accept these norms, and there is no need 
for a legal authority to reveal them. Moreover, Halevi claims, these universal ethical 
norms, the basic principles of natural law, serve as a necessary basis for the acceptance 
of the covenant based on revelation. Th e revelation at Mount Sinai would have been 
meaningless to the people of Israel had they not been previously a society built on nat-
uralist ethics. According to Halevi, a society that fails to abide by the basic moral laws 
is unworthy to receive the Divine laws, and when a society disobeys the basic rational 
laws then the observance of the ritual laws turns out to be worthless. 
Halevi’s former opinion about the superiority of the revealed law does not contra-
dict his latter view supporting natural law theory. It was important to him to empha-
size that there is an asymmetrical relationship between the two types of law. While 
disobedience to universal ethical norms degrades the value of the observance of ritual 
laws, obedience to the norms of natural law does not make superfl uous the observance 
of ritual laws. Halevi was convinced that only with the help of the revealed law is it 
possible to reach human perfection.16 
A homily in support of the Jewish Natural Law theory
A homily from the very beginning of the 17th century interprets the words of Cain 
aft er killing his brother, Abel. When God asked Cain about the whereabouts of Abel 
he answered with the well-known words: “I do not know. Am I my brother’s keeper?”17 
Rabbi Shlomo Ephraim Luntshitz,18 in his commentary on the Pentateuch called Kli 
yakar, suggested the following interpretation to the afore-mentioned verse:
Cain’s answer to God – ‘I did not know’ – is very surprising. If he was 
mistakenly thinking that ‘He does not see and does not understand the 
deeds of mundane beings’ why had he previously off ered a sacrifi ce to 
God? It seems that Cain certainly understood that God asked him about 
16 On Halevy’s concept of rational law see the classic article of Leo Strauss 1943.
17 Genesis 4.10 Th e original Hebrew words (לא ידעתי) are in past tense, and this will be important for the 
following interpretation.
18 Lived: 1550-1619, he served as the rabbi of Prague.
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the killing of his brother and his answer was: ‘I did not know. Am I my 
brother’s keeper?’ He wanted to say, I did not know that it is a sin to kill, 
and his words ‘Am I my brother’s keeper’ are not a question, but it is in 
the same sentence with the words ‘I did not know’. He in fact said: ‘I did 
not know that I am obliged to save my brother and I am not supposed to 
murder him’ […] God told him: ‘How is it possible that you did not know, 
since this is a rational commandment?! […] Rationality obligates you to 
keep this commandment even if you are not commanded to do it’.19
Th e plain sense of Scripture in this story seems to support the existence of the Nat-
ural Law theory. Without the implicit assumption that there are certain acts that we are 
forbidden to commit even without a formal legal act of proscription, the most obvious 
defense of Cain would have been the claim that God never forbade killing anyone. From 
the text it seems that Cain simply tried to lie to God – in a very similar manner to his 
father, who tried to hide before God in the Garden of Eden – and did not choose the 
way of apology by claiming ignorance of the ethical rules. Still, Rabbi Luntshitz prefers 
to reinterpret Cain’s words in a diff erent manner and puts in his mouth the claim that he 
had not been aware of the prohibition against bloodshed. By this interpretation – which 
is far from self-evident from Cain’s words – Luntshitz creates a fi ctive situation where 
God Himself can reiterate one of the basic principles of the Natural Law: there are some 
so evidently apprehended rational norms that no one can claim to be ignorant of them. 
Th e agenda behind this method of interpretation is obvious: Rabbi Luntshitz was so 
determined to emphasize the idea that universally binding moral laws exist that he pre-
ferred to reinterpret the plain sense of Scripture, which implicitly admitted the existence of 
those laws, just to make it possible to create a situation in which the Highest Legislator can 
declare that there are binding laws even without the legal action of the Highest Legislator.
Th is uncompromising hermeneutical endeavor to make explicit what already was 
implicit in Scripture is especially interesting since there are is a very old rabbinical 
tradition according to which God had commanded Adam the most essential norms 
(and the prohibition of murder was among them) in the Garden of Eden.20 At the same 
time, this tradition is not necessarily in contradiction with the idea of natural law ei-
ther, since it is defi nitely possible to claim that God commanded these norms because 
of their obvious rationality, but Luntshitz still preferred to make an explicit argument 
for the existence of the natural law. 
19 Th e translation is mine. 
20 Th ese laws are called the Seven Laws of Noah, and they are the prohibition of idolatry, blasphemy, in-
cestuous and adulterous sexual relations, murder, theft , cruelty to animals, and the obligation of establishing 
a legal system. Th ese laws can be detected in slightly diff erent forms in various Jewish sources: Babylonian 
Talmud, Sanhedrin 56a, Toseft a Avodah Zarah 8:4 and Genesis Rabbah 34:8. For a general analysis see: Lich-
tenstein 1981.
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Summary
In this essay I have tried to represent the argument that even if we are unable to decide 
unequivocally whether the Jewish tradition supports the idea of universal morality, 
there are numerous classical sources (and I have off ered only very few of them) that 
support this idea. An important consequence of this approach for contemporary Jew-
ish theology is that any religious leader or thinker who chooses to ignore the relevance 
of the principles of universal morality in Jewish religious life does so out of his or her 
own choice, and not due to the “compelling force of the classical Jewish sources”. 
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Under the Rainbow, over the Greed
Universal Morality in the Age of Globalization
TAMÁS BÉRES
Analytic ethics in its formalism missed to give relevant answers concern-
ing human beings dwelling in a world of relations. At the beginning of 
the 1980’s, in his book Aft er Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre warned of the 
inadequate nature of formalized ethics and he proposed to revitalize the 
much forgotten, old fashioned virtue ethics. John Rawls’s books aroused 
great interest since the beginning of the 1970’s. Hans Jonas’ book under 
the title Prinzip Verantwortung also appeared in the 1970 ‘s in Germany. 
Up to the end of the last century, ethics has been emptied and started to 
prepare changing its most peculiar issues. Th e very conviction has gained 
grounds again that ethics should be built upon considerations of anthro-
pology and sociology.
Th e present situation
It is one of the ambivalencies of the day that almost a century aft er Wittgenstein we still 
have to speak about what is beyond expression.
In his Tractatus Wittgenstein says that ethics is like aesthetics and religion, and 
cannot be spoken about (Wittgenstein 2011. 6.421). Ethics, if it is anything, is super-
natural and our words will only express facts (Wittgenstein 2014. 40). Yet he believed 
that it was precisely those things which one could not speak about that were the most 
important things in life, including ethics. 
Analytic ethics in its formalism missed to give relevant answers concerning human 
beeings dwelling in a world of relations. At the beginning of the 1980’s, in his book 
Aft er Virtue Alasdair MacIntyre warned of the inadequate nature of formalized ethics 
and he proposed to revitalize the much forgotten, old fashioned virtue ethics. John 
Rawls’s books aroused great interest since the beginning of the 1970’s. Hans Jonas’ 
book under the title Prinzip Verantwortung also appeared in the 1970 ‘s in Germa-
ny. Up to the end of the last century, ethics has been emptied and started to prepare 
changing its most peculiar issues. Th e very conviction has gained grounds again that 
ethics should be built upon considerations of anthropology and sociology. “Morali-
ty is a part of human nature”, states american evolutionary biologist Marc Hauser a 
couple of years later (Hauser 2006). Although this new turn could have resulted in 
a large amount of questions regarding the universal nature of ethics, these questions 
32  ¨  TAMÁS BÉRES
fortrightly were impeded by the rapid spread of contemporary forms of applied eth-
ics. Applied ethics was pretty prosperous even within corporations, institutions and 
other forms of industrial production, where strong interests have pushed against the 
declaration of the independence of ethical deliberations. By that time applied ethics 
could do its best by developing schematic checking aspects for many restricted fi elds 
of moral scrutiny.
In this situation Wittgenstein’s opinion has a double meaning. On the one hand it 
could be considered that by pulling religion and ethics out of the realm of expressible 
things, both had been saved and conserved for later and safer times, for an age of more 
proper understanding. On the other hand, with this gesture he could have created 
an opportunity for actuated contemporary actors of practical philosophy to take up 
the ethical issues in a more relevant and rapid way by other instruments. Reason and 
language as the most democratic and powerful cultural instruments had thereaft er 
been used for that purpose by many scholars. Th is was a period for an accelerated 
methodological clarifi cation of ethics. In the present day situation metaethics means 
a theoretical study of formal language and logical rules. It’s already far from the an-
cient conceptions of ethics, but it points clearly to its two main classical characteristics, 
namely the demand of being accessible by cognitivity and having universal validity.
Universal morality?
Th e morality of globalization
About 20 years ago the two parallel notions of mondialization and globalization re-
ferred to two diff erent unifi cation processes in our world’s history. Mondialization 
denoted this process in a political-cultural-communicational meaning while globali-
zation meant the economical side of the world’s way of unifi cation. In today’s lan-
guage, the notion of mondialization is not in use anymore and both of the mean-
ings are carried by the sole word of globalization. Th e word McDonaldization was a 
commonplace, too, which described the schematic function of commercialism that 
time. We don’t have the word McDonaldization anymore again – although one may 
be convinced of McDonalds’ commitment to support local culture e.g. through its 
adapted architectural solutions – but commercialism remained a strong phrase for 
one of the most signifi cant cultural phenomenon of the present globalized world. Th e 
root of the word originally meant a personal interaction between two equal actors. 
Today commercialism has lost the connotation of equality and reciprocity between 
the actors and even its meaning of personality. Th e economical mind of that kind 
doesn’t accept the other actor at the other side of a business action as a real partner but 
attempts to bring every element of the meeting to the common denominator of eco-
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nomic gain. Th is way ‘partners’ will sacrifi ce not only their traditional values but they 
will be getting defi nitely one-sided and narrowed down as well. One losts its previous 
hope in a kind of certainty which could have been saved for him/her even aft er the 
act of consumption. Th at’s why consumption becomes the only form of certainty for 
him/herself, and outside of this act s/he cannot fi nd any place where s/he could feel at 
home. As Paul Tillich says, “s/he loses his/her world”. In the 1980’s, Ralph Dahrendorf 
outlined the cultural consequences of this occurrence by phrasing it as a “soft  nihil-
ism”. Soft  nihilism doesn’t demand serious endeavours from the one who lives inside of 
this custom but behind the curtains, it introduces hard competitions into the life of the 
actors. Nihilism refers either to the ceasing of the subjective expectations on the long 
term, or these expectations and intentions could even ceased totally with tools and 
instruments of the constant forms of consuming taking their place. Th is was the fi rst, 
maybe instinctive answer to the uncertainty of the age which came aft er existentialism, 
which can also be called the last continental philosophy with a solid morality.
Besides some other well-known cultural and economical elements, religions played 
a pretty important role in the process of globalization. Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, 
Judaism and Christianity transgress geographical and political borders more easily 
than families. Th ey can go through these borders even more easily than philosophical 
concepts. Because of their age and its unalterable validity they have more chance to 
fi nd ways of adaptation on other regional or continental areas. Moreover, they usually 
exist in several forms and some of those have reduced intellectual expectations. Most 
of them have good capabilities to cope with strange cultural forms and all of them have 
at least some intentions to build up concrete forms of an inculturational process or to 
give constructive answers to the challenges of secularization. 
Scholars such as sociologists see this process mostly from the other side when they 
speak about the advancement of secularization. Religions contain an inner and de-
fi ned conception of truth and they have a large amount of followers spread out in more 
or less transparent social circles. Th ese concepts of truth can be of esoterical or exoteri-
cal kind, and religions could realize this in diff erent ways during their history. Th rough 
some special theological-methodological work of grounding their ways, they have a 
conception of universal morality too. Two questions arise at this point; 1) whether they 
are open for an outside process of justifying their morality grounded in inherent con-
cepts of truth and 2) whether they can share conceptions regarding universal morality 
also with someone on the ‘outside’.
“Projekt Weltethos” which was initiated by the German theologian Hans Küng 
is one of the most outstanding chances for the active and meaningful meeting of 
religions. Th is movement has already made its important contribution to the mit-
igation of the world problems through its unique instruments. Th e Council for a 
Parliament of the World’s Religions was created to cultivate understanding and 
harmony among the world’s religious and spiritual communities and foster their 
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engagement with the world and its guiding institutions in order to achieve a just, 
peaceful and sustainable world.
Th e Project started with great expectations but during the last two decades it has 
become clear that morality cannot be easily distilled from a living religion. At its start-
ing point the meetings among the representants of diff erent religions were called “in-
terreligious dialogues”. Today, however, the term “Encounter World Religions” has be-
come more widespread which is a decisive acknowledgement of the personal nature of 
carrying religious totality. In these encounters people can share their visions and con-
ceptions with each other and they can practice how to accept the other with diff erent 
customs and morality. A theory of a common religious or worldwide morality cannot 
be expected to be formulated in these encounters.
Let me mention some relevant examples similar to the program of Dietrich Bon-
hoeff er. He called his project “Christianity without religion”, but he could not elaborate 
on it because of his execution in the very last days of World War II in Germany. Th e 
“atheist theologies” and the political theologies such as of Dorothee Sölle are far from 
any kind of real atheism. Representants of these movements refrain from theological 
concepts and even from using the name of God in favour of achieving important com-
mon social goals, excluding the possibility of reversing the tools and goals. Besides the 
moral eff orts of the religions that are relatively transparent and open for the encounter, 
there is a grey area as well. Here we can fi nd cultural forms that are pervaded by the 
will of power and authority. 
Global myths
In recent decades we were the eyewitnesses of the collapse of meta-narratives and 
grand narratives as Lyotard said. He argued that we have ceased to believe that narra-
tives of this kind are adequate to represent and contain us. He points out that no one 
seemed to agree on what was real and everyone had their own perspective and story. 
Large scale theories and philosophies of the world, such as the progress of history, 
the knowability of everything by science, and the possibility of absolute freedom have 
been collapsed. Instead of them, new kinds of frame-narratives of religious origin have 
appeared. Lyotard, however, did not argue against subsistent moralities, he just sought 
limited, particular forms of their validity. So we can see these new global myths as 
vehicles of some global moralities.
In his book Subverting Global Myths, Vinoth Ramachandra lists the myths of ter-
rorism, myths of religious violence, myths of human rights, multiculturalism, science, 
modern market system, postcolonialism etc. 
About the function of the stories of these kind Northrop Frye says: “certain stories 
seem to have a particular signifi cance: they are the stories that tell a society what is 
important for it to know, whether about its gods, its history, its laws, or its class struc-
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ture… they all contain a central truth which is then infl ated and used to exclude other, 
perhaps more important, ways of seeing.” (Ramachandra 2008. 13) 
Th e British philosopher Mary Midgley has argued that not only are myths central 
to worldviews but they are strongly infl uenced by the dominant technology of the day. 
In an age of computers, everything (including human intelligence) becomes informa-
tion and information-processing. Th e rise of genetic engineering diverts attention to 
the search for biochemical solutions to complex social, political, psychological and 
moral problems. “For instance”, she writes “much of the demand for liver transplants 
is due to alcohol. But it is a lot harder to think what to do about alcohol than it is to 
call for research on transplants.” … “Changing the customs calls for quite diff erent and 
much straightforward kinds of thinking” (Ramachandra 2008. 13).
Standing up to, and perhaps even fi ghting myths is a more complex issue. Meta-
physics allows us to refl ect on reality itself, but as it is known from the works of Hans 
Blumenberg, Paul Tillich and others, myths cannot be broken up even by the tools of 
sophisticated intelligence. Myths can ground moralities in any society but their origins 
reach far back to the times before the era of the logical and democratic achievements 
of socio-cultural forms.
Global morality from a protestant point of view
Closing in on the question of which kind of morality could be named as a candidate for 
universal status from the standpoint of the protestant ethics, at fi rst it has to be stated 
clearly that biblical texts do not form a uniform and solid morality. Instead of a topic 
such as “the morality of the New Testament”, “many moralities of the New Testament” 
should be spoken about. If we are searching for e.g. the traces of virtue ethics, which was 
widespread during medieval times and of course in the societies of the ancient Greek 
and Roman culture as well, in a rather surprising way, we will fi nd a list about the virtues 
recommended for Christians in the Letter to the Philippians. It reads as follows: 
Finally, brothers, whatever things are true, whatever things are honour-
able, whatever things are just, whatever things are pure, whatever things 
are lovely, whatever things are of good report; if there is any virtue, and 
if there is any praise, think about these things. Th e things which you 
learned, received, heard, and saw in me: do these things and the God of 
peace will be with you. (Fil. 4,8f) 
Th e enumeration here obviously centers on the accepted virtues of the surrounding 
society and the writer lets Christians choose the more appropriate ones among them. 
By reading the New Testament text-sources it can be stated that Christology in the 
Making and Morality in the Making go very close to each other not only in a parallel 
way but by steadfastly having eff ects on each other as well. From this observation we 
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can state that there is a main tradition in Christianity which does not allow the divi-
sion of orthodoxia and orthopraxis, i.e. of dogmatics and ethics. As one of the most 
proper one, situational ethics has been used in 20th century for expressing the right way 
of thinking morally – at least inside of the protestant Lutheran theological refl exion. 
Th at was the rule of Origen of Alexandria too, who had chosen it for himself and for 
those who appreciated the special intellectual experiences in living as Christians.
Although the Golden Rule cannot be used exclusively as a moral law, it is one of the 
most powerful aid for Christians in being motivated to do right unto others. “Th erefore 
whatever you desire for men to do to you, you shall also do to them; for this is the law and 
the prophets” (Mt 7, 12). As Etzioni pointed out, the social application of this rule would 
end up accounting for the consequences of social disparity. I think he is right. If we read 
the text of the Decalogue carefully we must recognize that in spite of its grammatical 
form of hard apodictic law, a scent of empowering motivation can be found even there. 
Th e Golden Rule gives an opportunity fi rst of all to think about the moral subject, i.e. 
about the moral thinker regarding his/her situation in the eyes of the other human being.
Th e Rule of Love plays an important role, too, in biblical texts. “You shall love the 
Lord your God with all your heart, with all your soul, with all your strength, and with 
all your mind; / and your neighbor as yourself ” (L. 10,27). Reading only the second 
sentence it seems to be a subject of duty ethics. But if there is anything which cannot be 
commanded at all, love is precisely that. Conceiving love in the subjectivist-romantic 
tradition, it seemed to be emotivism for many readers. But aft er putting it back to the 
whole sentence the fi rst part of it will serve as a hermeneutical key and show that it is 
a kind of consequentialism. Th e fi rst part demands an existential gratitude towards the 
Creator, aft er which the second should follow: Love your neighbour, because he/she is ‘a 
me’ too. At this point it reveals itself to be a pure ethics of responsibility in the sense of 
a need of caring about the other on a decisive basis of equality and similarity. 
One of the most beautiful examples of this meaning can be found in Derrida who 
expresses the overlapping need of creatures – not only to the extent of the human 
existence but further to the nonhuman world as well, in the manner of Martin Buber. 
I think that responsible morality, as it follows from the above mentioned anthro-
pological sources of human responsiveness in the language of philosophy, may be ex-
pressed in a prominent way with terms of personalism. Th e mainline of today’s protes-
tant ethics follows this tradition too.
Some characteristics of ethics of responsibility 
in the protestant theological tradition
Th rough the steps of theological anthropology it can be realized that a human being is 
a fi nite creature, who – in his/her eternal now – partakes of the values of the past and 
shares responsibility for designing the present and protecting the future. S/he is a rela-
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tional being with four determining relations, namely to him/herself, to other humans, 
to the non-human world and to God. 
Th e Swiss ethicist Arthur Rich shows the importance of these basic relations with 
the notion of the four ethical dimensions of human acts when he discerns individual, 
personal, social and environmental kinds of ethics. Rich treats this last one as an “act-
ing and ruling fi eld” of the three previous ones. Let me mention two further names in 
the present context. Although their holders are not theologians but their contributions 
are at least partly in harmony with the eff orts of theological ethics. I think both of their 
theories have contributed to a possible universal ethics in spite of their weaknesses.
Th e fi rst one is Roberto Mangabeira Unger, a Brazilian politician and philosopher. 
Unger sees four fl aws in the human condition. Th ey are, our mortality and the facing 
of imminent death; our groundlessness in that we are unable to grasp the solution to the 
enigma of existence; our insatiability in that we always want more, and demand the in-
fi nite from the fi nite; and as a last one our susceptibility to belittlement which places us 
in a position to constantly confront a petty routine forcing us to die many little deaths.
As a second potential important early contributor to the question of a global uni-
versal ethics I would name Aldo Leopold.
His golden rule of the land ethic has many similarities to Jesus’ Golden Rule. It 
reads: “A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of 
the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.” It certainly could not func-
tion as a complete rule of ethics in its entirety but it gives a congruent impulse for tak-
ing account of the perspectives and motivations of our everyday acts. Leopold’s land 
ethic changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land-owning commu-
nity to a citizen of it. It implies respect for his fellow-members and also respect for the 
community as such. It is a closer “harmony” between people and nature, informed by 
science, woven into culture, inspired by ethics and spiritual insight. In the very act of 
compiling Th e Land Ethic, Leopold defi ned this challenge and broadened the conver-
sation about the ethics of the human–nature relationship. Th is stands very close to the 
dialogical personalism of Martin Buber. In spite of its obvious aspects, a motivation 
can be gained from that for setting a great value on the interconnectedness of all life.
Leopold states that “all ethics […] rest upon a single premise: that the individual is a 
member of a community of interdependent parts”. Ethical conduct is thus conduct that 
benefi ts the community. Leopold then argues that we must develop a notion of commu-
nity which includes plants, animals, soils, and waters that we collectively call the land and 
of which we are an inextricable, interdependent, symbiotic part (see Meine 1988. 239).
As it is put in classic theological ethics, greed is the main anthropological case of 
habitual sin. As it confronts us with all of our communities, the only chance we have in 
facing it is to handle them in a responsible way. To handle them means to be a conscious 
member, living in and acting for these communities of the human and non-human 
world. As a ground for developing proper forms of eff ective responsibility, perspec-
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tives of motivations are needed. A special kind of motivation can be gained from various 
fi elds of using our basic relations deliberately. As a biblical symbol, rainbow expresses the 
encounter but also a diff erence of the many communities of the Globe. Putting it with 
William Schweiker’s notion of overhumanization and hypertheism, the rainbow can serve 
as a warning sign, reminding us to remaining capable of discerning between the sources 
of motivation or fascination and the places where responsibility is needed.
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Th e Connections Between 
Personal Maturity and Moral Consciousness
From a Catholic Perspective
GÉZ A KUMINETZ
According to Christian philosophy, there is a harmony of three main factors 
that comprises personal maturity – these factors presuppose and act upon 
each other, but neither could be reduced to the other two. Th ese are: emotional 
balance and the maturity of the moralconsciousness and religious conscious-
ness(the worldview). Th e quality of the moral consciousness is especially im-
portant, for this has the greatest infl uence on emotional and religious maturity. 
Today, in the age of mass-societies, to develop these three factors is perhaps 
harder than ever before; that is why, perhaps, our age can be called (from this 
point of view) the twilight of norms. Th e need for a moral consciousness and 
worldview spontaneously awakens in man through the process of the person-
ality’s development. Th is need is a corollary of human nature, although man 
has to discover this terrain for himself – he has to establish his worldview (as 
the spirituality that gives fi nal evaluation and program to his life) according 
to his best knowledge and conscience. Th is process, however, requires direc-
tion, without which the personality could become a mere torso, leading to an 
amoral and diabolical personality. Th e responsibility is huge in all factors of 
education: the family, the school, religion and the state itself.
Ethical principles (basic duties) should be conceived in the vein of human 
rights.But in this fi eld, too, harmony between diff erent ethical systems can 
only be achieved if we can agree on the essential contents of the basic duties. 
We need to respect the intellectual legacy of prior generations while we com-
bat the demons of prejudice and the either/or alternative over and over again.
Christian philosophy takes human cognition to be able to conceive and 
implement such a moral code, upon which various ethical systems could be 
built – securing the unitas multiplex in this area as well.
Introduction
Th e fundamental question of our conference, asking whether there is an eternally and 
universally valid morality, is connected to other, no less important questions: if there 
is such a morality, can we acquire knowledge of it, can we make it our own – and do 
we want to bring it about?
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Th ose who wish to enquire about the human moral dimension today fi nd the fol-
lowing: observing the lives of diff erent societies we discover various customs and mor-
al ideas, perspectives on ethics that at times resemble or diff er from one another, both 
in their depths and characteristic features, and can even contradict each other. More-
over, unity and variety also characterizes moral consciousness even in a single homo-
geneous society. Th e question that the scholar has to ask when confronted with this 
situation is whether these diff erent conceptions and ethical systems truly contradict 
each other, or is this merely an opposition in appearances.
Our second observation is that moral consciousness is diminishing in Western 
countries, while spontaneous behaviour and knowingly chosen behaviour are on the 
rise. Habitual, however, does not necessarily equal moral (an assumed habit can sig-
nify either personal arbitrariness or an external convention), and knowingly chosen 
behaviour is not necessarily moral in character, since it may as well be rather manip-
ulative (see pushy and amoral personalities). In the same time, today’s man considers 
himself an adult, someone who is perfectly capable of shaping his own destiny, and 
does not require any kind of tutelage (while interpreting any kind of outside infl uence 
as coercion). 
Our third discovery is that strictly scientifi c observations do not seem to 
validate claims of the world’s maturity. In light of recent data, more than 
two thirds of the members of modern, progressive, space-travelling and 
electronic brain engineering Western civilization are emotionally unbal-
anced, morally childish, and religiously primitive. It seems that the lack 
of personal maturity has never been such a painful, crushing and actual 
problem than it is nowadays. (Szentmártoni 1978. 5)
Our fourth assumption is that the scientifi c-technological revolution and the cap-
italist mode of production have been providing unprecedented wealth and conveni-
ences for huge masses of people for decades, but our time is plagued by a multivarious 
crisis. Th is signifi es that the Zeitgeist – and the latent and manifest power that repre-
sents and shapes it – seems to have left  important (mainly ethical) factors of matura-
tion unattended.
Th e fi ft h realization is that in contemporary societies, narcissism and accompany-
ing consumer-mentality are on the rise, which results in the depreciation and neglect 
of our past cultural achievements. 
Economic man himself has given way to the psychological man our times. 
[…] Th e new narcissist is haunted not by guilt but by anxiety. He seeks 
not to infl ict his own certainties on others but to fi nd a meaning in life. 
Liberated from the superstitions of the past, he doubts even the reality of 
his own existence. Superfi cially relaxed and tolerant, he fi nds little use for 
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dogmas of racial and ethnic purity but at the same time forfeits the security 
of group loyalties and regards everyone as a rival for the favors conferred by 
the paternalistic state. His sexual attitudes are permissive rather than puri-
tanical, even though his emancipation from ancient taboos brings him no 
sexual peace. Fiercely competitive in his demand for approval and acclaim, 
he distrusts competition because he associates it unconsciously with an un-
bridled urge to destroy. […] He extols cooperation and teamwork while 
harboring deeply antisocial impulses. He praises respect for rules and reg-
ulations in the secret belief that they do not apply to him. Acquisitive in the 
sense that his cravings have no limits, he does not accumulate goods and 
provisions against the future, […] but demands immediate gratifi cation 
and lives in a state of restless, perpetually unsatisfi ed desire. Th e narcissist 
has no interest in the future because, in part, he has so little interest in the 
past. […] In a narcissistic society – a society that gives increasing promi-
nence and encouragement to narcissistic traits – the cultural devaluation 
of the past refl ects not only the poverty of the prevailing ideologies, which 
have lost their grip on reality and abandoned the attempt to master it, but 
the poverty of the narcissist’s inner life. (Lasch 1991. xvi-xvii)
Our sixth assertion concerns what could be called the twilight of norms: their over-
abundance coupled with a universal contempt towards them (they are viewed as un-
justifi ed limitations on personal freedom), and an externally motivated conformity 
towards them. It seems to be the case that the critical mass lacks a certain ’binder ma-
terial’ connecting them to pre-existent norms that we might identify as respect, noble 
sentiments, conscience or something else along these lines. Just think about the wars 
that are, aft er all, denials and denouncements of ethical and legal norms. (Cf. Bognár 
1930. esp. 887) However, if the taking possession of human dignity means personal 
maturity, or “being somebody” in Rogers’ sense, than it cannot be accomplished with-
out internally motivated appreciation of norms. 
It seems to be the case that human dignity cannot be found in the mere fact of be-
ing human, but in the quality of our moral consciousness. Moral consciousness, when 
acquired, functions as a representative of our self (with its intellectual, volitional and 
emotional unity), meaning that we identify ourselves with its judgements, entering the 
service of the purpose thought to be true.
According to the Catholic worldview, human dignity, the personal maturity of man, 
is constituted by the quality of his moral consciousness, since morality “sticks to the 
person. Th e metaphysical place of morality is the person.” (Jánosi 1944. 19) Th e value 
of a person lies in his moral authenticity, not only in his observable accomplishments. 
Th is is the completion of human dignity, the constitution and cultivation of the moral 
condition. (Hársing 1999. 15)
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Furthermore, human dignity is at the same time a given fact and the object of a 
task. A person can only take possession of his dignity through the process of nurtur-
ing, self-educating and creative work. With the help of our intelligence, we discover 
not only the various laws of nature, but the specifi c laws of our peculiar nature as 
well: the moral law that has a binding character, that requires our free decision to 
implement its commandment. It could be said that the human being is programmed 
not only genetically but even by the world of the spirit – although he has to fi nd this 
program of the spirit and to design it personally. Th is spiritual program is called a 
worldview, with moral consciousness being one of its central dimensions.
Some epistemological remarks concerning the Catholic worldview 
and philosophy
Before we set out to study moral cognition, it is useful to briefl y outline the Catholic 
stance on the nature and limits of human cognition.
Within the various kinds of philosophies there is philosophy based on the Christian 
attitude towards life and the Christian ideal of life as well. Here, we are only going to ask 
what it takes for scientifi c Catholic thought to not only consider a phil-
osophical system familiar, but to treat it as a colleague? What does it 
take for a system to be an assured tool of providing grounds for a de-
vout Christian conviction, and of systematically constructing the truth 
revealed? (Schütz 1933. 234) 
Th e nature of the spirit of Catholicity is such that it scrutinizes each attitude to-
wards life and each worldview, and attempts to fi nd seeds of truth in them – it aims to 
be complete and synthetic. Not every idea, of course, could be reconciled with Catho-
licity: there are ideas that stand in strict opposition of it. Not all kinds of philosophy 
are amenable, therefore, to adequately represent and express the Christian worldview. 
A system of philosophy has to meet three criteria (an epistemological, a metaphysi-
cal and a personal) to be properly deemed Christian (see Schütz 1933. 234-239). Ac-
cording to the epistemological criterion, it should not boil down to agnosticism (this 
comprises its lower limit). More precisely, it means that Christian philosophy takes 
the existence of the personal God, the immortality of the soul, the real, but somewhat 
limited freedom of the will, and the resultant moral duties to be truths that could 
be comprehended by reason. Th e upper limit is Gnosticism. Th ere are certain secrets 
that can never be transformed into philosophical truths; that must always be viewed 
as secrets to the human mind. Th e Christian philosopher, therefore, defends the sci-
entifi c autonomy of reason against the rising tendencies of scepticism, but does not 
allow this authority to become absolute independence and rationalism. He defends 
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the intelligibility of faith without becoming a fi deist. According to the metaphysical 
criterion he regards God to be a real entity, not a postulate or a pure idea. Finally, 
the personal criterion: doing philosophy is the labour of love of the philosopher, it is 
his way of life; he values the inheritance of his predecessors, and knows that his an-
cestral lineage does not begin with him. Th e Christian philosopher is convinced that 
a logos spermatikos manifests itself throughout history, towards the con-
sequences of which we cannot claim indiff erence unpunished; who does 
not want to work in close collaboration with his predecessors in the spirit 
of a philosophia perennis deprives himself from inspirations and exami-
nations of the most fruitful nature. (Schütz 1933. 236-237) 
Th is also means that the Christian philosopher always examines the works of other 
thinkers thoroughly (and bears the burden of knowing that his own works might not 
be examined with the same attention by others – acatholica semper leguntur, sed cathol-
ica non semper leguntur).
Both expert and non-expert thinkers in the fi eld defi ned the relation between faith 
and knowledge in various ways throughout history. Th e Catholic worldview deems 
radical a) such a conception of this relation according to which knowledge absorbs 
religious faith (either by placing faith insides the frames of reason (Kant), or by insist-
ing that reason fully comprehends even the greatest secrets of faith (gnosis)), b) or the 
conception according to which faith absorbs knowledge (all knowledge is based on the 
revelation: this is the viewpoint of traditionalism). Christianity can only claim the way 
of true synthesis as his own, within which natural and supernatural do not degrade 
one another, but mutually make each other’s areas clearer (see Schütz 1936. 82).
Philosophy and religion thus give the fi nal answer to the questions of the human 
attitude towards life, its evaluation and to the fi nal transcendent and immanent ques-
tions of life – and as such, both philosophy and religion, and even scientifi c refl ections 
of them have conscience-like functions. Should there be no fi nal answer we would 
have to relinquish faith in the meaningfulness of life, which would ultimately lead at 
fi rst to the idol of narcissism (see Lasch 1991), and then culminate in nihilism and its 
destructive tendencies (see Horváth 1948 and 1949).
Anthropological considerations regarding human nature
Th e existence, essence, immutability and limits of human nature are diff erently eval-
uated within specifi c philosophical systems. Th e question appears to turn on whether 
there is a fi rm enough anthropological foundation that provides a correct judgement 
on being human. Nowadays, this foundation is perhaps best exemplifi ed by the view 
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that a human being is a person, and his personhood is a cognitive, essence-generating, 
and activity-assigning principle as well as a point of reference. Consequently, in the 
following we wish to study the person that has to develop into a personality.
Our fi rst consideration is that we view the human person as a rational 
being and as a moral being, who as a rational being seeks reason in the 
order of things, and controls his actions through the insights of reason; 
as a moral being is conscious of the inseparable ties that connect him to 
God and fellow-men, conscious of the resultant responsibility and regu-
lates his behaviour accordingly. (Mihelics 1947. 19)
Secondly, it appears to be that the personality, that is, becoming somebody (see 
Rogers 2010), is closely connected to moral consciousness, and that moral conscious-
ness is pervaded by timeless ethical principles – in the sense that the person who has 
developed his moral consciousness responsibly considers its validity to be absolute. 
Moral consciousness is totalizing but not totalitarian; it is what lends human con-
sciousness its unity and the balance of the personality.
In the following, we briefl y review the personality-models, the characterizations of 
human personality, by three scholars – characterizations that are complementary and 
demonstrate the ethically important aspects of personality.
According to Mihály Szentmártoni SJ, the development of a mature personality is 
the total realization of being human, and it has three essential components: emotional, 
moral and religious maturity.1 In each case there are many and various obstacles to over-
come. A human with a mature personality is characterized by the faculty and ability to 
be able to construct a unity of his present that reaches towards the past 
but aims towards the future in his freely chosen or accepted calling. […] 
Th e construction means that a man can unite all of his conscious and 
subconscious dimensions in a vision, into a unifi ed worldview. We can 
1 „Th e man who has reached and developed his genetically given, hereditary possibilities in his corporeal 
development, and is capable of reproduction, is to be considered mature in a biological sense.” (Berentés 2012. 
35) Emotinal maturity “means that the individual has interiorized those emotionally grounded values and 
those habits of thought and behaviour that comprise the foundation of his motivational basis. Without these, 
we cannot speak of long lasting effi  cacy on either an individual or a social level. Th e emotionally mature per-
son lives in harmony with the outside world, is capable of self-realization, is able to attain his goals through 
interpersonal relationships based on reciprocity, and puts his acquired knowledge to successful use. Th ere is 
a natural correspondence between his values, his behaviour, and the effi  cacy of his actions.” (Berentés 2012. 
36) Intellectual maturity “means that the person has acquired the skill of conceptual thinking, certain con-
ditions of which are determined by biological maturation, but which ultimately arises through the means of 
upbringing and teaching. If someone is incapable of acquiring the minimal knowledge necessary for successful 
social adaptation, and cannot interpret his environment as something that comprises a system, or apprehend 
external infl uences, than that person could be deemed intellectually immature.” (Berentés 2012. 35)
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therefore call an individual mature if he is able to integrate the three per-
spectives of his personality: his past, his present, and his future. (Szent-
mártoni 1978. 27)
According to the model of Katalin Horváth-Szabó, personality has three dimen-
sions: body, psyche, and soul. Th e body does not warrant a special explanation, but the 
other two dimensions do. 
Psyche connects the cognitive, emotional/motivational and relational ar-
eas, while the soul or the spiritual dimension contains spirituality, the 
tendency towards the transcendent. […] Th e spiritual dimension is a 
distinct but exclusively human dimension of the mind, and it contains 
self-consciousness, experience, wondering, openness and the transcend-
ing of space and time. […] Th e spirit expresses itself in consciousness, 
intelligent understanding, rational judgements and self-defi ned choices. 
(Horváth-Szabó 2010. 43-45) 
Th e personality has three levels: 1. dispositional properties: inherited and acquired 
properties that manifest themselves in the peculiar properties of personality, against 
the background of the self. To inquire about the reasons behind these properties we 
need to have knowledge of the person’s experiences in life, the way he interprets these 
experiences, his goals and his plans. 2. Th e level of personal plans and aspirations: 
while we own the properties, the realization of our plans and our appointed goals man-
ifests itself in action and struggle. Th e kind of goals one sets depends greatly on his at-
titude towards life and his worldview (on his religion). 3. Th e level of identity: through 
which a person gives meaning and sense to his life, constructing a coherent worldview 
which becomes his own system of values, and which gives content and direction to his 
thoughts, feelings and actions. Th e whole personality is in the service of this system 
of values (Horváth-Szabó 2010. 49-52). Nowadays this personal worldview is called 
spirituality, global plan of life, a vision of life (as meaning-giving and acceptance), and 
the way of coping with various situations in life (Cencini 2011. 183-184). It can also 
be called the fundamental and unifying choice of value of life and meaning of life (De 
Fiores 1999. 1525). Mature religiosity is what completes spirituality,2 since “religion 
integrates and organizes the converted and his life, it also gives him goals and dresses 
him in loyalty.” (Horváth-Szabó 2010. 52 – see also Szentmártoni 1985. 810-817)
In the conception of Hildebrand Várkonyi OSB the greatest happiness in human 
life is personhood, the beautiful and harmonic personality. Th e lack thereof results 
2 It should be noted that religiosity does not simply mean being connected to a specifi c religious commu-
nity, but instead refers to the fact that humans as beings with a worldview necessarily develop their value 
systems, their religions. Religious activity is fundamentally taken to mean the unconditional service of the 
highest value (deity), in contrast with magical or superstitious activities that aim to control the gods.
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in suff ering and hurtful people. He views human individuality as a unitas multiplex, 
so that the various dimensions of human existence are “connected and united by an 
inner spiritual link, and this unity, this whole comes before its parts.” (Várkonyi 1936. 
737) Th is harmony or balance is, however, the dynamic union of opposites, unifi ed 
and fi nalized (although not closed!) by the character in both the longitudinal- and 
cross-sections of time. Character, then, is what gives a personality appropriate self-re-
straint, a unifi ed way of life and the style of personality, since only through its help, 
under the rule of a fi nal, supreme value, can personality be a unifi ed whole.3 However, 
the harmony and balance that constitutes the fi nal endpoint and rest of 
the soul’s fl uctuation is an ideal state that cannot be attained in reality. 
What is attainable is a relative harmony and relative balance which is 
equidistant to the stoically rigid tranquillity that is incapable of advance-
ment (ataraxia), and to the restless, fundamentally unbalanced soul that 
is troubled by never-ending vicissitudes, or to the tragic personality har-
bouring a radical fracture. Harmony with ourselves and the world sur-
rounding us is such an important and essential part of the personality, 
that other valuable goals are unattainable in its absence. […] Th e concept 
of personality can thus be dissolved into the balance of the tension of 
opposites: unity – in a momentary and temporal plurality, harmony – be-
tween diverging elements, balance – in the dynamics of change. (Várko-
nyi 1936. 739)
Reason and liberty play a major part in the creation of this balance, harmony and 
unity – that is, in the creation of the character. Th ey do so because 
reason has a central position in the whole and the structure of personal-
ity. Neither our emotional, nor our volitional life can develop to a high-
er order when reason remains underdeveloped. Th e reason that perme-
ates the depths, that perfectly grasps the essence and causal relations of 
things, that fl oats above both the spiritual and the material world, and 
mostly that is set to serve the truth: this reason is the leader and ruler of 
the emotional and volitional spheres of the soul, and it can turn them into 
deep and noble, solid and humble, consistent and benevolent. Truly deep 
emotional life is impossible to achieve for an entirely shallow personality 
– and true morality is not possible either without reason’s sense for what 
is true, its aspiration towards truth, and its passion for truth. In all pas-
sions, even in the malignant ones, the rule of reason prevails. […] Th is 
leading and centrally motivating role of reason, however, would prove to 
3 It is worth noting, that this rule does not mean subjugation or enslavement, but organic integration that 
results in unity and balance.
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be useless without the psychological element of personal freedom, with 
which it is inseparably interconnected. Only the free apprehension and 
recognition of truth is genuine understanding and knowledge; truth can 
only be approached through free service. […] Many kinds of behaviour 
can be enforced upon us by external powers, but no kind of reason can be 
forced to have true convictions. […] Th e self-defi ning and self-governing 
personality is free, because it is its own master; self-restraint is one of the 
most prized properties of personhood, as it guarantees a moral character. 
[…] Inner and outer liberty is an indispensable accessory of our human 
dignity. (Várkonyi 1936. 740) 
Th e investigation of the contents of personality examines
those values, ideals and ideas towards which the activities and the way 
of life of a personality is directed. Th ese values (truth, beauty, goodness, 
holiness, economic values etc.) are uncovered for the personality by the 
joint labour of reason and sentiment – and that is what makes them at-
tractive, mandatory, in a word: valuable for the personality. […] the abili-
ty to respectfully bow before the world of values is part of the totality of a 
true personality. Respect and piety are the chastity of spirit – the attitude 
of the spirit in which we can observe the secrets of the essence of things 
and the depths of values in their existence; it is therefore truly related to 
humility, to the philosophy of life that considers everything objectively, 
and that is neither conceited nor self-deprecating. […] Respect towards 
values cannot be uncritical, it cannot be blind; but aft er the criticism of 
reason – applying the measuring stick of truth – the personality must give 
himself up to the respect. Th e richer the value-contents of a personality 
are, the more values he respects and realizes both in himself and his sur-
rounding world, the more we trust in him. […] Th e value-content drives 
the spectator to trust, respect and even love towards such a personality; 
these two things together characterize the personality capable of respon-
sibility. Another driving force can also be distinguished in reason and 
sentiment: conscience, which is, on the one hand, a (delicate) sense for 
the maintenance and the fulfi lment-conditions of moral values, on the 
other hand, the expression of a certain moral need, and, fi nally, the direct 
practical judgement of reason regarding what is permitted or prohibited 
in the realm of moral values. Conscience is nothing else, but the foun-
dation and possibility of moral sentiment, upon which a whole world of 
actions rests. If we would like to answer the question how the personal-
ity discovers the world of values and especially the signifi cant values for 
himself, we could state two axioms; one being: Knowledge according to 
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our best conscience, – the other being: conscience according to our best 
knowledge. (Várkonyi 1936. 740-741)4 
Consequently adhering to these maxims prevents the personality from being bi-
ased, from fanaticism, prejudice, superfi ciality, love of comfort and indiff erence – this 
is what makes us meek and humble in the strictest meaning of these terms. Only those 
can become mature personalities whose knowledge 
aspires for the greatest possible completeness […] of truths and values, 
and attempts to acquire it according to their best conscience; and who 
follow their conscience according to their best knowledge in their ac-
tions. Th us it is nothing else than the innermost possible union of the 
soul with the truths and values. (Várkonyi 1936. 742)
Human personality, according to this conception, could only be developed through 
confl icts, so it is a task to be accomplished as well. Th e perfection of the human per-
sonality cannot reach divine perfection, but it can and it should become divinized. 
Th is trait makes the human aspiration for perfection heroic. Heroism itself appears as 
a kind of virtue; only with its help can a person defend his moral independence and 
keep his ability for unconditional goodwill even in the midst of the greatest derailing 
forces. Th e fi rst condition of acquiring this virtue is self-restraint, which is instrumen-
tal since discipline could equally be used for good and bad. Self-restraint itself is a 
result of several acts of self-conquest, and it provides fertile ground for virtue, or the ir-
reversible solidifi cation of the propensity for good. Self-restraint is related to heroism, 
but it is a virtue in itself, since the propensity for evil is defeated through heroism. Th e 
hero “no longer battles his own evil inclinations, as he does not really battle anything 
anymore. Th e great battle and the fi nal conquest of his inclinations had to have been 
already carried out to become a hero.” (Noszlopi 1932. 27) Further principles of this 
battle for the possession of values are the following: 
self-conquest and selfl essness on the one hand, and appropriate equip-
ment and spiritual tactics on the other in order to realize the world of 
values. Th e battle that every person has to fi ght (the drama of life) re-
quires sacrifi ce, according to the nature of the thing. Even recognizing 
and respecting the values requires a certain kind of renouncement of our 
egocentric aspirations, or at least it demands that we seek our own vin-
dication through the realization of objective values. […] Self-conquest, 
4 It is worth noting that “a value from a personal perspective is something which we identify ourselves 
with, not merely superfi cially and momentarily, but instead about which we recognize that we have to iden-
tify with eternally and unconditionally for the sake of our substantial self. Ethical value is not an external rule 
of our will; instead, it is the essence of the latter: permanently refusing to follow it results in the decay of the 
personality.” (Noszlopi 1929. 134)
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self-restraint, altruism and asceticism therefore belong to the develop-
ment of the true personality. Certain ascetic instruments also belong in 
this category, the so-called techniques of value-realization: applications 
and instrument-applications stemming from the spirit of service in order 
to validate and realize truth.” (Várkonyi 1936. 743) 
So “the trial of ethical maturity and tact is settled by how a man can know his way about 
diff erent situations, how he can understand the imperative of the moment, and what power 
and directness he can use to combat the hostility of the situation.” (Kecskés 2003. 86)
It is clear from the discussed models that man is a being able to alter its biological 
characteristics within certain limits; a being that can reprogram its sentiments and 
emotional realm; a being that can transform its spiritual realm, that is, it can replace 
its worldview (rebirth, once, twice, multiple times born man). Moreover, in order for 
a man to gain full possession of his humanity and dignity, he should be ready to make 
these corrections throughout his life. Th is battle is painful until the inner and fi nal 
fi rewall (the character) is complete, that true personally fi ne-tuned spirituality that en-
ables a man to select what he lets into his inner realm, and what he lets out from there.
Th e moral consciousness and the cumbersome task of gaining possession of it
Awakening of the moral consciousness
Man is a being that necessarily constructs a worldview, a religion, because he does 
not only have the ability to understand the world and himself, but he also can and 
has to evaluate it, which is followed by the awakening of his moral consciousness.5 
Th is awakening, however, can be smothered, corrupted and infantilized. Th is process 
might be called the alienation from our own essences. Th e man-torso that remains is 
the petty bourgeois, the mass-man and the diabolical man; while the former two are 
characterized by a weakening respect towards norms, the latter eliminates it altogeth-
er, replacing it with narcissism, egoism and arbitrariness.6
5 It should be noted that in every worldview and religion, the fi nal categories that order and evaluate the 
world and man’s relation to it are concentrated in beliefs, hopes and loves that move the thinking, acting and 
feeling person towards his goals.
6 Th is view can, in radical instances, lead to self-divinization, or a diabolic worldview that is unmercifully 
egotistic and consciously denies God and is hostile towards divinity. It denies “the nature that is dependent 
on and that is the partial realizer of the divine order, and it attempts to rise above it, and turn and act against 
it; it wishes to subjugate alien human souls, to exploit or coerce society into admiration, to turn culture away 
from absolute values towards himself. Th e non-admission of moral values means their conscious denial for 
it, in its infi nite hubris, this rare but not irreal, radically magical ethical attitude anoints itself the lord of the 
supernatural reality.” (Brandenstein 1938. 35-36.)
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Th e basic source of ethical values is our own value-consciousness, surrounded by 
its social consciousness – and the two are deeply interconnected. Society’s moral con-
sciousness refl ects and keeps safe the ethical legacy of great individuals in ideal cases 
(see Brandenstein 1938. 12-15)
It is important to see that in the moral action, the person 
is not the executer of a call from a sphere beyond reality, but the accom-
plisher or thwarter of demands stemming from his essential nature. Mor-
al value stands before us in the specifi c life-tasks as the essential demand 
of reality, as the imperative of our being-human. Moral value-contents 
are impossible to defi ne without their relations to actual life. (Kecskés 
2003. 103)
Moral consciousness awakens spontaneously in man, but it needs direction and cul-
tivation aft erwards, since it is subject to both development and regress. We realize that 
we are the originators of some of our actions (although not all of them). Th e ethical 
order, just as well as the legal order and the order of decency, presupposes freedom: the 
choosing and carrying out of responsible actions in accordance with the values recog-
nized to be true (see Guzzetti 1980. 7-8). Moral action presupposes intellect, will, and a 
sentiment that affi  rms values.7 One who acts according to accepted, interiorized moral 
prescriptions and principles, one who is guided by such a sentiment, is a good, honest 
and honourable man; a man who is loyal to his principles (see Kecskés 2003. 15-16).
Th e history of ethics, however, testifi es to a multitude of contradictory moral reg-
ulations and codes; diversity and unity rule over the moral consciousness as well (see 
Hartmann 2013. 61-88). It is also known that each authority and worldview inevitably 
creates its own ethical code, which refl ects its fi nal value judgements and the adequate 
conscience (see Noszlopi 2012. 157). Th e main question is this: where are the limits 
of this unity and diversity (both within one society and between diff erent societies)? 
7 Sentiments are taken here to mean those unseen spiritual springs that move and regulate a man’s whole 
personal and social life. According to Gyula Kornis, “in its ordinary meaning, sentiment refers to the sum 
of an individual’s morally inclined emotional propensities, the ethical habitus of a man. For lack of a better 
term, we have to broaden the meaning of the term sentiment in our actual sense: here, it does not only de-
signate emotional propensities (habitual emotions), but the real manifestations of those (actual sentiments) 
as well.” (Kornis 1919. 220) Bernhard Häring takes sentiment to be the thought of the heart, a specifi c tem-
perament in the foreground and during the course of action that regulates what a man holds to be ethically 
right or wrong, and that is not merely a sense of duty (as Kant saw it). Sentiment is much more than a sense 
of duty, for duty encapsulates “merely the obligation to act. Sentiment also contains the thought of duty; man 
is obligated to acquire the right sentiment and abolish the wrong. Th e essence of the sentiment, the basis of 
consciousness, however, is not duty, the fulfi llment of our obligations, but the experience of the valuableness 
of the moral good. A sense of duty only covers obeying or disobeying a certain order. True sentiment is the 
perfect opposite of that: it is based on consciously experiencing moral values. Sense of duty stems from the 
spirit of the sentiment, which is open towards the order of values. Fulfi lling obligations does not stand in 
direct and lively relation with the realm of values.” (Häring 1967. 243-244)
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Man can also err in his cognitive aspirations, there are many factors that could infl u-
ence his clear ethical vision. Still, we have to believe that if we all have the same human 
essence, the same human nature, if fundamentally identical anthropological constants 
constitute the human person, then there should be only one moral order – while the 
question of recognizing and expressing it in the right way and admitting its bind-
ing power is quite another matter. Specifi c moral conventions and ethical systems are 
partially contradictory to one another and partially unitary, or they attempt to artic-
ulate, defend and delimit the same value through diff erent regulations. Contradictory 
worldviews clash in this fi eld as well, worldviews that can have clarifying or disturbing 
eff ects on one another. Th ese contradictions, however, stem from the erroneous ethi-
cal judgements of particular worldviews and systems of power, not from an inherent 
duality in the moral order.
It is important therefore to study the various religions, myths and philosophical 
systems from an ethical point of view, since all of them possess some seeds of the truth. 
We have to appreciate the values of tradition, of the past.
Waking and developing the moral consciousness
Th e moral consciousness can awaken in man, but it needs waking and then nourish-
ing throughout our whole lives. Th e framework we need for this process is nurturing 
(and later self-nurturing), and its prime aim is the constitution of moral consciousness: 
the ability to responsibly exercise our freedom (see Fináczy 1925. 3). We can also call 
this shaping and moulding activity the learning of an organized and happy life. Peda-
gogy therefore borrows its objective from ethics. Th at is why ethics could be called the 
base-science of pedagogy (see Erdey 1936. 96). Nurturing, then, has to proceed through 
a unifi ed education of worldview, in which the intellectual, volitional and emotional di-
mensions of human consciousness should be presented as an organic whole. Educating 
the moral consciousness is not the task of only religion, it should be maintained inde-
pendently, since the quality of our human existence depends on it, although religion can 
help to elaborate it. Th e fruit of the awakening of the moral consciousness is the insight 
that we have to fi ght for the prevalence of values. In the following, I outline what makes 
human life full of struggle, but also benefi cial for the development of the personality.
Pain and suff ering as the facilitators of and potential pitfalls for 
the development of our personalities and moral consciousness
Th e sources of suff ering are found in the dimensions of human personality. Th e body 
could contact an illness, and pain signifi es it (the biological balance is upset); the psy-
che is also subject to battles, with emotional stability at stake; while faith, hope and 
love should be born in our souls as the essence of our personal worldview. One who 
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has attained personal maturity could be characterized as having unity, balance and 
harmony – therefore he is not the cause of suff ering for those in his environment. 
When we do not carry out our activities according to our best knowledge and con-
science, we have not yet acquired the proper sense of responsibility, or we are not 
using our freedom in the right (the responsible) way. In these cases we are careless 
and preoccupied (inadvertentia), do not possess the knowledge required (ignorantia), 
and we can uncritically adopt false judgements (prejudice); while fear can also hinder 
us from seeing clearly and acting the right way. In the absence of proper self-restraint, 
seeing clearly may not prevent us from the pull of our passions and impure desires. 
Habit also has an enormous infl uence on our behaviour. Torture and violence are also 
causes of suff ering (see Varga 1978. 26-30). It should be noted that the loving person 
with a mature personality can cause just pain, but only if “the beloved being should be 
changed in order to be fully capable of being loved.” (Lewis 2008. 67) It is the pain of 
nurturing a mature personality common to both tutor and nursling.
Th e crises inherent in the development of the personality are also sources of suff er-
ing: the main cause of confl icts in this area concerns the achievement of various identi-
ties, the construction of the appropriate plans of life (and loyalty towards it), or bravely 
changing an already established one (see Benkő – Szentmártoni 2002. 109-112). We have 
to fi nd a great many identities simultaneously: sexual, occupational, national, linguistic, 
and religious. Finding identity means that we have properly gained possession of the 
relevant idea, ideal, or behavioural pattern. We ultimately pass an ethical judgement on 
the propriety of our own emotions, desires and intentions – a judgement that is conveyed 
by our conscience. Th e ability to form such a correct ethical judgement is a criterion 
of human life. Personal maturity, emotional balance, self-identity and authentic reli-
gious life cannot develop without the ability to formulate proper moral judgements. Th e 
constitution of the moral judgement requires the whole person, with all of his abilities; 
his character, attitudes, subconscious determinants, emotions and his 
ability to make rational decisions. Th e whole person is visible on the sub-
jective level in the experience of self-identity […] If the moral judgement 
needs the whole person, then if someone lacks self-identity, it follows log-
ically that he is incapable of making responsible moral choices that take 
the possible consequences into account as well. Or reversing this insight: 
every situation that calls for moral judgements sheds light on the person’s 
defi cient self-identity. (Szentmártoni 1981. 127-128) 
In situations where moral decision is required, this person experiences his existen-
tial imperfection: that he is not who he is expected to be. Th is sentiment, which can be 
called existential sense of guilt, gives rise to negative emotions, that is, depression. De-
pression is just a symptom, the cry for help of a life derailed. Th ere are three main dead 
ends of human life: a) the fl ight from existential anxiety: the dead end of the life-task 
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brushed aside: if a man brushes aside existential anxiety, the development of his per-
sonality gets stuck, because he brushes aside life as a task. b) the fl ight from freedom: 
the dead end of determinism: man is afraid to take the risk involved in freedom, so he 
fi nds shelter in determinism, he conditions his decisions and makes them dependent 
on something else in order to avoid the responsibility inherent in his freedom – but he 
relinquishes the most distinctive ability of being human in the process. And fi nally c) 
fl ight from the transcendent: the dead end of the aimless life: if such a man loses his ex-
ternal social support or his biological well-being, his self-identity loses its foundations, 
and his personality is in danger of disintegration, of falling into chaos. Th is results in 
drug-abuse, nihilism, amok and suicide (see Szentmártoni 1981. 130-134). Th ese de-
railed lives are sources of great suff ering (and danger) not just for the person himself, 
but to his global environment as well. Being captive of the passions is also detrimental 
to the personality, and comes with great suff ering as well, since every idol reduces into 
slaves those who proceed without caution and recklessly seek danger. We can even say 
that the person is the hardware and the chosen religion or worldview is the soft ware, 
and in the above cases one or both of them functions improperly. 
Experiencing our guilt is also a source of suff ering, for it shows us our responsi-
bility; and we can neither place this burden on the inner necessities of human nature 
(indirectly, on the Creator), nor on the social collective or our innocent fellows. It is 
an illusion to think that the passing of time eliminates sin (see Lewis 2008. 74 & 81). 
Th e fruit of this suff ering: we realize our disobedience, express remorse and ask for 
forgiveness – while the intention to mend and to repair wakes in us.
Th e Christian man with mature personality – 
in possession of his moral consciousness
Th e fulfi lment of the heroic pursue of the Christian ideal of life is the new man, 
who is a practical idealist in his actions, who 
fi ghts for ideal but attainable goals, who is a gentle and noble soul, but 
who can hold his ground in the existential battle. Th is type turns towards 
the spiritual values, for he represents a certain aesthetic-logical-ethical 
balance. Subtlety and power combine in him. On the inside, he is bright 
and agile, on the outside, he is calm, kind, tame and strict. He has a sense 
for beauty. He is conscious, logical, but he senses coherence instinctively. 
He feels and thinks deeply. He can immerse himself in something as well 
as produce great results in action. He is insistent: his does not stop the 
work he set out to do, only death can make him abandon it. He maintains 
his composure in times of great excitement as well. He is puzzling and 
disturbing at fi rst, but later this eff ect is transformed into deep appreci-
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ation in those who make contact with him. He unites the ferocity of the 
lion and the meekness of the lamb, the passion and fi re of the Southern 
and impulsive people with the loyalty of those of the North. He is heroic, 
capable of self-sacrifi ce, and he even loves his enemies. Th rough great ac-
complishments and teaching he shows the beauty of his soul, he intrigues, 
incites suff ering mixed with pleasure in the heart of men, he enchants 
them and makes them his followers […] A certain synthesis of opposites 
is required to reach this highest level of human personality, which means 
that characteristics of a psychological type complement those of a diff er-
ent type […] like how strong emotionality complements strong self-re-
straint. Th e highest level of personality also unites the strongest courage 
to life, the affi  rmation of the personal life and the highest possible free-
dom of decisions with the most successful adaptation to the environment 
and to universal capacities. Th is is similar to the unity of determination 
and freedom, to self-determination, which is called autonomy aft er Kant. 
[…] He is the synthetic man, […] the unity of instinctiveness and con-
sciousness, […] of vitality and intellectuality. He unites […] classicism 
and romanticism, transcendentism and a sense of reality, idealism and 
realism, vita contemplativa and vita activa. […] Ingredients of a sense of 
humour are also to be found in him. (Noszlopi 2012. 172-174) 
He is prepared to suff er, and eventually die for his faith. He appreciates the value he 
believes in more than his life itself. He views suff ering as the trial of human and Chris-
tian maturity (see Davanzo 1999. 1498). Th e Christian man understands that the Son 
of God did not suff er to make suff ering of people unnecessary, but to make it identical 
with his own suff erings (see Lewis 2008. 6). Christ teaches us about the sanctity of suf-
fering, and his testimony enables suff ering to serve love (see Langen 1995. 33).
Conclusion
We introduced man as a being capable of autonomy, but who is not independent, who 
is the citizen of multiple worlds at the same time: that of biology, psychology and 
spirituality. He can only create unity and balance in his personality if the laws of the 
spirit more and more permeate the biological and psychological dimensions of his 
life. Th erefore man needs to understand and appreciate his inner and outer world, his 
activity, thereby constructing a worldview and forming moral judgement that orders 
his relations to himself, the other, the cosmos and its Master, and that designates his 
position and activities in the world. Th e mark of this unity and balance is the con-
sciousness (the worldview-fi lled parts of the self), as far as it determines our will; the 
moral consciousness gives it direction, while religion equips it with a specifi c solidity. 
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Man does not create but merely discovers the laws of the world and of his own per-
sonality; moreover, he has to recognize the essence of his humanity, his existence as 
an moral being. Moral consciousness, the categorical imperative of the moral law can 
grant the human person his maturity, the fulfi lment of his dignity; because the service 
of this law grants a person unity and balance, it grants him the way of life in which he 
does everything according to his best knowledge and conscience in all times, in the 
service of the absolute values.8 Discovery and recognition of truth is itself moral in na-
ture: I can only accept truth as the norm for my thinking and activities. Th erefore, the 
seeking, fi nding, and following of truth imply the forming of right moral judgements. 
It is not according to man’s arbitrariness 
what he should take to be moral values, but he recognizes them based 
on their absolute superiority. Respect and humility are the right kinds of 
behaviour with respect to the moral value. Th e moral value’s demand for 
unconditional realization is directed towards the absolute Reality, who, 
in his absolute being, is the absolute Value as well. (Kecskés 2003. 110)
Th erefore, the individual and society both have great tasks in the development of ma-
ture personality. Th e individual’s task is, once awakened to the fact that he is a moral be-
ing, to develop and correct himself (and should not himself be deformed), and to accept 
correction and justifi ed criticisms from society. Being human therefore is not merely a 
given fact, but an enormous moral task as well – which implies a constant struggle, since 
one has to vanquish the internal and external hurdles that keep him from the truth (prej-
udices, fears, irrational desires etc.). Th e moral order shows a man for what he should 
and should not use his intellect and free will, and what kind of sentiments he has to con-
struct in his consciousness. Respect and humble servitude of the moral order is therefore 
responsible for the maintenance of the unity and balance between man and his fellows as 
well as between him and his environment (see Kecskés 2003. 127).
If constructing and fi ghting for the moral consciousness is the most important hu-
man task, the precondition of peace and prosperity in society, then the basic obligation 
of the power representing society is to ensure that its members take the development 
of their moral consciousness to be their prime objective. In the case of education, this 
should mean that the most important subject should be ethics, since without the prop-
er moral consciousness our human dignity remains a mere torso, which is the source 
of great unhappiness. Regarding society, it is not irrelevant what kinds of behaviour a 
given power takes to be ideal or tolerable. Without ethical maturity, the individual and 
his society both remain incapable of looking at specifi c behaviours from the vantage 
point of an ideal. Th e main tasks of society and the power representing it and guiding 
it towards its aims therefore are the following: a) negatively, it has to defend its citizens 
8 In the absence of this, man suff ocates in the swamp of his desires and thoughts (see Cattaneo 2014. 5-9).
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from destructive forces threatening their personality; b) positively, it has to facilitate 
the solidifi cation of an intact moral common knowledge, and representatives of power 
should also endeavour to reach the heights of the moral ideal and lead by example. 
Th e mature personality is therefore emotionally balanced, and a major in an ethical 
and religious sense. It is signed by the purposive way of life, the integrity of the person-
ality, the ability to make responsible decisions, creativity and the ability to serve com-
munity life (self-abnegation), and the respect of norms and their hierarchy (see Boda 
1985. 161-167). As long as we fail to educate members of the society to properly re-
spect norms, to be loyal to them, to admit their obligatory powers in their conscience, 
there would be no peace neither within hearts nor between nations.
Th e fruit of the battle for personal dignity is the disciplined man who is capable of 
self-nurturing, who is able to develop his emotional intelligence, to deepen his moral 
consciousness and perfect his worldview until the end of his life. Th is battle is the 
price of being humane, which not only requires sacrifi cum intellectus, but sacrifi cum 
voluntatis et sensuum as well. Emotional state, moral consciousness and religious iden-
tity are the three main tenets of man’s personal maturity, as they all presuppose one 
another, and none of them is reducible to the other two. Th e emotional state is pri-
marily responsible for loving values in the right way (belonging to them in the right 
way), moral consciousness is responsible for the knowledge and mandatory character 
of norms, and religion serves as a fi nal support for the will. Th eir establishment is in 
a certain sense related to age. In the case of children, we should aim to develop the 
emotional basis of moral behaviour. In adolescence, the intellectual dimension of the 
moral consciousness is to be primarily developed, while the maturing person needs 
to reach religious self-identity for the fi nal maturation of the personality. All of these 
criteria are important, but the quality of the moral consciousness is perhaps the most 
important of them all. For man is a historical being as well, who is nurtured by former 
generations who pass on to him what is regarded to be most valuable, programming 
his consciousness in the process. To be able to judge what is the most valuable presup-
poses the correct ability of making moral judgements. Th e man with an intact moral 
consciousness will be able to know what could become a right, what should and should 
not be made proper; what is and what is not a value for future generations to acquire. 
We should therefore assert that it is in a certain sense impossible to gain emotional 
stability if there are errors in our moral consciousness (or in that of the generation 
teaching us), since that is what has the fi nal say on what should and should not hap-
pen. Moral consciousness, or the right judgement is what assigns and balances out 
the appropriate emotions; although that ability of self-correction is also an object of 
education. Moral consciousness also functions as the basis of religious consciousness, 
since it is what decides what can be a proper religious doctrine or way of life.
Man, however, has a certain freedom against the imperative of the moral order in a 
psychological sense: he can disagree with it, deny it, overwrite it, and distort it. Human 
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dignity then becomes more-or-less a mere torso, from the individual stuck on the level of 
conventionality, through the amoral personality all the way to the diabolical man (those 
who could not become somebody, personality, and those who brought out the worst in 
themselves – see Szentmártoni 1978. 78-127). Th e appropriately possessed moral con-
sciousness means the responsible and right usage of human intellect and freedom.
If humanity constitutes a single species, then it belongs to one and the same rea-
sonable nature, meaning that there is only one order of truth, goodness and beauty 
encoded in it (see Höff ner 2002. 281-282). Th erefore, there can be only one objec-
tively valid and right order of morality and law (see Gatti 2008. 679-692). Discov-
ering, recognizing, and following it, however, is not strictly subjugated to the law of 
development, since there can be eras in which humans are professional giants, while 
remaining moral dwarves. True development is only possible through the discovery, 
recognition and pursue of the right moral order. According to Christian philosophy, 
we can acquire knowledge of the essence of the moral order that is comprised of rather 
few basic principles in the vein of human rights. Th ereby the Augustinian principle 
of legitimate diversity, essential unity, and love in everything is guaranteed. If man 
attempts to orient himself according to his best knowledge and conscience, he can fi nd 
the time-proven principles and norms of this ordo ethicus in the sense of perennitas,9 
and he will be able to navigate through their hierarchy. Th ere is only one basic moral 
order – that is the key to eliminate double standards, and that is how the recurring at-
tempts and spectres of arbitrariness which wants to tamper it could be precluded. Th is 
is how specifi c moral systems could be compared, and how their objective value could 
be established.10 It is only in this way that specifi c, compatible, but legitimately diverse 
ethical systems can be established. Th ese principles have a common essential content, 
therefore accepting them amounts to accepting their content, their normative values 
and their binding power. In this way, it is possible to establish the ethical code of basic 
human duties that could serve as a foundation for human rights. Although should 
we be able to map out the rules of such a basic ethical code, it is important to know 
that man usually lacks the power to compare himself to the norm all the time and act 
according to its imperatives. Acting against the moral order is harmful to our fellow 
men, it damages our own dignity, and neglects or despises the author of the moral 
order. Th is process, that is to be found in every human being, raises, on the one hand, 
9 Latin has at least three words for “eternal”: perpetuitas, aeternitas and perennitas.
10 Following Pál Kecskés, we can show the mistakes of various moral systems in two ways: 1. immanent 
criticism that uncovers inherent contradictions in the system, and 2. objective criticism, that follows the 
principles of another system (with its own possibility of mistakes), or performs its evaluating (but not cond-
emnatory) activities according to timeless principles. When there is no absolute standard, then objective 
criticism can only be practised aft er proclaiming a certain system to be that standard, but which can ne-
vertheless be relativized in the name of another system. Let us not forget though, that truth is more-or-less 
incarnated in every ethical system. If we correctly identify seeds of truth in the specifi c systems, we can in 
principle construct a more fully true system (see Kecskés 1981. 41).
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the painful questions of sin, remorse and forgiveness – and on the other the possibility 
and necessity of external – perhaps divine – help. 
If there is no one singular objectively valid moral order, and if there is no such 
order of absolute values, then truth, morality and beauty also fail to have a universal 
point of reference; therefore truth, morality and beauty are constructed by human ar-
bitrariness, by the more powerful man, who construct and modify it according to his 
own selfi sh interests. Th e unforeseeable consequences of such a situation regarding 
the life and future of humanity are easily understood. Th en man truly becomes wolf to 
himself and his fellow men, and even to his environment. If the order of morality does 
not pervade human consciousness, runaway phenomena known in evolutionary biol-
ogy tend to manifest themselves in culture as well, and they make not only social, but 
individual processes of living a life uncontrollable (see Csányi 2010. 11-21). Egoism, 
which is one of the main obstacles in the way of becoming a mature personality, could 
be considered an evolutionary dead-end, the benefi ts of which are only short-lived 
(see Freund 2014. 7-12). Th is also means that man is in need of authentic help in order 
to truly possess his moral consciousness – he should not be left  alone in his quests. His 
helpers in waking and developing the moral consciousness are his parents, teachers 
and religious personnel, whose authority and competence should be recognized by 
both the individual and society. Th e individual in whom the moral consciousness has 
awakened should also want to possess his humanity and the battles inherent in the pro-
cess. Christian education places the emphasis in this respect on the awakening of the 
nursling’s obligations towards being human. Th e Christian attitude towards life, value 
system and worldview do not distance themselves from anything in which Christianity 
recognizes humane values – it considers them his own, which makes it capable of fac-
tual discourse, brotherly and tolerant conduct. It is also aware that the same behaviour 
could depict diff erent values, and that diff erent kinds of behaviour could embody the 
same value. Man is an reasonable being who is capable of understanding the essence 
of his dignity which he interiorizes not due to his obligations but because of the trust 
he has in something that is bigger than him. Christianity is specifi cally the religion of 
ethics, fostered by three enormous spiritual legacies. Th e fi rst one is the Jewish ethi-
cal monotheism. Th e second is constituted by the basic principles of human thought, 
which we owe to the ancient Greeks. And the third is the legal thinking of the Roman 
people. Th is fertile ground served as the basis for the science and practice of ethical 
thinking and action to blossom, for which we have the great philosophers of the Chris-
tian Antiquity and the Middle Ages to thank (see Bognár 1930. 884). But what does 
the ethical have to do with the rules of thinking and the principles of law? Th is con-
nection is to be found in how ethics is the basis of thinking and the legal point of view 
as well, since reasonable thought itself is ethical in nature, for it is only to truth that we 
should cling to; while legal practice also has its ethical foundations, since forced and 
unprincipled adherence to rights (both in law-making and law-enforcement) results in 
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the greatest injustice (summum ius summa iniuria). Ultimately, the Christian view of 
the world is a) negatively, one of the strongest bastions defending moral consciousness 
from errors, destructive forces, ulterior emotions capable of inciting hysteria, and irra-
tional factors; b) positively, one of the most noble religious powers teaching about the 
ideal of humanity. Th is ideal creates saints: people who are able to heroically practice 
moral virtues, who have reached the highest possible level of approaching the moral 
ideal, who have developed in themselves the purest quality of moral consciousness, 
who have truly reached the state of personal maturity.
Th e basis-nature of ethics regarding human emotions, thinking and actions shines 
through all of this, and Christianity has made a lasting impact in this area – that is why 
it is fruitful to study its legacy, its living traditions, in order for the highest possible 
amount of people to approach personal maturity, their own essences and the spirit-
uality through which it can be expressed; to fi nd religion (fi tting in with their own 
personalities, too), that turns them into somebody who is worthy to be called a man, 
in life and death alike.
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I’ll Take Revenge for my Mother’s Soul, 
but Killing without Reason is Sin
Morals and Values in Siberian Nganasan Society
VIRÁG DYEKISS
Nganasan people live around the Arctic circle on the Taymyr Peninsula. Th e 
extreme climate and living conditions also aff ect the set of rules within the 
society. Every folklore has its own system refl ecting the norms within a society 
and the values that have developed through the lifestyle and the options for 
survival. Th e life of Nganasans revolve around hunting for reindeer. Th ey fol-
low the migration path of herds, carrying their equipments on sleighs pulled 
by their domesticated reindeer. Families (sometimes two to three) traveling 
together belong to one clan, and during large hunts and main festivities they 
meet people from other clans as well. When this supporting community dis-
appears, the life of the individual becomes desperate. In order to survive, they 
need to fi nd new partners as soon as possible. Values are based on the inter-
dependence between people in the community and that the individual is rel-
atively worthless when it comes to the interest of the community. Th eir world 
is made up of several creatures: humans, animals, plants, spirits of deceased 
people and diff erent legendary creatures. Each of these are separate nations 
and are regarded as moral creatures within their own societies. Th e diff erent 
creatures have their own way of perceiving and understanding the world, and 
this all builds up around hunting. People see reindeer as their prey while evil 
spirits see people as their prey. Letting a potential prey live is a sin, but not 
considering the partner’s (let it be an animal) point of view is also punished. 
Th is multi-viewpoint value system is one of the basis of animism. 
Nganasan people, along with Nenets and Enets belong to the Northern Samoyedic lan-
guage group. Th ese peoples are part of the Uralic language family, therefore they have a 
distant relation to Hungarian language. Th eir home is the Western part of the Taymyr 
Peninsula that is located in the Taymyr Autonomous Okrug. Th ey call themselves ’nya’ 
which means ’someone who belongs to a compeer’, ’Tavgi Samoyeds’ was a commonly 
used name for them in Russian literature earlier.
In the latest census that was carried out in Russia in 2002, 834 people claimed that 
they belong to the Nganasan people. Th is low number can be regarded as constant 
throughout the centuries, because the harsh environment can not support more peo-
ple. Unfortunately, the number of native speakers decreases radically nowadays.
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Nganasans traditionally lived a nomadic lifestyle. Th eir main occupations were fi sh-
ing and hunting – their main games were wild reindeer, furry animals and birds. In the 
summer they sometimes travelled 600-700 kms from South to North, and came back in 
the fall; because wild reindeer went to the Northern part of the Taymyr Peninsula, where 
they ate grass, the branches of willows and were protected from mosquitoes. However in 
the fall they set out again because of the hurricane-like icy storms and lack of food, and 
went back South to the woody tundra and taiga zone. Migration and the strong ties with 
nature are part of their culture’s basic experiences. Summer’s duty was to preserve food 
for winter storage. Reindeer breeding had a less signifi cant role in their lives, but every 
family had its small reindeer herd. Domesticated reindeer were primarily used for pull-
ing sleighs, but they used every little part of wild reindeer from head to toe, because their 
skin and dog coat are necessary for their clothing and for making tent sheets needed for 
residing. For ritual proposes only domesticated reindeer were used.
Because of their nomadic lifestyle, Nganasans could keep their independence until 
the 19th century. Th e assimilation eff orts in the fi ft ies brought about a drastic change in 
their lives. Th e up until that point migrating Nganasan groups were relocated to villages 
with Russian and Dolgan population, and their traditional lifestyle almost completely 
vanished. Th e capital of the territory is Dudinka, but most Nganasan residents live in 
Ust-Avam. Along with the loss of their lifestyle and language, their culture changed rad-
ically, but with the help of folklore literature we can take a look at this vanishing world.
Nganasan beliefs fi t into the shaman beliefs of the arctic region, their world is fi lled 
and determined by diff erent deities, helping or hostile spirits. When studying the be-
liefs of indigenous people, we traditionally distinguish miraculous beings, animals and 
people, which appear in diff erent creature categories. We determine that, although 
according to the theory of animism (Tylor 1871) they all have souls, their way of living 
is diff erent, and in the belief system they all have their own, well distinguishable roles.
When studying Nganasan folklore, however, it is striking that these categories are 
not evident, the border separating diff erent creatures is permeable and malleable. Th is 
malleability does not only appear in myths, but in rites and customs described by dif-
ferent researchers as well. Th e same was observed by Rane Willerslev (2004, 2007) 
during his 18-month-long fi eldwork among the Yukaghirs, and by Viverios de Cas-
tro (1998, 2012) during his research in Amazonia. Th e way of the approach is called 
perspectivism by Castro, because he believes that the essence of the worldview is, ac-
cording to these indigenous people, that the diff erent creatures all perceive the living, 
dynamic world from their own point of view. Th ere is only physical diff erence between 
spirits, animals (predators and prey animals) and people, but they are all spirits. If 
special circumstances do not obtain, people see people as people, animals as animals 
and spirits as spirits (that is if they see them at all). Meanwhile prey animals perceive 
people as predators or spirits, while spirits and predators see people as prey. At the 
same time they take themselves to be people with culture, language, family structure 
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and inhabitance, into which others either cannot gain an insight or can only do so in 
special cases. Th is way multiple viewpoints appear regarding cosmology, where dif-
ferent creatures can percieve certain phenomena diff erently. At the same time values 
are compulsory for all peoples, and it includes several components that do take into 
account whether we talk about people, animals or deities.
In this study I analyze the moral system presented in the Nganasan folklore narratives. 
Th e Nganasan folklore has been collected since the 1930s, but the people’s knowledge of 
Russian developed slowly. Today we can still fi nd some Nganasans who do not speak Rus-
sian at all. Th is is the reason why ethnologists Boris O. Dolgih and Andrej A. Popov, who 
visited the area in the 1930s, could hardly fi nd any Russian-speaking Nganasan. Th ere-
fore, they had to conduct their research in Dolgan and with the help of an interpreter, in 
very poor Russian. Labanauskas Kazis, a Lithuanian researcher, and Valentin Gusev, a 
Russian linguist, with his colleagues have all contributed to a text corpus in Nganasan, 
which serves as the most important source for this study. Th e texts, accurately recorded 
for linguistic analysis, together with a precise translation and a special dictionary, tripled 
the size of the accessible Nganasan corpus. Aft er a thorough, critical review, folklore texts 
recorded in Russian can also be used as source. Th us, Galina Gracheva’s fi eld notes and 
the published works of Boris Dolgih’s folklore research from the 1930s and the collections 
of Jurij B. Simchenko from the 1970s and ‘80s can also be included in the analysis. 
Th e folklore texts used as a source mainly include myths, epic songs and some nar-
ratives about famous shamans. Th e most important texts are the long heroic epics, the 
sitebis. Th ese belong to the genre of epic songs, and have recitative, sung and spoken 
parts. All the texts used for the analysis are based on the lifestyle the Nganasans led 
before they have settled. Th us they represent their traditional worldview. Since these 
stories were considered to be sacred, their main elements changed very slowly over 
time. Th e same conclusion can be drawn from the similarity of the various texts. From 
the contrasting data it is clear that Nganasans did not have a unifi ed set of beliefs about 
the human life. Th erefore, we are only able to draw some broad outlines. 
One of the main function of myths, historical and mythical heroic songs and texts 
about shaman tales or stories of supernatural encounters, in every society, is to help and 
teach how to get by in the world. It is also true regarding that fact that the system of norms 
are learned – inter alia – through these stories, to which they could refer back to, and 
which also provided sources for legitimation. Th ere were stories that presented a sin and 
its punishment as a cautionary tale, although its opposite appeared as well: the trickster 
fi gure, who sometimes appears as the wraith of the culture hero, and other times as the 
fool who does not apply the basic rules of living in this world. Th e actions of the trickster 
highlight the negative side of certain norms, and the story builds around these elements.
If we read the epic stories of diff erent peoples, we may marvel that the same basic 
story appears with a completely diff erent tone in diff erent communities. It may hap-
pen, that we do not understand the line of events, or we are shocked because it is full 
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of unexpected twists, or perhaps we face unnecessary cruelty. Each folklore has its 
principles, which refer to a society’s inner system of norms as well as the values crys-
tallized by its lifestyle and the possibilities of survival – taking all this into account, the 
previously uninterpretable text becomes clear. Th e natural environment of Nganasans 
create circumstances that make an impression on their values.
Community and individuals
Th e main value for Nganasans, this nomadic group of people, is the community of converg-
ing people who help each other. Families who wander together belong to one (sometimes 
two or three) clans, and they meet the members of other clans during prominent feasts or 
huntings (Popov 1966). If this supporting community ceases to exist, the life of the individ-
ual becomes hopeless, he has to fi nd new companions to secure his survival. Th e commu-
nity and the individual are inseparably related, they mutually presuppose one another. Th e 
shaman’s relation to the community maps this point of view very well: in case there is sor-
row threatening members of the community, the shaman goes on a trip to the otherworld 
to propitiate the harmful deity or to fi ght with it for the human soul. Th e shaman “takes” all 
the people living together with him, since the triangles on the spine and bottom of the sha-
man’s clothes represent the tents of those standing behind him. (Kortt-Simchenko 1990, 
Gracheva 1996.) Without them, the shaman would be lost in the otherworld. Th is way he 
not only helps those committed to him, but he is dependant on them as well.
Th e desires, health and life of the individual are all secondary when it comes to the 
interests of the community. In case they go hunting as a group, everyone has their own 
tasks and they can obtain all the meat that lasts until the end of winter, all at once. Th ey 
force the wild reindeer herd into a lake or river, and the best hunters shoot them with 
arrows. Although when hunting individually there is room for the skills of the young 
man, in this case the most important task of the less experienced hunters is to keep the 
reindeer on the path, not to bring down the game. If they happen to do so, there is a 
chance the animals will spread and they will not reach the water where it is harder for 
them to move and it is easier to bring them down (Popov 1966.). Deranging the group 
hunt results in death or extrusion from the community. Th e ambitions of the individ-
ual must not come about at the expense of the community.
For the Nganasan people famine was the most threatening of all adversities. Ac-
cording to one shaman tale, a shaman who was facing starvation discovered that the 
failures were caused by a deity who wished to have the most beautiful woman in the 
camp, the daughter-in-law of the shaman. Th e shaman promptly strangled the woman 
before her daughters’ very eyes. Th e woman herself accepted this as the natural course 
of action. Her husband, however, who arrived from hunting with a wild reindeer as his 
prey shortly aft er the episode, moved away to another encampment, and never spoke 
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to his father again (N-06_otryvok.doc). Th e woman’s life was less valuable than the 
lives of the many she saved by sacrifi cing her own. Th e Nganasan people did not and 
could not protect the lives of the individuals at any cost. Sickly people or a woman in 
labor for example could not be taken along on the journey following the reindeer, thus 
the group is forced to leave these individuals behind at their previous encampment. Th ey 
could not jeopardize the survival of the whole group for the well-being of the sick.
Killing and punishment
Th e punishment for any wrongdoings also stems from the connection between the 
individual and the community. Committing off enses always results in punishment, 
and in the Nganasan folklore the punishment is oft en aimed not at the perpetrator, but 
rather at his or her community, or people close to the off ender. Th e punishment oft en 
comes in the form of death to the sinners’ acquaintances, and this results in the sinner 
ending up alone, without a community. In Hungarian folklore, the punishment usually 
strikes those who commit the sin, whereas here the most profound punishment is for 
the sinner to end up all alone, and thus lose his or her roots.
Th e orphaned child or the individual who has become all alone sets out to fi nd 
companions. Taking in a lonely roamer was not a moral obligation according to the 
Nganasan ethics, but it was considered a virtue. It was however forbidden to hurt or 
kill these lonely individuals, even if there was no reason to believe that they had any-
one left  to avenge the harm infl icted upon them, or their death.
Th e most grievous sin in the eyes of the Nganasan people is killing without a reason. 
An individual’s life is not only their own, and by ending it the off ender harms the whole 
community. For a sin such as this one, the perpetrator must pay with their own life, even 
if they are a signifi cant hero, a savior of many, the protagonist of a heroic song lasting 
several days. Th ese heroic songs are usually built upon a central act of vengeance (eg. 
Labanauskas 2001). Th e hero starts his journey for either this reason, or to fi nd refuge 
somewhere, but eventually he comes upon malevolent characters, who threaten to take 
his life, and thus the vengeance becomes well-founded. If the hero does not face malig-
nance in the song, than the opposite parties initially don’t match their strengths in a le-
thal combat, but rather some form of challenge or contest (such as an eating challenge or 
a jumping contest). Justifi ed vengeance is not considered a sin, indeed neither is it a sin 
to kill all the residents of a hostile encampment in order to move closer to the antagonist, 
the true enemy. Th e heroes of the myths and tales stand for the whole community. When 
everyone dies during the combat, and only the hero and the antagonist stay alive for the 
fi nal battle, the community has served its purpose: it defended the strongest, the sha-
manic hero, who maintained their life up to this point. (K-06_Lakuna.doc) By the end 
of these tales, one genus perishes completely, but all the nameless casualties practically 
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don’t even have any signifi cance, the shaman or the hero is always in the focal point of 
the events. Th e hero’s death is always equal to the death of the community, however the 
death of the community does not necessarily mean the death of the hero.
Th e victorious hero oft en gets used to the act of killing, or starts to perceive any 
unknown individuals as enemies, thus he begins to kill innocent people, which in turn 
leads to his own death.
If we accept that the Nganasan people somehow view the animals which are im-
portant to them (reindeer, bears, dogs etc.) as similar to them, or even as persons, then 
we must ask the question why killing in the course of hunting is a righteous act, why 
it is not perceived as a sin. Based on the folklore we can state that the prey gives its life 
voluntarily to the hunter, it wishes to off er its hide and meat to him. Th e killing of an 
animal has its proper way: the animal must be hit on the neck, or, if a trap is used to 
catch the prey, then it must be hit on the head when captured. Th e animal’s soul and 
strength are in its eyes, so these must be removed and, aft er saying a short prayer, left  
on the ground. Th is way the animal’s soul will return to Mother Earth, and a new ani-
mal can be born. If this ritual is not completed, or if the hunter willfully fails to kill the 
animal off ered to him, he is acting erroneously.
Furthermore, it is not acceptable for the hunter to fi nish off  with his – either human 
or animal – prey, even if he is righteously pursuing them. For example he must not 
kick, yank or scold his dead foe, and he must not yell at its corpse.
Th e prohibition of off ending the dead is not a unique rule, there are also norms 
which regulate the individual’s relationship with his peers, with strangers, and with 
other species – animals, the dead, and mythic creatures.
Sin or right?
Nagging, pointless questioning, harassing or just bothering the other person is a serious sin 
in Nganasan folklore. Questioning the decision of the shaman or of other leaders, or asking 
them questions is so absurd, that such things are not even found in texts. Th ere are texts 
however, where someone will be asking an animal to acquire information. It is considered 
harassment if people are noisy in the location of totems or if people are wandering around 
a funeral sleigh or a tomb. Th e consequence of such sins in folklore is death.
Th e judgement of theft  is controversial in texts. Here we fi nd the multi-aspect ap-
proach mentioned before. Th eft  is a rather serious crime among the Nganasans, the 
thief has to be punished, may even be killed. Since people have to make a living from 
very little, the loss of that little may deprive the victim of survival. Th e shaman who 
is also the leader of the campsite is in some sense the owner of the people led by him, 
the people he has under his power, and their death appears like the theft  committed by 
illness-demons that steal the human soul and devour it. Th e shaman sets out to avenge 
the crime or to fi nd out its causes.
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One’s life can be stolen in a much more tangible way as well – the stealing of a wife 
makes a man’s life impossible, for he cannot survive alone. Th e stealing of a wife is a 
crime the husband must avenge, and the off ender must be destroyed (Dolgih 1967).
However, if a reindeer is licking fat, or a wolf kills the reindeer at night, or perchance 
a one-armed and one-legged man is stealing meat in the middle of the night, one should 
take into account the thief ’s situation (Labanauskas 2001.). Th ere are numerous stories 
built around theft s where, from the aspect of a man who is seriously or mildly harmed, 
while the other party considers the stolen goods as ordinary booty or rightful property 
he is entitled to, the former takes revenge for the injury committed against him.
Th e prohibitions and values discussed so far apply equally to the creatures of the world 
of humans, animals and of the supernatural. Th eft , unnecessary harassment, and senseless 
murder are forbidden. Each nation has its own internal set of values, however, because each 
interprets the world in its own way. What appears to be senseless murder for man, may be 
harmless hunting for the human-eating giant, and as such it is certainly not a crime.
Preserving the values
On behalf of the deities, the earthly protector of the standards is the bear. Th e Bears are a 
transition between the benevolent mythological creatures, and people and animals; they 
are at home in all three worlds. Th e bear is usually mercyful, the friend of man (Gracheva 
1983). Of himself he says he has a soul, has a mind (korse) and it is straight and fl at. Ac-
cording to man, the bear is like a man, it is indiff erent whether we speak about a man or a 
bear, since both understand the human speech. Th e bear never traspasses the mandatory 
or optional rules delineated by human values. Th ese rules apply to him self-evidently, 
since he is just a human, but his original dwelling place is not here but in the upper 
world. He takes revenge against both people and animals if he sees a serious violation. He 
tells the wolf, who is a powerful predator like himself, that it is wrong to kill the reindeer 
herds without limitation to devour meat. He strictly punishes the off ences of humans as 
well; this is his important task in the world order. He threatens with destruction or death 
all those who commit unnecessary killing without proper cause for revenge. Th e pun-
ishment is particularly severe in the case of killing a defenceless woman or child. In this 
case the bear may kill not only the off ender, but his whole family as well (Dolgih 1976).
Just as the human rules apply to the bear, the Nganasan man has to regard the bear 
as his brother, and cannot kill him unless the bear is asking for it. Th e bear will express 
a death wish by jumping in the path of an arrow or not leaving despite calls from the 
hunter, acting like he is waiting for him. Th e bear understands human language, there-
fore his staying expresses his wish to be killed (Popov 1984).
In the human world, the keeper of the norms is the shaman. He is the arbitrator in 
disputes, and he is also able to fi nd the cause of any problems brought on by super-
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natural powers: he can explain these problems and also fend them off . For this very 
reason it is very dangerous for the shaman himself to make any mistakes. According to 
a legend that can be found in many variations, a very powerful shaman skinned an or-
phan girl to use her skin to create a drum that would be more powerful than any other 
drums. Th e drum was created and it did have the sound of a thunder, but the shaman 
had to pay the price for his actions, and his whole genus perished, because their leader 
killed a person for the wrong reason (eg. D-03_EN+ES-1.doc).
Conclusion
Many ideas unusual to us are perfectly logical consequences of the world order according 
to the Nganasan world view: human life carries less of an individual value than in our world 
view, in the Nganasan people’s eyes the genus is of real signifi cance – only a strong commu-
nity assures survival. Th e unity of nature and man, respecting every other creature besides 
humans is of crucial importance. Without this, life would be impossible on this desolate 
land. Th ere is an unstable equilibrium that has to be protected, and anything that endangers 
it must be severely punished. Th is is the message conveyed by the order in the myths.
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Common Preconceptions and their Application 
in Epictetus
ÁGOSTON GUBA
In my paper I discuss a late example of the Stoic theory of common precon-
ceptions in Epictetus, and I seek to show what might be considered primar-
ily Epictetan in it. For Epictetus the practical issues are in the foreground. 
Assuming the impossibility of moral confl ict as the consequence of the main 
characteristics of preconceptions, he held that philosophical education is 
necessary for the correct application of preconceptions. I will argue that 
only taking into account the criteria of happiness enables someone to apply 
the preconceptions correctly, only to the sphere of choice, in other words, to 
those things that are in our power. In the last part of my paper I outline a 
possible connection between the application of preconceptions and theology. 
One of the most discussed issues in ancient philosophy is the Stoic theory of com-
mon conceptions or preconceptions. Th e amount of sources about this theory that 
have come down to us is quite limited, and even the majority of the relevant sources 
(Plutarch, Alexander of Aphrodisias, Sextus Empiricus) survived in polemic works 
against Stoics. What seems to be certain is that the theory originated from Chrysippus, 
who in addition to the cognitive impression (phantasia katalēptikē) regarded precon-
ceptions as criteria of truth as well1; moreover, according to another source, Chrysip-
pus also maintained that these conceptions are innate (emphytoi prolēpseis).2 However, 
the faithful reconstruction of the theory raises several questions. How can the theory 
be reconciled with the empirical position of the Stoics? What are those things exactly 
that have preconceptions? How can they function as criteria of truth? What is the rela-
tion between the diff erent terms referring seemingly to the same kind of conceptions 
(koinē ennoia, prolēpsis, physikē ennoia, etc.)? Diff erent interpretations have emerged 
concerning this topic in scholarship.3
1 DL 7.54 (= LS 40A)
2 Plut. St. rep. 1041E (= LS 60B) 
3 Bonhöff er (1890) was the fi rst who treated the common (pre)conceptions comprehensively in his Epictet 
und die Stoa. His interpretation, in a simplifi ed way, was that the common preconceptions were restricted 
to the sphere of ethics and theology. In his opinion, although people are born together with preconceptions, 
these are present in them in embryonic state. Later Sandbach (1931) – whose interpretation has become 
widely accepted – refused this view. With the thorough analysis of numerous texts, Sandbach demonstrated 
that the theory of preconceptions in Bonhöff er’s interpretation is irreconcilable with the known empirical 
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In my paper I discuss how common preconceptions appear in a late Stoic work, 
the Discourses of Epictetus. I do not deal with the basic questions of research and I 
do not discuss to what extent can Epictetus be considered an authentic source of the 
original theory of the early Stoa.4 I show that for Epictetus the theory of preconcep-
tions is relevant rather on the practical than the theoretical level: he focuses on the 
application of preconceptions in practical ethics, and not so much on their role in 
epistemology. First, I go through the general characteristics of preconceptions and 
the special epistemological status they have (Section 1). Th en I explicate how precon-
ceptions are presented in practical context in Epictetus. Th e genuine characteristics of 
preconceptions would not allow moral confl ict, but its existence shows the necessity of 
philosophical education, and the realization of the reason of the confl ict means, in the 
words of Epictetus, the beginning of philosophy (Section 2). In order to be able to ful-
fi l their function as canons in particular cases, preconceptions are articulated during 
the philosophical education. Th e conditions that make happiness possible reveal that 
the sphere of application of preconceptions can solely be those things that are in our 
power (Section 3). Next, I outline the possible connections between the application 
of preconceptions and theology (Section 4). Finally, I sum up the main arguments of 
my paper and make some general conclusions about the Epictetan theory of common 
preconceptions (Section 5).5 
Th e general characteristics of preconceptions
Based on the titles given by Arrian the central themes of some discourses is connected 
to preconceptions: On Preconceptions (Peri tōn prolēpseōn; 1.22) and How Should We 
Apply Our Preconceptions To Particular Instances? (Pōs epharmosteon tas prolēpseis tois 
epi merous; 2.17). However, it would be misleading and would not provide a complete 
view of the topic if one considered only these, since the writings of the Discourses do 
not explicate a given philosophical topic systematically in the manner of treatises, but 
several related texts can be found in diff erent parts of the work. Th erefore, in addition 
position of the Stoics. He dismissed some of the sources as untrustworthy, among them also Epictetus. Sa-
ndbach’s fi nal conclusion is that since the Stoic notion derives from the Epicurean philosophy, they are not 
innate but obtained through perception. Of the recent interpretations I also refer to that of Jackson-McCabe 
(2004) that, breaking with the aforementioned dichotomy, explained the innate character of preconceptions 
described in the texts with the theory of oikeiōsis. Most recently Dysson (2009) discussed in detail the theory 
in his Prolepsis and Ennoia in the Early Stoa. 
4 Belonging to the late Stoa, usually Epictetus is not among the authentic sources in respect to this topic. 
However, it is worth pointing out that the Discourses suggest that Epictetus knew the works of Chrysippus 
much better, and these had a more signifi cant infl uence on him than it would be implied by the point of view 
following the traditional periodization of the Stoa (cf. 1.4.28-32).
5 Th e translations are based on Hard (1995). Whenever I found necessary, I slightly modifi ed his translations. 
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to the two above-mentioned discourses, in my paper I will also rely on several passages 
of other diff erent works. One of the general descriptions of preconceptions can be read 
at the beginning of the 1.22:6
Preconceptions are common to all men; and one preconception does 
not contradict another. For, who of us does not assume, that the good is 
advantageous and what we should choose, and, in all circumstances, seek 
and pursue? And which of us does not assume that justice is fair and be-
coming? Whence, then, arises the confl ict? In applying these preconcep-
tions to particular cases. As when one person cries: ‘He acted well, he is a 
courageous man’; and another: ‘No, he is out of his senses.’ Hence arises 
the confl ict of men with one another. Th is is the confl ict between Jews 
and Syrians and Egyptians and Romans, not whether holiness should be 
honoured above all else and pursued in all circumstances, but whether 
eating swine’s fl esh be consistent with holiness or not. (1.22. 1-4)7
Two essential characteristics of preconceptions are present in the fi rst sentence. 
Th e fi rst one (“common to all men”), in all likelihood, refers to their universal attrib-
ute, i.e. every single human-being qua human-being has them. Th e second part of the 
sentence is less obvious, because it can be interpreted in two diff erent ways: (1) the 
preconceptions of two men about the same thing do not contradict each other, or (2) 
the preconceptions about two diff erent things do not contradict each other. (In the 
second interpretation, thus, the statement is independent from the human beings and 
it claims that preconceptions make up a consistent system.) If one takes into consider-
ation the entire text, the fi rst interpretation seems to be more probable: people outline 
a given preconception in the same way, but their opinions on which concrete entities 
belong to the class of this preconception are diff erent.8
6 Although – as I mentioned – generally Epictetus is not considered to be among the most important sour-
ces of the theory of common (pre)conceptions of the early Stoa, this section is exceptional: even Long and 
Sedley include it as an authentic source in their edition (40S), but they omit other passages in the Discourses 
regarding the common preconceptions (e.g. 2.11.1-4 that I quote in the next passage). All the passages of 
Epictetus are reported in the Appendix D of Dysson (2009). However, it is controversial whether that was the 
original meaning of “common” (koinai) in the early Stoa: Obbink (1992) has convincingly argued that the 
expression meant just “widespread” rather than “common to all”.
7 Προλήψεις κοιναὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις εἰσίν· καὶ πρόληψις προλήψει οὐ μάχεται. τίς γὰρ ἡμῶν οὐ τίθησιν, ὅτι 
τὸ ἀγαθὸν συμφέρον ἐστι καὶ αἱρετὸν καὶ ἐκ πάσης αὐτὸ περιστάσεως δεῖ μετιέναι καὶ διώκειν; τίς δ’ ἡμῶν οὐ 
τίθησιν, ὅτι τὸ δίκαιον καλόν ἐστι καὶ πρέπον; πότ’ οὖν ἡ μάχη γίνεται; περὶ τὴν ἐφαρμογὴν τῶν προλήψεων 
ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις, ὅταν ὁ μὲν εἴπῃ ’καλῶς ἐποίησεν, ἀνδρεῖός ἐστιν’· ‘οὔ, ἀλλ’ ἀπονενοημένος.’ ἔνθεν ἡ 
μάχη γίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς ἀλλήλους. αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ Ἰουδαίων καὶ Σύρων καὶ Αἰγυπτίων καὶ Ῥωμαίων 
μάχη, οὐ περὶ τοῦ ὅτι τὸ ὅσιον πάντων προτιμητέον καὶ ἐν παντὶ μεταδιωκτέον, ἀλλὰ πότερόν ἐστιν ὅσιον 
τοῦτο τὸ χοιρείου φαγεῖν ἢ ἀνόσιον.
8 Th e fi rst interpretation is supported by 4.1.44-45 as well. Providing two similar possible interpretations, 
Dobbin advocates also the fi rst one (Dobbin 1998. 191).
74  ¨  ÁGOSTON GUBA
Besides, the general characteristics of preconceptions are described in another pas-
sage of the Discourses. Th at is the introductory part of What Is Th e Beginning Of Phi-
losophy? (2.11):
Th e beginning of philosophy, at least for those who enter upon it in the 
proper way and by the front door, is a consciousness of our own weak-
ness, and incapacity with regard to necessary things. For we came into the 
world without any natural conception of a right-angled triangle, or of a 
quarter-tone or half-tone; but we learn what each of these is by some kind 
of systematic instruction, and for that reason those who have no knowl-
edge of them do not imagine that they know what they are. But whoever 
came into the world without an innate conception of what is good and 
evil, honourable and base, becoming and unbecoming, and what happi-
ness and misery are, and what is appropriate to us and forms our lot in 
life, and what we ought to do and ought not to do? Th us all of us make use 
of these terms, and endeavour to apply our preconceptions to particular 
cases. (2.11.1-4)9
Despite its vagueness, this passage gives some valuable information about precon-
ceptions. What makes the diff erence among the conceptions is their epistemological 
status: people acquire them diff erently. Certain conceptions can be acquired by the 
instructions of some kind of profession (ek tinos technikēs paralēpseōs); for example 
the geometric (right-angled triangle) and musical (half-tone) concepts, that are both 
part of a mathematical science, as far as geometry or music can be considered as a 
discipline studying ratios.10 Th e second type of conceptions is more obscure: the items 
belonging to this class are not acquired through instruction like the former, and if 
one follows the plausible interpretation of 2.11.3-4, not even through experience, be-
cause one already possesses them since the moment of birth (tis ouk echón emphyton 
ennoian elēlythen;).11 Several terms refer to the latter class, such as natural conception 
(physei ennoia), innate conception (emphytos ennoia) and fi nally, the most frequently 
9 Ἀρχὴ φιλοσοφίας παρά γε τοῖς ὡς δεῖ καὶ κατὰ θύραν ἁπτομένοις αὐτῆς συναίσθησις τῆς αὑτοῦ 
ἀσθενείας καὶ ἀδυναμίας περὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα. ὀρθογωνίου μὲν γὰρ τριγώνου ἢ διέσεως ἡμιτονίου οὐδεμίαν 
φύσει ἔννοιαν ἥκομεν ἔχοντες, ἀλλ’ ἔκ τινος τεχνικῆς παραλήψεως διδασκόμεθα ἕκαστον αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ 
τοῦτο οἱ μὴ εἰδότες αὐτὰ οὐδ’ οἴονται εἰδέναι. ἀγαθοῦ δὲ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ καὶ πρέποντος καὶ 
ἀπρεποῦς καὶ εὐδαιμονίας καὶ προσήκοντος καὶ ἐπιβάλλοντος καὶ ὅ τι δεῖ ποιῆσαι καὶ ὅ τι οὐ δεῖ ποιῆσαι τίς 
οὐκ ἔχων ἔμφυτον ἔννοιαν ἐλήλυθεν; διὰ τοῦτο πάντες χρώμεθα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν καὶ ἐφαρμόζειν πειρώμεθα 
τὰς προλήψεις ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις.
10 On the idea of similarity between geometry and music, see for example: Resp. 521c-531c.
11  In my opinion the reason of this distinction is that Epictetus attempts to mark off  his own theory of 
common preconceptions from a Platonic viewpoint claiming that there are other innate conceptions (a good 
example of the innate geometric conceptions is the dialogue between Socrates and the slave boy in the Meno, 
see Men. 82b-86c ).
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used preconception (prolēpsis). Based on the examples cited by Epictetus, it can be 
ascertained that the class of preconceptions comprises only ethical conceptions.
In spite of these diff erences, it should be noted that from a certain aspect for Epic-
tetus the conceptions of these two classes share the same feature: he conceives both as 
universal conceptions. Although geometrical and musical concepts are the results of the 
process of abstraction, they become common to all aft er instruction. Th e diff erence in 
the aspect of the origin of conceptions is what explains why people’s relations to these 
two types of conceptions diff er. Whereas with the fi rst class of conceptions people do 
not think that they know them (since they do not even know about their existence), 
the case is completely the opposite with the second class due to their characteristics. 
Th e latter, namely that the application of preconceptions does not require instruction, 
is supported by the fact that people are able to apply these conceptions in their descrip-
tions of the world (e.g. a child uses the concepts of good and bad alike). Yet this fact has 
a further consequence that Epictetus points out: the knowledge and the application of 
preconceptions do not depend on the instruction of a certain profession and thus peo-
ple think that they know preconceptions satisfactorily and use them correctly.12
A counter-argument, however, can demonstrate that this view is untenable. If all 
people had the same preconceptions and really understood them, then they would 
consider the same things either good or bad, so in other words a moral confl ict would 
not be possible. But that is obviously not the case. According to Epictetus, the confl ict 
among people arises from the application of preconceptions to particular cases (to 
epharmozein tas prolēpseis tais epi merous ousiais), i.e. they use diff erent preconcep-
tions in the same case. Th e reasons of this confl ict are that people in fact do not under-
stand accurately the preconceptions though they have them since birth, and therefore 
they cannot apply them correctly. Th e realization of the incompatibility between the 
universality of preconceptions and moral confl icts is the fi rst step that leads towards 
the Epictetan philosophy.
Preconceptions in practical context: 
moral confl ict and the beginning of the philosophy
Let us turn back to 2.11 of the Discourses and examine it from another point of view. 
Th e central theme of this discourse is the beginning of philosophy (archē tēs philoso-
phias), in other words, what leads someone to the study of philosophy. Th e discourse 
entitled To Naso (Pros Nasōna; 2.14) can also be understood as a related case-study: 
the noble Roman offi  cer Naso visits Epictetus with his son. Presenting and refl ecting 
upon his own pedagogical method, Epictetus talks with Naso about the beginning of 
12 2.11.5-6 
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the study of philosophy. Th eir dialogue has a fi xed order, which is known from an-
other discourse, too.13 Epictetus agrees with his partner (1) that the partner possesses 
preconceptions (good, bad, honourable, base, etc.) and (2) that he applies these pre-
conceptions to particular cases but Epictetus thinks that (3) it is doubtful whether his 
partner applies the preconceptions correctly. His doubt is supported by the numerous 
moral confl icts in the world. 
Th e ability of his partner to start his studies in philosophy depends on the recog-
nition of the origin of moral confl icts and that he does not apply the preconceptions 
correctly to particular cases. Th e realization of these is not a simple cognitive act but it 
requires a change in attitude: someone who starts philosophy removes his self-conceit 
(oiēsis) in the matter of the application of preconceptions, where self-conceit means 
that he believes to know such things that in reality he does not know.14 Naso is an excel-
lent example of this kind of self-conceit. When his ignorance is pointed out by Epicte-
tus, Naso gets angry, and, referring to his high social status, he refuses to re-examine 
the meaning of the most basic conceptions he uses. (It is not known whether Naso was 
able to face his weaknesses revealed by Epictetus, since – like a Socratic dialogue in 
Plato – the end of the story remains open.)
It may happen of course that the partner is not willing to admit that he does not 
apply his preconceptions in the right way. In this case he has to give an account of the 
criteria on which his method, considered to be correct, is established. Th e answer to 
this seems simple. One believes that something is good or bad because it appears to 
be so; in other words, the fi rst impression (to phanen, phantasia) about a certain thing 
or event, which is either desirable or to be avoided, is necessarily correct.15 Epictetus 
admits that it is understandable if people judge a given case by their fi rst unexam-
ined impression and they act accordingly since these have some kind of persuasiveness 
(pithanotēs) that induce people to believe them.16 Epictetus argues against this view 
in the widespread Sceptical manner: people do not have such a criterion that would 
help them judge whether the given impressions and the opinions (dogma) and habits 
13 2.11.7-9; 2.14.14-18
14 See for example: 2.11.6; 2.17.1; 3.23.16. Th e initial self-conceit of the partner (i.e. he believes that he knows 
what he does not know in fact) is refused by Epictetus usually in a dialogue-form during which his partner 
re-examines all his earlier views about the most basic things. Th is method is associated with Socrates, as it is 
referred to by Epictetus himself as well in 3.14.8-9. Relying on Vlastos’ interpretation of the Socratic elenchus, 
Long discusses the connection between the Socratic and Epictetan discourses; Long 2001. 82-86. In addition to 
the removal of the self-conceit, Bonhöff er also underlines the consciousness of moral confl icts among people; 
Bonhöff er 1890. 3-4. Th e ambiguity of the term oiēsis, expressing at the same time emotional attitude and false 
assumption based solely on appearance (e.g. 2.11.8), is exploited by Epictetus in the Discourses. 
15 Cf. 1.28.28-33; 2.11.10-12. 
16 1.27.3-6; 2.22.6; 3.7.22. Th e Stoics explained the deterioration of human reason by the communication 
with companions (tōn synontōn katēchēsis) and the above-mentioned persuasive power of impressions (SVF 
III, 228-236). See more: Bonhöff er 1890. 274-275; Dobbin 1998. 215.
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(ethos) originating from them are true or false. Moreover, it is the diff erence among 
these three that is the cause of the moral confl ict.17
Th ose who do not accept that they do not apply their preconceptions correctly can 
still argue against Epictetus by modifying the above-mentioned view. Not only certain 
preconceptions are possessed since birth can be considered natural (physei), but it can 
be also supposed with good reason that they are used according to nature in a correct 
way. Yet it is not necessary to presuppose that diff erent usages of two diff erent persons 
must not contradict each other, similarly to preconceptions.
Referring to a distinction, Epictetus would not accept this counter-argument: he 
distinguishes between the use (chrēsis) and the understanding (parakolouthēsis).18 Ap-
plying it to preconceptions means the following: all animals (and also humans) are 
able to use their impressions, so they interpret the impressions from the external world 
and give answers to them in their actions. In order for the human-being, however, to 
be able to fulfi l his proper function (ergon), he should understand satisfactorily his 
preconceptions and also know the right method for dealing with them. Preconcep-
tions are common to all and do not contradict each other, so aft er their understanding 
the application can take place only in one single way. As the concept of the right-an-
gled triangle cannot be applied correctly to a particular right-angled triangle and an 
obtuse-angled triangle at the same time, the preconception of good cannot be applied 
to two contradictory events. Only one correct application of the good is possible, like 
in the case of mathematical concepts (this is why Epictetus speaks about anankaia in 
2.11.1, which means “necessary” and “necessary for life” in this context).
In the light of all this, Epictetus’ conversational partner has to admit that the use 
of preconceptions in itself does not mean that they are used correctly. It leads him to 
acknowledge that philosophical education (to paideuesthai) is indispensable. In the 
words of Epictetus:
What, then, is it to be engaged in education? To learn how to apply nat-
ural preconceptions to particular cases, in accordance with nature; and, 
further, to distinguish that some things are in our power, others not. 
(1.22.9)19
Th e project of philosophical education in a nutshell is that one learns to apply his 
preconceptions to particular cases in accordance with nature (katallēlōs tē physei).20 
17 See in particular: 2.11.15. For the Sceptical sources of Epictetus, see: Dobbin 1998. 192.
18 Th e distinction between use and understanding occur in diff erent contexts. Th e most frequently occur-
ring topic is related to the use of the impressions and its understanding (1.6.12-22; 2.8.6-8; 4.7.32). What is 
particularly relevant for my paper is the use of preconceptions and their understanding (2.14.14-16). 
19  Τί οὖν ἐστι τὸ παιδεύεσθαι; μανθάνειν τὰς φυσικὰς προλήψεις ἐφαρμόζειν ταῖς ἐπὶ μέρους οὐσίαις 
καταλλήλως τῇ φύσει καὶ λοιπὸν διελεῖν, ὅτι τῶν ὄντων τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, τὰ δὲ οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν.
20 1.2.5-6; 1.22.9 
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But preconceptions in their original forms are not suitable for the appropriate descrip-
tion. In order to be able to be applied correctly to particular cases, preconceptions 
need explication or articulation, and only then can they fulfi ll their function as canon.
Preconceptions in practical context: articulation and canon-function
First it should be noted that the reason why preconceptions are not suitable for the 
application to particular cases is not because they are false. All people give the same 
defi nitions of preconceptions containing some correct elements, but these are not sat-
isfactory since they are too general21 and therefore applicable to contradictory cases, 
as in 1.22. Preconceptions must be defi ned properly; this process is called articulation 
(diarthrōsis) by Epictetus.22 Despite articulation playing a central role in the philo-
sophical instruction in Epictetus, he does not provide any systematic exposition of 
how preconceptions can be formulated in an exact manner.
If the already mentioned epistemic status of preconceptions is taken into account, 
than how can they be articulated? Preconceptions are not created by abstraction, so 
they cannot be defi ned based on experience, since the objects of experience for their 
moral uncertainty are those that one wants to judge with preconceptions. Th is pe-
culiarity of their epistemic status may cause further complications, especially in the 
features of the good. As we have seen, all people attribute certain features to the good 
(e.g. preferable – haireton), but these are unsuitable to defi ne it. Other features, in turn, 
are not self-evident (e.g. free – eleutheron) but they are apt to provide the peculiar 
characteristic (to idion) in the defi nition of the good. But how can these new “synthetic 
judgements” of the good be acquired?
According to Epictetus, the desire for happiness (euroia, eudaimonia) is innate and 
common to all, like preconceptions. People become happy if they reach what they con-
sider good, and therefore they have a natural desire for not to be hindered (to akōlyton 
/ aparapodiston einai) in it.23 With the claim that god gave desire for happiness to 
people, Epictetus places the issue into theological context. Th is statement has a serious 
implication: god would not have given such a desire to the people that they are not 
able to satisfy,24 because this would completely contradict the Stoic conception of the 
rational world-order. Epictetus refers to numerous people who, although they reached 
what they regarded to be good (richness, offi  ce, love, etc.), remained at least as unhap-
21 Bonhöff er 1890. 189 
22 Th e notion diarthrōsis appears fi rst in Chrysippus and it seems that he also used this term markedly for 
the defi nition of ethical preconceptions (LS 32I, 40G). On the view of the early Stoa about the defi nition, see: 
SVF II, 224-230 and LS 32. On the articulation: Bonhöff er 1890.189-191. 
23 3.23.34 
24 3.24.1-3 
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py as they had been before, which in possession of the good seems to be impossible.25 
Unhappiness is an obvious sign of the incorrect use of preconceptions, since they are 
not articulated; happiness, in turn, should be the most evident indicator of these two.
Th us the requirement of Epictetus for the good is that it should be available in all 
circumstances by everybody. Th e same criteria appear in the well-known distinction 
of “that is in our power” (eph’ hēmin) and “that is not in our power” (ouk eph’ hēmin): 
only that can be attained that is in our power. Relating this to the present topic, Epic-
tetus excludes the possibility of the application of any kind of preconceptions that are 
not in our power: these are the indiff erent things (ta adiaphora).26 Th e preconceptions 
of good or bad are applicable solely to those things that are in our power. In the de-
scription of the philosophical education, as we have seen, in addition to the acquisi-
tion of the right application of preconceptions, one should also learn the distinction 
between those things that are and that are not in our power. Both of these formulations 
refer to the same process.
Bearing in mind this identifi cation, the preconceptions can be considered artic-
ulated enough to be used as canons in particular cases.27 Th is makes it possible for 
someone to be systematic in one’s actions. People regarded certain things to be good or 
bad because of the persuasiveness of their impressions, so they tried to obtain or avoid 
them, but the use of already articulated preconceptions as canons overrule this per-
suasive power.28 During the application of articulated preconceptions, fi rst it should 
be decided whether they are in our power or not, and only then can it be examined 
whether they can be considered good or bad at all:
[…] Go out at the break of dawn, examine whomsover you see or hear, 
and then answer, as if to a question. What you have seen? A handsome 
person? Apply the rule. It is within the sphere of choice or outside of 
it? Outside it. Th row it away. What have you seen? One grieving for the 
death of his child? Apply the rule. Death is outside the sphere of choice. 
Th row it aside. A consul met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a 
consulship? Within the sphere of choice or outside it? Outside it. Th row 
this aside too. It does not stand the test. Fling it away. It is nothing to you. 
(3.3.14-15)29
25 3.22.26-31; 4.1.45-50 
26 2.17.1-2
27 Th e use of preconceptions as canons in the early Stoa was diff erent from the use of Epictetus. On the early 
Stoic view of the usage, see: Dysson 2009. 23-47. 
28 1.27.6
29 εὐθὺς ὄρθρου προελθὼν ὃν ἂν ἴδῃς, ὃν ἂν ἀκούσῃς, ἐξέταζε, ἀποκρίνου ὡς πρὸς ἐρώτημα. τί εἶδες; καλὸν ἢ καλήν; 
ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε ἔξω. τί εἶδες; πενθοῦν<τ’> ἐπὶ τέκνου τελευτῇ; 
ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὁ θάνατός ἐστιν ἀπροαίρε-τον· αἶρε ἐκ τοῦ μέσου. ἀπήντησέ σοι ὕπατος; ἔπαγε τὸν κανόνα. ὑπατεία 
ποῖόν τι ἐστίν; ἀπροαίρετον ἢ προαιρετικόν; ἀπροαίρετον· αἶρε καὶ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἔστι δόκιμον· ἀπόβαλε, οὐδὲν πρὸς σέ.
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In another passage Epictetus calls the canons, with his unique expression, the real 
nature of the good and the bad (ousia tou agathou kai kakou):
What does it matter to me, says Epictetus, whether the universe is com-
posed of atoms or uncompounded substances, or of fi re and earth? It is 
not suffi  cient to know the true nature of the good and the bad, and the 
measurements of our desires and aversions, and also of our impulses to 
act and not to act, and by making use of these as canons, to order of aff airs 
of our life, to bid those things that are beyond us farewell […] (fr. 1)30
Th e right interpretation of the expression is presumably not a concrete object (to 
which the word ousia would refer), but rather a satisfactorily defi ned preconception. 
Th e distinction between things that are in our power and that are not is also present in 
the text implicitly since it is the measurement (ta metra) of all the subsequent things.
Th e connection between the application of preconceptions and theology
As it has already been shown, Epictetus regarded the articulated preconceptions as can-
ons that should be applied in the human actions, and he also called them the “true nature 
of the good and the bad”. Th is expression has a key role in the following passage as well:
God brings benefi t; but the good also brings benefi t. It would seem, then, 
that where the true nature of god is, there too is the true nature of the 
good. What, then, is the true nature of god? Flesh? – Heaven forbid! 
Land? Fame? – Heaven forbid! Intelligence? Knowledge? Right reason? – 
Certainly. Here, then, without more ado, seek the true nature of the good. 
[…] (2.8.1-3)31
Th e starting point of the text is that the most basic characteristic of the god and the 
good coincides, and this is the reason why Epictetus associates the two: the character-
istics of god should also be the characteristics of the good. Th e statement that the god 
is reason means, in the case of the good, that it is reason to which the concept of good 
can be applied. In my opinion Epictetus off ers here another way to a more accurate 
understanding of preconceptions of good through the examination of the character-
istics of the god.
30 Τί μοι μέλει, φησί, πότερον ἐξ ἀτόμων ἢ ἐξ ἀμερῶν ἢ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς συνέστηκε τὰ ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ 
ἀρκεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ τὰ μέτρα τῶν ὀρέξεων καὶ ἐκκλίσεων καὶ ἔτι ὁρμῶν καὶ 
ἀφορμῶν καὶ τούτοις ὥσπερ κανόσι χρώμενον διοικεῖν τὰ τοῦ βίου, τὰ δ’ ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς ταῦτα χαίρειν ἐᾶν […]
31 Ὁ θεὸς ὠφέλιμος· ἀλλὰ καὶ τἀγαθὸν ὠφέλιμον. εἰκὸς οὖν, ὅπου ἡ οὐσία τοῦ θεοῦ, ἐκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τὴν τοῦ 
ἀγαθοῦ. τίς οὖν οὐσία θεοῦ; σάρξ; μὴ γένοιτο. ἀγρός; μὴ γένοιτο. φήμη; μὴ γένοιτο. νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, λόγος 
ὀρθός. ἐνταῦθα τοίνυν ἁπλῶς ζήτει τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.
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Although in some earlier sources it can be read that people have innate conceptions 
about the gods,32 Epictetus does not mention this. Th ere are hints, however, that suggest 
that in Epictetus the conception of god does not belong to this kind of conceptions. Th e 
term hypolēpsis in relation with gods appears in Ench. 31., and it can be known from oth-
er loci that this term is used in the sense of opinion (dogma) in Epictetus. 33 People form 
their opinions based on experience, which can be either right or wrong – in contrast to 
the preconceptions. People are able to form a right opinion about god if they realize that 
the universe has a rational order originating from the provident divinity. 34
Th e similar place of preconceptions and theological studies in the philosophical 
curriculum also shows their connection. In 2.14 Epictetus, immediately before talking 
about the incorrect use of preconceptions, tells Naso that the fi rst task of a man who is 
about to start his studies in philosophy is to learn the right opinions about god. 35 It is 
more probable that the order of these two activities is reverse: fi rst the student has to 
recognize that he did not use correctly his preconceptions, and then the second is that 
he acquires new theological knowledge. During this, the student gets acquainted with 
the basic characteristic of god: free (eleutheros), faithful (pistos), benefi cient (euerget-
ikos), and high-minded (megalophrōn). Th e realization of all this does not merely have 
a theoretical relevance but it also presents god as a paradigm for the students of philoso-
phy. So according to Epictetus, theology not only helps people to understand what kind 
of things preconceptions can be generally applied to (i.e. the class of things belonging 
to the sphere of free choice), but also what concretely the good is within this sphere. Th e 
good is applicable to a certain moral character, which is similar to that of the god.
Concluding remarks
Th e theory of common preconceptions has an essential importance in the philosophy 
of Epictetus in several aspects. Yet his interest in this fi eld is not theoretical: he does 
not discuss metaphysical or epistemological questions relating to preconceptions but 
takes their basic characteristics for axiomatic, such as that they are innate, universal 
and ethical. Epictetus focuses rather on the practical side: if preconceptions truly have 
such a character, how can any moral confl ict exist? Th e answer lies in their original 
inarticulate state and thus in their incorrect application. Preconceptions need to be 
articulated; this cannot be done through logical analysis only, but by considering other 
points of view, like the possibility of gaining happiness or theological teachings as well.
32 For example Cicero ND II, 12-15; Seneca Ep. 117.6. On the innate conception of the gods in the Stoics: 
Bonhöff er 1890. 218-222; Jackson-McCabe 2004. 341-346. On Epictetus’ concept of god, see Algra (2007). 
33 See: 1.11.33; 2.20.11
34 1.6.1-11
35 2.14.9-13 
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Th e most signifi cant result of the articulation is that it enables people to decide the 
sphere in which these ethical preconceptions are applicable. As to their applicability, 
the separation of these spheres coincides with the central Epictetan distinction be-
tween what is in our power and what is not. So, apart from placing the application of 
preconceptions in the foreground, it is this distinction with which the earlier Stoic the-
ory becomes genuinely Epictetan. In addition to establishing the theoretical possibility 
of universal morality, Epictetus also aims at defi ning the conditions of its realization.
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On the Role of Ethical Maxims in the System 
of Classical Interpretation of Law
TAMÁS NÓTÁRI
Th e present paper has a modest aim; it does not off er a general survey, much 
rather an introspection into the problem. First, it enumerates the occurrences 
of this proverb in the sources of Roman literature (I.); aft er that, it investigates 
the meaning of summum ius in relation to the principle ars boni et aequi and 
the concept of Justice in legal sources and Cicero’s works (II.); fi nally, it will 
consider the further-reaching consequences of this proverbium in Adagia by 
Erasmus of Rotterdam, one of the most important humanists (III.).
I. 
Interpretation based on maxims of legal logic occupies an honourable place among 
the possible methods of legal interpretation; this is done most frequently by using 
basic concepts originating from the classical period of Roman law, which facilitate 
orientation among contradictory decrees and help to clarify the meaning of legal rules. 
Here belong the following principles, widely known in Modestinus’s formulation but 
dating from the period of the leges XII tabularum: “lex posterior derogat legi priori” 
(XII tab. 12, 5; Mod. D. 1, 4, 4), the Papinian “lex specialis derogat legi generali” (Pap. 
D. 48, 19, 41; 50, 17, 80), and the “lex primaria derogat legi subsidiariae”. It is a basic 
interpretive principle, that the legal rule should be interpreted in its integrity, not by 
extracting certain parts of it (Cels. D. 1, 3, 24). Following the letter of the law oft en 
leads to its evasion (Paul. D. 1, 3, 29.), during interpretation the legislator’s intention 
should be taken into account (Cels. D. 1, 3, 19), and if this is doubtful, the more lenient 
solution should be preferred (Marc. D. 28, 4, 3 pr.). All these can be traced back to a 
highly philosophical, Celsian principle – also widely accepted in contemporary legal 
thinking – which declares that the vocation of the Law is to implement Justice, assert-
ing that “ius est ars boni et aequi” (Ulp. D. 1, 1, 1), the Law is an art of the Good and 
the Just. Out of these, the procedure called in fraudem legis is related to the statement 
that enforcing the letter of the law oft en leads to inequity contradictory with the spirit 
of the law; i.e., to injustice. Cicero also quotes this proverbium, widely spread as early 
as in the age of the Republic, which remained in use in his formulation until today: 
“summum ius summa iniuria” (Cic. off . 1, 33); i.e., the utmost enforcement of the law 
leads to the greatest injustice.
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Th is idea fi rst occurs in Terence’s comedy, Heautontimoroumenos:
Neque tu scilicet / illuc confugies: ’Quid mea? Num mihi datumst? Num 
iussi? Num illa oppignerare fi liam meam me invito potuit?’ Verum illuc, 
Cherme, / dicunt: Ius summum saepe summast malitia (Ter. Heaut. 792 ff .) 
Th e situation is the following: Syrus asks Chermes for money, so that he could help 
his young master, but in order to get the sum he claims that he needs it for Chermes’s 
daughter. Th e law is indubitably on Chermes’s side, but unconditioned clinging to the 
law cannot be reconciliated with the pietas and clementia expected from a Roman pa-
ter familias. In order to analyse the summa malitia turning point it is useful to peruse 
some meanings and the most typical occurrences of the summus–summa–summum 
adjective and the diff erent connotations of the word malitia. In its original meaning 
summus is the Latin equivalent of the Greek hypathos (Walde–Hofmann 1954. II. 630). 
Varro (Varro ling. 8, 75) and Isidorus Hispalensis (Isid. etym. 1, 7, 27) use it as a gram-
matical technical term for the explanation of the superlativus, Quintilian applies it for 
the description of rhetorical amplifi cation (Quint. inst. 7, 10). Used fi guratively, it can 
be encountered in many places, both with temporal meaning (Plaut. Asin. 534; Persa 
33; Pseud. 374; Cic. Cato 78; Suet. Tib. 64, 4) and in relation to social status (Plaut. 
Cist. 516; Amph. 77; Capt. 279; Merc. 694; Stich. 409; Persa 418; Cic. Tusc. 2, 144); e.g., 
applied to the optimates and the nobiles (Plaut. Stich. 492 f.; Cist. 23 f.; Pseud. 70; Merc. 
604; Ter. Heaut. 227. 609; Ad. 502) as the contradiction of the humiles, the infi ma plebs 
(Plaut. Cist. 24 f.; Ter. Eun. 489; Hec. 380; Cic. Att. 4, 1, 5; Phil. 2, 3) and the infi mus 
ordo (Carcaterra 1971. 631 ff .). Isidorus describes the word malitia, deriving from the 
word malus, as the evil thought of mind (Isid. diff . 1, 358); it is used by many authors 
as the synonym of astutia and calliditas (Isid. etym. 10, 6; Carcaretta 1971. 638). In the 
prologue of Heautontimorumenos Terence mentions expressis verbis the Greek type of 
his comedy (Ter. Heaut. 4–5), which, with regard to the above cited proverbium, can 
most probably be identifi ed with two lines by Menander (Menandr. Nr. 545), although 
the two ideas do not correspond word for word. Terence speaks about ius, whereas 
Menander mentions nomoi; i.e., the laws and not dikaion. Th e synkhophantēs carries 
a slightly wider semantic load than malitia, which could be translated into Latin as 
damnum, calumnia or malum, in any way designating a content in contradiction with 
the spirit and destination of ius. 
Don. Comm. in Ter. Heaut. 792 ff . Summum ius saepe summa est malitia 
id enim, quod datum est, utique reddendum est, sed iure cautum est, ut fi lia 
quidquid acceperit vel fi liae nomine datum fuerit, quae in familia est, non 
recte datum videatur. Itaque aequitatis est ut debitum solvi debeat, ius est 
ut sic datum reddatur: ita summum ius summa malitia. 
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Lian akribōs can be equally translated by the phrase summo iure or nimis exacto 
quodam studio (Carcaterra 1971. 641). Hence it becomes obvious that Terence heavily 
altered the Menandrian thought and adapted it to the circumstances of Roman legal 
life but preserved its basic message (Carcaterra 1971. 644).
Hieronymus takes his version from this Terentian locus: “O vere ius summum sum-
ma malitia” (Hier. epist. 1, 44). A statement with similar content (summum ius summa 
crux) is formulated by Columella (Colum. rust. 1, 7, 1 f.), when he speaks about the 
responsibilities of the pater familias and the dominus: 
comiter agat cum colonis facilemque se prebeat, …sed nec dominus in un-
aquaque re, cui colonum obligaverit, tenax esse sui iuris debet, sicut in diebus 
pecuniarum vel lignis et ceteris paucibus accessionibus exigendis, quarum cura 
maiorem molestiam quam impensam rusticis adfert. Nec sane vindicandum 
nobis quidquid licet, nam summum ius antiqui summam putabant crucem.
So it is forbidden to deal too harshly with the colonii, and the master should exer-
cise the virtues of meekness and consideration (Fuhrmann 1971. 74).
Th e proverbium passed into legal common knowledge in Cicero’s formulation in 
De offi  ciis (Cic. off . 1, 33): “Existunt saepe iniuriae calumnia quadam et nimis callida, 
sed malitiosa iuris interpretatione. Ex quo illud ’summum ius summa iniuria’ factum est 
iam tritum sermone proverbium.” Consequently, it is not ius itself that results in iniuria, 
but the malevolent enforcement of a seemingly lawful claim is the case when injustice 
is committed under the mask of law enforcement (Bürge 1974. 53). Examining the 
bequeathing of the proverbium, one can safely assert that the versions of Terentius 
and Columella are more closely connected with each other than with the Ciceronian 
antithesis, and that they represent an earlier stage in the formulation of this thought 
(Stroux 1926. 21; Fuhrmann 1971. 74). In these two authors’ works the clash of the 
legal and moral norms becomes foregrounded; i.e., the action permitted and approved 
by ius becomes contestable from the side of mos (Stroux 1926. 49). Th e Ciceronian for-
mulation goes even further: it is not only the legal and ethical norms that confl ict here, 
but the collision takes place within the legal system (Fuhrmann 1971. 75). Th e claim is 
made not only for a morally correct decision but also for the right and just application 
of the law. Th e proverb objects to the abuse of the law, to its literal and not sensible in-
terpretation (Büchner 1953. 12; Tomulescu 1968. 230). Th e phrase factum etiam tritum 
sermone proverbium could refer to the fact that Cicero himself took over the idea of 
summum ius summa iniuria from an earlier auctor or the practice on the forum, or it 
can be assumed that he is referring to his own rhetorical practice when he emphasises 
the great familiarity of the proverb, as he frequently used the phrases summo iure agere 
and summo iure contendere too (Cic. Verr. 6, 4; Att. 16, 15, 1).
However, he greatly exceeds the requirement of equitable legal interpretation in De 
legibus, where, among other things, he analyses the connection between natural law and 
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positive law (Tomulescu 1968. 230). In this work Cicero appears as legislator – as his 
model Plato (Cic. leg. 1, 15) does in Nomoi – a thing which must have seemed extremely 
new, almost provoking indignation, because doing this he intended to reform and replace 
the venerated leges XII tabularum (Cic. leg. 2, 23. 59), thus occupying the place of the 
nation who made these laws (Knoche 1968. 41). Th e fi rst book contains considerations 
of legal theory, which was practically unknown in Rome in the 1st century bc. It aims at 
harmonizing ius civile with ius naturale because this was the only way Roman law could 
lay claim to universality. From the demand of ius naturale neither the comitia, nor the 
senatus can give exemption, this being eternal and unchanging. Th e fundamental task 
of the legislator and the judge is to proceed in accordance with it (Cic. rep. 3, 22), and 
the task of the law is to separate the lawful from the unlawful (Cic. leg. 2, 13). Ius and 
ratio are inseparably connected; moreover, they are each other’s synonyms in a certain 
respect; so law must originate directly from philosophy and not from the pretorial 
edict or the leges XII tabularum, therefore, it can never lose its validity (Cic. leg. 1, 18; 
2, 14). Law must be based on Justice, which might seem trivial in itself, but Cicero 
himself had felt the lack of this condition; so law depends solely on Justice, and social 
cohabitation depends only on the law – this conclusion must have seemed considera-
bly bold in ancient Rome (Knoche 1968. 46 ff .). Appearing as a great system-originator 
in philosophy, Cicero wanted to encompass law in a system as well in his work – un-
fortunately lost since then – entiteled De iure civili in artem redigendo, which does not 
seem to have exerted much infl uence on legal scholars in Rome (Lübtow 1944. 232).
Returning to summum ius summa iniuria: it was quite common that certain max-
ims formulated in everyday life and transmitted through literary sources were appro-
priated by Law as rules of universal validity. For example, here are a couple of proverbia 
that became regulae iuris (Carcaterra 1971. 663). Aquila Romanus quotes the sentence 
“cui quod libet, hoc licet” (Aquila Rom. fi g. 27), which can be found in the fragment of 
Ulpianus as “non omne quod licet honestum est” (Ulp. D. 50, 17, 144). Publius Syrus’s 
thought, “lucrum absque damno alieno fi eri non potest” (Publ. Syr. Sent. L, 6) resonates 
with Pomponius’s rule: “iure naturae aequum est neminem cum alterius detrimento fi eri 
locupletiorem” (Pomp. D. 50, 17, 206). Seneca maior’s sentence “tacite loquitur; silen-
tium videtur confessio” (Sen. contr. 10, 2, 6) corresponds with Paulus’s “qui tacet, non 
utique fatetur: sed tamen verum est eum non negare” (Paul. D. 50, 17, 142).
II. 
Celsus’s famous statement “ius est ars boni et aequi” – transmitted by Ulpianus – occurs 
as the opening idea of Iustinian Digesta. It claims that whoever intends to deal with law 
should fi rst know where its name comes from. Ius got its name from iustitia, and – as 
Celsus astutely defi nes – law is the art of the good and the just/equitable. Following 
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this train of thought, Ulpianus states that lawyers should exercise their profession as 
a priestly vocation, because they must respect justice, propagate the knowledge of the 
good and the equitable, separating the legal from the illegal, the permissible from the 
forbidden. 
Ulp. D. 1, 1, 1. Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet, unde nomen 
iuris descendat. Est autem a iustitia appellatum: nam, ut eleganter Celsus 
defi nit, ius est ars boni et aequi. Cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet: 
iustitiam namque colimus, et boni et aequi notitiam profi temur, aequum 
ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab illicto discernentes, bonos non solum metu 
poenarum, verum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione effi  cere cupi-
entes, veram nisi fallor philosophiam, non simulatam aff ectantes. 
Later Ulpianus defi nes justice as an unceasing and eternal eff ort to give everybody 
their due right. Th erefore, the commandments of the law are the following: to live de-
cently, not to hurt anyone, to give everybody their due. 
Ulp. D. 1, 1, 10. Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas suum cuique 
tribuendi. Iuris praecepta sunt haec: honeste vivere, alterum non laedere, 
suum cuique tribuere. 
Since this defi nition is well known, there is no need for further explanation. In con-
cordance with this, Ulpianus expressis verbis calls the magistrates’ attention to the fact 
that unlawful procedures are forbidden. As far as judges are concerned – for whom 
it is also forbidden to proceed with partiality, prejudice, or in general incorrectly – 
they must keep the principle of aequitas in mind, especially in the cases where their 
personal consideration is of greater importance (Ulp. D. 47, 10, 32; 5, 1, 15, 1; Gai. D. 
50, 13, 6; C. 3, 1, 13, 6; Tryph. D. 16, 3, 31 pr.). Th e mere memorization of the legal 
material is not equivalent with the genuine knowledge of law, as Celsus emphasises; 
and he strongly blames the lawyers who do not want to consider the entire law when 
solving a case, and who only present an arbitrarily selected portion even while justify-
ing their responsa (Cels. D. 1, 3, 17. 24). Th e principle “suum cuique tribuere” remark-
ably harmonises with that locus of Cicero’s Topica which defi nes ius civile as aequitas 
established for the people living in the same state with the scope of preserving their 
goods (Cic. top. 2, 9). Regarding the Corpus Ciceronianum, in the speech delivered in 
defence of L. Licinius Murena, this contradiction is thoroughly highlighted: in con-
nection with certain legal institutions of marital law (coemptio tutelae evitandae causa, 
coemptio sacrorum interimendorum causa), which became empty and troublesome by 
the time of Cicero, the rhetor formulates: “In omni denique iure civili aequitatem relin-
querunt, verba ipsa tenuerunt” (Cic. Mur. 27). So, criticism is not directed against the 
keystone of the state, the laws (Cic. leg. 1, 14), but only against legal practitioners and 
their methods of interpretation.
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Th e loci from the Corpus Ciceronianum referring to aequitas – with special regard 
to Cicero’s theoretical works – can be classifi ed in the following categories (Ciulei 
1968. 640). In certain cases aequitas appears as the opposite of ius (Cic. inv. 32; part. 
28; Caec. 36; De orat. 1, 56), in other cases one can fi nd the trinity of aequitas–ius–lex, 
which divides the concept of law in a very special way (Cic. top. 5. 7). On the one 
hand, it divides justice into a ius based on lex, on the other hand, into a ius based on 
aequitas (Ciulei 1968. 642). Elsewhere – e.g., in Pro Caecina – aequitas is none other 
than the means of interpretatio iuris (Cic. part. 39; rep. 5, 2). A third diff erent group 
is constituted by the loci where aequitas is referred to as a synonym of ius (Cic. top. 2. 
24; part. 37). In his philosophical works aequitas appears in many thoughts as a pro-
jection, a form of iustitia, being the foundation of human relationships (Cic. rep. 1, 2; 
Lael. 22; off . 1, 19; top. 23). It brings us closer to our present topic of discussion if we 
try to trace the occurrences of aequitas in Cicero’s speeches and his correspondence. 
In certain characterisations it appears as a personal characteristic feature (Cic. ad Q. fr. 
1, 1, 45). Th is is the way he characterises Scipio (Cic. Verr. 5, 81) and Servius Sulpicius 
(Cic. fam. 4, 4, 3; Phil. 9, 10), and as he expects every Roman in offi  ce to possess this 
quality, he fi nds it particulary desirable in the case of judges (Cic. leg. agr. 2, 102; Tull. 
8; Flacc. 49; Cluent. 5. 159). At the same time iustitia appears only as an exception as 
somebody’s personal feature in Ciceronian characterisations (Cic. fam. 13, 28A, 2; 13, 
66, 2). Aequitas, oft en mentioned together with ius not only as its complementary, is 
considered an ethical norm that plays an important role in the administration of law 
(Cic. De orat. 1, 86. 173), so it does not appear as the kind of equity that would give the 
judge the possibility to reach a decision in contradiction with written law because this 
way the verdict could easily become unjust, coming to a result contradictory with its 
aim (Cic. Phil. 5, 20; imp. Cn. Pomp. 58. See also Bürge 1974. 52).
Let us take a quick view – following Pringsheim’s statements – to the changes that 
the concept of aequitas underwent aft er Cicero, as the complementary and opposite of 
ius, and see how the concepts of ius aequum and ius strictum are formed (Pringsheim 
1921. 643). Th e ius aequum adjectival construction does not imply an equity based 
legal interpretation used in an abstract sense, but, in accordance with the original 
meaning of the adjective aequus, it denotes equal right identical for everybody both in 
literary and legal sources (Cic. Verr. 3, 118; Liv. 38, 50, 9; Tac. ann. 3, 27; Sen. epist. 86, 
2; Tryph. D. 29, 1, 18, 1; Paul. D. 46, 1, 55; C. 3, 36, 11; 6, 58, 15, 1). Basically, it is not 
ius that is divided into ius aequum and ius strictum, but it is aequitas that appears as 
a principle which regulates, at times aids, corrects ius, at times harmonises with it, at 
times constitutes a contradictory principle, which, however, was never defi ned at the 
level of an abstract defi nition, probably due to a lack of eff ort (Paul. D. 50, 17, 90; 44, 4, 
1, 1; Ulp. D. 2, 14, 52, 3. See also Pringsheim 1921. 644). During the period of the dom-
inate aequitas kept gaining terrain from ius. A turning point in this was Constantinus’s 
legislation who, on the one hand, declared that it is the emperor alone who is entitled 
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to interpret the diff erence between ius and aequitas, on the other hand, he made aequi-
tas the synonym of iustitia and ius iustitiaque, ranking these above ius strictum (C. 1, 
14, 1; C. Th . 1, 5, 3; 3, 1, 8). Th is idea was later taken over by Iustinian legal science, so 
the sources refl ect the clear dominance of aequitas, with which the concepts of human-
itas, iustitia, benignitas, utilitas and bona fi des are associated (Ulp. D. 15, 1, 32 pr.; Pap. 
D. 26, 7, 36; Paul. D. 39, 3, 25; Pap. D. 46, 6, 12), leaving to ius the meaning of strict, 
limited and – sit venia verbo – narrow-minded law, clinging to a rigid, word for word 
interpretation (Pringsheim 1921. 648). Th e expression ius strictum cannot be found in 
the literary sources of the classical period; iudicium strictum is used as a technical term 
of rhetorical works (Sen. contr. 1. praef. 23; 4. praef. 3; Quint. 12, 10, 52). In Statius’s 
Silvae strictae leges are opposed to aequum (Stat. Silv. 3, 5, 87 f.); ius strictum becomes 
an unquestionable technical term only in Iustinian’s legal work (C. 4, 31, 14, 1; 5, 13, 1, 
2; Pap. D. 5, 3, 50, 1; Paul. 13, 5, 30; Tryph. D. 23, 2, 67, 1; Pap. D. 29, 2, 86 pr.; Iav. D. 
40, 7, 28 pr.; C. 3, 42, 8, 1; Gai. inst. 3, 18).
Returning to Cicero, the expressions “summo iure agere” and “summo iure conten-
dere” indicate the use of the whole range of possibilities off ered by law (Cic. Verr. 6, 
4), which itself does not mean legal practice contradictory with aequitas; whether it 
is proper or improper becomes clear only in the concrete situation. At times Cicero 
has the possibility to be lenient, but the hostile behaviour of the opponent can make 
him legitimately act against it with the strictest means of the law, keeping in mind not 
only his personal interests but the interests of the state as well (Cic. Att. 16, 15, 1). 
(Concerning the point that summum ius depends on the specifi c situation, both Stroux 
(Stroux 1926. 57) and Bürge (Bürge 1974. 54) quote as a literary example, the scene 
from Shakespeare’s Merchant of Venice in which, Portia as judge uses, instead of the ra-
tional, the literal interpretation of the law against Shylock, who is reluctant to accept the 
doge’s more equitable proposal. She turns the situation inside out and fi nally makes him 
withdraw. (Shakespeare, Th e Merchant of Venice 4, 1, 300 ff .) Aequitas as the principle 
of interpretatio is not formulated expressis verbis in connection with the causa Curiana, 
treated by Cicero. However, since basically it expounds the contradiction between in-
terpretatio restrictiva and interpretatio extensiva, in its content aequitas seems to belong 
to its essence. Th e basic question concerning the facts of the case is whether substitutio 
pupillaris (Gai. inst. 2, 179) can also be regarded as substitutio vulgaris (Gai. inst. 2, 174 
ff .), and, in relation to this point, the question whether the alternate heir so ordered is 
also the heir of the bequeather should also be answered. Q. Mucius Scaevola argued for 
the restrictive, L. Licinius Crassus for the extending interpretation. Consequently, both 
of them referred to auctores substantiating their opinion. Moreover, Crassus, employing 
the weapon of humor, made fun of the obsolete formulation of the legal text, thus ridi-
culing its restrictive interpretation (Cic. De orat. 1, 180). Th e decision made in the causa 
Curiana did not prove to be long-lasting in legal science, as we know about several later 
sententiae contradictory with this (Treb. D. 26, 2, 33; Mod. D. 28, 6, 4 pr.).
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As we have seen, neither Cicero, nor other Roman legal scientists, basically re-
luctant to formulate abstract defi nitions (Iav. D. 50, 17, 202), determined the uncon-
tradictory concept of aequitas. Th erefore, the decisiveness of the attempt to solve the 
scriptum–voluntas contradiction, emphasised by Stroux in connection with the causa 
Curiana (Stroux 1926. 57), loses its validity because aequitas worked as a rhetorical 
ornament rather than a basic principle of judgement (Bürge 1974. 54). Crassus, who 
acted as patrocinium aequitatis in the causa Curiana, proved to be the advocate of 
ius strictum in another case. M. Marius Gratidianus sold a plot to C. Sergius Orta, 
from whom he had bought the same plot a few years earlier. Th e plot was loaded with 
servitutes, about which Sergius Orta, as the former owner must have had knowledge. 
However, when signing of the contract, Gratidianus did not mention the servitutes, 
though this would have been his duty (Cic. off . 3, 67). In the case of actio empti the sell-
er is responsible for the dolus, the judge had to decide whether Gratidianus proceeded 
dolose or not. Th e advocati of the parts had a great opportunity to infl uence the iudex, 
using rhetoric devices based on legal science (Bürge 1974. 61). As Cicero remarks too, 
in this case Antonius based his reasoning on aequitas; opposed to him, Crassus clung 
to the more restrictive interpretation. Th e appearance of these poles in the same case 
unequivocally harmonises with the training practice of rhetoricians, where the magis-
ter divided the case to be discussed among the students in a way that half of them had 
to defend their point of view based on aequitas, the other half based on ius strictum, 
then they changed roles (Cic. De orat. 1, 244; Quint. 7, 6, 1).
In as much as we do not consider aequitas to be an abstract idea in these cases, but 
as a freely applicable rhetoric device, Cicero’s rather liberal handling of the concept 
of aequitas harmonises with other statements that deal with the essence of eloquence 
(Bürge 1974. 63). Within the boundaries designated by legal science – which in a given 
case can mean the facts of the case, determined by the iuris consultus – the orator can 
freely move while concentrating his attention on the task of defence; all the more so, as 
he is not striving to prove the truth, but to convince the audience of the veri simile (Cic. 
part. 90; off . 2, 51). To illustrate this, Cicero tells the following example. A simple man 
from the country wanted to ask iuris consultus P. Crassus for advice, but the jurist sent 
him away as he thought that he could do nothing for him. However, Servius Galba, the 
rhetor, presented him so many examples, parallels, arguments interlarded with humor, 
based on aequitas, and not on ius, in support of the rusticus, that the jurist – still not 
sharing the rhetor’s point of view – had to admit that his arguments were so probable 
that they almost sounded like truth (Cic. off . 2, 40). Th e freedom of movement of the 
rhetor is considerably greater than that of the jurist; as Gellius puts it, he is not closely 
tied to the truth content of the facts (Gell. 1, 6, 4). Th e rhetor had to be able to argue 
for or against the same case, as this technique constituted a substantial part of rhetoric 
studies (Cic. De orat. 2, 30). Th e diff erence between legal and rhetorical methods was 
long preserved in Rome, as Quintilian admits in his Institutio oratoria, in the chap-
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ter in which he emphasises the importance of the rhetor’s acquiring legal knowledge 
(Quint. 12, 3, 2 ff .). In the course of time, this diff erence became even wider, when, at 
the beginning of the Principate, political eloquence faltered, whereas eloquence lost its 
connections with jurisprudence by dealing with fi ctitious examples and solving more 
and more artifi cial rhetorical situations (Norden 1909. 126).
III.
Investigating the use and explanation of the proverbium “summum ius summa iniuria” 
in the works of Erasmus of Rotterdam seems to be substantiated not so much by the 
historical and dogmatic depth of the Erasmian interpretation – as this idea was made 
the object of much more intensive and exhaustive legal theory scrutiny by numerous 
humanists; e.g., Claudius Cantiuncula, Bonifacius Amerbach or Symon Grynaeus (if 
only due to Erasmus’s slighter interest in historical studies) – but because of the im-
mense infl uence produced by this excellent humanist over the centuries enhanced by 
his enormous authority, which is hard to underestimate (Appelt 1942. 20 ff .). Without 
any need to enter a more meticulous study of the genesis and infl uence of Erasmus’s 
Adagia, it can be stated that from its fi rst edition in the sixteenth century until the end 
of the eighteenth century, it was used as a widely appreciated scholary text book, so 
it can be safely assumed that the “summum ius summa iniuria” paroemia gained con-
siderable popularity among humanists, theologians, philosophers, as it is proved by it 
being frequently quoted in the most various contexts (Kisch 1955. 211).
As Erasmus had been making an eff ort to perfect the Adagia until the end of his 
life, several versions and explanations of this idea can be encountered in the Erasmian 
corpus. Th e fi rst edition dating from 1500 refers to the proverb in two places (Desyderii 
Herasmi Roterdami veterum maximeque insignium paroemiarum id est adagiorum col-
lectanea. Parrhisiis M. Iohanne Philippo Alamanno diligentissimo impressore Anno 
MVc). First in connection with the Terentian quotation “summum ius summa malitia”; 
later with regard to Plato and Cicero under the title of “ad vivum summo iure”. Th e text 
appearing in Basel in 1540 but dating from 1536 synthetises all the known occurrences 
of this idea in Latin authors (Des. Erasmi Rot. Operum Secundus Tomus Adagiorum 
Chiliades Quatuor cum Sesquicenturia Complectens, ex postrema ipsius auctoris recog-
nitione accuratissima, quibus non est quod quicquam imposterum vereare accessurum. 
Basileae ex Offi  cina Frobeniana AN. M.D.XL.). Before enumerating and analysing the 
loci, trying to avoid the charge that he includes sententiae instead of adagia; i.e., prov-
erbs, Erasmus gives a long explanation, and eventually fi nds his acquittal in quoting 
the Terentian nominatim (Kisch 1955. 207).
Not being a jurist, Erasmus dedicated less attention to the legal paroemia, except 
for a few explanations referring to Iustitia. Only four years before his death, in 1532 
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did Erasmus become interested in juridic regulations, and asked his friend, Bonifacius 
Amerbach in a letter to send him some material, suitable for the completion of the 
Adagia. Th en, aft er receiving the two-page-long collection, he urged his friend to send 
him some more. It is highly probable that this was how the quotations from the Roman 
sources found their way into the 1540 edition of the Adagia (Kisch 1955. 208).
In Erasmus’s interpretation aequitas oft en mentioned to highlight the paroemia 
”summum ius summa iniuria” probably did not actually mean equity as a legal inter-
pretive principle, much rather justice that should be enforced even against the letter 
of the law (Büchner 1953. 13). For the explanations Erasmus usually refers to antique 
authors generally with the exact documentation of the sources but at times without 
summarizing their content. Most oft en the concept aequitas is simply used in the sense 
of aequum et bonum, as the opposite of iniquitas, placing the spirit of the law above 
its letter. One can fi nd the type of the Ciceronian pair of concepts in the Aristotelian 
Ethica Nicomachea, which asserts that a man can be regarded equitable, if he is satis-
fi ed with less, even if the law is on his side, and does not stick to his own justice in the 
detriment of others, so equity is none other than a kind of justice (Aristot. NE 1138a). 
It is interesting though, that Erasmus does not make any reference to Aristotle in the 
early editions of the Adagia, and only the 1536 and 1540 editions allow us to assume 
that probably he had the specifi c locus from Ethica Nicomachea in mind. In these latter 
editions reference is made to Cicero’s Pro Murena, instead of Pro Caecina; naturally, 
together with the classic formulation of the proverbium, which can be read in De of-
fi ciis. We can suspect Aristotelian infl uence – on an ideological level rather than in 
the concrete wording – in the reference to the intention of the legislator opposed to 
the letter of the law (Aristot. rhet. 1374b). Th e image “voces …quasi legum cutis est”; 
i.e., the words constitute the skin, the outward layer, is presumably Erasmus’s own. It 
was probably Bonifacius Amerbach who called Erasmus’s attention to the two legal 
fragments by Celsus and Paulus respectively from the Digesta by Iustinian, but he used 
them merely as a kind of illustration without examining either their historical or dog-
matic background (Kisch 1955. 210).
Reaching the end of our introspection, we can draw the following conclusions. 
From the maxims of legal logic as means of legal interpretation, in the present work 
we made the proverb “summum ius summa iniuria” the object of our scrutiny, enumer-
ating its occurrences in antique literary sources, namely in Terence, Columella and 
then in Cicero. In this last formulation the meaning of the proverb became the most 
clearly crystallized. It signifi es the excessive, malevolent legal practice in the course 
of interpretatio iuris, which plays off  the letter of the law against its spirit. Th e Celsian 
sententia “ius est ars boni et aequi” formulates one of the most general, all-encompass-
ing basic principles of interpretatio meant to off er protection against the too strictly 
interpreted and applied summum ius. Although jurists never clearly defi ned the con-
cept of aequitas, it became a very important means of legal development as a thought 
ON THE ROLE OF ETHICAL MAXIMS…  ¨  93
emerging from the interaction of jurisprudence and eloquence. Th e presentation of 
the relevant loci from Erasmus of Rotterdam’s Adagia as a typical example of the per-
sistence of the paroemia “summum ius summa iniuria”, was aimed to show the way a 
proverb turning into regula iuris – apart from its direct legal application – became an 
integral part of today’s legal common knowledge.
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Saint Augustine on the Foundation of Morals 
and the Reason for a Normative Ethics
ZOLTÁN FRENYÓ
Th e problem of universal morality is irrelevant for descriptive ethics; it is 
to be rejected for metaethics; but it is a real subject for normative ethics. 
Ethics is a practical philosophical discipline, which needs a metaphysical 
theoretical foundation. Ethics can be bound to, and it can originate from 
the world (in a narrower sense, nature), from the man (his rational or 
irrational character), and fi nally from the absolute. 
Th e Christian philosophy of ethics takes into account all these features, 
naturally with the dominance and priority of the absolute. Th e principles 
of Saint Augustine have a great signifi cance in that regard. Similarly to the 
whole of patristic and, generally, to Christian ethics, this theory is a normative 
ethical theory, that is not an immanent but a transcendent system, which has 
its foundation in the natural law, and in a wider sense in the whole Christian 
view of the world. On the grounds of the natural law a rightly understood uni-
versal ethics can be deduced, while a false concept of universalization or to-
talization, mainly on the gruouds of the notion of the person, is to be rejected. 
Th is paper aims to analyze some of the works of Saint Augustine within 
such a conceptual framework. Here it is demonstrated that Saint Augustine’s 
chief theses and principles in his relevant works are: the doctrine of the order 
of being as a starting point; the connections within the order of being, the 
eternal law and the natural law; the foundation of the principles of morals in 
the eternal law; the demand of a rational foundation of morals; the request of 
a positive, normative ethics; the unity of virtue and love.
Preliminary remarks
Considering the moral situation of our age, the inquiry aft er the possibility of a universally 
valid morality is a matter of primary importance. Nihilistic and relativistic tendencies have 
gained considerable strength in the twentieth century against the conception of a universal 
morality. Opposing the traditional normative ethics, a view has appeared and spread through-
out the century; this view distinguishes between the so-called descriptive or comparative, the 
normative or prescriptive, and the analitical or metaethics1. Th is view evolved together with 
1 Cf. Quante 2012. 19. 
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a modern way of thinking for some centuries, aiming to utterly diminish the signifi cance of 
Christian thinking in the history of philosophy. However, in the so-called moral crisis of 
our age, the importance of a normative ethics has begun to be appreciated once again. 
Th e following questions arise with good reason: supposing morality can be found-
ed, then how is it possible, from where does it originate and what guarantees its va-
lidity? If we consider the notion of being, the whole as a unit of three factors forming 
the subject of philosophy, there we fi nd the absolutum, the world and the man, and 
nothing else exists and can be imagined. Th e schools of philosophy diff er from one 
another according to their concepts on the rank and order of these factors. 
It is not by chance that ethics is a practical discipline of philosophy (although there 
are some who simply deny this); and in this way ethics is dependent on and is rightly 
founded on metaphysics and ontological axiology. Ethics without metaphysics remains 
an immanent circle of questions, which is compelled to substantiate itself by itself, and, 
as a consequence of this, it generally leads either to naturalism, hedonism, utilitarian-
ism, emotivism and faulty eudaimonism, or it eliminates itself by a mere logical anal-
ysis. It can be asked whether moral sense on the one hand (which is undoubtedly and 
indisputably present in man’s soul), and morality on the other hand (which emerges as 
the demand of human reason) are able to subsist in themselves or not, or are they to be 
reduced to their metaphysical basis to assure their truth and validity.
Th e question concerning universal ethics is obviously a question concerning nor-
mative ethics. Th e distrust of modern times against normative ethics is based on false 
metaphysics, but from another point of view it can be partly respected as it opposes 
a sweeping generalization, an exaggerated totalization and collectivization. Th is mis-
trust, however, is defi nitely without a cause, since, facing the natural order and social 
reality, it questions the verifi cation of the content of morals. 
Counterpoints
Normative ethics can be attacked from several directions. Beside relativism and natu-
ralism, which are probably simpler cases, such intentions can be found in metaethics 
as well. It is a right and useful aspiration of metaethics in analytical philosophy to 
vigorously revise our conceptions. What will be, then, the uniform results of these 
investigations, according to this discipline? 
George Edward Moore, in his Principia Ethica (1903), claimed: 
Th e main object of Ethics, as a systematic science, is to give correct rea-
sons for thinking that this or that is good; and unless this question be an-
swered, such reasons cannot be given. […] If I am asked ’What is good?’ 
my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if 
I am asked ’How is good to be defi ned?’ my answer is that it cannot be 
defi ned, and that is all I have to say about it. (Moore 1922. 5-6.) 
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According to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922): “Th ere is 
no value in the world;” “If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all hap-
pening and being-so;” (6.41) “Hence also there can be no ethical propositions.” (6.42)
Th e philosophy, the creed and the practical activity of Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret 
Anscombe, the British analytic philosopher who was a student of and later on one of 
the main experts on Wittgenstein, is found in a strange relationship. Her high appre-
ciation is even refl ected in the somewhat exeggerated expression of Roger Scruton, 
the conservative philosopher, who noticed that “the late Elizabeth Anscombe <was> 
perhaps the last great philosopher writing in English” (Scruton 2010). Anscombe was 
Catholic with a characteristic public activity, who raised her voice several times for the 
realization of Christian moral principles. 
Anscombe’s way of thinking represented the so-called analytical thomism. On the 
one hand, we appreciate the partial values of this tendency; at least it has the merit to 
refresh the analytic philosophy dominating the anglo-american spiritual life. On the 
other hand, we have to point out that the two principles included in the tendency are 
incompatible and irreconcilable with each other. Namely, thomism represents a meta-
phisical position, while analytic philosophy represents an anti-metaphysical one. Con-
sequently, the concept of analytical thomism has an inner contradiction, and emerges 
as a result of the typically inconsistent way of thinking of our age. 
In spite of her personal Christian spirituality, the infertility of this tendency can 
be recognized in the following statements of Anscombe’s famous study Modern mor-
al philosophy (1958), diametrically opposing the traditional principles of the Chris-
tian worldview, ontology and moral philosophy, but easily corresponding to the well-
known theses of analytic philosophy: 
It is not profi table for us at present to do moral philosophy. […] Th e con-
cepts of obligation and duty – moral obligation and moral duty, that is to 
say – and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of 
’ought’, ought to be jettisoned […]; because they are survivals or deriva-
tives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics which no longer 
generally survives, and are only harmful without it. […]
Th is word ’ought’ having become a word of mere mesmeric force, could 
not, in the character of having the force, be inferred from anything what-
ever. […] I should judge that Hume and our present-day ethicists had 
done a considerable service by showing that no content could be found in 
the notion ’morally ought’. […] It would be most reasonable to drop it. It 
has no reasonable sense outside a law conception of ethics. […] I should 
recommend banishing ethics totally from our minds. (Anscombe 1958).
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Th e signifi cance of the Patristic moral philosophy
When Eric Osborn, the excellent expert on patristic thought, has published his famous 
volume in 1976 titled Ethical Patterns in Early Christian Th ought (Osborne 1976), it 
was not by chance that in the introduction of the book he began his investigations by 
examining some modern conceptions. He dealt in great detail with several important 
authors of analytic moral philosophy. Osborn cited both of the main works of Richard 
Mervyn Hare, Th e Language of Morals (1952) and Freedom and Reason (1963), and 
cited Georg Henrik von Wright and some other authors as well. Osborn tried to create 
order among such various ideas; he recognized some promising signs and tendencies, 
but as a whole he pointed out that these theories of contemporary moral philosophy 
could not off er a secure basis for a system of moral values.
Osborn states: “A fi nal feature of contemporary thought is a thoughtful rejection of 
Christian claims.” At the same time he observes: “Th e urbanity of much twentieth-cen-
tury ethics has worn thin.” He claims that under such circumstances it is absolutely 
necessary to rediscover Christian faith as a fundamental domain of morality: “Th e 
need for exploration in this area is therefore urgent. It is not merely a matter of better 
understanding but a question of integrity.” In this way the signifi cance of the Church 
Fathers of the patristic age can be realized. Characterizing their spirit, Osborn de-
scribes: “Dread of evil and enthusiasm for good were always with them.” When taking 
into account the features of patristic thinking, fi rst of all he emphasizes the coherence 
of their system (Osborne 1978. 3-4.).
It is also instructive to insert here some sections of Alasdair MacIntyre’s self-crit-
icism formulated in the introduction to the second edition (1998) of his A Short His-
tory of Ethics, a book published three decades earlier (1967). Here MacIntyre regrets 
neglecting Christian philosophy, and adds: 
Th is error of mine refl ected a widespread, even if far from universal, prac-
tice in the then English-speaking world – which still unfortunately persists 
in numerous colleges and universities – of ignoring the place both of the 
earlier Christian eras and of the high middle ages in the history of philos-
ophy. 
Some lines below that he appreciates the rank and value of Christian thinking as 
follows:
Th ose doctrines successfully defi ne a life for Christians informed both 
by the hope of the Second Coming and by a commitment to this-worldly 
activity in and through which human beings rediscover the true nature of 
their natural ends and of those natural virtues required to achieve those 
ends. (Macintyre 1998. viii-ix)
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Saint Augustine
In accordance with this appreciation I aim to reconstruct the main ethical doctrines 
developed by Saint Augustine. His whole work has an ethical dimension, although his 
chief activities were focussed on faith, truth and being. At the same time, he also wrote 
special tractates and treatises on moral subjects. His most important works in that re-
gard are the following: De ordine, De beata vita, De libero arbitrio, De moribus ecclesiae 
catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum, De continentia, De doctrina Christiana, De 
natura boni contra Manichaeos, De patientia, Enchiridion. Reading these works one 
can realize that Augustine did not treat moral problems immanently and separately, 
but always in connection with his principles of faith and being. 
Th e critics of a sophistic and sceptical view
In Saint Augustine’s view, the purpose of thinking is to grasp and realize the order of 
being; and he is convinced about the vanity of thinking should it focus only on itself 
separated from the relations of being. His distinction between a metaphysical and a 
sophistic way of thinking has a defi nite validity in any era: 
Th erefore it is one thing to know the laws of inference, and another to know 
the truth of opinions. […] Th e man who knows that there is a resurrection 
of the dead is assuredly better than the man who only knows that it follows 
that if there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not risen.2 
Advocating the idea of a philosophy focusing on truth and at the same time criticiz-
ing adversary philosophies, Saint Augustine describes the situation and his task with 
the following words of topical interest:
In this age of ours, when we see none who are philosophers – for I do not 
consider those who merely wear the cloak of a philosopher to be worthy 
of that venerable name – it seems to me that men (those, at least, whom 
the teaching of the Academicians has, through the subtlety of the terms in 
which it was expressed, deterred from attempting to understand its actual 
meaning) should be brought back to the hope of discovering the truth.3 
Th e source and the foundation of morality
If morality is not simply included in thinking, and if the world is a created being, than 
morality points to the absolute (absolutum). Saint Augustine originates the rules of be-
haviour and the knowledge of good and bad from the divine absolute being. It is the same 
2 Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana, II. 34. 52.; Cf. his similar arguments in De Trinitate, IV. 16.21. – 17.23.
3 Augustinus, Epistula 1. 1.
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as the later scholastic conception of eternal law, which is the source of natural moral law. 
Saint Augustine explains his notion giving an objective ground for morality as follows:
Where indeed are these rules written, wherein even the unrighteous rec-
ognizes what is righteous, wherein he discerns that he ought to have what 
he himself has not? Where, then, are they written, unless in the book of 
that Light which is called Truth? Whence every righteous law is copied 
and transferred (not by migrating to it, but by being as it were impressed 
upon it) to the heart of the man that works righteousness; as the impres-
sion from a ring passes into the wax, yet does not leave the ring.4 
Th e order of being and the natural law
Saint Augustine’s fundamental principle is to recognize and acknowledge the order of 
being.5 He begins his dialogue on order with the statement that it is in the nature of all 
to follow the order of being. However, it is a diffi  cult task to understand how this order 
rules and holds together the universe and it can rarely be carried out successfully.6 
In this early work he already develops a strong connection between the order of 
being and the principle of the right life. He concludes his book with an invitation to the 
right life in the following words: 
Most of our eff orts are to be directed to the better morals. Our God 
doesn’t listen to us if we don’t live righteously, but if we do so, he listenes 
to us quite soon.7 
In Augustine’s works the conceptions of order of being and law are in similarly 
strong connection. He consideres it to be an eternal law to preserve the natural order 
established by the Creator. According to his formulation, eternal law is the will of 
the divine reason which compels us to follow the natural law and forbids us to avoid 
it in any way.8 
Similarly to the scholastic principle “agere sequitur esse”, that is, “action follows 
being”, Saint Augustine starts the investigation of human activity and morals from 
4 Augustinus, De Trinitate, XIV. 15. 21.; “Ubinam sunt istae regulae scriptae, ubi quid sit iustum et iniustus 
agnoscit, ubi cernit habendum esse quod ipse non habet? Ubi ergo scriptae sunt, nisi in libro lucis illius quae 
veritas dicitur, unde omnis lex iusta describitur et in cor hominis qui operatur iustitiam non migrando sed 
tamquam imprimendo transfertur, sicut imago ex anulo et in ceram transit et anulum non relinquit?” Corpus 
Christianorum, Series Latina, 50. A. 451.; Th is text was cited also by the International Th eological Commission, 
in the 31. note of its document entitled In Search of a Universal Ethics. A New Look at the Natural Law (2009).
5 Cf.: Rief 1962.
6 Cf. Augustinus: De ordine, I. 1.
7 Augustinus, De ordine, XX. 52.
8 Cf. Augustinus, Contra Faustum, 22. 27.
100  ¨  ZOLTÁN FRENYÓ
the concept and reality of being. (As Aquinas states: “Th e mode of activity of anybody 
follows the mode of his being itself.”9) 
As Augustine claims, man strives aft er happiness, and happiness is the fulfi llment 
of human nature. One can realize it if his actions correspond to reason and truth.10 
Likewise, virtue is a mental disposition – as he points out in accordance with Cicero – 
which is in harmony with nature and reason.11 
He explains the principle as follows: 
Passions of our soul are not alien to us. Th ey feed co-existing with us 
on the knowledge of sciences, best morals and eternal life, as they were 
seeding herbs, fructifying trees and verdurous plants. And it is just this 
case which constitutes the happy and tranquil life of man, when all of our 
passions harmonizes with reason and truth.12 
It means that Saint Augustine’s theory of passion admits and confi rms the rule of 
passion in human life as a phenomenon having a right place in the order of being. In 
his work on Th e City of God, he turns against the stoic concept of equanimity (ἀπάθεια, 
impassibilitas); he declares that in reality it doesn’t belong to our present life, and for-
mulates his teaching as follows: 
In the light of these considerations, since we must lead a right sort of life 
to arrive at a happy life, a right sort of life has all these emotions in a right 
way, and a wrong sort of life in a wrong way.13
Virtue and love
Besides the foundation of morals, the core content of Saint Augustine’s moral philoso-
phy is the forming of virtue and love into an organic unity. In the course of this he also 
unites the classical Greek philosophical doctrine on the four cardinal virtues and the 
Biblical tradition. In his work De moribus ecclesiae catholicae,14 in a hellenistic-pla-
tonic spirit he cites the following passage of the Book of Wisdom: 
9 Th omas Aquinas, Summa Th eologica, p. I. q. 89. a. 1. “Modus operandi uniusquiusque rei sequitur mo-
dum essendi ipsius.”
10 Augustinus, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I. 20. 31.
11 Augustinus, De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, 31. 1.
12 Augustinus, De Genesi contra Manichaeos, I. 20. 31. “Non enim a nobis alieni sunt motus animi nostri. 
Pascuntur etiam nobiscum cognitione rationum et morum optimorum et vitae aeternae, tanquam herbis 
seminalibus et lignis fructiferis et herbis viridibus. Et haec est hominis vita beata atque tranquilla, cum om-
nes motus eius rationi veritatique consentiunt.” Migne, J-P. (ed.), Patrologia Latina, vol. 34. col. 188.
13 Augustinus, De civitate Dei, XIV. 9. “Quae cum ita sint, quoniam recta vita ducenda est qua pervenien-
dum sit ad beatam, omnes aff ectus istos vita recta rectos habet, perversa perversos.”
14 Augustinus, De moribus ecclesiae catholicae, 16. 27.
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And if a man love righteousness, her labours are virtues; for she teacheth 
temperance and prudence, justice and fortitude; which are such things, as 
men can have nothing more profi table in their life.15 
Th e question arising at this point is the following: How and in what manner are 
virtues and love compatible with each other? According to Saint Augustine’s fi nal for-
mulation, virtue is the order of love (virtus est ordo amoris). Th e specifi c sentence 
runs as follows: “Hence in my opinion, a short and true defi nition of virtue is ’a due 
ordering of love’.”16 
Th is is a recurrent principle in Saint Augustine’s whole life-work and fi gures in 
each of his relevant writings. In his early work On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 
love is defi ned and treated as the summary of virtues,17 the basic hermeneutical work 
of the middle-aged Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, explains his important notion 
of the right order of love,18 and his late and great work On the City of God contains the 
formula mentioned above. 
Th e rational foundation of morals
In his work On the Morals of the Catholic Church written in 388, Saint Augustine ex-
plained and summarized his views on moral philosophy developed in opposition to 
the manichaean conception. Th is work has many merits, especially regarding its inten-
tion to establish and assure moral philosophy by a rational method. As he declares at 
the beginning of the work: “How then, according to reason, ought man to live ?”19 Th e 
following section presents the main principles of this work. 
Th e work manifests the Christian transformation of the antique concept of eudai-
monism through a series of concepts, namely, that of happiness, virtue, love, and God. 
Th e desire of happiness leads us to practice virtue; the summary of virtues is love; the 
practice of virtue aims towards the fi nal good (summum bonum) which is identical 
with God. 
He states: “No one will question that virtue gives perfection to the soul.”20 Th en he adds: 
15 Wisdom 8,7.; καὶ εἰ δικαιοσύνην ἀγαπᾷ τις οἱ πόνοι ταύτης εἰσὶν ἀρεταί σωφροσύνην γὰρ καὶ φρόνησιν 
ἐκδιδάσκει δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀνδρείαν ὧν χρησιμώτερον οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν βίῳ ἀνθρώποις. Σοφία Σολομῶντος, 
8. 7. Et si iustitiam quis diligit, labores huius magnas habent virtutes: sobrietatem enim et prudentiam docet, 
et iustitiam, et virtutem, quibus utilius nihil est in vita hominibus. Liber Sapientiae 8,7.
16 Augustinus, De civitate Dei, XV. 22. “Unde mihi videtur quod defi nitio brevis et vera virtutis ordo est amoris.”
17 Augustinus, De moribus, op. cit. 33. 73.; 15. 25.; 13. 22.; 25. 46.
18 Augustinus, De doctrina Christiana. On the order of love cf.: Origenes: Commentarius in Canticum 
Canticorum, III. 4.
19 Augustinus, De moribus, op. cit. 3.4.
20 Op. cit. 6. 9.
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Undoubtedly in the pursuit of virtue the soul follows aft er something.21 
[…] If, then, we ask what it is to live well, – that is, to strive aft er happi-
ness by living well, – it must assuredly be to love virtue, to love wisdom, 
to love truth, and to love with all the heart, with all the soul, and with all 
the mind.22
Saint Augustine consideres the four virtues as four diff erent manifestations of love: 
For the fourfold division of virtue I regard as taken from four forms of 
love. For these four virtues (would that all felt their infl uence in their 
minds as they have their names in their mouths!), I should have no hes-
itation in defi ning them: that temperance is love giving itself entirely to 
that which is loved; fortitude is love readily bearing all things for the sake 
of the loved object; justice is love serving only the loved object, and there-
fore ruling rightly; prudence is love distinguishing with sagacity between 
what hinders it and what helps it.23 
Aft er this, Saint Augustine also refers the four virtues to God. Man wants to be 
happy, and for this reason he is looking for the fi nal good. “Such, then, being the chief 
good, it must be something which cannot be lost against the will.”24 “As to virtue lead-
ing us to a happy life, I hold virtue to be nothing else than perfect love of God.”25 
As he observes, the right way of living can be deduced by and for anybody from 
these principles.26 “I will briefl y set forth the manner of life according to these virtues, 
one by one.” He analyses the four virtues in detail and deduces principles of life from 
them.27 
In this way the practice of virtues is accomplished in the love of God. 
I need say no more about right conduct. For if God is man’s chief good, 
which you cannot deny, it clearly follows, since to seek the chief good is 
to live well, that to live well is nothing else but to love God with all the 
heart, with all the soul, with all the mind; and, as arising from this, that 
this love must be preserved entire and incorrupt, which is the part of tem-
perance; that it give way before no troubles, which is the part of fortitude; 
that it serve no other, which is the part of justice; that it be watchful in its 
inspection of things lest craft  or fraud steal in, which is the part of pru-
21 Op. cit. 6. 9.
22 Op. cit. 13. 22.
23 Op. cit. 15. 25.
24 Op. cit. 3. 5.
25 Op. cit. 15. 25.
26 Op. cit. 16. 26.
27 Op. cit. 19. 35.
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dence. Th is is the one perfection of man, by which alone he can succeed 
in attaining to the purity of truth.28 
Th e essence and the reason of the Augustinian moral philosophy
Saint Augustine acknowledges that there are two kinds of attractions operating in the 
human being, namely, self-love and unselfi sh love and states that an endless fi ght of 
these two kinds of love runs through the history of our race. In other words, it is 
obvious and unambiguous that man is equally able to be good and evil. Under such 
circumstances a theoretical investigation favours the pursuit of a normative and posi-
tive foundation of morality, rather than a turn to a logical dilemma or a metaphysical 
and anthropological dualism. Although Saint Augustine takes into account and keeps 
track of both the communities and “cities” of human nature and attitude, he only de-
nominates the concept of the “city of God” (civitas Dei) as the leading principle in the 
title of his grand work.29 He endeavours to show norm and virtue to be more real phe-
nomena than corruption and lack of order. Independent from whether someone has 
faith or not, I think the above insight into the human spirit is the main reason behind 
thinking and culture. (On Saint Monica’s old feast, 4. May, 2014.)
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General Consent and Universal Morality
An Early Modern Platonist View
ÁDÁM SMRCZ
Considering his argument with Lord Herbert of Cherbury, John Locke has 
long been regarded as the champion of the so called innatism debate (not 
considering here Descartes, only Locke’s Brittish counterparts). However, 
this historiographical stance fails to explain a number of historical facts, 
including how could a whole philosophical tradition, commonly called the 
Cambridge Platonism, have developed on such seemingly unsteady grounds.
Th e aim of this paper is to revise Locke’s arguments in the light of Cher-
bury’s own theses. Suspectedly, only few of Lord Herbert’s contemporaries 
had fi rsthand knowledge concerning his text, but the same can be said 
about historians of philosophy. Roughly all of our knowledge is hence based 
on Locke’s report, which – as I intend to show – makes the picture rather 
distorted, while a diff erent view instead may provide us with solutions con-
cerning historiographical hardships. 
Introduction
Locke famously denied the existence of innate principles, either theoretical or moral. 
Th e fi rst book of the Essay bears testimony partly to his debate with the Cambridge 
Platonist Lord Herbert of Cherbury, in which the criteria of knowledge are in question. 
Lord Herbert’s standpoint is that general consent to a principle provides suffi  cient ev-
idence for its innateness, while Locke argues that such general consent is both against 
our intuition and is theoretically impossible. 
One serious problem is that even among scholars there is no general consent about 
whether it was Lord Herbert with whom Locke was arguing at all (Yolton 1956; For-
rai 2005. 55-75). While many of the arguments debated by Locke do originate from 
Lord Herbert, some still suspect Descartes or some early Cartesians in the background 
instead of Cherbury, who many refuses to consider to be a fi rst-rank thinker (Forrai 
2005. 61). Th e key to this fi rst question can be reformulated as follows: in fact, what 
kind of innatism is Locke arguing with? 
(1) Th e fi rst aim of this paper is partly to argue on behalf of those who claim that 
Cherbury was Locke’s counterpart, even if merely one of his counterparts. (2) Th e sec-
ond goal of this paper concerns the historiography of philosophy: scholars who accept 
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the previous thesis tend to label Locke as the champion of the innatism debate without 
considerable hesitation. However, this predominant historiographical tendency fails 
to explain how a whole philosophical tradition could have been established on the 
basis of Cherbury’s seemingly refuted principles, or how a whole school of thinkers – 
generally known as the Cambridge Platonists – could have built their system on such 
unsteady grounds. All this renders the solidity and validity of Locke’s seemingly fi rm 
arguments questionable: the mere existence of the Cambridge school of philosophers 
suggests that Locke’s counterarguments were interpreted in a signifi cantly diff erent 
way by contemporaries than by the historiographical tradition. Since empirical history 
of philosophy and historiography seem to diverge in this case (as the latter cannot give 
a full explanation of the former), a revision of Locke’s arguments seems to be justifi ed. 
Regarding the fi rst question, this paper intends to suggest that both Cherbury and 
Descartes were originally among Locke’s adversaries; but, concerning the second one, 
it will be shown that he later capitulated to Lord Herbert. Supporting this view, I in-
voke some texts by other members of the Cambridge school besides Lord Herbert’s 
own writings. 
Whether Cherbury or the Cartesians?
Broadly speaking, an innatist had two possible strategies in order to defend his posi-
tion: (1) proving that the idea or proposition he is trying to defend is backed by general 
consent, so it must necessarily be true. Th is is a method already employed by ancient 
Stoicism1, but considered to be less conclusive by the majority of early modern think-
ers. (2) Proving that these could not have originated from anywhere else than from 
being imprinted in our souls (e.g. Descartes’s notion of infi nity). Reformulating this 
distinction, we could say that innateness was a suffi  cient condition for the fi rst group of 
thinkers, while only a necessary one for the second. 
Cherbury’s common notions
Lord Herbert’s epistemology consists of three main concepts: veritas rei, veritas ap-
parentiae and veritas intellectus. Veritas rei is used for denoting the thing as it is, while 
the remaining two denote the thing observed in relation to the observer; veritas per-
ceptionis is the kind of truth transmitted to us by our senses, while veritas intellectus is 
1 Th e Cambridge Platonists’ indebtedness to Stoic philosophy is clearly visible both on the level of content 
and terminology (e.g.: “We seem clearly to be led by the instincts of nature to think that there is something 
ἐφ ἡμῖν, in nostra potestate, in our power […]”. Cudworth 1996. 155.) Th eir interest in Stoic philosophy is 
most likely to have originated from Hugo Grotius (see below), who himself is likely to have been infl uenced 
by Justus Lipsius.
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the truth of the thing derived from our intellect (Cherbury 1645/1966. 9-10.; Popkin 
2003. 129-136). Th e problem with sense perception is well-known: our senses deceive 
us so oft en that relying simply on them can never fully eliminate our doubts. Th e only 
thing that remains is intellectual perception, since the intellect seems to be the only 
instrument capable of obtaining the truth of the thing itself. 
But how do we know that our intellectual perception conforms to the object? Th is 
is the point where general consent enters the argument, being the only means able to 
provide us information about the verity or falsity of our ideas. Th e only thing needed 
in order to obtain this is the proper use of our intellect. A kind of intuitive faculty, the 
so-called natural instinct (instinctus naturalis)2 is meant to reveal the hidden cognitive 
content later to be consented to by everyone. In other words, whatever revealed by this 
faculty will necessarily entail general consent.
We approve of general consent as the only necessary norm of truth (this 
cannot come into being without Divine providence). We cheerfully re-
ceive this providence, since the most eminently good and greatest cause 
of God is revealed in it, who has always, in every century given his com-
mon notions to the people as a mediator of his Divine providence (Cher-
bury 1645/1966. 40).
Lord Herbert’s formulation can be slightly misleading, as he seems to speak about 
general consent as only a necessary condition of having common notions of something. 
In fact, he speaks about the only necessary condition, which renders this only neces-
sary condition suffi  cient at the same time. Hence Lord Herbert can obviously be ranked 
as belonging to the fi rst group of innatists (according to our previous distinction)3.
Reading only this passage, one could easily be led to another kind of misinterpreta-
tion as well, since the lines quoted above may even intimate a claim for moral homoge-
neity. Th is could also be a reason why Locke attributed such a claim to Cherbury. How-
ever, Lord Herbert himself never advocated the idea that the world would be morally 
homogenous. Th e only thing he claimed was that the deduction of complex principles 
or ideas into more simple ones would necessarily result in such simple principles or 
ideas that had to be generally consented to by everyone. Diversity, either theoretical or 
moral, is only given empirically (at a very superfi cial level), since a deeper view would 
immediately reveal the sameness between the principles observed.
2 It later became a key notion of the Cambridge Platonists, generally called the light of nature or the candle 
of the Lord by later authors. See: Roberts 1968. 66-91.
3 It’s not the point of this paper to investigate the internal consistency of Lord Herbert’s theses, the only thing 
that matters here is their validity related to Locke’s counterarguments. However, it is worth noting here what 
Richard Popkin has rightly observed regarding the logical fallacy of petitio principii Lord Herbert commits “We 
ignore meanwhile all those who are fools, enthusiasts and imbeciles, or all those who are either fanatics of some 
church, school or opinion” (Cherbury1645/1966. 40; for further reading see: Popkin 2003. 131-132).
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Common notions in practice
Regarding the innateness of theoretical principles, Cherbury’s method can easily be 
observed via his discourse on the plurality of gods. Lord Herbert says that external 
manifestations of religions may be diff erent, but he also claims that the enumeration 
of attributes, common to all divine beings in all cultures, creates consensus among 
competing traditions. 
Th e author enumerates altogether eleven such attributes, which everyone must 
consent to, regardless of tradition, confessional affi  liation etc.4 He quotes happiness 
(esse beatum), goodness (esse bonum), justice (esse justum) among others as necessary 
divine attributes. If his theory works, these all must be consented to by anyone in-
dependent of his culture or the circumstances of his upbringing. Th is supposed ho-
mogeneity behind the seemingly varied phenomena is the point where the infl uence 
of Hugo Grotius is eminently palpable, as he famously recommended a very similar 
method while examining how man’s natural rights should be determined5.
Lord Herbert’s theory, however, does not confi ne itself to mere theoretical princi-
ples; it deals with moral ones as well. 
Concerning that in the soul of men there always has been an abhorrence 
from sin. So much, that no guilt can ever be hidden from them: they need 
to be amended through absolution. Concerning rites or sacred things, 
which were invented by priests in order to absolve [sinners], there is no 
consensus. […] (Cherbury 1645/1966. 217.). 
Here he continues with quoting diff erent prohibitions (e.g.: the consumption of 
meat), which were intended to give absolution from sin. 
4 „Concerning that some kind of supreme divine power exists: concerning gods there is no consensus 
(conventum), but concerning God, there is indeed: in the class of gods there is some kind of supreme one, 
but no religion has ever admitted to this [doctrine], and will never do so. Hence was the attribute of God 
Optimus Maximus at the Romans […] Jehovah at the Hebrews […]. Hence, the divine power (no matter 
what name it was given) has always been called God wherever it was talked about”. Cherbury goes on with 
enumerating the attributes common to all divine beings in all cultures: “We comprehend him, (1) as happy. 
(2) as who is the purpose of things. (3) as the cause of things as far as they are good. […] 4. as the mediator 
[medium] of things as only through middle parts does a road lead from the beginning to the end. (5) as be-
ing eternal, since the origin of all things must be eternal according to what our common notion (communis 
notitia) teaches us. (6) as good, since our common notion teaches us, that the cause of all the good must be 
good in the most eminent way. (7) as just [justum], as he tempers all things according to the biggest equality. 
(8) As wise, since the signs of his wiseness are revealed not only in the above mentioned attributes, but also 
in his ordinary works”. Later, he adds three more attributes which may not be so easily accepted as universal, 
but still must be attributed to God: (9) Infi nity, (10) Omnipotence, (11) Liberty.
5 Biographical details further reinforce this correlation between Cherbury and Grotius, as the Dutchman 
was the one who encouraged Lord Herbert to publish De Veritate. See: Popkin 2003.128-129.
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Not focusing here on other rites, some of which seem to be absolutely 
stupid, [we can declare] that our sins are wiped away through real repent-
ance, and through that we can make a new alliance with God. Th is is what 
the general consent of religions, the condition of divine goodness, and our 
conscience itself teach us (Cherbury 1645/1966. 217.).
Hence, in Cherbury’s view, three crucial factors help us bridge the confusion of 
moral diversity concerning religions: consent, divine goodness and our conscience. 
Th e mechanism has to begin with the inquisition of our conscience6. Aft er the natural 
instinct has revealed any content found there, it must be investigated whether the con-
tent revealed conforms with divine goodness. But even if it does, it still does not satisfy 
the criterion of truth, as it still has to be subjected to the tribunal of general consent7. 
Providing the content was admitted generally it could be decleared to be true. Th e role 
played by general consent can hence be interpreted as an a posteriori verifi cation of 
whatever is revealed by the natural instinct or the light of nature. 
Why moral homogenity does matter
If the principle of innateness is correct, then it concerns theoretical and moral cases 
alike. However, it is more than likely that for Cherbury moral principles were of prior-
ity; scholars have only recently pointed out the Cambridge school’s strong involvment 
in the irenicist movement (Jue 2006 65-85.) which might reasonably explain their en-
thusiasm regarding the kind of innatism outlined above. 
Irenicism, a movement aimed at the reunifi cation of churches separated by dog-
matic dissent, seemed for many to be a viable solution to the problem of spiritual 
and political stability. While some thinkers like David Pareus confi ned the plan of 
reunifi cation only to Protestant Churches, others, like Grotius, were eager to include 
Catholics as well in the grand project (Jue 2006. 65-85.).
Th ough it is more than likely that Grotius’ infl uence on Cherbury was more consid-
erable, the main point here is not to determine which kind of irenicism Lord Herbert 
followed. It is enough for us to highlight the possible reason for his joining this episte-
mological battleground.
6 „Th e same sense of nature’s instincts appear yet more plainly, from men’s blaming, accusing, and cond-
emning themselves for their own actions” […]. “In which latter case men have an inward sense of guilt (be-
sides shame), remorse of conscience, with horror, confusion, and astonishment” Cudworth 1996. 156.
7 „Whoever reveals a demonstration from the natural instinct, he reveals of necessity such a common 
cognitive content which can be refuted by no one” Cherbury 1645/1966. 37-38.
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Diachronic consent, or the prisca theologia narrative
Refuting dissent, however, does not stop at a contemporary level, since Lord Herbert 
also said that God has “in every century given his common notions to the people”. 
Hence, the urge to fi nd common denominators among the seemingly diverse phenom-
ena did not stop at a contemporary level, but left  the door open for historical research, 
providing the careful inspector with infi nite amount of evidence. Lord Herbert’s off -
spring, the Cambridge Platonists hence tried to apply this principle in a diachronic 
way; trying to prove that no real diversity existed between ancient theories or customs 
and present ones. In doing so, they developed the historical narrative of general con-
sent. 
Th e method employed by the Platonists was a type of narrative received from 
Marsilio Ficino. Ficino’s so-called prisca theologia project was aimed at restoring the 
authority of some ancient thinkers, among whom the most eminent ones were Zoro-
aster, Hermes Tristmegistus and Plato. Th e claim that ancient wisdom was nothing but 
the mere recapitulation of Biblical revelation was supposed to provide for Plato and the 
others divine authority. 
[Th e Greeks] underlined the main doctrine of the Hebrews and the mira-
cles of the Bible as well, which makes it clear – as Clement of Alexandria, 
Eusebius and Aristobulus of Attica thought it – that whatever eminent 
doctrine or secret teaching the pagans possessed, it was all stolen from 
the Hebrews. 
As a consequence of all this, what “Numenius the Pythagorean says seems legit-
imate: “Plato possessed nothing but the teachings of Moses translated into an Attic 
dialect” (Ficino 1475. 26.). 8
Ficino’s aim with this peculiar narrative was to broaden the received framework of 
Christianity: he believed that providing legitimacy to the so far forbidden speculative 
or moral knowledge of the ancients would be of great help in the augmentation of 
his contemporary knowledge. Th is is one point that has diff erent connotations in the 
Cambridge narrative: for Cambridge thinkers not the augmentation of our knowledge, 
but the sameness of our knowledge is important. 
Our most important source concerning this Cambridge narrative is Ralph Cud-
worth. He originates ancient wisdom not from Zoroaster or Hermes, but from a rather 
mysterious person called Mochus; a theory that is rather hard to falsify, since nobody 
has any knowledge of him. Th e greatest mystery surrounding this person comes from 
the fact that only two ancient sources (Iamblichus and Eusebius of Caesarea) give us a 
report on him, and none of these tells too much, while Cudworth seems to know a lot. 
8 For further reading on the topic see: Hankins 2008.; Levi 2001.
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According to the seventeenth century philosopher’s account, Mochus was supposedly 
the inventor of atomism in the age of the Trojan War. Being a versatile polymath, he 
also wrote treatises on philosophy of the soul, cosmology, and the holy trinity. Aft er 
briefl y acquainting us with this extraordinary person, Cudworth concludes that he 
could not have been anyone else but Moses, prophet of the Hebrews. He hence estab-
lishes the essential unity between religion and philosophy, at the same time intimating 
that no separation exists between the ancients and his age (Cudworth 1996. 38-42.). 
Putting our doubts concerning the reliability and accuracy of the facts employed 
by Cudworth aside, one thing can be declared: this narrative was intended to provide 
enormous amounts of evidence concerning the existence of generally accepted prin-
ciples, which – on the other hand – may also help to show the sameness of the most 
distant times and cultures.
How it all concerns the innatism debate
Turning back to the debate with Locke, we may compare the above-mentioned method 
with the reconstructed framework of the innatism debate. Th e problem is the following: 
1. Th e proposition we intend to prove is characterized by property T (property T signi-
fi es general consent). 2. Whatever T is, it is innate. 3. Whatever is innate, it is necessarily 
true. 4. Th e proposition we intend to prove is necessarily true (Forrai 2005. 63.) 
Lord Herbert’s and the Cambridge Platonists’ intention is to follow the second path, 
and to prove the existence of innate ideas or principles through empirical evidence. 
As it was mentioned concerning moral principles, Locke’s attack seems to focus 
mainly on the fi rst premise, claiming that no idea or principle exists that would be 
generally accepted, the proof of which is the empirical variety of customs. From the 
author’s line of argument, it evidently follows that premise 2 is meaningless, as no such 
thing as T exists in reality, and so the further parts of the argument also collapse. 
In my view this is not so obvious. Locke famously challenged the doctrine of gen-
eral consent, but maybe this challenge was not as successful as it is generally thought 
to be. If we recall briefl y the reconstruction of Locke’s attack, the problem is clear. His 
strategy is threefold: fi rst he intends to prove that tangible diversity can in itself provide 
the refutation of the innateness of moral principles (faith and justice are not owned by 
all men etc.). At this point Cherbury’s analytic-comparative method is not even men-
tioned, so here Locke argues with positions that claim empirical moral homogeneity in 
the world. As demonstrated previously, this is not the case with Cherbury. 
Secondly, Locke’s view is that the Platonists’ principles (principles such as virtue or 
guilt without further articulation) are so abstract that they are practically worth almost 
nothing. Th e fi rst problem here is that this does not amount to a real refutation of the 
original proposition (as Locke does not refute the innateness of abstract principles, he 
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only claims that they are useless). Furthermore, as we have seen, the Platonists do not 
only mention abstract universals, they do speak about particulars as well, hence, Locke 
could here be accused of ignoratio elenchi, since he fails to notice an argument.
Locke’s third counter-argument seems to be the only one that stands fi rm, when 
he says that Lord Herbert’s common notions are so arbitrary that practically any idea 
or principle could be considered to be such common notion this way. Even if this 
argument seems to be the strongest among the ones mentioned above, it applies par-
ticularly to Lord Herbert’s theory and not to the general doctrine of common notions 
based on general consent.
As a consequence of the line of argument mentioned above, we could say that Locke 
fails to seize the fi nal victory over the innatists. Hence, in my view, the second part of 
Book 1 in the Essay can be interpreted as if Locke was abandoning the battlefi eld in 
order to fi nd another opponent:
[W]hen I say, all men shall be proved actually to know and allow all these 
and a thousand other such rules, all of which come under these two gen-
eral words made use of above, viz. virtutes et peccata, virtues and sins, 
there will be more reason for admitting these and the like, for common 
notions and practical principles. Yet, aft er all, general consent (were there 
any in moral principles) to truths, the knowledge whereof may be at-
tained otherwise, would scarce prove them to be innate; which is all I 
contend for (Forrai 2005. 63.). 
Th is is the point where Locke seems to change the premise attacked. He claims that 
even if general consent was obtainable, it would not prove the innateness of an idea or 
principle. Th e only possible proof would be the Cartesian one, namely, that such ideas 
or principles could have no other origin than being imprinted in our souls; a doctrine 
to be attacked by him later.
Conclusion
My view is that the shift  between the standpoints in Locke’s case is due to the fact that 
the advocates of general consent proved too hard to be refuted; hence Locke cannot be 
declared to be the winner of this debate. Whether or not their argumentation was pe-
culiar, refuting their infi nite number of evidences concerning common notions would 
have required infi nite number of counterarguments. Seeing how such an experiment is 
theoretically impossible, Locke had to shift  his strategy and face Cartesianism instead. 
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Love for Natural Beauty as a Mark of a Good Soul: 
Kant on the Relation between Aesthetics and Morality
MOJCA KÜPLEN
Ralph Waldo Emerson once wrote: “In the tranquil landscape, and espe-
cially in the distant line of the horizon, man beholds somewhat as beau-
tiful as his own nature” (2003. 39). Th e poet captures nicely an idea, dom-
inant in the contemporary environmental aesthetics, namely, that aesthetic 
appreciation of nature is intimately connected with the moral nature with-
in us. Many of us have experienced when in contact with nature that its 
beauty moves us in a way that goes deeper than its initial appeal; it elicits 
in us a feeling of comfort, hope, a sense of well-being and belonging to the 
world. My aim in this paper is to propose an explanation of the connection 
between our aesthetic experience of natural beauty and our moral ideas. 
I approach this problem in light of Kant’s aesthetic theory put forward in the 
Critique of the Power of Judgment.
Introduction
In §42 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant puts forward the view that to take 
a direct interest in natural beauty is a sign of a good moral character. He writes: 
I do assert that to take an immediate interest in the beauty of nature (not 
merely to have taste in order to judge it) is always a mark of a good soul, 
and that if this interest is habitual, it at least indicates a disposition of the 
mind that is favorable to the moral feeling (5:299, p.178).9 
As Kant concedes, it is not merely the ability to judge objects as beautiful (i.e. to 
have taste) that indicates a good moral character. For example, it is oft en the case, 
he writes, that people with good taste are “vain, obstinate, and given to corrupting 
9 References to Immanuel Kant will be given in the text to the volume and page number of the Akademie 
edition (Kants gesammelte Schrift en, ed. Königlichen Preußischen [later Deutschen] Akademie der Wis-
senschaft en [Berlin: Georg Reimer (later Walter De Gruyter), 1900). References are also given, aft er a com-
ma, to the English translation of Critique of the Power of Judgment, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and 
Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2000), which includes the “First Introduction” (vol. 20 of the 
Akademie edition). References to Critique of Pure Reason, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. 
Wood (Cambridge University Press, 1998), are provided using the standard citations of the A and B editions 
(vols. 3 and 4 of the Akademie edition, respectively).
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passions, could perhaps even less than others lay claim to the merit of devotion to 
moral principles” (5:298, p. 178). Rather, it is one’s ability to take a direct interest in a 
beautiful object that gives us reason to assume that he or she must have a good moral 
character. Since Kant formulates interest as “[t]he satisfaction that we combine with 
the representation of the existence of an object” (5:204, p. 90), the claim he makes is 
that one who is able to take pleasure in the existence of a beautiful object must possess 
a mental attunement favorable to a good moral thinking. 
Kant appeals to an example to illustrate what this kind of pleasure is like. He writes:
Someone who alone (and without any intention of wanting to communi-
cate his observations to others) considers the beautiful shape of a wild-
fl ower, a bird, an insect, etc., in order to marvel at it, to love it, and to 
be unwilling for it to be entirely absent from nature, even though some 
harm might come to him from it rather than there being any prospect of 
advantage to him from it, takes an immediate and certainly intellectual 
interest in the beauty of nature. I.e., not only the form of its product but 
also its existence pleases him (5:299, p. 178). 
It is said that pleasure in the existence of natural beauty is an intellectual pleasure, 
rather than an empirical one. While the latter is a pleasure grounded in private inter-
ests one might have in a beautiful object, the former is pleasure in the sheer existence 
of a beautiful object in virtue of its form alone. What intellectually pleases us is the 
fact that an object, which gives rise to a disinterested and universally communicable 
aesthetic pleasure, exists. Such pleasure is akin to a moral pleasure, because, as Kant 
writes, it is “being determinable a priori through reason” (5:296, p. 176).
It is not every beautiful object, however, that can engender such intellectual pleas-
ure in us; rather this is a privilege held by natural beauty alone: 
if someone had secretly deceived this lover of the beautiful and had planted 
artifi cial fl owers (…) and he then discovered the deception, the immediate 
interest that he had previously taken in it would immediately disappear, 
though perhaps another, namely the interest of vanity in decorating his 
room with them for the eyes of others, would take its place (5:299, p.179). 
It is suggested that one’s intellectual pleasure is grounded not merely in one’s ex-
perience of beauty, but also in a thought that it is nature, rather than a human hand, 
that created this beauty. Th us, it is only love for natural beauty that is related to moral 
thinking. Kant claims that even though artistic beauty might surpass the beauty of 
natural forms, it cannot however indicate anything about one’s moral character: 
the interest in the beautiful in art (as part of which I also count the artful 
use of the beauties of nature for decoration, and thus for vanity) provides 
no proof of a way of thinking that is devoted to the morally good or even 
merely inclined to it (5:298, p. 178).
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Contemporary interpretations usually take two diff erent approaches in order to ex-
plain the relation Kant makes between aesthetics and morality.1 In short, one sugges-
tion is based on Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas and his claim that beauty is a sensible 
realization of moral ideas (Rogerson 2008. 84-99). Th e idea is that experience of beau-
ty reveals moral ideas to us and thus we take a moral interest in the existence of beauty. 
Th e other suggestion is based on Kant’s statement that there are signifi cant similarities 
between our experience of beauty and our moral judgments (White 1979. 179-188). 
Th e state of mind inherent in making judgments of taste is similar to the state of mind 
in making moral judgments. Th e experience of beauty is an experience of a universally 
communicable state of mind between our cognitive powers (i.e. a state of mind devoid 
of any private interests), but this is an experience similar to the one that can be found 
in moral judgments. Presumably, the resemblance between the two experiences as-
sures us that an interest in one of them will also elicit an interest in the other.2 
Both of these explanations are, however, insuffi  cient mainly because they cannot 
explain the specifi c connection Kant makes between natural beauty and a good moral 
character. Based on the fi rst account, all beauty expresses moral ideas, and if an expres-
sion of moral ideas is a suffi  cient reason to take a moral interest in a beautiful object, 
then it is also artistic beauty that must engage one’s moral interest and indicate a good 
moral character. But this is a conclusion that Kant explicitly rejects, as evident from 
the passage above. It is true that Kant holds the idea that artistic beauty is expressive of 
moral ideas.3 But if artistic beauty can be expressive of moral ideas, yet it cannot elicit 
moral interest, then it follows that expression of moral ideas cannot serve as a facilita-
tor of one’s moral interest. Hence, this approach – as it stands – fails.
Th e second approach faces a similar problem. If all that links aesthetic and mor-
al judgments is a resemblance between the two forms of refl ection, then this cannot 
explain what is so special about aesthetic judgments regarding natural objects that 
are related to one’s moral nature. Based on this approach, to have an ability to judge 
objects by the means of taste and to experience a disinterested and universally com-
municable feeling of pleasure is a suffi  cient condition to take a moral interest in beauty. 
Since moral interest in beauty indicates one’s good moral character, it follows that any 
person who experiences a pure aesthetic feeling has a good moral character. But this is 
not true, as evident both from the observation that a morally reprehensible person can 
have a refi ned taste in nature and art, and from Kant’s claim that what indicates good 
moral character is not merely to have taste, but to have the ability to take pleasure in 
the existence of a beautiful object. Th ere is a diff erence between an experience of an 
1 For a short overview of diff erent explanations of the relation between aesthetics and morality in Kant, 
see: Guyer 2005. 196-200.
2 Independently of Kant, this is a view also endorsed by Eaton 2001. 83-88, and Brady 2003. 256-258.
3 For example, he writes “Th e poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the king-
dom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation” (5:314, p. 192).
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aesthetic pleasure (which is disinterested and universally communicable and therefore 
similar to pleasure we take in moral judgments) and an experience of pleasure we take 
in the fact that such an object exists. It is the latter pleasure that indicates good moral 
character. 
My objective in this paper is to propose a diff erent interpretation of the relation 
between aesthetics and morality, which can accommodate the connection Kant makes 
between natural beauty and a good moral character. I believe that the key to fi nding 
a viable link lies in Kant’s notion of the refl ective judgment and the a priori principle 
of purposiveness of nature. Kant introduces this principle as required for both our 
ability to have empirical cognition and to make judgments of taste. As I intend to 
show, this principle is also essential for our basic motivation to pursue moral goals. 
Th e discussion proceeds as follows: fi rst, I provide a reconstruction of Kant’s argument 
for the connection between natural beauty and a good moral character, and point out 
two main diffi  culties that his argument is facing. Second, I consider Kant’s notion of 
the a priori principle of purposiveness of nature. Kant introduces this principle as his 
answer to the ‘empirical nature-cognition’ problem, but which is related to a similar 
‘nature-freedom’ problem. Th ird, I explain the association of beauty and the principle 
of purposiveness of nature, and based on that, point out how natural beauty relates to 
moral purposiveness.
I.
In §42 Kant argues that one’s interest in natural beauty is a sign of a good moral char-
acter. Th e reconstruction of his argument is as follows (5: 300-301, p. 180):
 1. It is in the interest of reason that moral ideas have objective reality, 
that is, that nature shows some traces or gives a sign that it is compat-
ible with our moral ends. 
 2. Th us, reason must take an interest in every manifestation of nature 
that shows its compatibility similar to moral compatibility. 
 3. Th e existence of natural beauty is such a manifestation.
 4. Hence, reason must take an interest in the existence of natural beauty.
 5. Because of this affi  nity, this interest is moral (pleasure in the existence 
of moral goodness).
 6. One who takes interest in the objective reality of moral ideas can do 
so only insofar as he has already fi rmly established his interest in the 
morally good (good moral disposition).
 7. Hence, one who takes an interest in the existence of natural beauty 
must have a good moral disposition. 
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Th e argument is based on two premises (premise 1 and 3) that are questionable. 
Premise one claims that we must be interested in any indications of nature’s moral pur-
posiveness. But this premise can be justifi ed only in the case if it is not necessarily true 
that nature is compatible with our moral ends and that we are able to realize our moral 
ends in the empirical world. Th is assumption, however, seems questionable when con-
sidered in light of Kant’s epistemological and moral theory. Namely, in the Critique of 
Pure Reason Kant demonstrated the logical compatibility of the concept of nature and 
the concept of freedom (A448/B476). Th e concept of nature is under the legislation of 
the faculty of understanding, which determines the sensible world with categories, and 
the concept of freedom (moral laws) is under the legislation of the faculty of reason, 
which determines how the world ought to be. Presumably, the concept of nature does 
not disturb the other and vice versa. Kant repeats this idea in the third Critique: 
Understanding and reason thus have two diff erent legislations on one 
and the same territory of experience, without either being detrimental to 
the other. For just as little as the concept of nature infl uences legislation 
through the concept of freedom does the latter disturb the legislation of 
nature (5:175, p. 62). 
Accordingly, to act freely is perfectly compatible with the general concepts of na-
ture (law of causality). Furthermore, it follows from Kant’s moral theory that even 
though we cannot prove that freedom is possible, we can assume the reality of this 
freedom from our awareness of our duties under the moral law. Th e moral law is a 
determining basis of our will and thus if we ought to perform a moral action then we 
must be able to do it. In view of that, Kant’s claim that we must fi nd some evidence that 
nature is compatible with our moral ends seems questionable.
 
Also, premise three is not justifi ed. Kant merely states that the existence of natu-
ral beauty is a manifestation of nature that shows its compatibility similar to moral 
compatibility, but without providing any support for this claim. Furthermore, all 
that Kant says about the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful is that it is the result of 
the mental state of free harmony between imagination and understanding, which 
is also the state of mind required for empirical cognition (for empirical concept ac-
quisition). Hence, all that the existence of natural beauty seems to reveal is that em-
pirical nature is amenable for our cognition (that apprehended sensible manifold is 
compatible with the cognitive structure of our mind). But stating that nature agrees 
with our cognitive eff orts does not necessarily imply that such a nature also agrees 
with our moral eff orts.4 
4 Th is objection is also pointed out by Budd 2002. 56-57.
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I propose to address both of these problems in light of Kant’s notion of a refl ective 
power of judgment and the a priori principle of purposiveness of nature.5 Kant introduc-
es this principle as his answer to the ‘empirical nature-cognition’ problem, but which 
reveals that there is a similar problem pertaining to nature’s moral purposiveness in the 
empirical world. In order to address the latter, it is fi rst required to consider the former. 
II.
In the Introduction to the third Critique Kant argues that in order for us to have empir-
ical cognition we must presuppose the existence of an a priori principle of judgment 
(i.e. principle of purposiveness of nature) that guides us in our cognitive investigation 
of nature. Kant’s argument for postulating the principle of purposiveness as necessary 
for empirical cognition can be reconstructed in the following way: 
1. We are in possession of the pure concepts of understanding, which determine 
nature in the most general way (as a substance, cause and eff ect, etc.): 
we fi rst fi nd in the grounds of the possibility of an experience something 
necessary, namely the universal laws without which nature in general (as 
object of the senses) could not be conceived; and these rest on the cate-
gories, applied to the formal conditions of all intuition that is possible for 
us, insofar as it is likewise given to us a priori (5:183, p. 70).
2. However, these concepts do not determine the empirical content of specifi c nat-
ural forms, such as dogs, stones, fl ower, fi sh, or of particular events, such as the warm-
ness of the stone being caused by the sun: 
the universal laws of nature yield such an interconnection among things 
with respect to their genera, as things of nature in general, but not specif-
ically, as such and such particular beings in nature (5:183, p. 70).6 
5 According to Kant, refl ective judgments, together with determining judgments, belong to one of the 
three faculties of thought, that is, to the faculty of judgment (understanding and reason being the other two). 
Th e function of the power of judgment is to connect empirical intuition with the appropriate concept, and 
to attain harmony between the imagination and understanding. In the case of determining judgment, the 
universal concept is given, so the judgment merely subsumes the particular under it. Th e refl ective power 
of judgment, on the other hand, is activated when we are presented with a manifold for which we do not yet 
have a concept. Th e role of the refl ective power of judgment is to fi nd a new concept (rule) under which the 
particular can be subsumed, so that the determining judgment can be made (5:179-180, p. 66-67).
6 Kant claims that categories are heterogeneous from empirical intuition and can never be encountered in 
any intuition (A137/B176). Th at is, there is no image of a category of a substance or an image of the categ-
ory of cause and eff ect. All the images and laws we encounter in the empirical world are merely particular 
determinations of the categories. For example, an image of a house, or an image of a dog is only a particular 
determination of the category of a substance. Since categories do not distinguish between particular images 
and laws (the category of a substance does not distinguish between the image of a house, and an image of a 
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3. Since the categories do not determine the empirical content of specifi c natural 
forms, then, without any further presupposition, there could be such a diversity of nat-
ural forms and events that we could never understand nature as a unifi ed and coherent 
system. Th ere could be so many ways of organizing these particular experiences, that 
without the presupposition of an underlying unity we could never understand nature 
as a systematically organized whole. Categories alone cannot guarantee the coherence 
of our empirical cognition: 
For although experience constitutes a system in accordance with tran-
scendental laws, which contain the condition of the possibility of expe-
rience in general, there is still possible such an infi nite multiplicity of 
empirical laws and such a great heterogeneity of forms of nature, which 
would belong to particular experience, that the concept of a system in 
accordance with these (empirical) laws must be entirely alien to the un-
derstanding, and neither the possibility, let alone the necessity, of such a 
whole can be conceived (20:203, p. 9). 
4. But this is not true. We do have an experience of empirical nature as a system 
(for example, a classifi cation of biological forms into the system of genera and species).
5. Hence, this means that in addition to the pure concepts of understanding, there 
must be a principle that guides us in making our experience of empirical nature coher-
ent and systematic. Th is principle is nothing else but a necessary presupposition of the 
power of judgment that 
nature [in] the specifi cation of the transcendental laws of understanding 
(principles of its possibility as nature in general), i.e., in the manifold of 
its empirical laws, proceeds in accordance with the idea of a system of 
their division for the sake of the possibility of experience as an empirical 
system (20:243, p. 42). 
According to Kant’s reasoning, we must assume that refl ective judgment, which 
looks for the universal of a particular, operates under the pressuposition that nature 
in its specifi city forms a system in which all phenomena are related to each other and 
divided into the genera and species. Th is assumption makes it possible for refl ective 
judgment to look for the commonalities in natural forms, and therefore, to bring them 
under the universals. Th is assumption of the systematic character of nature is neces-
sary for the rationality and coherence of our refl ection, because without it, as Kant 
says: “all refl ection would become arbitrary and blind, and hence would be undertaken 
without any well-grounded expectation of its agreement with nature” (20:212, p. 16). 
dog), they cannot determine nature in its particularity. For a more detailed explanation of this problem, see: 
Pippin 1982. 137; Ginsborg 1997. 56; Guyer 2006. 180-181. 
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As the ‘empirical nature-cognition’ problem shows, the existence of general con-
cepts of nature cannot guarantee that nature in its specifi city will be compatible with 
the structure of our mind. But if general concepts of nature do not determine empiri-
cal content of specifi c natural forms then it follows that even though Kant established 
the compatibility between a priori concepts of nature and the concept of freedom on 
the transcendental level, this does not guarantee that they are also compatible on the 
empirical level. Th us, there is a possibility that empirical nature is structured in a way 
that precludes the realization of our moral demands in the sensible world. General 
concepts of nature do not determine empirical nature in its particularity and also the a 
priori concept of freedom cannot guarantee that the empirical order of nature is such 
that it conforms to our particular moral pursuits.7 Even though we are committed to 
perform our moral obligations, there might still be a worry about the eff ectiveness of 
our moral actions. As Henry Allison puts it, the worry is “whether what is required 
by (moral) theory is achievable in practice (in the “real world”)” (Allison 2012. 219). 
But it is Kant’s idea that the concept of freedom should have an eff ect on the empir-
ical nature, that is, “the concept of freedom should make the end that is imposed by its 
laws real in the sensible world” (5:176, p. 63). Hence, it is necessary that we assume the 
idea that nature is nevertheless compatible with our moral aims: 
nature must consequently also be able to be conceived in such a way that 
the lawfulness of its form is at least in agreement with the possibility of 
the ends that are to be realized in it in accordance with the laws of free-
dom (ibid.). 
To conceive nature as attuned to our moral projects is required in order for human 
beings to pursue their moral goals. Without a belief that moral laws can be realized in 
the sensible world, we would not be motivated to pursue our moral ends and put them in 
practice. To interpret nature as being responsive to our moral ideas is a necessary condition 
for our moral actions and moral behavior. Dieter Henrich nicely puts this idea as follows: 
the moral agent pursues purposes that derive from the good will. He at-
tempts to help other human beings and he aims to improve the overall con-
dition of society so that evil will no longer fl ourish or just men suff er. And 
since he simply cannot follow the law’s demand without believing that it is 
possible to succeed in all these regards, he accepts, together with the valid-
ity of the moral law, a view of what the world is like: its constitution must 
be such that its eff ects are not indiff erent to, or even counteract, morally 
motivated actions. Th is belief is a necessary implication of the agent’s mor-
al conduct, whether he becomes aware of it or not (Dieter 1992. 24-25).
7 For a more detailed explanation of the ’nature-freedom’ problem see: Düsing 1990. 79-92; Genova 1970. 
452-480, and Allison 2001.195-217.
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III.
In the previous section I explained Kant’s reasoning behind his claim that as moral 
beings we must be interested in signs of nature’s compatibility with our moral ends. 
Because we have to assume the idea of nature’s moral purposiveness as a condition for 
the very possibility of our moral life, we have an interest in any expression of nature 
that shows to be compatible with our moral ends. When we come across such signs, a 
feeling of pleasure is produced. 
Kant seems to be convinced that it is natural beauty that gives us a sign that empir-
ical nature is compatible with our moral ends. However, all that he says about a beau-
tiful object is that it reveals that nature is purposive for our cognition. Namely, Kant 
suggests that the same principle of purposiveness of nature that governs our cognitive 
investigation of nature is also responsible for our ability to make judgments of taste (of 
the beautiful). For instance, in one of the many passages supporting this connection 
he says: 
Th e self-suffi  cient beauty of nature reveals to us a technique of nature, 
which makes it possible to represent it as a system in accordance with 
laws the principle of which we do not encounter anywhere in our entire 
faculty of understanding, namely that of a purposiveness with respect to 
the use of the power of judgment in regard to appearances (5:246, p. 129). 
Th e claim is that a beautiful object exhibits a technique of nature, that is, a pur-
posiveness that allows us to represent nature as a system. But, as Kant writes, it is not 
nature itself that is technical (that is, purposive), but rather “the power of judgment is 
properly technical; nature is represented technically only insofar as it conforms to that 
procedure of the power of judgment and makes it necessary” (20:220, p. 22). In other 
words, an object is considered beautiful when it satisfi es the principle of purposiveness, 
which guides the procedure of the power of judgment. A beautiful object represents the 
satisfaction of the principle of nature’s purposiveness for our cognitive abilities.
Moreover, Kant suggests that the principle of purposiveness is properly revealed 
only in judgments of taste: 
It is therefore properly only in taste, and especially with regard to objects 
in nature, in which alone the power of judgment reveals itself as a facul-
ty that has its own special principle and thereby makes a well-founded 
claim to a place in the general critique of the higher faculties of cognition, 
which one would perhaps not have entrusted to it (20:244, p. 44). 
Th is implies that the principle is not revealed in cognitive inquiries, even though it 
is also necessary for them. In my understanding, Kant’s thought can be explained with 
reference to the two kinds of refl ection employed in the power of judgment. In cogni-
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tive inquiries, refl ection is the action of comparing one form with other forms in order 
to fi nd common features. In judgments of taste, on the other hand, refl ection is the ac-
tion of comparing a single form with our own faculty of cognition (20:211, p. 15). Th is 
means that in the fi rst case the primary result of the comparison made in accordance 
with the principle is the perception of the commonalities between two objects. How-
ever, in judgments of taste the primary result is the feeling of pleasure or displeasure, 
and it is this feeling that reveals the extent to which the principle of purposiveness is 
satisfi ed by the object. What we perceive in a judgment of taste (of the beautiful) is 
the conformity of the object with this principle, that is, a harmony between imagina-
tion and understanding, and this is experienced through the feeling of pleasure alone. 
Pleasure designates that our expectations about the world are fulfi lled. In other words, 
we feel pleasure in the experience of the contingent harmony between nature and our 
cognitive abilities. A beautiful object complements our idea of nature as a system. Th at 
is, a beautiful object discloses the purposiveness or systematicity of nature at the most 
particular and concrete level and it does that through the feeling of pleasure alone. 
I do not want to go into details of legitimizing the connection between the principle 
of purposiveness and judgments of taste, which has already been pointed out by other 
Kant-scholars (Ginsborg 1990. 66-68; Matthews 2010. 63-79; Baz 2005. 1-32; Kuplen 
2013. 124-134). Here I just want to point out how this connection can explain the asso-
ciation of natural beauty with moral purposiveness. Th at it is the principle of purposive-
ness of nature, the satisfaction of which is revealed in a beautiful object, that connects 
empirical nature with practical reason, is explicitly pointed out by Kant as follows: 
Th at which presupposes this a priori and without regard to the practical, 
namely, the power of judgment, provides the mediating concept between 
the concepts of nature and the concept of freedom, which makes possi-
ble the transition from the purely theoretical to the purely practical, from 
lawfulness in accordance with the former to the fi nal end in accordance 
with the latter, in the concept of a purposiveness of nature (5:196, p. 81-82).
Unfortunately, Kant does not provide any details on how the principle of purpo-
siveness makes this transition possible. However, based on what he does say on the 
relation between beauty and the principle of purposiveness, certain suggestions can be 
made. My proposal is the following.
According to Kant, the feeling of pleasure in a beautiful object is a result of the 
confi rmation or satisfaction of the principle of purposiveness of nature. Th is principle 
represents a unique way of refl ecting and approaching nature. Th e principle does not 
determine the world; rather, it determines us, and our need to see the world in a spe-
cifi c way. It is an indeterminate idea about how the world is supposed to be organized 
so that it allows our understanding to cognize it. And it is an idea that holds only for 
us, but not necessarily for nature. Th is means that when this presupposition of pur-
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posiveness is met with in nature, that is, when the harmony between imagination and 
understanding is established, then this harmony is considered as contingent. Pleasure 
designates that our expectations about the world are fulfi lled. We appreciate forms that 
are in accordance with the principle of purposiveness, and that reassures us that the 
world is indeed such as we expect it to be. 
Accordingly, what is inherent in the experience of beautiful nature is the idea of 
nature that favors us and which is made with the sole purpose to suit us and please us. 
As Kant points out: 
Th e fl owers, the blossoms, indeed the shapes of whole plants; the delicacy 
of animal formations of all sorts of species, which is unnecessary for their 
own use but as if selected for our own taste [and] which seem to have 
been aimed entirely at outer contemplation (5:347, p. 222). 
We think of nature being contingently harmonious with our cognitive abilities. 
However, when we come across beautiful natural forms, our feeling of pleasure is ac-
companied with an idea that such forms must be intentionally produced (by an un-
known source) for the sole purpose of pleasing us: 
We may consider it as a favor that nature has done for us that in addition 
to usefulness it has so richly distributed beauty and charms, and we can 
love it on that account, just as we regard it with respect because of its 
immeasurability, and we can feel ourselves to be ennobled in this contem-
plation – just as if nature had erected and decorated its magnifi cent stage 
precisely with this intention (5:380, p. 252). 
But to think of nature as if made for the sole purpose to suit us is to think of it as 
something that can be shaped freely according to our desires, and for the satisfaction 
of our needs and aims, thus, for our moral needs as well. Beauty makes us think that 
our moral ideas can also be met in nature and that our “moral self [has a place] within 
the realm of natural system” (Kneller 1998. 411). Th rough a feeling of intense pleasure, 
nature gives us evidence that moral ideas can be realized in nature. Just as the princi-
ple of purposiveness, which is properly revealed in the beautiful, makes our cognition 
systematic and coherent, so does encountering beautiful objects make us think of the 
possibility of the existence of a moral world, which is not subjected to arbitrariness and 
irrationality, but rather, which is harmonious with our moral self and susceptible to 
our moral pursuits. Beautiful images of nature – from colorful tulips, magnifi cent and 
graceful birds such as the Hyacinth Macaw, to majestic Victoria Falls when viewed at 
sunset, its reds and oranges myriad, and the mesmerizing sandstone rock formation, 
Th e Wave, in Arizona – they all reinforce our hope that the world is not indiff erent to 
our moral goals and actions. Th e existence of natural beauty gives us a sign that nature 
is compatible with our moral goals, in other words, that the faculty of reason, which 
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determines how the world ought to be, is compatible with the concept of nature, that 
is, with how the world is.8 
According to this explanation, we can now make sense of Kant’s claim that interest 
in natural beauty is a sign of a good moral character. We have an interest in the exist-
ence of natural beauty because it reveals to us that our moral pursuits are not in vain. 
As moral beings we strive to realize our moral goals in the sensible world and to fi nd 
signs that nature is compatible with such moral pursuits elicits in us a feeling of intel-
lectual pleasure. Th us, one fi nds pleasure in the existence of natural beauty only insofar 
as one is committed to pursue his moral ends. But one who is committed to pursue his 
moral ends must have a good moral character or at least a disposition to a good moral 
way of thinking. Hence, as Kant concludes, pleasure in the existence of natural beauty 
indicates a disposition to a good moral character. All that follows from Kant’s argument 
is that one who takes a morally based interest in a natural object must be favorable to a 
good moral thinking and this allows for the possibility that one might have a good moral 
character and fail to enjoy natural beauty; not all of us are lovers of natural beauty, but 
this in no way indicates that we must have a morally reprehensible attitude.9
Furthermore, such an explanation of the relation between aesthetics and morality 
can also accommodate Kant’s claim that beauty is an expression of moral ideas. Natu-
ral forms, Kant writes, “contain a language that nature brings to us and that seems to 
have a higher meaning” (5:302, p. 181). For example, the white color of a lily evokes 
the idea of innocence, or a bird’s song evokes the idea of joyfulness. Th e reason for our 
interpretation of nature as communicating such ideas is the following: the experience 
of aesthetic pleasure (beauty) designates that our expectations about the world are ful-
fi lled. We have a need to systematize experience, that is, to attain agreement between 
nature and our cognitive abilities. Th e systematization of experience is our mode of 
approaching and organizing nature, so that we are able to cognize it. Accordingly, the 
experience of aesthetic pleasure (beauty) is a sign of the familiarity with the world, of 
feeling at home in the world. Th e ability to know the world occasions the state of har-
mony and union between us, our mental structure, and the world. When our expec-
tations of order and our need to organize the world in a specifi c way are satisfi ed and 
fulfi lled, we do not experience merely pleasure, but also a sense of having control over 
8 Some Kant-scholars explain the relation between beauty and morality as the former being subordinated 
to the latter. For example, Michael Kraft  argues that based on Kant “Th e world is beautiful because it has a 
moral meaning for man” (1983.598). My interpretation of Kant does not support this conclusion. It follows 
from my account, that because we fi nd an object beautiful, in other words aesthetically purposive, we have a 
reason to assume the existence of moral purposiveness. 
9 As Baxley nicely puts this point: “even if taking an intellectual interest in natural beauty is an indicator 
(of indeterminate reliability) of a moral disposition, it is perfectly conceivable that one could have a good will 
or a fully developed virtuous character – and lack such an interest” (2005. 39).
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the organization of experience, and this can occasion feelings and ideas of joyfulness, 
of care, innocence, virtue, hope, optimism, etc. But these are all ideas with a strong 
moral content. Natural beauty aff ords an intimation of the world of moral ideas and 
this in itself makes our experience of it all the more valuable and morally signifi cant. 
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Judgement in Politics
Responses to International Insecurity from Hannah Arendt 
and Immanuel Kant
GÁB OR GÁNGÓ
My paper compares a few of the key issues of Hannah Arendt’s and Immanuel 
Kant’s account on IR by revisiting the controversial reading she off ered on § 
40‒41 of the Critique of the Power of Judgment. It claims that by focusing closely 
on their parallel insights concerning the insecurity inherent to the supranational 
level of politics which was called by Arendt “the world” and by Kant “the cos-
mopolitan community of mankind”, one can argue for her thesis on the high 
political relevance of the theory of judgement based on what Kant labelled as 
sensus communis in his aesthetics. Kant held that political stability in national 
political communities is part and parcel of the upcoming emergence of an over-
all rule of the law on the global scale, while Arendt convincingly proved that to-
talitarianism (the formative experience of her thinking on human co-existence 
whatsoever) is a completely new and unprecedented form of government which 
substantially diff ers from other forms of governance. She also pointed out that 
this qualitative diff erence does not create a diff erent world. Th e vulnerability 
of other, more traditional forms of governance is heightened by the advent of 
totalitarian politics exactly because of this unity in humans’ world.
Introductory remarks
Th e Critique of Judgment is the only [one of Kant’s] great writings where 
his point of departure is the World and the senses and capabilities which 
made men (in the plural) fi t to be inhabitants of it. Th is is perhaps not 
yet political philosophy, but it certainly is its sine qua non. If it could 
be found that in the capacities and regulative traffi  c and intercourse 
between men who are bound to each other by the common possession 
of a world (the earth) there exists an a priori principle, then it would 
be proved that man is essentially a political being (Arendt 1982. 141‒2; 
quoted in Beiner – Nedelsky 2001a. viii).
As this quote from her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy shows, the essence of 
Hannah Arendt’s interpretation of Kant’s political teaching is that the foundation of 
politics rests on the disinterested glance embracing the shared world. Th is principal 
idea discovered in Kant was consistent with her theory.
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I aim to show in this paper that her interpretation is one of the most convincing 
attempts to apply Kant’s pre-modernistic view on society and politics to a context aft er 
modernism. In Arendt’s view, the main diff erence between Kant and the nineteenth 
century liberal mainstream consisted in their attitude towards the world. Nineteenth 
century liberals had a ‘tactile’ eye that expressed their basically appropriative attitude 
in relation with the world, which resulted in the subordination of politics to the gen-
eral system of appropriations, that is, to economics as Hegel and Marx described it. 
Th e acquiring‒annihilating attitude, as Hegel pointed it out, is more authentic than 
the cultural‒contemplative one, “the transformation of appetite itself into thought” 
(Bakan 1979. 53). It was the oeuvre of Marx that opened Arendt’s eyes to the human 
being as “a consuming being” who, as Bikhu Parekh wrote, “builds the world only to 
dismantle and recreate it to suit his constantly changing needs” (Parekh 1979: 75). 
Unlike them, Kant insisted on what he called in his Critique of the Power of Judgement 
‘disinterestedness’ and in his essay on Perpetual Peace ‘the right to visit’ as a desirable 
and conceivable foundation of any intersubjectivity.
Th us, a thesis complementing the sympathetic readings of the Arendtian interpre-
tation of Kant can be as follows: if humans’ world is principally constituted by political 
action, then it would be also possible on the basis of Kant’s proto-liberal premises and 
on his view on history and on the public sphere to off er a theory of action which is not 
interest- and appropriation-oriented, irrespective of the fact that Kant actually chose 
another foundation of his political theory in the thesis on the individuals’ autonomy. 
Arendt noticed that the theory of the relation between humans and their world off ered 
by Kant comprised also a theory of the communicability of this very same relation 
which is based on the contemplation instead of the appropriation of the world – that 
of the aesthetic glimpse (Beiner – Nedelsky 2001a. x). Th e opposition between the 
‘beautiful’ and the ‘I like’ as a manifestation of the rights of a non-possessing eye has 
one single function, the appellation to judgement and consent.
Arendt’s views on culture prove that the opposition between appropriative and 
disinterested attitudes intrigued her. Th is conceptual opposition is a central notion 
of Arendt’s philosophy of culture: in her Crisis in Culture she distinguished between 
consuming and non-consuming attitudes towards culture. She saw ‘bad’ politics, mass 
society, and the culture of consumption interconnected with a possible antithesis of 
‘good’ politics, healthy society, and non-appropriative enjoyment of culture. Th e rea-
son behind it is that the enjoyments of mass society are destined only to “while away 
time” (Arendt 2001. 9); that is to say, free time, which should be the basis of any polit-
ical action, loses its central role in the life of individuals:
Mass culture comes into being when mass society seizes upon cultural 
objects, and its danger is that the life process of society […] will literally 
consume the cultural objects, eat them up and destroy them. Of course, I 
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am not referring to mass distribution. When books or pictures in repro-
duction are thrown on the market cheaply and attain huge sales, this does 
not aff ect the nature of the objects in question. But their nature is aff ected 
when these objects themselves are changed – rewritten, condensed, di-
gested, reduced to kitsch in reproduction, or in preparation for the mov-
ies (Arendt 2001. 10).
Th is diagnosis of the culture-destroying, consuming mass society makes clear that 
Arendt intended to grasp the meaning of cultural ‘consumption’ in its outer, reifi ed 
appearance and not as the fundamental characteristic of a civilisation. On the contrary, 
true culture, which is durable and not characterized by its functionality, belongs to the 
world. She established an analogy between cultural and political dichotomies by saying 
that culture isolates itself from the world of consumption just like the public sphere 
from that of the needs. Arendt’s statement that the common feature of art and politics is 
their public visibility appears together with her claim of regarding Kant’s Critique of the 
Power of Judgement as his real political philosophy. Th is shows the way she connected 
aesthetics to politics, with laying less stress, as Ronald Beiner put it, on the Kantian 
common denominator of these spheres, namely autonomy (Beiner 2001. 95-6).
She was of the opinion that the fate and future of morality in the world is doubt-
ful, although preserving disinterestedness may shelter humankind from totalitarian 
rulers. Concerning the relation between politics and morality, Arendt thought that 
it is desirable that the morality of politics should be an ‘inner’ morality (Villa 2000a. 
14) in a sense that it cannot be driven by self-interest aff ecting the use of the pub-
lic space. According to Arendt’s view, the agents appear in the public sphere without 
taking advantage of it (with symbolic politics). Still, it is hard to believe that Arendt 
did not know that Greek politics was also tainted by goal-rational morality and that 
she entertained illusions about the symbolic occupation of public space in modern 
politics. Nonetheless, it is plausible to argue for her eff orts to safeguard at least a part 
of the public sphere as a playground of the expression of ‘inner’ morality, as a place of 
freedom where the ‘disinterested’ spectator can become visible. Without this reserve 
for ‘inner’ morality, the symbolic, appropriative use of the political sphere threatens 
to become total, and in this threat Arendt recognized one of the fi rst steps leading to 
totalitarianism. She was not longing for the comeback of Greek democracy but she 
warned that by the destruction of this normative playground modern democracy takes 
the fi rst step towards self-destruction. 
Arendt did not deny the possibility of political consensus concerning the use of the 
public space along with the interests and aim-oriented moral principles, although she 
never ceased to emphasize the importance attached to that part of the public sphere 
where consensus is not reached on the basis of interests but on that of judgement. Th is 
kind of use of the public sphere does not aim towards its appropriation but refl ects 
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on politics while leaving it intact and, moreover, confi rm its autonomy. Th is may be 
termed the ‘aestheticization of politics’ if refl ection is the action of a disinterested gaze, 
but it also proves that this ‘aestheticization’, in opposition to Dana Villa’s claim, goes 
far beyond a broader use of the metaphor of the ‘theatrum politicum’ (Villa 1996. 12).
Th ere is no proof whatsoever that Arendt seriously considered the possible role of 
this disinterested gaze in politics. Her return to Kant is decisive as she forwarded the 
question to Kant: if disinterested pleasure is possible in aesthetics, it may be possible 
in politics too. Th e answer to the question depends, of course, on the interpretation we 
attribute to the concept of judgement. Many think that the nature of our judgements 
is not similar to the judging refl ection of an impartial mind suddenly confronted with 
its object. Th is attitude, which is by no means alien to Kant, is perhaps all too much 
attached to a presumably ideal psychology of art enjoyment.
Th e outcome of disinterestedness is a shared world instead of a divided one: Arendt 
and Kant agreed on this point. Th e unrestricted communication is a prerequisite of 
the suppression of ‘sensus privatus’ and of the public, that is, intersubjective reason’s 
authority (O’Neill 2001. 74). Th is is the main issue of Arendt’s reading of Kant: the 
safeguarding of a common, shared world without having to postulate an ‘objective’ 
human nature (Beiner 2001. 92). Th e basic idea that shaped the attitude of nineteenth 
century liberalism, the interwar period, and the Cold War was that of an originally 
divided world instead of a shared one. In Arendt’s eyes, Kant’s account of judgement 
is not embedded in the theory he drew in his essay Answer to the Question: What is 
Enlightenment? but is enveloped in a broader theory (Villa 1996. 65).
Hannah Arendt – a thinker aft er totalitarianism
 
In this part of the paper I argue that Arendt’s journey, eventually reaching her conclu-
sions, began with the personal experience of totalitarianism. I consider Hannah Arendt 
to be a thinker whose theory was not so much ‘about’ but rather ‘aft er’ totalitarianism 
(Villa 2000a. 4). First of all, I am interested in the way the experience of totalitarian re-
gimes penetrated her thought regarding its aims, subject matters, and methods. Th en, 
turning to totalitarianism itself as a historical phenomenon, one can state that it is the 
total negation of the changeability of the world, i.e., of action. However, it is at the same 
time the phenomenon that spurs individuals to action by awakening their sense of mo-
rality. My aim is to show that Kant’s teaching, in Arendt’s interpretation, might prove 
helpful in these borderline situations. Exposure to totalitarian dictatorship prompted 
Arendt to turn to the question of judgement, which, alongside with the idea of disin-
terestedness, led her to the third Kantian Critique.
Dictatorship remained a recurrent theme of Arendt’s writing. Her key moment 
came with the trial of Adolf Eichmann when she turned towards the problem of judge-
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ment (Beiner 1982. 99; Benhabib 2000. 75). Her essay on Personal Responsibility un-
der Dictatorship sheds light on her path from the personal experience of totalitarian 
regimes to the refl ections on the nature of judgement in politics. Th e complete lack 
of judgement is unacceptable and the same applies to any kind of collective judge-
ment (for example, the idea of collective guilt of the Germans “from Luther to Hitler” 
[Arendt 2003. 21]), because judgement belongs exclusively to individuals:
Which in practice turned into a highly eff ective whitewash of all those 
who had actually done something, for where all are guilty, no one is. […] 
Th ere is no such thing as collective guilt or collective innocence; guilt and 
innocence make sense only if applied to individuals.1
One can add that the notion of collective guilt seems to presuppose collective judge-
ment and therefore endeavours to create an otherwise not necessarily existing social 
consensus or prejudice. However, judgement is, and indeed should be, in every aspect 
an individual mental act; individuals have to judge on the deeds of individuals, but in 
such a way that their judgement should form a communicable and morally coherent 
structure. Th is insight does not only have a retrospective signifi cance; the impersonal-
ity of collective judgement threatens to reproduce that faceless mass society whose ap-
pearance led to the catastrophe. Th us, regaining and using their faculty of judgement 
enables the individuals to pose the question of responsibility (Arendt 2003. 30‒1). 
Arendt’s narrative concerning the process of the annihilation of the power of judge-
ment is based on her experience in National Socialist Germany. Th e fi rst step was 
“the intrusion of criminality into the public realm” (Arendt 2003. 24) but the moral 
problem was posed by the presupposed ‘hindering’ of historical telos: “this very early 
eagerness not to miss the train of History” (Arendt 2003. 24). Th e majority of the Ger-
mans, she wrote,
were not responsible for the Nazis, they were only impressed by the Nazi 
success and unable to pit their own judgment against the verdict of His-
tory, as they read it. Without taking into account the almost universal 
breakdown, not of personal responsibility, but of personal judgment in 
the early stages of the Nazi regime, it is impossible to understand what 
actually happened (Arendt 2003: 24).
Her Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy connected the Kantian themes – disin-
terestedness and judgement – with that of despotic regimes. She linked the experience 
of totalitarianism with the fact that others’ behaviour becomes utterly unpredictable, 
as she highlighted: “if you go through such a situation [as totalitarianism], the fi rst 
1 Arendt 2003. 29. As she wrote in her 1968 essay ‘Collective Responsibility’, “Guilt, unlike responsibility, always 
singles out; it is strictly personal. It refers to an act, not to intentions or potentialities” (Arendt 2003b. 147).
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thing you know is the following: you never know how somebody will act” (Arendt 
1982: 115). Th us, one of the fi rst consequences of totalitarianism is the undermining 
of sociability. Th is also explains why Arendt applauded the signs of social solidarity in 
the Hungarian upheaval of 1956 (Gángó 2009).
Arendt and Kant, the philosopher of history, has a clear consensus on the neces-
sity of taking a judging position that is diff erent from the routinely used one, but one 
that nevertheless remains inside of historicity. Judging spectators should not apply a 
timelessly moral perspective to certain processes in history. Arendt rejects this Kan-
tian solution as Kant himself rejected it at the end of long decades of refl ection on the 
relation between morals and politics. Th e point is that for the act of judging individ-
uals one have to choose another historical perspective to apply to these events: diff er-
ent in several aspects (chronological scale, point of observation) from their everyday 
perspective. Th en, this diff erent perspective, which is the result of abstraction and as 
such the essence of the autonomous judgement, has to be shared with others. Th is is 
an eminently Kantian problem and also a major argument justifying the opinion that 
Arendt’s critical interpretation based on the Critique of the Power of Judgement was 
not directed against the whole written political doctrine of Kant, but only against its 
utopian conclusion.
Th at is the reason why Arendt asked: “How can you think, and even more impor-
tant in our context, how can you judge without holding onto preconceived standards, 
norms, and general rules under which the particular cases and instances can be sub-
sumed?” (Arendt 2003: 26) It is only everyday historical experience that provides us 
with these “preconceived standards” and only the abstraction from these standards has 
to be presupposed, hence Arendt’s answer is as follows:
“For only if we assume that there exists a human faculty which enables us to judge 
rationally without being carried away by either emotion or self-interest, […] can we 
risk ourselves on this very slippery moral ground with some hope of fi nding a fi rm 
footing” (Arendt 2003: 27).
Th e adjective ‘preconceived’ seem to make reason historical, as if the categorical 
structure of our concepts of understanding was a matter of habit:
In the light of these refl ections, our endeavouring to understand some-
thing which has ruined our categories of thought and our standards of 
judgment appears less frightening. Even though we have lost yardsticks 
by which to measure, and rules under which to subsume that particular, a 
being whose essence is beginning may have enough of origin within him-
self to understand without preconceived categories and to judge without 
the set of customary rules which is morality.2 
2 Arendt: ‘Understanding and Politics’, quoted in Passerin D’Entrèves 1994. 106.
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Th us, Arendt emphasizes the prudential side of Kant’s theory: she considers it the 
frame of his real political philosophy in opposition with his written doctrine on mo-
rality. Arendt also suggests that because of the impossibility of achieving morality, hu-
mans have to be reconciled with a prudence-based coexistence instead. (A community 
on the basis of moral principles would be, according to Kant, a religious community: 
Arendt puts this possibility aside and instead accentuates the private essence of reli-
gion [Gángó 2010].) With her thesis on the unwritten Kantian political philosophy, 
Arendt suggested that Kant’s intention was to fi nd a community based on prudence, 
but she also suggested that his written political philosophy intended something else, 
namely, a community based on morality.
Arendt’s reading stresses a special feature of politics, namely, that the actor and the 
spectator are intermingled so as that they cannot be completely separated (Hutchings 
1996. 97). According to Arendt, something similar happens to the life of individuals 
under totalitarian rule, namely, that no one can avoid becoming a part of the system 
nor can they beat or bypass it in any way. Kimberly Hutchings directed attention to 
Arendt’s reading of Kant’s concept of the spectator judging history:
Arendt bases her claim as to the essentially political nature of judgment 
on her reading of the role of the sensus communis in the Critique of Aes-
thetic Judgment, and on her reading of the fi gure of the spectator or phil-
osophical judge which emerges from Kant’s essays on enlightenment, 
peace, history and the contest of the faculties (Hutchings 1996. 93).
Judgement and social communication in Kant’s 
Critique of the Power of Judgement
Although in the third Critique Kant discussed the qualities of taste, individual or so-
cial, Arendt claimed to have found the germ of his political philosophy in there, name-
ly, in the §§ 40‒41. In the next part of my paper I examine Arendt’s proposition by a 
close reading of the §§ under question.
Th ese paragraphs give prominence to a collective thinking about sociability and 
have a curiously digressive nature; both features support Arendt’s thesis. Th ese two 
paragraphs are evident digressions in the text. Moreover, they contain a great number 
of further digressions. Kant kept returning to this topic despite its apparent irrele-
vance to his principal subject matter. It might indicate to an even less clear-eyed reader 
than Arendt that something of the utmost importance must be discussed here. Indeed, 
there is, even if marginal, discussion of politics in Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judge-
ment and it is contained in the digressions of these two paragraphs.
First of all, I explore the Kantian idea of sensus communis to evaluate correctly 
Arendt’s interpretation. Arendt must have noticed that Kant, for whom thinking is 
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normally a solitary activity, in the Critique of Judgement pictured it as a social activity. 
It had to presuppose that thinking in company can only take place in a shared world – 
in a divided world the possibility of co-thinking is denied for humans.
According to § 40 of the Critique of Judgement, sensus communis is not a higher 
cognitive faculty but a way of thinking; a faculty to form judgement from a universal 
point of view. As the title of the § indicates, Kant regards taste as “a kind of ” (AA 5. 
293; Kant 2000. 173) sensus communis: he draws a loose analogy between them. Kant’s 
seemingly purposeless insistence on fi nding moral analogies to sensus communis in-
dicates the importance of attaining this universal point of view. Th e parallel between 
the sense of community and the sense of justice leads towards a universal point of 
view by leaving behind the personal perspective of what is just or likeable. Kant’s claim 
is similar to that of Arendt: overriding the selfi sh perspective and putting yourself in 
your neighbour’s shoes help to reach this universal viewpoint: “putting himself into 
the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that contin-
gently attach to our judging” (AA 5. 294; Kant 2000. 174). Th is position means nothing 
else than the abstraction of the limits and contingencies of our position: in a word, the 
abstraction of our interestedness.
Further, he deals with common sense as “common human understanding” (AA 5. 
293; Kant 2000. 173). Th ere Kant speaks about the feasibility of putting yourself into 
someone else’s position by keeping your open-minded attitude; this propaganda of the 
Enlightenment clearly reiterates the point of his political writings and mirrors his writ-
ten doctrine. Common sense means taking another individual’s position, that is to say, 
trying to foresee other peoples’ actions. Th rough a series of analogies Kant elucidates 
the similarity between taste and common sense: “One could designate taste as sensus 
communis aestheticus, common human understanding as sensus communis logicus” 
(AA 5. 295; Kant 2000. 175). Th ey are universal, they are communicable, and they are 
embedded in sociability, still, the former belongs to the power of judgement while the 
latter to the understanding.
Concerning the digression itself, the last section at AA 5: 293 makes clear that the 
author was aware of digressing from his main point: “Th e following maxims of the 
common human understanding do not belong here” (AA 5. 293; Kant 2000. 174). Af-
ter debating the meaning of common sense, Kant off ers the following conclusion: taste 
can be called common sense with more right than common sense as such, presumably 
because the shift  of positions is only one of the characteristics of the latter, while it is 
the only and principal one of the former. Consequently, the defi nition of taste pivots 
around communicability: “Taste is thus the faculty for judging a priori the commu-
nicability of the feelings that are combined with a given representation (without the 
mediation of a concept)” (AA 5. 296; Kant 2000. 176).
In § 41, Kant fi rst deals with the interconnectedness of taste and sociability. Taste, 
according to Kant, has a lot in common with social communication, refi nement, and 
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humanity: hence, taste belongs to the sphere of ‘impure ethics’ (Louden 2000). Kant 
even identifi es taste with refi nement (AA 5. 291; Kant 2000. 171). But it is still a long 
way from politics; at this point Arendt has to assist us in bridging the gap between 
impure ethics and politics. Th is leap is understandable if we take into account Arendt’s 
special personal experience, that is, the emergence of the sphere of the social, its con-
nection with the political as well as with the mass society (a phenomenon unknown to 
Kant) in the public sphere, and the appearance of irrationality in politics. But all this is 
just another digression on Kant’s part, since the relation of taste to sociability is of em-
pirical nature and therefore touches the matter (the a priori judgements of taste) only 
indirectly. Th e transition from the agreeable to the good is labelled as “ambiguous” 
(AA 5. 298; Kant 2000. 177), only with regard to the impure ethics of refi nement that 
also takes the inclinations into consideration.
Later on, Kant articulates the idea that judgement of taste enables humans as social 
beings to share their feelings as well as their thoughts. Sociability from this point of 
view means a very narrowly conceived community of communication with an overall 
agreement. Th is is a corollary of disinterestedness, and its consequence is a surpris-
ingly ‘social’ sociability of the Critique of the Power of Judgement: while unsocial so-
ciability begins where interests and competitive society take over the communion of 
socializing humans.
Th en § 41 off ers an account of the genesis of culture. Kant argues that the social 
aspects of taste can be investigated only by taking the “empirical” interest into account 
(AA 5. 296; Kant 2000. 176). He elaborates the answer to the question whether a com-
munity of taste, from this perspective, is necessarily a community of communication. 
Because, says Kant, it creates a sort of original contract, that is, a step preceding the 
pactum associationis; taste enhanced by interest is the necessary foundation of any civi-
lization and refi nement. Th is refl ection is, however, conspicuously termed a digression:
However, this interest, attached to the beautiful indirectly, through an 
inclination to society, and thus empirical, is of no importance for us here, 
for we must fi nd that importance only in what may be related to the judg-
ment of taste a priori, even if only indirectly (AA 5. 297; Kant 2000. 177).
Th ere are further arguments for the political reading of the third Critique, but 
Arendt, who never evinced any interest in the eminently aesthetical problems of the 
sublime and the beautiful, chose not to explore them. Neither the beautiful nor the 
sublime has anything to do with her thinking, she neither regarded works of art as 
essential parts of the world nor fashioned her concept of the world to correspond with 
that of a limitless nature. Her world is the Globe inhabited by humans. Kant, on his 
part, generally mistrusted political rhetoric that uses the beautiful prudentially in or-
der to achieve (one’s own) goals (AA 5. 327‒8; Kant 2000. 205). In the methodological 
chapter, his refl ections on a “lawful society” refer to eventual political connotations 
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(AA 5. 355, Kant 2000. 229). Moreover, he uses political metaphors in the analytic 
of the sublime. In the case of the dynamically sublime nature shows strength, being 
sublime because it awakens humans to their vocation over nature: “Th us nature is here 
called sublime merely because it raises the imagination to the point of presenting those 
cases in which the mind can make palpable to itself the sublimity of its own vocation 
even over nature” (AA 5. 262; Kant 2000. 145). Th is is why the General, and not the 
Statesman, is the right metaphor of the aesthetic judgement: “war, if it is conducted 
with order and reverence for the rights of civilians, has something sublime about it” 
(AA 5. 262‒3; Kant 2000. 146).
To sum up: Arendt’s opinion that the main theme of the §§ 40‒41 is co-thinking in a 
shared world proved to be mostly correct. Th e importance of these digressions should 
by no means be underestimated. Still, Arendt failed to draw together the threads of 
the whole intersubjective world of the third Critique and that of her political theory. 
All she did was to decipher the meaning of a digression. With her extreme sensitivity 
towards the problem of judgement, Arendt must have noticed that in the third Critique 
Kant regarded thinking as a social activity, which implicated that it can take place only 
in a shared world, since a divided world denies humans the possibility of co-thinking. 
Furthermore, her original insensitivity towards the problem of the beautiful also came 
into play in her reading of Kant’s aesthetics.
Kant on international relations
Th e idea of the disinterested use of the shared world, especially at a supranational level, 
is present in Kant’s essays. Arendt is more indebted to the principal idea behind these 
writings than she actually acknowledges it in her texts. Kant dealt with international 
relations in Chapter 7 of his Idea of the Universal History with Cosmopolitan Purpose. 
He held that humans cannot yet see the end of their road through history, but he was 
convinced that progress could be saved by a fi nely balanced system of self-interests 
that may prove benefi cial on the long run (Kant 1990a. 50‒1). In Toward Perpetual 
Peace: A Philosophical Project, he postulated the possessing behaviour as the basic fea-
ture of human nature. Th erefore, the states composed of humans are a hundredfold 
prone to this faulty conduct. Still, he was convinced that there existed a way out of 
an actual interstate relation fraught with “the malevolence of human nature” (AA 8. 
355; Kant 1996a. 326). Arendt, having narrowly escaped the horrors of the twentieth 
century, held a diff erent opinion. In her view the idea of real progress seemed to be 
hopelessly mistaken.
Th e prohibition of the use of other people as a means, this deep insight of the Kan-
tian Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, remains valid not only in his philosophy 
of history (Kant 1990b. 225‒6), but it is analogously expanded in his political philos-
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ophy. A state is and should be as autonomous as an individual, and, as Kant wrote in 
his Toward Perpetual Peace, “to annex it to another state as a graft  is to do away with its 
existence as a moral person into a thing” (AA 8. 344; Kant 1996a. 318). Kant opposed 
the possessive relationship at the level of international relations while Arendt similarly 
disagreed with any satellite-type international alliance with Russia or the USA in its 
centre (Gángó 2009). Seeking the principles of “any rightful constitution”, Kant consid-
ered the individuals, the supranational relations, and the inhabited world, respectively 
as the “individuals within a people”, the “states in relation to one another”, and “citizens 
of a universal state of mankind” (AA 8. 349; Kant 1996a. 322). Kant’s chief argument 
concerning the free dwelling of humans on the Earth, the right to visit, is based on the 
belief in a concept that Arendt would almost two centuries later call ‘the shared world’:
this right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings 
by virtue of the right of possession in common of the earth’s surface on 
which, as a sphere, they cannot disperse infi nitely but must fi nally put up 
with being near one another; but originally no one had more right than 
another to be on a place on the earth (AA 8. 358; Kant 1996a. 329; see also 
AA 6. 305‒6; Kant 1996b. 450).
However, “commercial states” exhibiting inhospitable behaviour adopt a posses-
sive attitude towards foreign peoples, which “goes to horrifying lengths” (AA 8. 358; 
Kant 1996a. 329). Th e developing ways of communication fi rst caused a new sensation 
amongst, fi rst the people of Europe: “a violation of right on one place of the earth is 
felt in all” (AA 8. 360; Kant 1996a. 330). Th erefore, Kant worked towards a practical 
solution for the problem caused by the increasing injustice and the general conscious-
ness of insecurity. Th e proposed solution had the same aim as Arendt’s project: to 
transform humans “with their self-seeking inclinations” into good citizens without the 
requirement of moral perfection (AA 8. 366; Kant 1996a. 335). Although rulers cannot 
be expected to achieve this goal: “since possession of power unavoidably corrupts the 
free judgment of reason” (AA 8. 369; Kant 1996a. 338).
To summarize: both of them stood on a rather utopian ground. Th e fi elds in which 
Arendt and Kant, the philosopher of history, worked had corresponding features but 
Kant’s aims and conclusions were diff erent: he intended to reconcile the malevolent 
human nature with historical progress of morality on the one hand and with legality in 
politics on the other. Facing the choice between political prudence and morality, Kant 
preferred the latter, hoping that it would promote the ultimate goal (that is, legal gov-
ernment and perpetual peace) (AA 8. 378; Kant 1996a. 344). Kant held that the moral 
principles, for “people within a state as well as states in their relations” should prevail, 
“regardless of what objections empirical politics may bring against them” (AA 8. 380; 
Kant 1996a. 346‒7). Th at is the reason why he urged the federation between states as 
a guarantee of this construction. For Kant, the foundation of the state (i.e., of politics) 
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is not publicity but legality. Th is non-appropriative principle by which he meant the 
prohibition of acquisition, the necessity of federation, and the fair treatment of one’s 
neighbours without being biased by self-interest was the basis of his doctrine, while 
Arendt subsumed these concepts under the all-embracing notion of disinterestedness. 
Th is common utopian ground of morality being reconcilable with prudence on the 
one hand and disinterestedness on the other is the link between the two theories.
Conclusion
It is a well-known fact that Arendt’s reading of Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judge-
ment is in need of correction and completion; this was the intention of this paper. In 
the period aft er modernity, Hannah Arendt was among the fi rst ones to turn to Kant’s 
oeuvre to challenge his views on politics and on human sociability. However, the scope 
of her interests was in a certain way limited to the political implications of the third 
Critique and to the ever-changing character of the notion of sociability. Later Ron-
ald Beiner broadened this view by correcting Arendt’s interpretation in fundamental 
ways. He emphasized the prudential aspect of judging (Beiner 1982. 104) as well as the 
fact that the ‘enlarged mentality’ as the ground for social thinking is the presupposi-
tion of any judgement. Ernst Vollrath further complemented the picture, remarking 
that in politics there was no ‘thing in itself ’ behind the appearance. Furthermore, he 
added that the power of judgement could be substituted for an action in a negative 
way; humans endowed with the power of judgement may hinder the emergence of 
despotic rule. Th is means that Arendt never ceased to expect and fear the raise of 
despotic rule in any part of the world, she cautioned to be continuously vigilant. Pos-
sessing a sound judgement seemed to be a good protection against falling for political 
appearance: “Th ose who possess taste, who are discriminating in things beautiful and 
ugly, good and bad, will be less likely to be caught off  their guard in times of political 
crisis” (Beiner 1982. 111).
I highlighted the importance of the experience of totalitarianism in the purpose of 
a better understanding of Arendt’s relation to Kant’s oeuvre. Arendt considered passiv-
ity as suffi  cient resistance against totalitarian regimes. However, her view exclusively 
depended on the mature power of judgement on the part of individuals involved in 
the aff air and also mature dictatorship on the other. Arendt, focusing primarily on the 
political playground (fi t for adults with moral judgement), lost sight of the other side 
of life and did not take into account the possibility of being born into such a regime, 
therefore having been accustomed to it well before the formation of any judgement. 
Arendt’s perspective was overtly predetermined by the experience of her own genera-
tion: a young, morally fi t generation in its full power of judgement, suddenly confront-
ed with dictatorship.
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Kant and Arendt were both looking for practical ways of human co-habitation but 
their starting points were widely diff erent. Kant considered fi rst of all the individual, 
Arendt the community. Kant described the valid ways of judging and the behaviour of 
the ideal individual, which led to the system of civil rules of smaller communities. For 
Arendt, the distinguished place of human interaction and political activity was the polity, 
being, excluding blood ties, open for adults for discussion and decision. Th e political for 
Kant was the consequence of human interaction while for Arendt it was the primary 
condition of it. But Arendt’s views met radical challenge presented by dehumanizing to-
talitarian systems and a new breed of humans: mass men. Despite all this, she never gave 
up the idea of the polity where humans can fi nd dignity and communication.
In spite of the enormous diff erence in their personal experiences and starting 
points, their views concerning the level of international relations are strikingly similar. 
Both advocate that it should involve independent and free states (similarly to inde-
pendent individuals), and that these relations should be grounded upon sound judge-
ment, reason, and legality. Kant argued for a federation of states ruled by law, while 
Arendt warned against the dominance of superpowers.  
Th e deepest similarity between them consists in their view of a shared world. It 
is this feature and not their common view on politics that rendered Arendt’s read-
ing possible. Th ey share a similar vision of the historical road of humanity between 
progress and decline (Benhabib 1992. 91), and it is ever present in the background 
of their picture of the homo politicus. Th e main diff erence between them consists in 
the fact that for Arendt, this vision is complemented by a theory of public sphere. 
Th is public sphere exists at two levels: as the open sphere of the political community, 
formed by individuals, on the one hand, and as a supranational sphere formed by 
political communities on the other. For Kant, in harmony with his moral philosophy, 
it is the doctrine of the Rechtsstaat that emerges from this vision. Th e Arendtian and 
the Rawlsian theory of the political are equally rooted in Kant’s political philosophy, 
but Arendt’s theory springs from the random conditions, historical or anthropolog-
ical, while Rawls’s derives from the latent or not fully developed implications of the 
critical project. Arendt the storyteller (Hill 1979a. 287ff .) can be compared to Kant the 
storyteller who, in his essays on the philosophy of history, presented the history of the 
world as a story. Humans have to use their power of judgement despite their obvious 
involvement in the actual happenings of history, which hinders them to take a point of 
observation outside the process of temporal history.
Th e connection Kant establishes between history and human beings judging his-
tory proved inspiring for Arendt. She refi nes the Kantian model by completing the 
story with the political chapter. According to her theory, any given constellation of a 
public space can be understood only with its precedents in time. Th e politician, like 
Kant’s historian with philosophical insight, cannot occupy a point of view neglecting 
the burden of historical experience; their judgement should be simultaneously charac-
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terized by the consciousness of this experience and by the refl ective attitude towards 
this experience. Kant did not link politics to historicity; according to him political 
communities are based, within a social contract theory, on the autonomy (freedom) of 
individuals as an a priori principle.3
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‘Why is Goodness a Destroying Force?’
Morality and Politics in the Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt
GÁB OR KOVÁCS
Th e political philosophy of Hannah Arendt is oft en charged with the lack of 
a moral dimension. Some interpreters go further; Arendt’s theory of action is 
stigmatized to be immoral by them because it is devoid of moral constraints 
inhibiting immoral actions. Arendt’s agonistic model of action – they say – 
doesn’t tell apart good and bad in a moral meaning. Th e interpretation of 
goodness as a world-demolishing force is one of the most contested topics 
in the political philosophy of Arendt. It appears in Th e Human Condition 
when Arendt talks on the personality of Jesus. Goodness here is described 
as an absolute private phenomenon which must remain outside the public 
realm because upon entering the world, it inevitably loses its special charac-
ter. Th e problem emerges again in a diff erent context in On revolution. Here 
Arendt concludes that goodness, being a worldless phenomenon entering 
the stage of politics necessarily appears as a devastating natural force. My 
paper aims at giving an interpretation of this enigmatic statement by the 
contextualization of it in the framework of Arendt’s theory.
It can be asserted without risking too much that the most controversial topic of Hannah 
Arendt’s well-researched political philosophy is the place of morality in the context of her 
theory. Her enigmatic position gave grounds to the charge that takes her to be an immoral 
thinker exiling morality from the fi eld of public realm. Some interpreters pose the ques-
tion of how a thinker, aft er having written a voluminous and passionate book about total-
itarianism and declaring this political form to be the embodiment of radical evil on Earth, 
could have been able to put on paper, some years later, that “absolute goodness is hardly 
any less dangerous than absolute evil” (Arendt 1990. 82) and say that goodness and love 
become devastating forces upon entering the public realm. One of her most acute critics, 
Georg Kateb charged her with dangerously on the verge of political immoralism when 
she purges out moral motives and considerations from her idea of politics. Others, for 
instance her monographer, Margaret Canovan, said that even though Kateb highlighted 
existing inconsistencies and defi ciencies in the theory of Arendt, he cast his judgment 
without taking all aspects of her thought into consideration (Canovan 1992. 156).
Taking sides in the debate, however, needs a sketch-like reconstruction of Arendt’s 
political philosophy. Arendt was surely not a system-building thinker; still, the out-
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lines of her political ontology were explained in Th e Human Condition (1958), which 
she viewed as a prolegomena for a would-be political theory. In this book, with the 
method of phenomenology learnt from her former masters Heidegger and Jaspers, 
she analyzed the basic human activities, allotting a distinct place to each of them. She 
has frequently been criticized because of some kind of spatial essentialism; special hu-
man activities, in her theory, must occur in their relevant places; trespassing of the 
borders destabilizes the economy of human existence. Such a thing happened, accord-
ing to Arendt, at the beginning of modernity, when labor, whose only relevant place 
is the darkness of the private realm, trespassed its borders, entering into the public 
realm and a new hybrid sphere emerged as a consequence: the social realm which, for 
Arendt, is the primary public enemy responsible for the catastrophes of the twenti-
eth century, including totalitarianism (Pitkin 1998). Th e private and the public realms 
must be strictly separated; the spheres of necessity and freedom must not be intermin-
gled. Greek polis-democracy, the archetype of political community, was based on the 
rigorous upholding of this principle.
Th ere is a strict hierarchy of basic human activities. It can be visualized in the pic-
ture of three concentric circles. Th e inner circle is the sphere of labor sustaining of 
the metabolism of humanity with nature. It is responsible for the continuous physical 
reproduction of human race considered as one of the animal species. Labor does not 
produce lasting, solid things; its products are consummated by the everlasting cycles 
of metabolism. Th e agent of labor is the animal laborans embodying the bottom, most 
animal-like stratum of human existence. Th e allotted place for labor in the Arendtian 
thought is the private realm.
Th e middle circle is the terrain of work producing the lasting human world of 
things which is the sheltering home of human beings. Th e agent of this terrain is the 
homo faber, the ingenious user of instruments, the creator of human artifi ce from raw 
materials plucked out from nature by force. Work, concerning its allotted place, is in 
an intermediary position; its products are frequently the results of an activity per-
formed in solitude, but these products themselves maintain and enrich the common 
world of things. 
Th e outer circle is allotted to action, the most particularly human activity constitut-
ing human beings as such who are only able to realize their freedom in action. While 
labor and work are subjected to the law of necessity, in action freedom opens itself for 
human beings. As Arendt declares “Men are free […] as long they act, neither before 
nor aft er; for to be free and to act are the same.” (Arendt 1968. 153). Freedom, for 
Arendt, means neither the chance for choosing between preordained possibilities nor 
the liberum arbitrium, the free will of philosophers. It can only appear in the together-
ness of human beings constituting the public realm, the theatre of human action. Hu-
man plurality is the condition of action, just as the world being the condition of work 
and life is the condition of labor. It is one of the basic tenets of Arendt’s political theory 
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that action and freedom constitute the capacity to create and introduce something 
entirely new into the world. Th e result of action is unpredictable; it is some kind of a 
miracle breaking the predetermined and predictable course of events. Arendt’s theo-
ry is centered on communication: action and speech are inseparable. Action without 
speech ends in violence. Speech-situation, in Arendt’s theory of action, is a relation of 
peers that takes place through deliberation and persuasion. Equality is a human arti-
fi ce, the notion of natural inborn human rights, for Arendt, is one of the modernity’s 
fallacious ideas; equality is meaningless outside the public realm, that is, the political 
community. Action and politics, in the Arendtian theory, belong together; when you 
act and speak in the community of equal persons, the political appears in the human 
world. Arendt’s notion of politics is diff erent from the Weberian conception; politics 
for her is not a competitive struggle for power reserved for professional politicians but 
the opposite: it is the action performed by the plurality of peers.
In the space of appearance the actors, seen and heard by each other, reveal their 
personal identities by actions disclosing the ‘who’ that is diff erent from the biologically 
and socially given human characteristics, personal abilities, and defi ciencies. Th e main 
problem of Arendt’s theory of action, investigated in the respect of the moral criteria 
of action, is that it applies two diff erent models of action, which are opposed to one 
another (Passerin d’Entrèves 1994. 84). Th e fi rst is the expressive model, and the other 
is the communicative model. Th e main feature of expressive action is its agonality; it 
was the typical action type of Greek polis where the actors, for the disclosure of their 
excellence, manifested themselves in their deeds. Arendt herself admits “[n]o doubt 
this conception is highly individualistic, as we would say today. It stresses the urge 
toward self-disclosure at the expense of other factors […]” (Arendt 1958. 194). But 
the stumbling block for interpreters with critical bias is Arendt’s thesis that opposes 
ordinary, everyday human behavior and expressive-individualistic action, declaring 
that the latter cannot be judged by the yardstick of ordinary morality applied for as-
sessment of behavior. Motives and consequences in this case are irrelevant:
[…] the innermost meaning of the acted deed and the spoken word […] 
must [be] untouched by any eventual outcome, by their consequences for 
better or worse. Unlike human behavior – which the Greeks, like all civilized 
people, judged according to «moral standards», taking into account motives 
and intentions on the one hand and aims and consequences on the other – 
action can be judged only by the criterion of greatness because it is in its na-
ture to break through the commonly accepted and reach into the extraordi-
nary, where whatever is true in common and everyday life no longer applies 
because everything that exists is unique and sui generis. (Arendt 1958. 205)
Martin Jay, one of her severe critics, asserts that with this thesis, Arendt came dan-
gerously close to the intellectual position of German political existentialism in the 
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‘20s. One of its main tenets was the setting up of a sharp line between the heroic deeds 
of liberty unconstrained by the conventional moral codes and the philistine, earth-
bound life-conduct (Jay 2006. 191–213). It was this conception that paved the way for 
the Nazi heroism-cult, proving to be one of the components of totalitarian mentality. 
Another interpreter, Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves, contrastingly, warns that the cor-
rect interpretation of Arendt’s theory of action can only be given by taking her com-
municative model of action into consideration (Passerin d’Entrèves 1994. 84). Arendt 
is far from being an immoralist thinker; it is undeniable that expressive–individualistic 
action in itself can lead into the direction of excluding moral criteria altogether, but 
Arendt’s intellectual position is diff erent from that of political existentialism. Her main 
intention is to fi nd inner moral criteria for action, instead of outer ones supplied by 
traditional moral codes, whose validity and inhibitive power have been weakening 
since the beginning of modernity.
Th is conception is part and parcel of Arendt’s philosophy of history undeniably 
inspired by the interwar German cultural criticism. Arendt, especially in Th e Human 
Condition, is prone to see the centuries of modernity as Verfallsgeschichte, a history 
of decline; she explains that the trinity of religion, authority and tradition inherited 
from the Roman antiquity has been weakening, and are being eliminated step by step 
since the beginning of modernity (Arendt 1968. 128). One of the consequences of 
this disintegration is that the belief in inherited, traditional moral codes has weak-
ened; they have lost much of their inhibitive power and now are unable to supply the 
necessary restraints for action. Th e emergence of totalitarianism, for Arendt, served 
as a proof for the insuffi  ciency of traditional moral codes to serve as bastions against 
radical evil unknown to that time (Canovan 1992. 160–161). (As it is well known, 
Arendt’s opinion concerning the nature of this evil underwent radical changes: in her 
Totalitarianism-book, it was called radical evil, but in the Eichmann-book this term 
was withdrawn: Arendt wrote on the banality of evil there, stirring a hot debate. Th is 
question is related to our topic but its detailed analysis falls out of this paper’s scope.)
Now, what are Arendt’s options? How can action in itself supply inner moral criteria? 
Agonal-individualistic action, as we have seen it, is unable to achieve such a thing. But, 
argues Arendt, the communicative type of action is able to provide these criteria. Th ese 
are the faculties of forgiveness, giving and keeping promises, rooted in action itself:
In so far as is morality is more than the sum total of mores, of customs 
and standards of behavior solidifi ed through tradition and valid on the 
ground of agreements, both of which change with time, it has no more 
to support itself than the good will to counter the enormous risks of ac-
tion by readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to make promises and to 
keep them. Th ese moral precepts are the only ones that are not applied to 
action from outside, from some supposedly higher faculty or from expe-
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riences outside action’s own reach. Th ey arise, on the contrary, out of the 
will to live together with others in the mode of acting and speaking, and 
thus they are like control mechanism built into the very faculty to start 
new and unending processes. (Arendt 1958. 245–246)
Let us accept provisionally that the faculties of forgiveness and giving and keep-
ing promises are able to supply the necessary inner moral criteria for action. It still 
does not provide an explanation for Arendt’s perplexing idea on the world-destroying 
potential of goodness, explained in detail in her book entitled On Revolution (1963). 
Th is concept is, however, the consequence of her spatial essentialism discussed earli-
er. According to her goodness and the activity inspired by it must remain within the 
borders of the private realm, because it has a strict personal character. A good act has 
to be absolute selfl ess and worldless in character: you do not expect any reward, in-
cluding your fellow man’s gratitude at whom this good act is directed, for it. You have 
to be unaware of your own goodness, so to speak; if you refl ect on it in your mind, it 
loses its special character. Moreover, you cannot perform a good act in public, because 
in this case, it is converted into an act of charity with special, expressly ego-centered 
social motives and aims; for instance, you wish to strengthen your social prestige by 
performing it. Goodness, in other words, is the phenomenon of absolute morality. 
Th e archetype of a good man, for Arendt, is Jesus, the hero of this absolute morality, 
together with Socrates:
Th e one activity taught by Jesus in word and deed is the activity of good-
ness obviously harbors a tendency to hide from being seen or heard. […] 
For it is manifest, that the moment a good work becomes known and 
public, it loses its specifi c character of goodness, of being done for noth-
ing but goodness’ sake. When goodness appears openly, it is no longer 
goodness […] Goodness can exist only when it is not perceived, not even 
by its author; whoever sees himself performing a good work is no longer 
good, but at best a useful member of society or a dutiful member of a 
church. […] Good works, because they must be forgotten instantly, can 
never become part of the world; they come and go, leaving no trace. Th ey 
truly are not of this world. (…) Goodness therefore, as a consistent way 
of life, is not only impossible within the confi nes of the public realm it is 
even destructive of it. (Arendt 1958. 74, 77)
Th e main argument of Arendt for why goodness must be hidden and should not 
enter the public-political realm is its muteness. It is not the case that goodness does not 
need words; there is more to it: goodness cannot be shaped into words at all. Goodness 
is mute. Th is muteness always includes, latently but inherently, a possibility of vio-
lence. Deliberation and persuasion are not among its means; goodness prefers direct 
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action. For illumination of her concept, Arendt turns to literature. In her book entitled 
On Revolution she refers to Hermann Melville’s short novel Billy Bud and the story of 
Th e Grand Inquisitor from Dostoevsky’s novel Th e Brothers Karamazov to illustrate the 
tenet of the inherent dumbness of goodness.
 Goodness, Arendt suggests with these parables, exists outside the sphere of com-
municability. Th e detailed explication of Arendt’s sophisticated, but nevertheless de-
batable reasoning is beyond the scope of this paper. I am only able to supply here a 
brief summary of this problem. What holds primary importance for us is Arendt’s idea 
concerning the relations between goodness, compassion and pity. Arendt’s starting 
point is a question: why did the French Revolution of 1789 lost its way running into 
the horrible scene of Jacobin terror? Th e main cause, Arendt argues, was that because 
of the mass misery of sans culottes, the social question replaced the original aim, the 
foundation of the institutions of liberty. Th e leaders of the revolution, being moved by 
the goodness inspired by compassion, tried to eliminate misery with political means. 
But the problem is that compassion, by its nature, can only exist in the private, per-
sonal sphere; your compassion arises seeing actual suff ering persons face to face. Th e 
number is very important here: you cannot feel compassion toward a faceless crowd. 
What you feel when confronted by crowd-like suff ering and misery is the sentiment 
of pity, which, contrary to compassion, is generalisable. We are able to understand a 
suff ering crowd, but the price is the loss of sensitivity to individual suff ering. You will 
even be capable to order the execution of innocent individuals if you are convinced 
that it promotes the happiness of the faceless crowd.
Conclusion and critique
Both Arendt’s strongly critical and lenient interpreters agree that the concept of inner 
moral criteria of action is one of the most vulnerable spots of her political theory. 
Th e main problem is the lack of justice in her approach (Pitkin 2006. 214–236, Dossa 
1988. 139, Passerin d’Entrèves 1994. 61). However, promise-keeping or forgiveness as 
criteria can also exist within a gang of robbers. Th ese are undoubtedly necessary for 
running a human community; but they seem to be necessary but insuffi  cient criteria 
to serve as barriers separating immoral actions from moral ones. Arendt’s theory of 
the self-contained character of action, which is one of the basic presuppositions of 
her theory, takes revenge at this point. Paradoxically insisting on the self-contained 
character of action and accepting the inner criteria given by her, we are not able to 
make a clear distinction between the self-revelatory, self-expressive deeds striving for 
excellence and the misdeeds committed by totalitarian rulers:
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But what about the relations among the top Nazis? Between the Roehm 
purges and the last years did they use violence each other? Did they not use 
speech and make an audience for each other? – if not public, then not private 
or social either? Did they not try to shine before each other and excel each 
other and live beyond they everyday selves, live as performers, or wearers of 
masks, or as men inspired by a principle like glory? Th ey were a gang; but so 
may a body of citizens be a gang in relation to the outside. (Kateb 1984. 30)
It is the problem of justice conceptualized in a classical manner by Saint Agustine 
in his City of God:
“Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? 
For what are robberies themselves, but little kingdoms? Th e band itself is 
made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together 
by the pact of the confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed 
on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such 
a degree that it holds places, fi xes abodes, takes possession of cities, and 
subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, 
because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal 
of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt 
and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who 
had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by 
keeping hostile possession of the sea, he answered with bold pride, “What 
thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty 
ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fl eet art 
styled emperor.” (Augustine, City of God, IV, 6. 104.)
Th e cause of this strange blind spot in Arendt’s approach lies in the logics of her po-
litical thought. She rigorously insists on the distinction between making and acting; the 
former is the characteristic of work that has an aim, a telos. Its aim is a product, which is 
its end-result. But action’s aim is itself; it is an atelic activity. Arendt selectively appropri-
ates Aristotle’s theory of action (Willa 1996. 17–41). She borrows the distinction between 
making and acting, poiesis and praxis, from him, but she has to refuse the idea that 
justice is the aim or the telos of action because in this case action would have an aim 
outside itself, in other words, it would cease to be a self-contained activity: it would be 
transformed into poiesis, making, always having an aim outside itself. Action, freedom 
and politics are the same in the theory of Arendt. She has to insist on the atelic char-
acter of action to preserve the autonomy of politics described by her as an activity with 
strong affi  nity towards the performing arts. Th e aim of an artistic performance is the 
unfolding in the activity of the performance. Th is is an aestheticized concept of politics, 
implicating some drawbacks whose investigation is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Dignity of Human Beings – Dignity of Animal Beings
A Case Study: Bulls as Gladiators*1
BÉL A MESTER
A frequented instance of the recent discourse on the animal rights is the 
topic of bullfi ghts. Th e aim of my contribution is to off er an analysis of a 
similar debate on bullfi ghts one hundred years ago, in Budapest. In the be-
ginning of the 20th century several “road shows of Spanish toreros” had been 
organized in Central Europe, off ering an opportunity to meet the new needs 
of mass entertainment and the idea of animal rights. By my analysis, the 
argumentation for animal rights in these debates was based on an analogy 
between the “dignity of the animal beings” and he “dignity of the human 
beings”, rooted in a naturalised anthropology of the late Continental posi-
tivism. At the end of my paper, I will mention a parallelism between this old 
philosophical background and the new concept of embodied mind.
Introduction: bullfi ght as a model
An emblematic example of the contemporary discourse on animal rights and animal 
welfare is the debate on the permission or prohibition of bullfi ghts. It manifests a sim-
ple situation of the immoral abuse of animals’ lives, without any modifying element, 
such as a strong economic interest in human welfare or the politics of world-nutrition. 
Th e question of bullfi ghts seems to be a clear model of a pure ethical problem, in which 
the practical consequences are insignifi cant. Seemingly, the single sensitive question 
is the cultural embeddedness of bullfi ghts in several societies and the resulting possi-
bility of misunderstanding in intercultural discourses on several phenomena. In what 
follows I rarely touch on the cultural embeddedness of the analysed phenomenon. It 
is to be noted that before the economic crisis, especially in the ’90s, the plan was to 
organise European road-shows of bullfi ghts as parts of the global mass-entertainment. 
My analysis is focussed on this globalised form of bullfi ghts, in the mirror of the large 
discourse on a similar situation, namely the real bullfi ghts in Budapest more than a 
century ago, in the year of 1904. In the following part of my article I outline the events 
*1 For this paper I have used the ideas presented at my lectures in Th e Lošinj Days of Bioethics, 2011, 
Croatia; and at the conference “Living with Consequences 2011”, Koper, Slovenia, 2011. Th e present article 
is a part of a research program entitled “Narratives of the History of Hungarian Philosophy (1792–1947),” 
supported by the Hungarian Scientifi c Research Found (OTKA K 104643).
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of the early bullfi ghts and their aft erlife in cultural memory. Following that, I off er an 
analysis of the argumentation of the pro-animal movement of the time, and its back-
ground in the philosophy as well as other fi elds of culture of the same epoch. Finally, 
in the last part of my paper, I draw parallels between the philosophical background of 
the discourse that surrounded these phenomena one hundred years ago, and a relevant 
trend of our contemporary philosophical discourse, with regards to their consequenc-
es for animal rights.
Budapest corridas in 1904 and their cultural memory
Th ere is a well-known comic scene of the classical genre of ‘Budapest Cabaret,’ with 
an elderly husband who can see only one escape from the trap of his awful marriage: 
to apply for the job of a ‘volunteer torero’ of the next ‘Budapest Corrida.’ However, 
today’s Hungarian audience regards this classic scene as a standard of the ‘comedy of 
a married couple,’ with grotesque, irrational elements; an elderly downtown citizen in 
the role of a real torero, the ‘arena of bulls’ as a real place in Budapest. However, origi-
nally these elements made the gist of the story. Th e wife of our ‘volunteer torero’ was a 
chairperson of a local pro-animal society in the fi ction of cabaret, and the fi rst problem 
of the non-fi ctional public sphere of the time was the evaluation of the corridas as the 
newest form of mass-entertainment in Budapest. In this period, all the great European 
cities had guest-toreros and “guest-bulls” for several pilot-corridas. Bullfi ght, having 
been a local tradition before, had tried to fi nd its place and role in the new structure of 
globalized mass-entertainment. Th e case of Budapest was special in an international 
context, because in Budapest a permanent ‘arena of bulls’ had been built in a sym-
bolic societal space; in the middle of the City Park, in the centre of the triangle of 
the Amusement Park, the Hippodrome, and the Budapest Zoo. Aft er establishing this 
institution at this symbolic place, and successfully acculturating the bullfi ghts into the 
new mass-entertainment of the city, Budapest was able to become the centre of the 
(never established) Central European bullfi ght-industry.
On the surface, the discourse about the bullfi ghts followed the trend of contempo-
rary Hungarian politics. Th e non-governmental organisations founded especially for 
touristic and cultural reasons were active in this regard, partially promoting and par-
tially opposing the bullfi ghts, using mainly nationalistic slogans. (Typical topics in the 
newspapers were the emphasis put on ‘Spanish barbarism’ and the contrast between 
the bull with a typical Hungarian bull-name and the torero with a typical Spanish 
name.) In the beginning, the government’s attitude was ambiguous. At fi rst, bullfi ghts 
were permitted, albeit only in the ‘French style’ (without killing the bull) – with toreros 
educated in Spanish corridas. Almost every new event in the arena, or even a street 
scandal, off ered an opportunity to change the offi  cial rules. Finally, the government 
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prohibited the bullfi ghts, and the globalized mass-entertainment in Budapest focused 
on other topics1. Th e local press was mostly on the side of prohibition, and took the 
opportunity to present an analogy between the barbarism of the old animal battles 
in the eighteenth century and the new project2. Twenty years later, the next and last 
appearance of a Spanish bullfi ght road show was not in the focus of the public sphere. 
Corridas were only permitted in suburbs, outside the territory of the local authorities 
of Budapest, without sensational circumstances. In the press a periodical associated 
with the pro-animal movements published a signifi cant refl ection on the topic3, using 
the old clichés of the barbarism of bullfi ghts and evaluated the new event as insignif-
icant in comparison with the fi rst Budapest bullfi ghts. In the cultural memory of the 
Hungarian pro-animal movement the debate in 1904 was signifi cant and triumphant, 
while the present one in the twenties was evaluated only as a boring shadow of the 
past. Th e prohibition of animal battles was considered to be an evident thesis, not wor-
thy of a single new or special argument concerning the animal–human relationship.
Th e stereotype of the “protection of animals in the civilized Budapest,” versus 
the “barbarism of the bullfi ghting nations” was rooted in the role of the pro-animal 
movements in the Hungarian fi n de siècle society. Written sources on the early history 
of Central European, and especially Hungarian, animal protection movements have 
convinced us that it had a double embeddedness, both in the bureaucratic elite of the 
new institutions of the late nineteenth-century modernization, and in the institutions 
of the new disciplines of biological studies. Th e commander of the Budapest Police4, 
a representative of the staff  of the Budapest Zoo5, and the founder of Hungarian orni-
thology, Ottó Hermann were all active and distinguished members of the societies for 
animal protection. As a consequence, these societies were closely connected with gov-
ernmental practice such as the rules of the local authorities concerning urban animals 
and animal fairs, circular letters for the schoolteachers of natural history, and so on. 
Th eir relationship with the sciences is important in understanding the pro-scientifi c 
position of the movement; its criticism of the wrong, non-enlightened traditions of 
everyday life was based on scientifi c data. An institutionalized, technologically and 
scientifi cally grounded, twofold utilitarianism has emerged as the dominant discourse, 
consisting of the utility of the animals for humanity on its fi rst level, and a calculus of 
utility concerning the welfare, pleasure and pain of the animals on its second. To be a 
1 For the events and political circumstances of the early Budapest corridas see Vari 2010.
2 For the most typical refl ections in the local press, see Takáts 1905; Vay 1904.
3 See Gelsei Bíró 1925.
4 Boldizsár Bornemissza, chief commander of the Budapest Police was the Honorary President of the 
Hungarian animal protection movement. His death on the 25th of August, 1905 was in the headlines of the 
press of the pro-animal movement in Hungary.
5 József Kukuljevič, as a representative of the management of the Budapest Zoo, was the chief editor of the 
central periodical of the Hungarian pro-animal movement.
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moral subject in the above mentioned bureaucratic discourse is interpreted as being 
the subject of law. A paradigmatic consequence of this idea is the aspiration to broad-
en the Geneva Convention to include the “animal warriors,” especially the horses and 
dogs employed in the armies. Th e vocabulary of the movement was rich in metaphors 
taken from human professions: animals oft en appeared as workers, employees, or pro-
ducers of goods in this discourse.
At this point, the need has emerged of a new ground for argumentation. For avoid-
ing the superfl uous pain of every living being is enough to regard them as sensitive 
entities, but a description of animals as beings functioning in quasi-societal roles re-
quires another concept of the animal phenomenon. Th is concept had been off ered by 
a system of ideas about animal rationality and emotions, and a language devoid of the 
distinction between the human and animal physiological functions. All the important 
features of these discourses emerged together in a concise form in 1904 in the debates 
on Spanish bullfi ght, the new kind of mass-entertainment in Budapest. While the ar-
ticles against the bullfi ghts were published in the special periodicals of the pro-animal 
movement and did not interact with the mainstream discourse which rather used the 
stereotype of “Spanish barbarism;” still, the actions and opinions of the movement 
had a signifi cant social eff ect6. At this time, within the pro-animal press, a new idea 
emerged, based mostly on the known opinions on avoiding the pain of both humans 
and animals, which took into consideration the personality or dignity of the bulls. In a 
system of ideas that regards the tasks of urban animals as quasi-societal roles, a profes-
sional fi ghting bull is a societal disfunction and a culturally alien phenomena, like that 
of a gladiator. Th is discourse evaporated with the crisis of World War I, and it has nev-
er been reconstructed in its former, complex form. Th e above mentioned pro-animal 
article about the bullfi ghts from the ’20s remembers the triumph “over the barbarism 
of bullfi ghts,” but has forgotten the argumentation of the debate.
A new concept of animals
In the following I describe the main elements of this new frame of ideas about ani-
mals based on a typical text from the theoretical literature of the Hungarian pro-an-
imal movement of the turn of the century. Th e fi rst step is to distinguish it from the 
mainstream utilitarian argumentation of the animal protection movement of the time, 
mirrored in the other articles of the same periodical: “educated people know that the 
6 Actually, we cannot speak about a unifi ed organisation. Th e Hungarian pro-animal movement at this 
time was highly diversifi ed. Almost every signifi cant town had an independent pro-animal group, typically 
with the participation of the local intelligentsia, and with the active collaboration of the local teacher of na-
tural history. Th e national-level organisation was only established in a relatively late period of the movement, 
and it has functioned as a federation of independent societies.
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animals are worthy of good treatment not only because of their utility, but because 
they are sensitive and understanding beings as well7.” Th e thesis of animal reason has 
an important eff ect on the concept of human reason as well, and destroys the dichoto-
my between human and animal mental capacities. Th ere is no strict diff erence between 
(animal) instinct and (human) reason, both being based on the same processes of tam-
ing and training. Th e structure of the reason of a tamed and trained animal, living in a 
cultural environment, is similar to that of a human, because the humans under cultural 
conditions are tamed and trained animals, formed by their own culture. Both animal 
and human reasoning are based on the common capacity of imitation. Th e emphasis 
in both human and animal cases is placed on the role of imitation in establishing soci-
eties, concluding in an utterance about the “(animal) capacity of civilisation.” Th e con-
sequent style of the author, using ‘he,’ or ‘she’ instead of ‘it’ to refer to animals, is a nat-
ural consequence of the principles. We can see in the vocabulary and scientifi c context 
that this new concept of animals is not a naïve romantic analogue but an element of 
a new worldview. Th e article mentioned above had off ered a systematized epitome of 
the most widespread ideas amongst the pro-animal movement8. Th is highly socialized, 
maybe humanized concept of animals is the root of the idea of animal rights based on 
a concept of “animal dignity,” similar to that of humans. Th is socialized animal, e.g. a 
bull, not only has the rights to avoid pain and suff ering, but to avoid participating in 
humiliating actions (e.g. in bullfi ghts) as well.
A possible philosophical root of the new image of animals
Th e above described, typical example of the theoretical thinking of the pro-animal 
movement of the era was not separated from the intellectual life of the epoch. It was 
not only embedded in sciences but in philosophy as well. My historical example for 
the connection between pro-animal theory and contemporary mainstream philoso-
phy outlines a characteristic anthropology. It was, however, rooted in fi n de siècle pos-
itivism; its development is not typical. Mainstream Hungarian philosophical thinking, 
in accordance with the trends of Continental thinking, had departed from positivism, 
and was more in line with neo-Kantian tendencies, and later, with the diff erent schools 
7 Reisz 1905. Th e article is an edited version of a lecture of the author, Irén Reisz, a teacher of natural his-
tory, read in the presence of the general assembly of the Animal Protection Society of Baja, a little town on 
the right bank of the Danube.
8 However, at the same time there were other initiatives for the popularization of the idea of animal pro-
tection, especially in the fi eld of education; that used the known theories instrumentally. For instance, there 
are known appeals of the pro-animal movement for teaching the elements of animal rights in the frame of the 
organized religious education in schools. Th ese appeals have never been rooted in the theological thinking 
of a Christian pro-animal group of any denomination; they were always the opinions of a laic movement, 
communicated towards the clergy.
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of neo-idealism. Th e author discussed below demonstrated a reciprocal intellectual 
development. In the beginning, he focused on topics of neo-Kantianism, like the prob-
lem of the category of time, and later, he took up the positivistic point of view during 
his investigations. He was a consequent critic both of the old-fashioned materialism of 
Karl Vogt and Ludwig Büchner, and of the contemporary idealism, and his close con-
nection with the new data of experimental psychology made his ideas acceptable in the 
public opinion of his period, which was mainly based on the sciences. In this chapter 
of my paper I show that this system of ideas with its anthropological consequenc-
es is useful in a pro-animal argumentation, including an explicit argumentation for 
the parallelism of animal and human reasons and personalities of the era mentioned 
above. Finally, I show that his anthropology and the above mentioned argumentation 
of the animal protection movement went hand in hand.
In the following I refer to the texts of a Hungarian author of late positivism, Jenő 
Posch (1859–1923), a recognised ancestor of international behaviourism9. I use these 
texts as instances off ering a good opportunity for the comparison of several elements 
of his philosophical vocabulary and the vocabulary of his contemporaries in the Hun-
garian animal protection movement. Th e fi rst remarkable idea is a systematic an-
ti-metaphysical cleansing of the vocabulary of the theory of mind10. For him, the use 
of the words ‘soul’ and ‘mind’ is similar to the use of the word ‘cholera’. Th e illness 
called cholera is not caused by the black bile (in Greek: cholē), like in the theory of 
Hippocrates, but the word is still used as a neutral sign of this illness, without prob-
lems of interpretation. Likewise, there is no substantial soul or mind as a separate and 
pre-existent cause of the mental phenomena, we use these old words only as a neutral 
sign of a group of special phenomena, called mental. Th e cleansing of the language 
was expanded to include the vocabulary of the recent materialism of Karl Vogt, whose 
famous example had been unmasked as an unconscious requisite of the old metaphys-
ical vocabulary. For Vogt, to suppose the existence of the soul is similar to suppose the 
existence of a ‘spirit of kidneys.’ (Urine is the product of kidneys without a ‘special spir-
it of kidneys,’ and the thought is the product of the brain without a phenomenon called 
the ‘mind.’) By the critique of Posch, this Vogtian localisation of the thought in the 
body is just a requisite of dualism, which upholds the existence of the thought as a sep-
arate entity, and not a bodily function11. Th e insuffi  cient character of Vogtian materi-
9 Researches of the fi rst American behaviourists and Posch ran in parallel, although the achievements of 
Posch were available in the international scene aft er World War I, with a concise explanation of his ideas 
in German. See Posch 1923. Posch later became part of the historiographical canon of behaviourism; Mc-
Guigan 1978.
10 Th e author’s opinions about the critique of language are connected to those of Mauthner. An interpreta-
tion of their relationship is the future task of the history of philosophy, especially considering their corres-
pondence.
11 For the topics mentioned see in his masterpiece, passim: Posch 1915.
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alism inspired him to call his own system ‘realism,’ as a theoretically more consequent 
form of old materialisms. Th e central position of the critique of language, and the aim 
of his researches, was to off er a new, complex anthropology and keep it in the realm of 
philosophy, in spite of his close connection to the experimental sciences (his writings 
were published in periodicals of philosophy.) In the system of Posch, mental phenom-
ena evaporated amongst the events of the (potentially or actually) acting bodies. His 
system was not based on “thinking bodies” alone, but in a more radical manner, on the 
identifi cation of thinking with physical acting. In the style of the author, his theses did 
not include any humiliation of the human being; on the contrary, he expresses them 
with a kind of pathos characteristic of the Enlightenment. It seems that in these theses 
he found the answer for the question of his early Kantianism (“what is the human”).
Posch’s ideas had partly been developed in individual articles since the last years 
of the nineteenth century, and the outlines of the system were fi nished by 1910; the 
whole work was published as late as the second year of World War I. Its reception is not 
separable from the cultural shock of the war period. For the illustration of the cultural 
plausibility of this new anthropology, I refer to the short stories and novels of a well-
known Hungarian writer, Frigyes Karinthy, written in the war- and post-war years12. 
Karinthy’s stories in this period are abundant in fantastic elements, connected to the 
phenomenon of changeable personalities; in the simplest form it is the idea of changea-
ble bodies under conditions of the newly invented scientifi c method of conscious rein-
carnation. All the stories have similar, tragic ends, as the main character, who should 
not be connected to a pseudo-being of ‘soul,’ full of false ideas and theories, misinter-
prets the concept of identity. In the fi nal scenes it becomes clear that human personal 
identity can only exist in the human body; failing to respect this fact one of the char-
acters discovers the inability to make love with a borrowed body as a simple tool, an-
other can really feel his self-identity only on the occasion of his hanging. Paraphrasing 
Foucault’s thought, we see here scenes where the human bodies try to escape from the 
prison of soul, but it is too late for the human persons to survive.
Aft er this culturally interiorised anthropological turn, Posch explicitly formulated 
the consequences of his philosophy regarding animals. From the point of view of his 
system, the integration of a new theory of animals into a radical conception of act-
ing bodies can fi nd its place in the interpretation of thinking and the critique of the 
metaphysical language. In this analysis he judges the diff erences between the animal 
and human physiological functions in ordinary languages to be a meaningless req-
uisite of a failed metaphysics, just like the words ‘soul,’ ’spirit’ and ‘mind’ were in the 
above mentioned texts. A normative distinction between the perished animal and a 
12 Th ese writings of Karinthy have a large interpretative literature in Hungarian humanities; I for now 
choose, however, disregard the refl ections on them. Th e supposed parallelism between Posch’s philosophy 
and Karinthy’s fi ctions is my own hypothesis.
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dead human being, an eating person and her devouring pet, or referring to a human as 
‘he,’ or ‘she,’ and to an animal as ‘it,’ are mere linguistic phenomena, rooted in the lan-
guage-use of the epoch. Th is pro-animal argumentation was published on the pages of 
the most infl uential Hungarian literary review, as a practical conclusion of the summa-
rized philosophical opinions of the author, published in his books and his articles in 
serious periodicals for scholars13. From our present point of view, it appears only as an 
interesting particularity of the history of philosophy, without any of the above detailed 
parallelism with the vocabulary of the animal protection movement of the same era. A 
historiographer, aft er reconstructing these analogous structures, must observe that the 
arguments for animal rights on a philosophical basis had unfortunately disappeared in 
the ’20s of the last century. Th e cultural plausibility of the above quoted theories evap-
orated in the darkness of the intellectual history of the interwar Continental Europe.
Epilogue: remarks on a contemporary theory
Every argument for animal rights or welfare – or at least, for the smallest amount of 
suff ering for animals – has an inevitable, either explicit or hidden, anthropological 
aspect. We can express this question in the concept of the diff erence and similarity of 
the animal and the human personality, the animal and the human nature. Th e history 
of Western philosophy is abundant in relevant pro and contra arguments, especially in 
the fi eld of moral philosophy; both the supposed uniqueness of humankind and the 
requirement of animal–human brotherhood are fundaments of widespread systems of 
moral opinions. Th e initial topic of my present approach was based on a recent con-
cept of the philosophy of mind called the ’embodied mind’. According to my hypothe-
sis, the opinions in philosophy of mind connected to this term are able to establish an 
argument for animal rights based on the similarity of the human and the animal body–
mind structure, both historically, as detailed above, and synchronically, as follows.
At the end of the last century a new concepet emerged simultaneously in the dif-
ferent discourses of epistemology: ‘embodied mind.’ According to the opinions of the 
most enthusiastic supporters of the theories based on this term, it has the potential 
to be a fundamental challenge and the turning point of Western thought concerning 
crucial questions of philosophical anthropology. One of the most infl uential books of 
these theories, written by Lakoff  and Johnson, formulates the question rhetorically in 
its initial chapter: “Who Are We?” (Lakoff  and Johnson 1999). Th is text off ers a list of 
the ideas of the European intellectual heritage that their novel theory exceeds. One of 
the most important utterances concerns the relationship between animals and humans: 
13 See Posch 1924. For the animal–human relationship, see especially Chapter IV. Th is posthumous writing 
can be regarded as his “intellectual last will and testament.”
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“Th e discovery that reason is evolutionary utterly changes our relation to other animals 
and changes our conception of human beings as uniquely rational. Reason is thus not 
an essence that separates us from other animals; rather, it places us on a continuum 
with them.” (Lakoff  and Johnson 1999. 4.) Th e emphasis is, of course, on the rejection 
of the Cartesian dualism. Th e list of the theses of “the changes of our understanding of 
reason” is followed by another list of the failed theories from Descartes through Kant to 
Chomsky. However, these are theories of the mind only prima facie, on a closer reading 
it turns out to be a list of the main anthropological opinions of Western philosophy. 
Based on the fi rst thesis of this list – “there is no Cartesian dualistic person” –, and aft er 
the declaration of the human–animal continuum, we presume that the next statement 
must be the enlargement of the concept of ‘person’ to include animals, or at least, some 
argument against this enlargement. Later, the authors off er large systematic chapters 
on “the cognitive science of basic philosophical ideas,” i. e. about morality. Based on 
the initial promises of the book the reader expects an enlargement of the sphere of the 
moral beings or subjects to include animals, or at least a reasoning for the exclusion of 
animals from the moral sphere. Surprisingly, we cannot fi nd any such statement, and 
aft er the fi rst pages the reader must say “goodbye to animals” forever.
Th is forgetting of animals is rooted in several structural elements of the early theo-
ries of ‘embodied mind.’ In what follows I briefl y outline a highly simplifi ed model of a 
large, vivid and interesting fi eld of recent research. I think it holds true only for the ear-
ly theories; and only from the point of view of animal protection. In the new theory the 
words ‘body’ or ‘fl esh’ refer to the neural networks and sensitive apparatus, sometimes 
in almost the same way that ‘brain’ does, instead of the whole of the fl esh. A vocabulary 
built on this special point of view of the ‘body’ can function in a theoretical discourse 
as a material reduplication of the dualistic theories that are considered old-fashioned. 
However, the judgements about the things and processes are radically new; the struc-
ture of this New World is almost the same as that of the old one was. It is true that the 
body–mind dualism and the separated person as an agent of sensation and action are 
theoretically denied, but the texts always speak about the new epistemological and 
moral roles of ‘persons,’ and new concepts and roles of ‘minds.’ It seems to be like old 
actors in an old play of an old theatre, only with a new director – the tradition will re-
organize the old dramaturgic machinery against the will and the new point of view of 
the new director. Th e semantic structure of the key words – ‘embodied mind,’ ‘disem-
bodied mind,’ ‘embodiment,’ and ‘disembodiment,’ in French: ‘incarnation’ – supports 
the tendency of this hidden dualistic discourse with the clear theological connotation 
of the vocabulary. Body–mind dualism is encoded in this vocabulary, despite of the 
monistic intention of the speaker. Ironically, an argumentation against the pre-exist-
ent mind and the separation of body and mind should express it by using the terms 
of the separate, pure mind and body. (Recently, as a member of the editorial board 
of the Hungarian Philosophical Review, I encountered the question as a problem of 
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translation and the appropriate standardized use of terms like ‘embodiment,’ ‘embod-
ied mind,’ in Hungarian, by diff erent authors14. Finally, instead of the word by word 
translation it became ‘bodily mind,’ but the most radical, and clear formulation was the 
‘thinking body,’ without a separate mind.) Conclusively, we have seen a great promise 
for rethinking the relationship between animals and humans within the framework of 
a recent theory in the philosophy of mind, that proved unfulfi lled because of its old 
vocabulary, and the unconscious use of the terms of this vocabulary. It seems like the 
philosophers have forgotten the results of the old linguistic turn by the new ‘mentalist’ 
turn. Th e case may be that philosophical theories, like a human eye, must always have 
a blind spot.
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A Possible Contradiction in Discrediting Morality:
Th e Queerness of the Argument from Queerness1
TAMÁS PAÁR
John Mackie argued that objective moral values and principles are queer and 
that we should not believe in their existence. As opposed to some more sim-
plistic readings, in my paper I off er an interpretation of the argument as one 
that appeals to parsimony. In this interpretation the argument says that by 
believing in objective morality we break the principle of parsimony, according 
to which one should not postulate unnecessarily many and unparalleled kinds 
and particulars. I argue against this view by pointing out that the rules of 
reasoning would lead to the same kind of problems Mackie suggests objective 
morality leads to. In the paper I try to deal with several possible nuances of the 
argument from queerness and answer important counter-objections.
John Mackie famously argued in his book Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong (1977) 
that objective morality, especially in its intuitionist account, is too ’queer’ to be true. 
His so-called argument from queerness is an old part of the toolkit of those who want 
to discredit objective morality, Mackie himself dates it back at least to Hume. Since 
the publishing of Mackie’s book, the term ’queer’ has suff ered major changes: activists 
have been campaigning for tolerance towards ‘queerness’. Although in a signifi cantly 
diff erent way, in the present paper I am going to defend queerness and argue that 
features of morality that Mackie points at as being queer are theoretically tolerable; in 
fact, morality might not even be as queer as he implies.
In an initial approach to Mackie’s argument, Ralph Walker states that it might be 
an overestimation of Mackie’s objection against objective morality to call it an argu-
ment (Walker 1993. 71). It might be taken as the ‘blank stare’ reply to the objectivity 
of morals that could be simply evaded by another ‘blank stare’ and an astonished con-
fi rmation of the claim: “Well, morality is just diff erent.” Th is point brings out a feature 
of Mackie’s argument that might be one of its defects. At least, it seems to imply that 
we should not believe in quite strange, that is, incomparable or unparalleled kinds of 
1 Th is paper is an extended version of one of the sections of my talk titled “Possible Contradictions in 
Discrediting Morality” presented at the conference “Is a Universal Morality Possible? Moral philosophy and 
the challenges of the postmodern age” in Budapest on 8th June 2014. I would like to thank the organizers and 
the participants of the conference, and especially Simon Rippon, who introduced me to the argument from 
queerness and kindly commented on a previous version of the present paper.
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things. Th is might be answered easily by pointing out how a lot of the objects of our 
knowledge are rather unique. Michael Huemer, for example, provides a long list of 
these, including time, space, mental states and properties. Th ese entities are hardly 
comparable to anything else that we are aware of (Huemer 2005. 200). 
Convincing although it may seem, this would not answer Mackie’s point entirely. If 
we want to interpret Mackie correctly, I think we should interpret him in the following 
way, even if he did not explicate himself in the terms used by me. At least in my eye the 
argument in question is given the most charitable treatment if we see it as appealing to 
parsimony. It seems to be a rational criterion of any theory that it should not postulate 
unnecessarily many and utterly unintelligible or unparalleled kinds and particulars. 
Mackie seems to suggest quite implicitly that believing in the objectivity of moral val-
ues or principles commits us to giving up the principle of parsimony and is therefore 
irrational – since the phenomena of morality could be explained without postulating 
anything too queer to be easily accepted.2
Mackie’s argument from queerness is a threefold one – we could even say that 
it consists of three diff erent, yet analogous arguments. Th e fi rst one points out the 
strangeness of the intrinsically motivating nature of the objective moral values. Th e 
second one is directed at the mysterious supervenience of the objective moral values 
upon natural features. Th e third one’s target is the peculiarity of our supposed knowl-
edge about the objective moral realm. (Cf. Mackie 1977: 49.) In the present paper I can 
only give a fair treatment to the fi rst argument, and I am going to turn to the third one 
only near the end when this seems to be needed in order to complement my reasoning.
As Mackie notes with regard to the third argument from queerness, the best strat-
egy to counter his challenges is to fi nd companions in guilt (Mackie 1977: 39). Em-
ploying a move like that against the argument from the queerness of the objectivity 
of goodness would amount to showing other kinds of things that can be intrinsically 
and directly motivating. By using this suggested technique we can come to see that 
morality is not so special in many respects aft er all. Showing this is my main aim here. 
In my opinion, it is many times a useful strategy to compare moral laws and values 
to epistemic rules and values. By the latter I mean the rules of reason, logic, and the 
epistemic value of truth and knowledge.
Two examples borrowed from Wittgenstein (1965) might help to shed light on what 
my views are. One day I see my friend Albert playing tennis and he is not very good at 
it. I tell him: “You should be playing tennis much better and you should practice much 
more for this reason.” But he replies: “I don’t want to get better at tennis, I play tennis 
just because it is fun and I like it, I don’t want to be a professional.” We can very well 
accept his point and say with Wittgenstein: “Ah, then that’s all right”. 
2 Th erefore, his explanation of our beliefs in objective values is in fact an important supplement to this 
argument – which, however, I am not going to address in these pages. See, for example, Mackie 1977. 42–46.
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Now suppose that your friend Berta behaves obviously immorally. For example, 
she tells you that she has stolen the wallet of an old person and that is why she is rich 
enough to own a yacht now. You answer her: “You should not do these kind of things; 
you should live morally and practice temperateness to get less greedy.” Now suppose 
she answers: “I just do not want to be either moral or temperate. I don’t want to be 
poor!” Would you still say that this is all right?
Th at is where the Wittgensteinian examples end. Nevertheless, we can construct 
a further case just like these. Suppose our odd friend Cecil already believes that “All 
humans are mortal” and “I am a human”. Yet, he is reluctant to accept that “Cecil is 
mortal”. We answer him: “You should be rational, you should follow the rules of logic, 
particularly modus ponens and infer that you are mortal, too.” But we get this unex-
pected answer: “I just do not want to be rational or logical.”
I suppose we would not answer in the latter two cases in the same way as in the fi rst 
one. Morality and rationality seem to have the feature that no matter what our desires 
and volitions are, they remain to be the same and have standards that are independent 
of our aims. Maybe Cecil is better off  this way, he might even be moral. But this is a 
clear case of abandoning rationality and logic. Th e same goes for the case of Berta. She 
is clearly immoral, even if she pursues her happiness and being moral is not among her 
goals. In both cases, a prescription arises that holds independently of what one wants 
to do most. 
Believing – it seems to me – is a subclass of doing things. It might be much harder to 
change our epistemic practices (or the standards of our theory-acceptance) than to scratch 
our head, yet, changing our moral practices is also a longer process – still, both accepting 
a belief (not to mention inferring!) and doing something moral are deeds themselves.3
Suppose Diogenes accepted the implication of Mackie’s claim that it would be ir-
rational to suppose unnecessarily utterly unintelligible and unparalleled kinds, more-
over, he would believe that moral values and obligations are just unintelligible. Yet, 
he would express that he does not want to be rational, so he has absolutely no trouble 
believing in objective morals. What force would Mackie’s argument from queerness 
have on him? It is either the case that he could be motivated by it or he could not be. 
If it is the fi rst case and he could be motivated by it, one could say that it is just a lucky 
coincidence that Diogenes is the kind of being that can be motivated by rational argu-
ments – just like Mackie might say that it is just a coincidence that we can be motivated 
by morality – yet, he does not accept a good many of them (including Mackie’s), since 
he has an overriding motivation not to do that. Or Diogenes might happen to be a 
maniac lunatic who is not capable of recognizing the force of sound arguments and 
cannot be motivated by them at all.
3 Th is view might be challenged, of course. Th ose who dismiss it might still accept my conclusions if they 
maintain at the same time that believing and doing things are similar in the relevant aspects.
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Diogenes, Cecil, and Berta seem to be in the same situation. Th ey are or are not 
capable of being motivated by something (the rationality or the rightness of some-
thing) and if they are capable of being motivated by it, they may or may not in fact be 
motivated by it to some degree; nevertheless, if they are, their other motivations are 
strong enough to repress their opposing motivations. It seems that the same points 
hold about them. Yet, these were the points that Mackie found so problematic about 
objective morality. But morality does not seem to be alone in this trouble. Even the 
rules of logic cannot be objective, if we take Mackie’s argument seriously. What would 
he reply to this kind of reasoning? In order to get a reply, let us look at the argument 
more closely.
Th roughout his chapter on the argument from queerness Mackie seems to suggest 
that the motivation that may come from morality must be an overriding one. Th is is 
quite a strong assumption and in order to be charitable, I interpret him as saying that 
this supposed motivation does not have to be overriding. Nevertheless, there must 
be a motivating force built into goodness, according to him. Anyone acquainted with 
the objective good would be at least slightly motivated by it. “An objective good – 
Mackie writes – would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not because 
of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted that he 
desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-persuadedness somehow built 
into it. Similarly, if there were objective principles of right and wrong, any wrong 
(possible) course of action would have not-to-be-doneness somehow built into it.” 
(Mackie 1977. 40) Th e same could be stated of objective principles of argumentation 
and logical fallacies. Every correct inference has to-be-acceptedness somehow built 
into it. Th erefore – it seems – portraying this in-builtness as ridiculous cannot make 
a good argument in itself.
Mackie could answer – as he seems to go on in the text – that the queerness comes 
from the “automatic” infl uence of the good on the will and not on the reason. Morality 
sets up goals for you that you are capable of wanting, while rationality does something 
else, to put it bluntly, it gives you means to ends. (I think that we may even say that 
morality does not give you an “automatic” motivation, just as we said that it does not 
provide an overriding one. In a more charitable reading of the dialectic it is enough for 
Mackie to state that you can be directly motivated by objective goodness and that also 
constitutes weirdness in a Mackian view.)
Let me approach this counter-objection in the following way. It is not a surprise if 
someone sees Mackie’s argument – as Ralph Walker does – as one that is directed at 
any objective rule. To say that morality – as something that infl uences the will, not the 
reason – is strange could very well be answered by the symmetrical statement: if rules 
of logic infl uenced reason and not the will, it would be similarly strange. Th e realm of 
rationality and logic seems to be utterly obscure in this picture; we cannot compare it 
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to anything else. How could it be the case that the universe includes these incompara-
ble kinds of rules that are objectively prescriptive or normative?4
Two points to be noted. First, this shows again that if we interpret Mackie’s argu-
ment as simply pointing out the feature of something that is utterly diff erent from 
anything else that we know as problematic, we have a plausible interpretation, yet, it 
cannot be the whole issue, nor the heart of the issue. Of course, rationality is diff erent 
from other things. But as I interpret Mackie, he does not want to imply that the rules 
of rationality and logic are the targets of his argument. Th is shows that interpreting 
him as doing nothing else but pointing at the very diff erent nature of objective rules as 
unacceptable is a wrong interpretation. He must mean that if our theory about some 
phenomena unnecessarily postulates kinds that are incomparable, then our theory is a 
bad one and the more parsimonious theories are better ones. If no theories are availa-
ble that are more parsimonious, then supposing ‘odd’ kinds does not count as unnec-
essary – perhaps they should not even be considered queer. Mackie might entertain 
that we cannot account for the quite obvious rules of rationality in more parsimonious 
ways than to suppose their objectivity.
Th e second thing to be noted is that morality is much more closely tied to ration-
ality than Mackie supposes it. If we have accepted that the rules of rationality are ob-
jective, we might very well accept that the rules of morality are also objective. I have 
claimed that we cannot account for the rules of rationality, logic, and inference in any 
other way but to suppose their objectivity. Th is is because they seem to be valid, even if 
no one is acquainted with them or no one is motivated by them. When we grasp them 
adequately we see that they cannot be otherwise. If someone is not motivated by them, 
then that person is not acquainted with them properly. If someone is motivated by 
them slightly, but her other motivations override this particular motivation given by 
the rules of rationality, then we do not think that it is “all right” or unproblematic to act 
contrary to them. As I have indicated, rules of morality seem to share these features. 
Th is makes it likely that morality has the same roots as rationality, or at least they are 
interconnected, and if we can give an account of morality this way, the objectivity of 
morals seems to be saved from the charge of queerness.
Let me turn now briefl y to external objects and primary qualities. I think Mackie 
would accept their objectivity. Although our senses are not rational themselves, it is 
quite rational from us to accept the existence of things that we know by our senses. 
Something’s shape or mass, as Walker puts it, is such that “any rational being, however 
diff erently constituted from us, would apprehend it as square or as having a mass, if 
he apprehended its nature accurately.” (Walker 1993. 71) If we had a sense that was 
4 Or, as Derek Parfi t writes: although “logical truths are not themselves normative, they are closely related 
to some normative truths. When we know that some argument is valid, and has true premises, we have deci-
sive reasons to accept this argument’s conclusion.” Parfi t 2011.2/2:492
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capable of sensing moral qualities and/or rules it would be rational from us to accept 
that we apprehend them as they are.
Yet, this line of thought counters what I have called the second argument from 
queerness, that is, the argument that a faculty of moral sense is utterly strange and we 
do not need to suppose its existence. Simply supposing that we have moral intuitions 
or a moral sense is just a lame strategy, according to Mackie. (Cf. Mackie 1997. 39)
Th is argument seems to be the most vulnerable one Mackie puts forward. He ad-
mits that companions in this kind of guilt are not hard to fi nd (intuition of numbers, 
necessity, time, space, etc.) and that he can only state his belief that he can give account 
of these without relying on any kind of intuition. (Ibid.) Since his time, this task is still 
to be completed. As far as I know, no one managed to give such a full account that was 
pursued by Mackie. Th at makes one comfortable in expressing the contrary belief that 
such an account is not ever going to be found. Nevertheless, neither my statement, nor 
Mackie’s count as an argument.
To strengthen this point, we should return to the similarity of logical rules and 
moral rules. How do we know about modus ponens, the rule of inference that Cecil was 
so reluctant to employ? It seems to me that the best answer is that we intuit it. On the 
face of it, this is an a priori necessary rule that holds in every possible world. Yet, I only 
have sensations of the actual world. I could only come to know modus ponens by the 
use of my reason. Similarly, the well-known example of moral intuitions, that torturing 
babies for fun is wrong, seems to be true in every possible world. Th e best explanation 
of my awareness of it is to suppose that I acquired it the same way as I know about 
modus ponens (Cf. Huemer 2005. 111-115). Mackie admits that if we supposed that 
moral intuitions existed, these should perhaps give us forms of argument, too (Mackie 
1977. 38). I do not see serious problems in supposing that many of the forms of argu-
ments (both moral and non-moral) that we recognize as valid are provided by rational 
intuition – the same faculty or capacity that is responsible for our moral judgments.
Th e upshot of my paper is that the argument from queerness, or, to be more precise, 
the fi rst and the third arguments from queerness are entirely queer. Th ey seem to rid-
icule the objective rules of logic and reasoning, and therefore the nature of arguments 
in general – including themselves – and our knowledge of them.
Nevertheless, there appears to be an important objection to the line of thought pre-
sented above.5 Th ere are important practices we cannot participate in without intend-
ing to follow their rules – rules are constitutive for these practices. Games and actions 
that can only happen in games are the obvious examples. One presumably cannot play 
baseball if she does not take any interest in following the game’s rules. Believing might 
be considered similar. If one does not have any kind of interest in following the rules 
5 I owe the following objection to Simon Rippon. Compare this objection to the view expressed in Rawls 
1955., especially pages 24–28.
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of belief, then one does not believe at all. Cecil, for example, might just recite that “All 
humans are mortal” and “I am a human” – if he is not interested in following logic, he 
does not believe these at all. 
It might be the case that my whole argument turns on this question. What I suppose 
is that one may literally believe things, even if one does not follow any rules of believ-
ing. Believing, in my eye, is not a practice that one can quit quite easily. Whenever one 
takes something to be the case or thinks that it holds or is true one believes something. 
We are able to do the former things without any interest in following logic or hand-
books on critical thinking – and therefore, as I understand the concept, we are able to 
believe things without any intention to follow rules. Rules are out there, nevertheless. 
Rules of logic are also rules of believing but one can believe things without paying at-
tention to the rules.6 Just like if the rules of morality are the rules of how to behave or 
how to lead our lives – even if one acts obviously immorally, and intentionally so, like 
Berta, one is still behaving and leading a life. Rules exist and they also classify us: our 
beliefs as irrational, or our lives as immoral.
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Principles or Values?
ZOLTÁN BAL ÁZS
Th e paper criticises Derek Parfi t’s claim that ethical universalism should be 
defended by fi nding an overarching principle that unifi es the most plausible 
ideas of Kantianism, consequentialism and contractualism. Such a principle 
is almost certainly incapable of providing reliable guidance in truly diffi  cult 
moral dilemmas. Instead, the paper argues for a defense of ethical univer-
salism in terms of values that are themselves universals. Value theory is not 
without diffi  culties but it has virtues such as realism, fl exibility and universal 
applicability that make it superior over principle-based ethical theories.
I.
Arguably, the most ambitious undertaking in recent moral philosophy has been Derek 
Parfi t’s widely celebrated magnum opus, On What Matters. In it, Parfi t argues for a 
universal and realist ethical theory and claims to be able to show that Kantian deontol-
ogy, rule consequentialism and a version of Th omas Scanlon’s contractualism can be 
integrated into what he calls the “Triple Th eory.” Characteristically, his conclusion is a 
concise principle that states the following: 
An act is wrong just when such acts are disallowed by some principle that 
is optimifi c, uniquely willable, and not reasonably rejectable (I. 413).
Needless to say that the formulations of consequentialism, Kantianism, and con-
tractualism that appear in this combination have been developed by a meticulous and 
rigorous argumentation, the details of which cannot be recapitulated here. But my 
purpose is not to argue for a diff erent version of the principle, or for its wrongness. 
Rather it is, fi rst, to criticize the method Parfi t uses for demonstrating that ethics can 
be universal. My point is that this method presupposes that the core of ethical uni-
versalism is a well-designed principle. It is, however, a questionable presumption. But 
if it is questionable, then an ethical relativism, or a sort of intuitionism or subjectiv-
ism seems to threaten ethical universalism. Although some philosophers do not fi nd 
such a perspective threatening at all, my second, constructive point is that there are 
other ways to defend ethical universalism. One viable approach is value ethics. Th is 
approach takes values to be universals that serve as reasons to justify our decisions and 
actions. Of course, a host of problems arise once we try to defend ethical universalism 
with the help of values that are oft en clashing with one another, are not necessarily 
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wholly moral, and are oft en of controversial nature. Value ethics is not superior to 
principle-based ethics in terms of being able to solve more moral dilemmas, or guar-
anteeing universal consensus in every situation. It is, however, closer to real, eff ective 
solutions, thus having a more solid empirical and moral psychological basis. Further, it 
is more fl exible yet still suffi  ciently universal in the required sense. However, only the 
rudiments of such an ethics can be laid out here.
II.
Let me begin with a problem Parfi t himself identifi es. If Kantianism is right and hu-
manity, or as he calls it, the rational nature, has incommensurable value, or dignity, 
then the irrevocable damage or total loss of any instance of it is morally bad. But there 
can be, and unfortunately there are, numerous situations where the moral agent is 
forced to choose between actions that entail such a loss or such losses. For the sake of 
simplicity, let me refer to Parfi t’s own case of the lifeboat, where, by assumption, I am 
required to make choices between diff erent lives. Simple consequentialism is comfort-
able with such a choice because its main principle prescribes that I choose the course 
of action by which more lives can be saved. Of course, all sorts of further refi nements 
are possible and even necessary. For instance, there is a possible argument about the 
distinct lives having diff erent values, which would make a mere numerical aggregation 
unacceptable. In other words, saving A, rather than B, or A, rather than B and C, could 
be the right action. Everything depends on what consequences we are prepared to take 
“into account, which, in turn, depends on what value we attach to individual lives”. But 
if we are ready to accept the equal value of every human being and his or her life, then 
simple or simplifi ed consequentialism has no problem in making a choice between 
instances of life. 
Kantianism is, however, in a deeper agony, for it cannot approve of any of the avail-
able choices since each entails the moral decision to cause the death or serious injury 
of at least one rational being. As a matter of principle, Kant refuses to measure the 
worth of any human being, calling it priceless. Parfi t believes that Kantians have a way 
out of this well-known dilemma that amounts to establishing the rules for the situation 
on the spot, so to speak. Parfi t claims that in a situation where we must choose between 
lives, the only principle that rational beings chose would be the Numbers Principle, 
that is, to take the action by which more people can be saved. In other words, everyone 
would agree on this principle, provided that everyone is committed to ethical univer-
salism, grounded in reason. 
Parfi t thinks that this method is applicable to even more challenging cases. Suppose 
that in the lifeboat case one of the persons involved is a close relative, a friend, or a close 
relative of a friend of mine. Clearly, in theory, there is a continuum of various attach-
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ments in terms of personal closeness or nearness, beginning with a mere sympathy felt 
towards a stranger, through compassion we may have toward a weak person (a child, 
a disabled, an elderly), up to the most personal feelings of love and care. Parfi t does 
not consider these cases one by one. He is content with repeating the former argument 
about the local availability of some optimifi c principle (his terminology). It is, he says
absurd to imagine Romeo or Isolde choosing to let Juliet or Tristan die. 
If you were Romeo or Isolde, you would not in fact make the choice that 
would save […] other people. But we oft en know that people won’t in fact 
do what they have suffi  cient reasons to do. […] It might be claimed that, 
when the stakes are as high as this, we ought rationally to give absolute 
priority to the well being of those we love. If that were true, there would be 
no principle applying to such cases that everyone could rationally choose, 
so there would be no principle that, according to the Kantian Formula, 
everyone ought to follow. Th is formula would not require me to save even 
a million strangers rather than the person whom you love. Th at is another 
unacceptable conclusion. […] As before, the Kantian Formula could be 
revised by adding some local veil of ignorance (I. 388-89, original italics).
And that’s the advice. If there is no unambiguous principle at hand, construct one 
locally, taking care that everyone’s will is respected and all morally relevant conse-
quences are refl ected upon. (Parfi t, let it be added, thinks no such local veil of igno-
rance is necessary aft er all.) 
Is this helpful? In the case of total strangers, the outcome would indeed most prob-
ably be the Numbers Principle, that is, a rule that is applicable to every similar case. But 
suppose one of the persons involved is my spouse. Th e Numbers Principle may now be 
amended by an Exception Made for Spouses. Th is is an amendment everyone would, 
presumably, agree on. However, this is clearly a slippery slope. Allow for one exception 
and there will come a host of further exceptions, infl ating and eff ectively ruining the 
principle. For evidently, a moral principle is, by defi nition, not only a normative rule 
that applies equally to every similar case, allowing for no exceptions, but it must also 
be practically applicable. Th e questions are thus, fi rst: is there a moral principle for 
which every situation is similar, or equal from a moral point of view? And second: is it 
realistic in any sense to expect an infi nitely refi ned principle to guide a moral decision 
and serve as the basis of a local consensus? 
We have to make a distinction here. Parfi t concludes his book with what we may 
call a metaprinciple. Remember his formulation: he expounds a theory that is about 
how to construct a principle. He does not propose any principle in the strict sense, only 
an ethical theory about constructing moral principles. 
However, his theory rests on three ethical theories that are based on some princi-
ples. Kantian moral philosophy, for example, is both about how to construct a princi-
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ple (namely, by prescribing universalizability) and about a particular principle, name-
ly, respecting every rational being equally.1 Consequentialism, again, is both about 
how to construct a principle (namely, by focusing on the consequences) and about 
a particular principle whose core is the well-being of persons.2 Th erefore, the Triple 
Th eory is not just about how to construct moral principles but how to construct them 
provided that some more basic principles, for instance, moral facts, have already been 
accepted. Th erefore, Parfi t’s advice about moral dilemmas such as the lifeboat case or 
cases is not really helpful. It recommends to the parties to construct their own locally 
valid principle of moral rightness, but prescribes them to be equally concerned with 
everyone’s dignity, and to be equally concerned with everyone’s dignity and well-being. 
In reality, of course, there can be other moral concerns, or, to further complicate mat-
ters, non-moral or not-evidently-moral concerns as well. For instance, we can think 
of a kind of environmentalist ethics that does not favor human beings over anything 
else. Suppose there is, among human beings a rare animal in the lifeboat. An environ-
mentalist may seriously doubt the objective moral priority of any of the human beings 
over that animal. And we can imagine other life and death cases that do not bind our 
imagination to a lifeboat where non-moral (no-evidently-moral) concerns, such as re-
ligious devotion or other religious or political commitments, may meaningfully collide 
with the more obviously moral concerns (e.g. should the banner be put to safety fi rst?). 
Hence, it seems that Parfi t wants to have his cake and eat it too. But in fact he just sets 
his hopes on the reasonableness of the participants and believes that they always solve 
the dilemma with the help of either or both moral principles. Th is is indeed possible 
but it is hardly probable that the solution or the outcome of the deliberations will be es-
tablished as a principle. Or if it will, it would most certainly remain debatable from the 
point of view of reason (and of Kantianism and of consequentialism) and heavily in-
fl uenced by ad hoc cultural, historical etc. factors. Th ese are what we call conventions. 
One may then believe that every morally relevant convention (say, that women come 
fi rst in a rescue attempt) is a local solution to some moral dilemma in the fashion Parfi t 
expects, or in any other morally defensible way, but such a belief is hardly plausible. 
Allan Wood in his commentary on Parfi t included in the second volume of On 
What Matters, also warns that there are hardly any absolutely pure cases to which a 
single principle applies. He is a Kantian, and believes in the principle of the supreme 
dignity of rational nature. Yet he himself allows for cases where one’s rational nature 
and life are in confl ict, requiring, for instance, to sacrifi ce life for integrity. And as a 
liberal, he inveighs against what he regards as a misapplication of the Kantian respect 
1 Although in a simplifi ed way, we may assert that the Categorical Imperative is about constructing moral prin-
ciples, whereas the Dignity of Humans/Humanity is the core principle of Kantian ethics. See Korsgaard 1996.
2 Whether contractualism (e.g. Th omas Scanlon’s ethical theory (Scanlon 2000) that Parfi t discusses at 
length) is in fact suffi  ciently diff erent from both Kantian and consequentialist ethics to qualify as a third source 
of ethical reasoning on par with the other two, is, in my view, an open question. But it is not an issue here.
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for person, calling “the unexceptionable wrongness of euthanasia, or the right to life 
of human embryos or fetuses” “most pernicious” and “dreadful superstitions” (II. 68). 
Well, this is certainly a possible reading of Kantianism and a particular application of 
the universal principle of respect for persons. However, it is evidently not a univer-
sally convincing one. Th ere are incompatible views on who counts as a human being 
and these views are infl uenced by various convictions informed by certain beliefs over 
which a purely Kantian or contractualist moral theory just does not have competence. 
It is possible, of course, that certain conventions still decide in cases over which moral 
wars are being fought (read Wood’s words again) but such conventions do not live long 
precisely because they are oft en nothing more than compromises rather than principles. 
Th e upshot is, therefore, that ethical universalism is not at all straightforwardly 
defensible by the method of fi nding the ultimate moral principle, or the theory about 
constructing such principles. 
III.
To sketch an alternative method for defending ethical universalism, let me return to 
Parfi t’s lifeboat example once more and consider it in some more detail.3 As I pointed 
out, to the persons involved in the case, we may have an extremely wide range of types 
of relationships. Parfi t mentions the Principle of Nearness, though he does not explain 
it and I think as a principle it cannot work anyway. Although there is a natural scale of 
kinship-degree, it is oft en unhelpful in itself. Whom should I rescue fi rst? My spouse? 
My mother? My son? Again, friendship is generally considered more important than, 
for instance, business partnership, but how to compare friends or friendships? 
And there are even more moral complications in personal relationships. Parfi t ac-
knowledges the importance of love and even argues that it is permissible to save one’s 
own child instead of a stranger, perhaps instead of more than one stranger, because 
love is objectively important for the goodness of the world. But love is, fortunately or 
unfortunately, a highly complex attitude and relationship. Love between friends may 
be diff erent from love between spouses. Or, for example, should I save the person 
whom I love but who does not love, perhaps even does not know, me or the one with 
whom love is mutual? 
3 Th ere is a debate on the usefulness of highly artifi cial examples of moral dilemmas in moral philosophy. 
One should indeed retrain oneself from taking such examples as the ultimate tests of the soundness of a 
moral theory because they are hardly capable of replicating real dilemmas with their deep embeddedness in 
their broader environment. However, they, especially those that can indeed happen in the real world, may 
help moral thinking by urging us to refl ect on the way we think and act morally. Th ey are not tests of moral 
rightness and wrongness, or the validity of a moral theory, but instruments to illuminate the strengths and 
weaknesses of various moral theories. See O’Connor (2012).
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Emotions and sentiments are notoriously diffi  cult to rank. Should sympathy 
precede compassion or the other way around? Love is indeed a top priority for most 
of us but professional duty should oft en come fi rst. A bodyguard should perhaps risk 
his life to save the president, instead of his friend. Moreover, emotions and feelings 
belonging to the makeup of our human nature are not restricted to persons or human 
beings in general. We can cherish an object, pursue a profession, respect an institution, 
and believe in a cause. Again, recall the less-evidently-moral dilemmas: should the 
banner be saved fi rst and the soldier second? Should one die for his essential religious 
beliefs? Contemporary Kantians have widened what seems to have been the original 
Kantian account of the rational nature of human beings to the point of respecting not 
rational nature but human integrity. And since feelings, emotions, beliefs, convictions 
are integral to our lives, human dignity may consist in having or being able to have 
such things. And as Wood hinted at it, life may be but one of these many things. But 
then how should we rank them?
Parfi t’s method suggests itself once again. Alternatively, we could follow the Rawl-
sian advice and bracket all these things in order to construct a moral principle that 
avoids the problem of ranking altogether. But as many critics have pointed out, in this 
way we do not go anywhere. It is impossible to ignore ourselves completely and think 
as if we were nothing but rational (and relatively self-interested) beings deliberating 
over some moral principles. And if these principles are based just on the fact that we 
are all beings who are concerned with almost everything there is in the world, then 
we may come to appreciate the Kantian idea of equal human worth without thinking 
that it is a principle. In other words, along with many contemporary Kantians, we may 
realise that human worth consists in our being able to value our life, to make a broadly 
taken moral sense of life. It is a morally relevant fact, yet we may still be at a loss about 
how to treat a diffi  cult moral situation simply by realising this fact. If, in the lifeboat ex-
ample, life does not have an absolute priority over other concerns, or it is not ’bare life’ 
that is of absolute priority but a life with some qualities such as honor or, as was said, 
’a’ life (an instance of Life) that involves an ability to value things, to be concerned with 
others etc., then we are no longer trying to apply a principle to a moral situation. Rath-
er, we are only aware of the worth of human life in general but are desperately seeking 
for the relevant features and qualities that help us make morally relevant and justifi able 
distinctions. And we may become quickly aware of the fact that we cannot rank our 
priorities in an objective way. We only know that we are loaded with countless pref-
erences, desires, emotions and relationships that make up our lives. All we can do is 
to record this fact. And we cannot but constantly think of them. Bracketing them and 
concentrating on our bare selves may perhaps work when setting up a political order 
but by no means when laying down a principle on which we can rely in every situation.
However, to save ourselves and ethical universalism, or the moral emphasis, as Au-
rel Kolnai calls it (Kolnai 1977), we may still insist that any moral decision and action 
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needs some kind of justifi cation which, by defi nition, must be more than just referring 
to intuition, feeling, or that sic volo, sic iubeo. Justifying an action requires a reason that 
is potentially available and accessible to every person involved. But there is no further 
requirement for treating every person equally or for being concerned with everyone’s 
well-being equally. In a morally dubious or controversial situation, like the lifeboat 
case, the morally relevant and universally valid reasons for diff erent actions will likely 
be certain values.
Values are, or at least they function, not as facts but entities, more precisely, univer-
sals or their instances that share a peculiar property, namely, that they are intrinsically 
good. In plain words, a value is something that is good to have or something about we 
think that it is good that it exists. Th is is why and how values can serve as reasons: they 
are available and accessible to everyone just because they are universals.
 Suppose, for instance, that I want to save the life of my child rather than that of a 
stranger. Parfi t himself refers to love in this case, as it has already been cited, and ar-
gues that consequentialism may justify this decision because even from an impartial 
point of view, the world is morally better off  if it contains strong love relationships. It is 
highly unlikely, however, that I or anyone else wishes to justify such a decision by such 
a principle. Love is just important and I can count on others’ moral appreciation of 
this value. Human life is also important and considered generally a value. If I can save 
the lives of others, my reason may not be an impartial principle that everyone should 
accept, but simply heroism, glory, love, loyalty, atonement, or some other great value 
that I fi nd especially commanding. 
Not all values are necessarily or particularly moral in the strict sense of the word. 
Goodness, as a top value, is surely moral in some basic sense, although goodness and 
value are concepts that are probably not identical or reducible to one another without 
some remainder. Pain, for instance, is hardly a value yet it can be good in an instru-
mental sense, hence even if it is not good intrinsically, it does bear some goodness. 
But such axiological diffi  culties belong to a diff erent discussion. Th e point is only to 
realise that some values are more conspicuously moral whereas others have a looser 
relationship to morality. Justice is a fundamental moral value, eloquence is hardly so. 
Th erefore, if we want to have a viable method of defending universalism in morality 
based on value thinking, we must presume that people are generally capable of making 
and appreciating such diff erences. Th e examples of values listed in the preceding para-
graph are all appreciable in our case as morally relevant. If I am willing to save the life 
of another person, say, of a woman because I want to enjoy her beauty in the future, 
I may still do what would be right to do but I could hardly count on others’ uncondi-
tional support of the value of beauty as a morally right value in that case. 
By making the distinction between morally relevant and morally irrelevant (or less 
relevant) values that are acceptable for purposes of moral agreement among the in-
volved persons, we have indeed made a huge step towards a solution of a dilemma 
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or disagreement that is potentially universalisable yet not in the way principles are 
universal (not by defi nition). For Parfi t is of course right in supposing that morality, 
or the ethical point of view, does carry an inherent universal demand. If only a local 
agreement is required and envisioned, then it is still an agreement that is at least po-
tentially open to all the reasons (based on values) of every participant.
It is of course easier to make a (note: not necessarily ’the’) right moral decision if a 
general consensus emerges about the ranking of values in a given case. But there is no 
absolute guarantee for this to happen. Even if only the morally relevant values are tak-
en into account, they may still be more numerous than what the solution of the prob-
lem would demand. As Carl Schmitt argued, there is a threatening confl ict between 
values being asserted, declared, and perhaps imposed upon others. Values become 
nothing more but words behind which pure force hides (Schmitt 1996). 
 Let us thus revise the case step by step. As it was hinted at, in emergency situations 
we usually think that children, women, elderly and disabled people should be res-
cued fi rst. What is the reason behind this? Again, we may try to defend it by help of a 
principle that will probably be a consequentialist type. Th e assumption could be that 
society is better off  if the weak have extra chances at the expense of the strong. But this 
reason is rather dubious. Who should or is capable of making such a very general and 
very obscure judgment about when and how society is better off ? Worse, consequen-
tialism could approve of the opposite ranking as well. Indeed, in societies where the 
survival of the community depends on the survival of adult men, it is they, rather than 
the weak, who ought to be saved fi rst. Th e outcome is similar in wars: soldiers have 
precedence over civilians. Even in cases that seem to be governed by well-established 
norms, they are sometimes quite diffi  cult to defend and justify by using Kantian, con-
sequentialist, or a combined theory of ethics. (Kantians would especially have a hard 
time in justifying this norm.)
If it is not some general, universal principle, it may still be, as it had been argued, a 
mere convention. But conventions are oft en formed and infl uenced by ad hoc cultural, 
historical etc. factors that are not necessarily morally right. For instance, we are in-
clined to think that saving the rich fi rst, at the expense of the poor, for no other reason 
but wealth and money, would be a morally reprehensible convention. 
Th us, instead of seeking for an all-encompassing principle while preserving the 
need to justify moral decisions and actions, and being attentive to the potentially im-
moral reasons behind a convention, we might look for some morally relevant values 
(the universal component) but with full awareness of the particular circumstances sur-
rounding the situation (the local component). In a war, the just cause, say, the value of 
freedom, may justify many decisions. In a small society where survival is a matter of 
everyday physical struggle with nature, the value of collective, meaningful life justifi es 
the decision that adult men ought to be saved fi rst. On the board of the highly civilised, 
luxurious Titanic, compassion, chivalry, perhaps mere politeness, may be the relevant 
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values. Th us, the locally valid and right moral decision is to follow the command of 
these values. Th is is oft en put in terms of duties (’it is your duty to let women be res-
cued fi rst – that is, your duty as a man’) but such duties are diff erent from the Kantian 
universal moral duty. Yet they are genuine duties inasmuch as they refer to a universal 
content, a value (probably ’chivalry’) that requires submission qua a particular feature 
or quality one happens to possess which is also an instance of a universal (such as 
’being a man’). 
Th e objection that such features or qualities may be immoral reasons needs to be 
dealt with. ’Being rich’ is not a quality that we would consider an acceptable reason for 
being rescued fi rst. But note that our judgment is not that this quality is immoral as 
such. It can be morally relevant and connected to a genuine value such as generosity. 
Richness may be said to oblige one to be generous. Here again duty arises from a link 
that ties together a particular feature of the agent that is an instance of a universal and 
a value. In certain situations, generosity creates a duty for a rich person to do this or 
that. In a diff erent situation, that is, on board of a sinking ship, this link cannot be ac-
tualised. Th us, in morally diffi  cult situations, one should try to fi nd such links through 
which the relevant moral values may appear.
 Typically, however, in real moral dilemmas there is more than one such value. Th ey 
can support one another but they may also be in confl ict and that confl ict can be an 
internal one. It is not always people arguing with one another that causes a problem, 
rather, persons may feel themselves being torn apart by opposing values. It must be 
acknowledged therefore that thinking in terms of values does not solve Parfi tian or 
deeply tragic dilemmas. But the point is not to fi nd a way of solving such dilemmas, for 
that kind of concern forces us to look for an ultimate principle of, say, how to rank val-
ues. Rather, we should and can discover, reveal, respect and cherish particular values 
that seem to be capable of contributing to an ethical framework in which may emerge 
a fairly general actual consensus among those involved in a given case. Lifeboat cases 
and the moral decisions and actions they elicit may diff er greatly according to who are 
involved, when, why, and how. Ethical universalism does not require a single solution, 
derived from an overarching principle. Seeking for such principles in vain may cause 
increasing frustration and disappointment that may result in nihilism or outright im-
moralism. But if we relinquish such attempts, then it is still possible to preserve the 
universal moral demand, namely, the requirement that decisions and actions be justi-
fi ed by some universal reasons, available, accessible, but at least intelligible to people 
who make diff erent decisions and take diff erent actions. Although my constructive 
argument above was sketchy, I hope I could at least make the idea plausible that values 
are not just a rich treasury of such reasons but are, from a practical and empirical point 
of view, closer to our actual, everyday moral thinking than abstract principles and 
hence serve as a strong alternative conception to the Triple Th eory. 
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Th e Aporia of Morality and Law in Democratic States
IWONA BARWICKA-T YLEK
Th e article uses Leon Petrażycki’s distinction between moral obligations (hav-
ing a simple imperative form and perceived by individuals as totally free) and 
legal obligations (having two-dimensional, imperative-attributive form) to 
argue that in the history of democracy we can observe the tendency to inte-
grate moral and legal aspects of the democratic ideal by giving priority to the 
latter. In eff ect, we face the consequences of replacing moral attitudes with le-
gal ones (a process that is named here ’Plato’s paradox’), and this is pernicious 
for democracy. To restore a positive tension between morality and law within 
democratic societies, a greater attention should be paid to the discourse of eth-
ics, but fi rst of all, the incentives necessary to encourage individuals to develop 
the moral reasoning must be introduced.
Th ere are issues we have been discussing for ages and yet we cannot say we have done 
enough to understand them. Th e longer the debate, the less the hope is for any con-
clusion, as if their importance was to a large extent proportional to the disagreements 
they provoke. Such is the issue of the relationship between morality and law. We usu-
ally agree that both are crucial regulators of human social behaviours and thus ac-
knowledge that they deserve a profound examination, but that is the only thing we 
tend to agree upon. Th e rest is a matter of formulating strict or nuanced defi nitions, 
multiplying distinctions, and drawing or denying interdependencies between the two. 
As Maria Ossowska has said, 
Hundreds of pages have already been written about the diff erence between 
legal and moral norms. Some authors have seen the diff erence in their ex-
ternal form, others in their content, some in their origin, others in the cir-
cumstances under which they are binding, or in sanctions applied to those 
who did not conform themselves to their commands. (Ossowska 1960). 
For many philosophers and scholars, law and morality should be separated1. For 
others morality should be the basis for law, as it grants the latter the quality of being 
just2. Th ere are thinkers for whom moral norms are objective (Shafer-Landau 2003). 
1  As it is the case for the legal positivism, but also was the case for sophists or thinkers such as 
Marsilius of Padua.
2  Or even the law itself, like the natural law theorists claim.
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For others, they are merely social constructs or the product of biological evolution 
(Wilson 1993). Some are inclined to value morality more for its implicit universality. 
Others prefer law to morality, if not for other reasons then at least for its effi  cacy in 
compelling obedience.
Th is article does not pretend to have invented a perfect solution for the morali-
ty–law problem. Instead, it will highlight just one of several aporias embedded in the 
discourse on morality and law. Th is aporia is particularily important for democratic 
states and for the future of democracy itself. 
Th e core of the aporia could be called ‘Plato’s paradox’. Plato draft ed two political 
projects, one of the perfect Kallipolis (the beautiful city) and one of the polis which is 
called ‘the second best’. Th e fi rst is described with the language of morality. In the ideal 
state visualized in Th e Republic every citizen would be guided by the virtue ascribed to 
his social function and thus, we would get a perfect community ruled by philosophers. 
Th e wisdom of its rulers would guarantee the triumph of morality over law. However, 
with time, Plato got dissapointed. Th e experiment with Dionysius of Syracuse failed, 
his favourite apprentice Aristotle abandoned him, and he himself, the fi rst and appar-
ently the last true sage, was getting older. His language changed. Since his ideal could 
not attract others to follow it on a moral basis, Plato decided to write down every detail 
of it and to promote it as the Laws. Th at is the paradox: to begin with the moral and to 
end up with the legal, hoping that the change of means does not infl uence the essential 
moral provenience of the whole undertaking. 
And indeed, from a certain perspective such a move into the legal can be viewed as 
progress. Law, if derived from an ethical vision of good order, allows us to articulate 
its values and to ensure their realisation by formulating prescriptions for right action 
and sanctions for not following such prescriptions. Even if citizens are not able to 
strive consciously towards the good, the true, and the beautiful, one may still expect 
them to do good so as not to be punished. And with time, as good actions will be 
constantly repeated with the same good outcomes, the citizens will have internalized 
norms of behavior, thus making the threat of punishment unnecessary. In this way, the 
door to morality will open again, inviting everybody to pass the threshold that divides 
legal conduct from moral character, for, as Aristotle, in accordance with behavioral 
psychology of learning, states, character and virtue come from repetition (Aristotle, 
Nikomachean Ethics, 1103b20). 
Th e above reasoning has only one fl aw. Th e process it describes does not work as 
simply as the description suggests. Even if the legal order we create is in accordance 
with the moral ideal we believe in3, it is wrong to assume that such order always works 
toward the realization of the moral ideal. So, instead of this assumption, the proposi-
3 Th is is the case being examined here. Situations in which there is an open confl ict between law and mo-
rality are not discussed.
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tion is asserted that morality and law work best in societies that engender an important 
tension between these two elements. It is not enough to sow the seeds of community 
into a moral soil and then take care of its development with legal means only, thereby 
only relying on the quality of the soil to support the new legislation. Unfortunately, 
every soil impoverishes if it is not fertilised, and then the crop deteriorates. In an anal-
ogous manner, a society that forgets to cultivate its values as moral ideals fails in sus-
taining them. And it will fail even if it is supported by laws that are considered ‘good 
laws’ because they are rooted in morality. Moreover, if the proposition is correct then 
the Plato’s paradox will remain a paradox. No matter how faithful a society might be to 
its moral ideals while constructing a legal order, expanding legality can cause its own 
morality to evaporate. 
Th e thesis of this paper is that Plato’s paradox can be traced throughout European 
history. In brief: Europe started the project of democracy as a certain moral ideal, yet 
in time it has become more and more legalized4. Slowly, we have been exchanging 
morality for law5. As we move further in this direction we are losing the moral aspects 
of democracy, and thus loosing also the ability to defend it as something good. To 
support this thesis I explain fi rst the diff erence between morality and law that I fi nd 
seminal to an understanding of the nature of the paradox in question. Th en I briefl y 
discuss a few aspects of the aporia of morality and law that can be observed in modern 
democracies.
Th e diff erence between water and champagne
We all distinguish morality from law, but usually we do it intuitively, without putting 
much eff ort in defi ning either term. And so far this article referred to such intuitive 
judgements. Now it is time to be more precise. Scholars cannot aff ord inaccuracy or 
confusion, so they need defi nitions to establish reliable criteria for making distinctions. 
Th e diff erence between morality and law that I want to underline is best laid out 
by the legal realists. Th ey argue that law and morality are in the fi rst place norms that 
channel our behaviour. For them, the most important question is not what diff eren-
tiates a legal norm from a moral one, whether it is its form, content, source, or sanc-
tions, but how these norms actually work in human life. To determine whether a given 
norm is moral or legal, it is not enough to ponder on the norm itself according to a 
pre-established criteria of moral and legal. Instead, the legal realists take as their start-
4 Turning the ideal into a legal concept; in other words: legislating it.
5 Voices that the contemporary Western societies lack morality (if we think ’moral’ in a wide sense, as a 
human drive to live a good life) were particularly loud in the second half of the 20th century, and they came 
from many intellectuals, distant in their sympathies and affi  liations: the Frankfurt school, diff erent branches 
of existentialists, neo-Th omists, postmodernists, and others.
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ing point an individual consciousness and then examine the processes, motivations, 
reasonings, emotions, and so on, that are activated under the infl uence of a particular 
norm. Only aft er such an examination are we able to decide whether the whole nor-
mative behaviour is to be named moral or legal. Here, the line of demarcation between 
the two is drawn on a deeper level, the level that connects theoretical statements on 
law and morality with mechanisms responsible for human conduct. Th is means that 
we also need to include psychology to explain how morality and law works in indi-
vidual cases, and sociology together with cultural anthropology, in order to consider 
the impact of the two on particular groups, including political communities. Such a 
detailed analysis, however, would be too extended. Fortunately, we have the theory of 
a Polish legal philosopher, Leon Petrażycki, to lead us, like Ariadne’s thread, through 
this interdisciplinary maze. 
Petrażycki states that both law and morality belong to the kingdom of norms, de-
fi ned as principles that guide our behaviour. According to him, they can be viewed 
as two repositories, one moral, one legal, in which particular recipes for actions are 
stored. Usually scholars confi ne themselves to examining the content of these repos-
itories, stressing the fact that they are recipes. But Petrażycki takes a diff erent per-
spective, stressing that norms are fi rst of all recipes for actions. He defi nes morality 
as norms which ‘establish obligations free in respect to others’. Th at is, ‘they prescribe 
certain conduct for us but give others no claim or rights of any kind to fulfi llment by 
us’ (Petrażycki 1955. 46). Legal norms, on the other hand, make our obligations secure 
on behalf of others. Here ‘that to which some are bound is due to others as something 
authoritatively granted to them’ (ibid. 47.).
To explain further, for Petrażycki, moral norms are one-sided. Th ey have a simple 
imperative form: I feel obliged to do something. Legal norms, on the other hand, are 
double-sided. Th e term Petrażycki uses is imperative-attributive or binding-exigent, 
that is, what I am obliged to do is expected to be done as a right of someone else so that 
if I do not do it the other can expect that I shall be punished. 
Let us assume, for instance, that I encounter a beggar. If I give him some money, 
I do it on a moral basis. Th e beggar has no right to receive my money. He can try 
to increase the probability that a moral obligation will awaken in me, but he cannot 
foresee my behaviour nor the amount of my donation, should I make one. Th e deed 
would be wholly mine, and performing it I would perhaps receive positive feedback 
and one more reason to call myself a good6 person. Conversely, there exist situations in 
which giving money to someone else is a legal obligation. As an employer I have to pay 
6 Th is self-assessement may in fact be invalid but that does not change the conclusion. Petrażycki’s theory 
is not objectivist in this respect, as it is interested in explaining motivation (either moral or legal) that awakes 
in an individual. It does not make judgements on intentions (perhaps in helping my beggar I try to escape 
remorse for refusing a church donation the other day) or eff ects of the action (may be that the beggar spends 
money on drugs).
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a salary to my employees. Th ey do not have to ask me to do it; my obligation is their 
right, and they have concrete means to exert it. I may not like paying my employees 
(especially when my company faces a crisis). I may let out a sigh while transferring the 
money to them. Still, no one can question my conduct as long as I pay.
It is worth noticing that in both cases the action may look the same externally. Even 
their eff ects may be the same, as each time my money goes to someone else. Still, my 
experience and the whole relationship is diff erent. If we went beyond one situation and 
constructed two worlds, one based only on moral behaviours and the other on strictly 
legal ones, they would work completely diff erently. Also, they would require diff erent 
political management. Such extremes, however, could not endure. We deal with reali-
ties in which morality and law percolate each other. 
To understand all the implications of Petrażycki’s outlook, we must renounce many 
popular conceptions. We tend to expect that legal actions require written laws, signed 
agreements, or, at least, articulated rules on which people rationally agree. Morality, on 
the contrary, we associate with ‘being good’, fulfi lling standards ascribed to identities 
and social roles we play (a good Christian, a good father, a good colleague, eg.). Pe-
trażycki maintains that there exists continuity between all types of intercourses. Every 
relationship needs these types of normative behaviours of both kinds. It is only the 
proportion of moral and legal acts that changes, oft en without changing the underly-
ing form of the intercourse. Th is assumption calls into question the commonly-held 
belief that family ties, friendship, or religion, are issues mainly of morality. From Pe-
trażycki’s point of view it is not necessarily so. Believing in God, for instance, I can 
view my actions as due to Him, but this makes my conduct motivated only by legality. 
Another example: when I change my plans for the evening because a friend asks me to 
visit her, my motivation can be both moral and legal. Maybe I value my friendship so 
much that giving up other occupations is easy for me, as that is the way I am (moral). 
But maybe I simply remember that she did the same for me once, and not visiting her 
would violate her right to expect the same behaviour from me (legal).
For Petrażycki, even the most intimate relationships must include many legal 
norms. Indeed, any relationship and any community can function only as long as we 
grant the other side, be it a spouse, a friend, the Church, the state, the right to demand 
certain conduct from us and to accept punishments for violating their rights. Th at is 
why Petrażycki compares law to water. Th ere is no life without it.
Nevertheless, if law is water, morality for him is champagne. Eliminating it, we 
would lose something very important and enjoyable: the individual impulse, the mo-
tivation to do more than is expected by others, and to do it only because an individual 
wants to do it. Without morality, as here defi ned, no development of any relationship 
is possible, no novelty, no gratitude can appear. Relationships simply freeze in habitual 
patterns and rituals. It is not diffi  cult to agree that the lack of moral attitude is harmful 
for family relations or friendships. Th ere is no reason to believe that this is not true 
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also in the world of politics in the broad sense, our relationships coming from our 
being zoa politika. 
Data confi rms that the diff erence between morality and law as it was grasped by 
Petrażycki is more than a mere pretence to theoretical originality. Examining human 
moral development, psychologists point out that individuals diff er in their responses 
to ethical problems. Lawrence Kohlberg suggested that we can identify several stages 
of moral development, the two highest of which are analogical to the diff erence be-
tween legal actions and moral actions7. To justify the former, individuals look for a 
norm, a rule that would be obligatory for every person making choices under the same 
circumstances, and they perceive such a rule as an external expectation (of the society, 
of the other person involved, etc.). Th e superior to this legal reasoning is moral reason-
ing, when a person performs more autonomous actions, interprets events in a detailed 
fashion to expose their uniqueness, and concentrates upon values to be realised rather 
than rules to be fulfi lled. Of course there are dilemmas that favour either legal or moral 
thinking, but the most interesting cases are ones in which a choice between the two 
can be made. And it turns out, for instance, that the more accessible the possible legal 
norm is, the more we tend to obey it at any cost and without moral consideration8. 
Other data convergent with the aporia of the moral and legal as sketched by Pe-
trażycki come from sociologists. As they point out, diff erent social groups strengthen 
either the moral or the legal consciousness of their members. Cultural anthropologists 
add that diff erences in consciousness9 or mentality have some cultural background 
so that the inclination to give priority to morality or law varies in diff erent societies. 
According to many researchers, Polish society is morally-biased. Th at is, the Polish 
culture has always promoted moral consciousness at the expense of legal one – quite 
an interesting issue in itself (Boski 2012).
Let us return to Petrażycki’s comparison of law and morality with water and cham-
pagne. What the analogy wants to say fi rst of all is that moral actions cost an indi-
vidual much more than legal ones. And the price, together with the high quality of 
champagne, makes us drink it for reasons other than just getting drunk. Moral actions 
can not always be equated with behaviours we call rational. It is hardly possible to 
rationally explain why people who value life sometimes feel obliged to give their lives 
7 It has to be added that the theory of Kohlberg raised a great debate among many psychologists who ex-
perimentally tested the idea, questioning some of his hypotheses. However, the critique is concentrated upon 
issues that are secondary here and their questionability does not overthrow the core of the concept (Kohlberg 
et al. 1983).
8 Th e problem is of course much more complicated than this as there are many factors that modify our 
legal and moral impulses. However, the striking legality of actions (in Petrażycki’s sense) under circumstan-
ces that should rather encourage moral reasoning, remains a fact. It is enough to invoke Milgram’s famous 
experiments during which people could not resist infl icting physical pain (electric shocks) on others only 
because some authority (experimenter) told them to do so.
9 Th e concept is not only being used for empirical purposes; see: Habermas 1990.
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away. Still, it must be remembered that every metaphor has its dangers – there exist 
well-justifi ed reservations in comparing morality to alcohol – so we have to remember 
that they are not to be taken literally. Analogies help us understand phenomena which 
are so multidimensional that they require a poetic rather than an analytical approach. 
All great philosophers, following the example of Socrates10, know that the discourse on 
morality must be such. What does Petrażycki’s analogy enable us to see when we use it 
as a prism to look at political communities, particularly at democratic states?
First of all, we are supplied with Petrażycki’s water, the great number of the rules 
of law among crucial democratic principles. Democracy encourages citizens to act 
legally, which requires, fi rst of all, to recognize others’ rights and learning appropriate 
patterns of actions. We know how to behave in offi  ces, in schools, in shops, how to 
run our business, or how to get a driving license. All of that we do mainly legally,11 and 
thanks to legality our social relationships are for the most part predictable and, thus, 
safe. However, from time to time, in big ways and small ways, we act under the infl u-
ence of champagne. It is possible in Petrażycki’s terms that an action, like donating a 
kidney to someone, would be perceived by the donor as legal,12 but in most cases it re-
quires moral sensibility. I can buy apples in a shop only on a legal basis, specifying my 
request and paying a proper price. But oft en I complicate my conduct with additional 
moral behaviours. I feel obliged to smile at the shop-assistant, for instance, or I reach 
for apples myself so as not to trouble her. Such action is my interpretation of being 
human in this particular situation. I could do yet more for the same moral reasons. I 
could chat a bit, tell a joke, or even help the shop-assistant deal with a new delivery. 
Th at is how bubbles of the moral champagne work: they make moral actions under-
standable for others who share the same values, and yet, at the same time, they make 
them unpredictable. Th ere is always an element of surprise attached to moral actions. 
And since they are one-sided and free, it is no wonder that we connect them directly 
to a person’s character. It takes a ‘good’ teacher to be available for students during his 
leisure time, just as the ‘good’ doctor is probably she who has gentle bedside manners. 
Th e question arises, whether morality – champagne – is always advantageous for 
democracy. In my opinion the simplest answer is no. Too much morality, if we agree 
to follow Petrażycki’s understanding of it, can bring chaos into the public sphere. Th e 
more so that with time it can strengthen bonds between individuals engaged in a mor-
10 Th e fact that Socrates did not try to defi ne ’the good’ precisely but referred to metaphors is underlined by 
(Gadamer 1991).
11 Th e problem of illegal or immoral actions is not of interest here.
12 A mother can assume that her child is entitled to receive her kidney (for instance, according to the norm 
claiming ’parents should do everything for their children’). Th ere is mainly a legal choice in that case: to obey 
the rule or to disobey and suff er punishment (maybe an irrational one – ’they’ll all take me for a bad mother’ 
– but still quite real psychologically).
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al exchange so much that a source of alternative13 legal obligations arises. For instance, 
a box of chocolate I received from a student whom I had helped with his dissertation 
could indeed be no more than a sign of his appraisal of my morality. A moral action is 
always a personal choice within an interpersonal relationship, and that is how it should 
be evaluated. Th e problem starts when other students observe and contemplate this 
idea and then, as a result, I obtain more boxes of sweets. Such actions demonstrate how 
individual choices (each person motivated by a type of moral incentive) can aggregate. 
Furthermore, I might get used to receiving chocolates and, without even noticing it, I 
could consider this expression of their moral behaviours as my right while at the same 
time my next students might come to believe it is my preference. Th is same type of cor-
ruption can also spread across an entire society – and just as easily. Contradicting it is 
diffi  cult because from an individual point of view the behaviour we call corrupted can 
still be a normative behaviour, that is, an obligation that can be subjectively justifi ed. 
One can either point out its intended moral motivation (the thinking that, for exam-
ple, ‘as a friend I need to help a friend in need so I will hire her even if others have a 
better curriculum vitae’) or appeal to unwritten but assumed common legal reasoning 
(‘everybody bribes, so it is a part of the game’). Th is tendency of excess morality to-
wards corruption is why democratic societies have more trust in laws that are written, 
or at least articulated, and are as common as water. Yet too much legality results in 
Plato’s paradox. An inherent danger is inevitable when moral norms are converted to 
legal ones as a society constructs its social and political relationships. Although each 
society benefi ts via a more stable and crystallized structure, they also lose vital parts 
of their socio-political process that had previously fostered the rights of individuals as 
free moral agents. Th ere is no easy way out of this moral-legal dilemma. 
Th e contemporary scene of Plato’s paradox
Beyond doubt, the supreme value of liberal democracy is liberty. In the long tradition 
of European political thought, the discourse on liberty has always been one of its main 
tenets. Philosophers and politicians examining freedom have imbued the concept with 
so many meanings that the word seems to be applicable to almost every phenomenon 
that appears within a society. Th e ongoing discussion on liberty, its content, possible 
boundaries, its quantity and quality, is an important aspect of democracy, the political 
system that is proud to have freedom as its lifeblood.
 Another issue facing democracies is how to translate a broadly defi ned liberty 
into the language of everyday actions, to make sure that citizens build a social reality 
according to rules that sustain or enhance whatever we believe a free society to be. To 
13 Th at is: functioning independently of the democratic legal order.
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achieve that, we need to activate mechanisms responsible for normative behaviour 
rooted in the principle of liberty. Following Petrażycki, we can choose between acti-
vating either moral or legal motivations here.
To use any concept of freedom as material to model moral actions on is at fi rst 
glance contradictory when we try to do it with respect to Petrażycki’s defi nitions. 
Th e unilateral, imperative form he attributes to morality means that freedom here is 
something like ‘I feel obliged to be free – no matter what others say’. Th e obligation 
must be perceived as free (because of the single imperative form of a moral norm) and 
the subsequent action must be a realization of freedom (no matter how we defi ne it). 
Th ere is nothing suspicious here so far. However, we encounter many diffi  culties in 
establishing criteria that would allow the individual to check whether his conduct is 
free in this double sense (being both moral and the realization of freedom). Th e only 
criterion that does not require further explanation is a dissimilarity of my action to 
any action that others would prescribe for me. Th e simplest case is a situation in which 
I do the opposite of what others say. Th is extreme position would actually make my 
personal freedom questionable. Acting contrarily cannot be a norm to preserve my 
freedom. If others knew that my freedom sprang from a rule as simple as that then 
they would be able to annihilate it quite easily by using reverse psychology – by simply 
advising an action they do not want me to perform. Only when others are truly against 
my freedom can the choice of simple reactance be confi rmed as my moral choice. In 
other situations, the reassurance that my actions are free and moral must be found 
elsewhere. Petrażycki’s concept of morality gives a hint as to where that place exists. 
Because a moral relationship is fi rst of all a relationship between me and myself, one 
must, as Socrates taught, know oneself. According to him, to act freely I must recog-
nize myself as a free man. And to do this I have to be aware of the elements that make 
up the character (personality or nature) of a free man. Such a conclusion makes it 
possible to see an important correspondence between Petrażycki’s understanding of 
moral behaviours and concepts labeled as examples of the so-called ‘ethics of virtue’ 
(Hursthouse 1999), because they insist on rooting moral actions within one’s charac-
ter. Also, they refuse to call moral actions motivated only by a general sense of duty or 
the concequences of the act. 
If we want someone to perceive liberty morally, we cannot simply tell him what 
to do to be free. Only the individual knows the interpretation of his liberty in a given 
situation. It is part of his (and not someone else’s) moral obligation. Nonetheless, we 
can provide people in advance with the knowledge that is necessary to make sure that 
they do not pervert the value they are supposed to realize. Suggestions about meth-
odology can be found in the vast quantity of literature on ethics. Many great thinkers 
have written about liberty as a moral obligation and argued that in order to gain real 
freedom one must fi rst achieve a type of special competence. Th is competence was 
called virtue for Aristotle, an understanding of the natural law for liberalism, or loving 
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God for Christianity. Perhaps the most radical requirement of the kind was espoused 
by the Stoics. For them, to become a free man meant becoming a sage.
In our history, however, grounding liberty on moral soil has not been enough, es-
pecially since its enemies have for a long time been dominating the political scene. To 
expect that the victory of democracy could be the outcome of individual actions moti-
vated by morality would only be a utopian claim. To bring about real political changes 
meant applying strictly political means. And so at least from the time of the Enlight-
enment – the French Declaration of Rights of Man and Citizen is symbolic here – the 
opinion that individual liberty must be guaranteed by laws have become common. 
Th e pursuit of freedom slowly changed political systems and led us to democracy, but 
it also infl uenced the status of liberty itself as it was perceived by citizens. It started to 
work as a legal concept; to use Petrażycki’s term, the ‘attributive’ element was added to 
the core of it, giving the liberty the imperative-attributive shape. 
From then on citizens were encouraged to perceive their liberty as particular ‘rights’. 
Th at is, they became passive recipients of liberty. ‘Rights’ stand on the attributive side 
of the legal concept. Being a right, my liberty bounds every other person. Others are 
obliged to respect my choices, and the democratic state is bound to protect my rights. 
My freedom is no longer my obligation; it is the obligation of others. I am simply to 
be left  alone, and, further, my choices or actions or character do not have any direct 
reference to my liberty. I could do nothing, and would still be called free, as long as 
others do not interfere with my choices. 
Th e attributive view of liberty as laid out above causes major problems for democ-
racy. In many democratic states, Poland included, there is, for instance, a problem 
with decreasing political participation which can be observed in the low turnout for all 
kinds of elections. If old democrats, having fought for the universal suff rage, had seen 
this, they would have been quite appalled. For them, the right to vote was just a tool 
to authenticate the moral content of the individual freedom. Now we have the right 
to vote, and we feel no obligation to actually vote. We do not see voting as an issue of 
freedom any more. Th e issue of freedom has rather become the issue of protecting the 
right itself.
I have focused on liberty, but replacing the moral with the legal has been the fate 
of many other components of the democratic ideal as well. Th is transition solidifi es 
and protects democratic ideals from possible enemies and makes democratic systems 
distinct from undemocratic ones. However, laws provide citizens with too little infor-
mation to motivate action. Legalised concepts inform us about what we can expect 
from others, and at the same time explain how to act so as not to deserve punishment, 
but they do very little to encourage positive action or to convince me that my actions 
matter for anyone except for myself. Once we have legalized all moral ideals, the bub-
bles from the democratic champagne evaporate and we are left  with insipid water. 
Th e water can supply our institutions and our usual habits to let them survive for a 
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while. Still, with time the legal, without the moral, would collapse on itself, not being 
suffi  ciently protected by citizens who would be able to appreciate its high quality and 
confi rm this quality in their conscious actions.
Conclusion
Th e positive tension between morality and law, or rather, between moral and legal mo-
tivations, infl uences our behaviour and frames our relationships. A great part of these 
relationships can be called political in the wide sense, insofar as they are important for 
sustaining the life of our communities. Th erefore, the aporia of the moral and the legal 
is natural in politics as well. Th e ideal of democracy was deeply moral at the outset. It 
presented values such as freedom, equality, and justice as important for the develop-
ment of every individual, and it encouraged everyone to take the challenge of living up 
to the democratic ideal. By institutionalizing democracy as a political system, we were 
hoping to strengthen such inclinations by having them articulated in laws. However, 
in the long run, we have not avoided the dangers of Plato’s paradox. Objectifying and 
legislating democratic values has infl uenced political culture as a whole, and individu-
al behaviour in particular. Moral actions, Petrażycki teaches, are the ones born out of 
our internal imperative impulses, and so they cannot be generalized as prescriptions 
for others. Still, others must comprehend them as being good so as not to feel insecure 
or to withdraw from the relationship. Th is is possible only when we all share at least 
basic and abstract ethical standards, standards that would anchor all our particular 
choices in some general vision of a good human life. Th at is why a moral action, being 
an outcome of a person’s particular personality and character and, therefore, more 
individualized than any other behaviour, must to be rooted in a universal and abstract 
consensus on good and bad. Th e language of legality is unable to formulate any uni-
versal and general ideals that would not prescribe specifi ed actions to be followed or 
refrained from, but rather give these actions a sense of a good direction14. Th e legal 
discourse either withdraws from an attempt like this and argues that we do not need 
ethics at all, or allows us to look for relevant standards elsewhere, in what we call the 
public sphere (see Rawls 1996 for example). 
Both methods – erasing ethics, or expecting that the citizens enter the public sphere 
with a moral equipment acquired elsewhere – fail and are, in fact, dangerous. Th e fi rst 
one, erasing ethics, seems to consider Plato’s paradox as no paradox at all. It believes 
in a ‘democratic practice’ that would work smoothly on the grounds of legality, and 
14 Legal language hates universalities for not having clear boundaries, which leads to a strange partition 
of every concept. Instead of inquiring about what freedom is, we talk about particular ’freedoms’, as it is for 
instance proclaimed in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
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this smoothness would make moral reasoning unnecessary. However, things do not 
become ‘practical’ because we name them so. Democracy, as it is practiced every day, 
is full of political judgements, and such judgements are made on an ethical basis15. 
Yet, claiming that seeds of morality could be sowed and grown outside the political 
sphere, and then their eff ects could be transferred into it is not necessarily a better 
option. Under certain circumstances, this can work against democracy, as once some 
moral alternative is formulated, a morally empty democratic concept may become too 
weak to compete with it. Th e danger grows if diff erent ethical discourses fall under the 
mechanisms of Plato’s paradox and become sources of norms inconsistent with demo-
cratic ones. It is not rare in modern democracies that particular groups try to pass an 
individual need off  as morality in order to achieve concrete political goals. Not being 
bound by the ‘political correctness’ of the legal language, such groups do not avoid 
strict statements on good and bad, right and wrong, assuring individuals that sticking 
to these distinctions will allow them to fi nd the right path of their moral development. 
Th e problem begins when such proposals increase mutual hostility and make it more 
diffi  cult for their followers to eventually drop or change their group-identity.
It would be depressing to fi nish this article in the manner of Cassandra. I end, in-
stead, with remarking that there are symptoms of positive change. Moral refl ection is 
reviving in the core of the discourse on democracy, providing it step by step with new 
impulses that remind us about the ethical standards behind a democratic legal order 
which encourage us to rethink our own standards of being good democratic citizens, 
whether we are scholars, judges, politicians, entrepreneurs, teachers, etc. Voices which 
claim that ethics should be invited again to the public sphere grow louder, inspired, 
for instance, by advocates of the ethics of virtue. Some call for an aretaic turn (Solum 
2009) in many areas of social life: political theory, jurisprudence, constitutionalism, 
even economy. Th is being the case, perhaps democracy will benefi t again from the 
dynamics of the law–morality aporia that is so natural for our everyday normative 
behaviour. It is important to remember the lesson of Petrażycki, that the energy neces-
sary for any relationship to develop comes from morality and that the issue of morality 
is fi rst of all the issue of truly moral individual actions. Th us, it can not be enough for 
democracy simply to proclaim particular values, nor is it enough to enact good laws. 
Th e demanding challenge is the formation of good citizens which is not an easy task 
itself. It requires reconciling morality and law within the democratic practice to shape 
characters without violating rights to freedom. 
15 A similar observation has been formulated for instance by Hadley Arkes, who summarizes: “In short, 
the judgments on politics that seem to be off ered so widely and emphatically today would have to imply the 
existence of moral principles, the principles on which moral judgments would have to be founded if they 
are to be regarded as valid or comprehensible. (…) In fact, the paradox of our own day is that these political 
judgments are off ered most intensely at a time when more and more literate people have become convinced 
that there are no principles of morals and justice in the strictest sense.” (Arkes 1986. 4–5.)
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Taking Disanthropocentrism Seriously
Outlines of a Hypothetical Natural Law
ZOLTÁN TURGONYI
Apparently we already have a universal morality: that of Western liberal 
democracies, based on the central value of individual liberty and aspir-
ing to be acknowledged globally. However, this system permits behaviours 
which, while causing no harm to actually existing individuals, are harmful 
to society and so to the reproduction of individuals as well in the long run. 
We cannot argue that we can trust in some social or cosmic automatism 
defending us from such consequences, since, if we take State’s offi  cial ag-
nosticism seriously, without a possibility of a public reference to God we 
cannot refute that the universe is disanthropocentric, completely indiff erent 
to human interests. Th us, we need a morality that takes long-term social 
consequences of individual behaviours as well consciously into considera-
tion. But, because of the gap between facts and values, this morality can 
only be hypothetical.
In a certain sense we can easily answer the question in the title of our conference; 
our actual Western civilization (believing in its global mission) insists on the univer-
sal validity of a morality based on individual liberty. According to this, everybody 
can follow his own way of life, if he does not hinder the similar liberty of others, i. 
e. if he respects the harm principle. Th e task of the State is “equal concern” for all 
the conceptions of good life, for instance, to quote Dworkin, that of “the scholar who 
values a life of contemplation” and, at the same time, that of “the television-watching, 
beer-drinking citizen” (Dworkin 1978. 127). An other example can be the “equal con-
cern” for traditional families and for merely hedonistic, non-procreative sexuality. If 
somebody does not develop his intellectual virtues or if he practises free love, he does 
not cause harm to any other concrete living person, so according to the present con-
sensus his behaviour is not blameworthy. Still the long-term consequences of this can 
be disastrous for the system itself. Firstly: in the long run, without intellectual virtues 
it is impossible to sustain the economical and cultural background which is necessary 
for the great variety of forms of life presupposed by the liberal respect for autonomy; 
if society will sink back into barbarism and the whole human lifetime will be used for 
mere physical self-preservation, the right of the individual to choose freely his own 
way of life will be reduced to a bare theoretical possibility. Th us, there will practically 
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be no objects of free choices. Secondly: if sexuality is a private aff air in the actual liber-
al sense of this expression, it is possible that the majority’s sexual behaviour becomes 
merely hedonistic, ruling out procreation of children, and this will result in a decrease 
of population. Th us, in the end there will be no agents of free choices.1 So the actually 
dominant Western morality is self-defeating.
We cannot expect that some social or cosmical automatism defends us from such 
consequences. Such an expectation is reasonable only if we suppose a universe ad-
justed in some way to mankind, where certain human interests prevail without our 
conscious eff orts. But this is evidently impossible without the existence of some divine 
being, who directs the things “backstage” for our sake. (Th e problem is similar to that 
of the “invisible hand” in economy.) So if we think that the only duty of individuals is 
to respect the harm principle while following their own way, without any subjective 
regard to the harmony (or to the mere subsistence) of the whole of society as such, 
and, at the same time, we want to sustain this harmony (and this subsistence), then we 
must presuppose the existence of God. But contemporary Western political consensus 
seems to preclude this presupposition, since one of the bases on which the religious 
and moral neutrality of the State is required is exactly the (alleged) indemonstrability 
of the existence of God. (So a reference to Him would not be a “public reason”.) In the 
following I also accept this indemonstrability as a working hypothesis (bracketing my 
own opinion on this issue), adapting myself to this “methodological atheism”, which 
must be, at the same time, a “methodological disanthropocentrism” too, since with-
out presupposing the existence of God we have no reason to think that the universe 
functions automatically according to the interests of mankind. Th us, if contemporary 
Western liberal democracies want to be long-lasting, they must consciously provide for 
the reproduction of their own preconditions, i.e. assuring, fi rstly, that there be humans 
at all, secondly, that their activities be specifi cally human, i.e. higher than mere (bio-
logical) self-preservation. But so we must say that liberalism needs, beyond the harm 
principle, some common substantive values as well. To put it in other words: liberalism 
has to become perfectionist, prescribing some virtues and publicly preferring certain 
forms of life which are favourable for the survival of society.
But this kind of perfectionism is, in fact, needed not only by liberalism; it is the pre-
condition of every truly human society. We can say that without it there is no human 
nature (if we use this expression in a classical Aristotelian-Th omistic sense, meaning 
1 A possible counter-argument is, of course, the reference to the immigration compensating for the decrease 
of local Western population. But, even if we disregard the well known confl icts between coexisting groups 
of very diff erent ethnic and cultural backgrounds, we still have a problem: liberal democracy considers itself 
a system of universal validity, it endavours to be global; but once it achieves this purpose, it “exports” the 
inherent contradictions of this system, too, so the actually Western problems will be global ones, the possibi-
lity of massive hedonism and population decrease included. So we would not be able to fi nd overpopulated 
countries anywhere, countries that would possibly be able to send us immigrants.
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the human essence from the point of view of activity). Our specifi city compared to 
other living beings is just the fact that our activity is not confi ned to the satisfaction of 
merely biological needs, but we satisfy specifi cally human needs as well; furthermore, 
all this is made consciously, and meanwhile the needs and the corresponding activities 
multiply, and our rational control over the world (self-control included) increases. Th e 
latter is evidently the precondition of the former; without rationality we are unable to 
decrease the time used for our mere biological sustenance and so to increase the time 
usable for specifi c human activites.2 All these processes are only possible because there 
are physical and spiritual human objectivations surviving the concrete individuals and 
accumulating during history, and, of course, because there is a society which transmits 
the way of using these objectivations (and, of course, it even transmits the mere exist-
ence of spiritual objectivations that are unable to subsist without consciences by which 
they are carried, e.g. language, skills). Without this accumulation, each generation 
would repeat the life of the previous one and we would vegetate on a nearly animalistic 
level.3 So the historical permanence of human society is also a part of our nature.
Th e functioning of this mechanism presupposes both the harm principle assuring 
the peaceful coexistence of individuals and the long-lasting survival of society in a 
human way (i.e. characterized by consciousness, as well as specifi cally human needs 
and activities); I shall call here this form of survival “common good”, accepting the 
defi nition of the latter formulated by Jacques Maritain.4 In what follows, the set of 
norms considering both the harm principle and common good are referred to as “bi-
functional morality”, the validity of which, of course, has also to be defended by the 
legal norms of the State. Originally it is a product of a spontaneous (mostly cultural, 
but in the beginning also biological) evolutionary process, but it becomes increasingly 
infl uenced by conscious refl ection. Th is corresponds to our methodological disanthro-
pocentrism; if human society is nothing but a product of spontaneous and originally 
accidental processes, there is no “cosmic” guarantee for its lasting subsistence, so it can 
2 Maybe some readers will fi nd this anthropology one-sidedly “Western” and too attached to modernity. 
But one must not forget that the basic tendencies are the same in every age and civilization; even the making 
of a stone axe presupposes some degree of conscious domination over the world, even the most primitive 
social group is impossible to exist without some degree of self-control etc. Th e relatively high degree of this 
conscious control in the West has made it possible for us to make ourselves aware of the importance of it, but 
the processes themselves that increase rational human domination are omnipresent.
3 Th ese are perhaps commonplaces, like many other statements of this paper; still, we have to underline 
them because the irrationalist fashion of our postmodernist age sometimes makes us forget even the simplest 
truths.
4 He writes that the common good is “the good human life of the multitude” („la bonne vie humaine de la 
multitude”). (Maritain 1978. 299 – Maritain’s italics) By good human life he evidently means a life characteri-
zed by the practice of virtues in an Aristotelian sense, while the use of the word “multitude” (instead of “men”, 
“persons”, “humans”, “individuals” etc.) can be interpreted as emphasizing the fact that here we are speaking 
of mankind as a unity, a whole, a structure surviving concrete individuals as its changing components; so this 
expression implies the historical continuity of society as well.
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perish if we do not take care of it consciously. In this sense our nature “requires” or 
presupposes this bifunctional morality, which, therefore, can be called a “natural law”. 
From the above considerations it is perhaps clear that my view, notwithstanding my 
insistence on survival, is diff erent from that of Hart, since he speaks, above all, about 
individuals who usually want their own survival, and this pursuit requires some typi-
cal norms, present in every society: “some form of prohibition of the use of violence, 
to persons or things, and requirements of truthfulness, fair dealing, and respect for 
promises” (Hart 1961. 176, cf. 195). So he remains on the level of the harm princi-
ple. But striving aft er survival is not, in fact, in itself a human specifi city. Th e factors 
which really distinguish us from animals are the way in which this eff ort of defending 
our lives is realized (rationality, planning, conscious self-control, domination over the 
world etc.) and the content we put into our defended lives (our specifi c human needs 
and activities). Even the fact itself that we ensure individual survival just this way, i. 
e. by norms, is due to these two factors. Now, they can really blossom only through a 
multigenerational (potentially endless) historical process (in the beginning of which 
humans practically do not yet diff er from animals). So historical continuity also be-
longs to our nature. But even the biosphere is interpretable only as a structure of com-
plicated synchronic and diachronic relations, not merely as a mathematical sum of in-
dividuals or species living in the same age by chance. It functions as a whole, surviving 
its conrete parts (i.e. individual living beings). It is even more so in the case regarding 
the human world, which is also a long-lasting structure with changing components, 
i.e. individuals, whose functioning cannot be understood without comprehending the 
society as a whole that survives them. Of course, the average man oft en cares about 
himself alone, and he is unaware of the above considerations. Still, individual pursuits 
result in this great whole, and without this latter even the mere existence of human 
individuals would be impossible. Now, here we want to examine the real functioning 
and order of the world, so we insist on the survival of the whole as well.
Accepting the above-mentioned methodological disanthropocentrism, it becomes 
obvious that individual pursuits are not in “pre-established harmony” either with one 
another, or with the common good. So we need compromises, requiring personal ef-
forts and even sacrifi ces, usually made unwillingly. Th at’s why motivation is so im-
portant. It happens partly by sanctions, partly by internalized moral convictions. Th e 
role of moral convictions is much more important, since they oft en are the only real 
motivations, because the functioning of sanctions presupposes the fact of the sin and 
the person of the sinner to become known, which is not always the case.5 Th e content 
of these convictions is the existence of the objective goodness of something, which, 
5 Of course we are speaking here of “earthly” sanctions; the belief in divine sanctions can be very effi  ca-
cious, but religion can disappear faster than moral convictions. At least this is what we can see in Western 
society, and it is this latter one that mainly interests us at this point of our investigation.
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therefore, we have to respect. We can accept either the self-evident “goodness” of the 
common good itself, or that of some other thing, but in this latter case the respect for 
the value in question must require a behaviour, which corresponds to the above men-
tioned bifunctional morality, and so it objectively promotes the common good, even 
when the agents themselves are not conscious of it. E.g. they can simply accept the 
value of tradition as self-evident, or believe in the inherent goodness of some duties or 
in “equal human dignity” of each individual, or regard virtues as values in themselves 
etc. (Each of these convictions can furnish, in theory, a suffi  cient motivation.) So the 
objective mechanism of morality needs a consequentialist interpretation (since mo-
rality originally, in its chronologically fi rst ontological function, is a means to an end, 
namely, to the survival of society in a human way)6, but the subjective motivation of 
the agents oft en really happens as if deontologism or virtue ethics were true. Th is is 
not a kind of distortion or anomaly. It is rather a good example illustrating the genesis 
of new, specifi cally human needs (which, as we have seen, are essential components 
of our nature); a sense of duty and virtues, while being necessary means for the func-
tioning of morality, can become ends in themselves for us; but this fact of becoming 
ends in themselves itself is also a means in the whole of the mechanism. It is because it 
gives us motivation and it facilitates our decisions, since this way we do not have to re-
fl ect upon the whole system of causal connections between certain behaviours and the 
promotion of common good every time we decide on some moral issue, so we can act 
routinely. (Otherwise human activity would be simply impossible.) On the other hand, 
this process can also endanger the normal mechanism of morality, beacuse the onto-
logically primary function of this latter can even sink into oblivion, although we must 
consider it consciously when we have to correct the spontaneous evolution of morality. 
And, if we use our methodological disanthropocentrism consistently, we have to say 
that, sooner or later, this correction becomes indispensable, since we cannot think that 
the new elements produced by cultural evolution are always automatically favourable 
for the common good.
Now we see the necessity of bifunctional morality. But what is its content? Th e 
norms belonging to the fi rst function, corresponding to the harm principle, are more 
or less evident for contemporary Western people. What about the norms of the sec-
ond function, responsible for the survival of society (in a human way)? We have 
already mentioned the reproduction of population and the conservation of objecti-
vations (especially the spiritual ones; virtues, language, customs etc.). Th e third task 
belonging to this second function is the conservation of natural preconditions for 
human existence: favourable ecological conditions and sources of energy and row 
6 Of course by “function” I do not mean here some “prescribed” role; what I mean is simply that human 
civilization de facto has survived until now by means of this mechanism. An analogous example would be 
given by the organs of an animal, which are the results of a spontaneous evolution and still, we speak about 
their function.
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materials. Now, these tasks are more or less neglected or approached in a wrong way 
in our Western societies.7
So the norms concerning these latter tasks also have to be contained in our bifunc-
tional morality, i. e. natural law in the right sense. Th us, the number of its norms are 
far greater than, e.g., that of “the minimal content of natural law” according to Hart. 
(Hart 1961. 189 ff ., cf. the quotation from his work above.)
It is of course impossible to present all these rules here. But it should nevertheless 
be clear: if we go into details while formulating a set of moral norms, it is sure that 
there will be a lot of historical and ethnological examples contradicting them. Th is fact 
seems to justify relativism and to endanger the possibility of using the name “natural 
law” in the case of our bifunctional morality. Th ere is a frequently mentioned image of 
natural law as a completely fi xed system of norms, recognizable by any mentally sound 
adult living in any kinds of historical and geographical circumstances; it is formulated 
once and for all, without any possibility of changes. If we accept such a conception, 
any historically formed moral rule diff ering from that fi xed system has to be regarded 
as an anomaly. Th is latter can be interpreted at least in two ways. We can see it as an 
7 The contemporary Western world really only cares about this third task, and even in this case it usu-
ally acts in a way which is not in harmony with the common good in the sense used by us in this paper. It 
is doubtless that public opinion shows great concern about “green” issues, but proposed solutions often 
represent two extremes which are equally wrong from the viewpoint applied here. The partisans of the 
first one, “deep ecology” in a broad sense, look for a solution for the sake of the biosphere, not for that of 
mankind, and sometimes they even consider the extinction of the latter to be necessary. The adherents 
of the other extreme stick firmly to the actual liberal paradigm (“rights talk” included), so they want to 
conserve the environment and natural resources in the name of “the rights of future generations”. But 
there is a possible counter-argument here: the infringement of the rights of future people is evitable also 
by preventing them from being born. Thus, this approach permits even a collective suicide of mankind, 
so it may have the same practical consequences as the attitudes represented by the radicals of the first 
extreme solution. 
As for the other two tasks: the most important objectivations, the virtues, are neglected, because of the 
declared anti-perfectionism of liberal democracies, so in this respect the education of the bulk of the people 
is made by mass culture. Th e same can be said about the reproduction of population, too; notwithstanding 
the evident underpopulation crisis of the West, the offi  cial “politically correct” opinion is still that sexuality is 
a “private aff air”, in the case of which the only task of the State is the enforcement of “equal concern” towards 
all kinds of sexual relations between consenting adults. Th us, the offi  cial preference for traditional family is 
abating, although this is the only model about which we can surely know that, at least until recently, it repro-
duced the Western population succesfully. 
In contrast to our contemporary Western liberal democracies, in the non-Western (and pre-modern 
Western) world there was a dominance of norms promoting the education of virtues and defending the ins-
titution of marriage. (Ecological issues were neglected only because people of those times were not aware of 
the existence of these problems.) – Still, I am neither antioccidentalist nor completely antimodernist: on the 
one hand, I think that the (premodern!) West had an indispensable contribution to the whole human civi-
lization, namely, the conception of a natural law; on the other hand, Western modernity, inasmuch as it has 
enormously augmented human domination over nature and the variety of specifi c human needs and activiti-
es, corresponds perfectly to the main tendencies of human nature (i. e. to a universal measure); the problem 
is that in the meantime it has forgotten the common good, at least in the aforementioned Maritainian sense.
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empirical proof of the non-existence of a natural law, but we can also say that the peo-
ple in question commits a sin by accepting such an anomalous rule. Neither of these 
possibilities is good for us. We reject the fi rst one since we are looking for real natural 
law in the classical sense. At the same time, the second possibility is also inconvenient: 
in what sense can we speak about a natural law (of eternal validity) at all, if there are 
entire societies living without its authentic form (i. e. being continuously sinners) and 
still sustaining themselves during centuries or millennia?
We can fi nd some solutions in the mainstream of the classical natural law tradition. 
Saint Th omas Aquinas acknowledges the historical existence of peoples which have 
or had moral norms diff ering form those of the natural law. According to him, such 
deviations exist partly because of an ignorance due to some morally condemnable 
factor, e. g. “in some the reason is perverted by passion, or evil habit” (S. Th ., I-II. 
94.4). But he also acknowledges the possibility of sinless collective deviations from 
the natural law; the validity of some of its norms can be suspended temporarily, when 
their non-observance better promotes some historical goal. E. g. God dispensed the 
Jews from observing the precept of monogamy “through an inward inspiration […] at 
a time when it behooved the aforesaid precept not to be observed, in order to ensure 
the multiplication of the off spring to be brought up in the worship of God” (S. Th ., 
Supplementum, 65. 2). So, the non-observance of certain norms of the natural law in 
some ages of the past can not only be acknowledged, it can even be considered a useful 
or necessary means for mankind during its progress.
When Jacques Maritain interprets this Th omasian text, he says that instead of “in-
spiration” we can also say “anticipated dispensation” (dispense anticipée) (Maritain 
1986. 170): God does not give us an explicit dispensation (by means of an inspiration) 
from an already known law, instead He simply leaves us in ignorance of some norms 
of the natural law in some past times of history (Maritain 1986. 170); this is completely 
normal in itself (Maritain 1986. 194) if we consider mankind from a strictly philo-
sophical viewpoint, “disregarding theological data concerning the state of innocence” 
(Maritain 1986. 193), i. e. bracketing our knowledge about Paradise (and about the Fall 
as well, of course), recognizable only by Revelation. So the ignorance of some norms 
of the natural law in the past (even together with an eventual historical function of this 
ignorance) can be interpreted simply as a normal fact of history, due to undeveloped-
ness or to other merely immanent circumstances and causes, without any reference 
to God. Th us, Maritain can make a distinction between two aspects of natural law: 
the ontological one and the gnoseological one. On the one hand, it is eternally true 
that there can be an ideal set of norms which is the best for human nature, and which, 
therefore, can be called the “natural law”; on the other hand, the recognition of these 
norms are realized during a historical “trial and error” process, a kind of cultural evo-
lution (Maritain 1986. 20-35 and 188). Th is theory is acceptable even for our method-
ological atheism and disanthropocentrism.
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So this view of Aquinas interpreted by Maritain establishes a precedent for us in 
making such a natural law theory which is compatible with historical changes in the 
knowledge of this law. But once we acknowledge this evolutionary model, we also have 
to accept the fact that each of the diff erent moral systems is (in a certain sense) justi-
fi able in its own place and age, for it corresponds to that specifi c place and time. (Or 
we can say this at least in the case of those that make possible a relatively long-lasting 
functioning of a society.) How can we choose, then, the authentic one (i. e. the natu-
ral law itself) from among them? Are we sure that a moral system that we elaborate 
rationally and identify with the natural law for now, will not be obsolete someday in 
the future? A true natural law must maintain some supra-historical character, it has to 
contain some defi nitive norms which are de jure in themselves the most suitable for our 
nature, even if they are not known equally in every age, and to which we can compare 
the norms formulated de facto, in order to qualify them right or wrong.8
Are there such norms? Is the process of the recognition of norms fi nite, at least in 
some regards? I.e.: are there at least some rules which, once formulated, must never 
become obsolete? Well, I think, if we want to answer these questions, we must pro-
ceed in the following way. When we ask whether a certain norm is defi nitive, we have 
to examine the historical circumstances under which the norm has been formulated. 
If we fi nd that the historical process resulting in the genesis of these circumstances 
and corresponding to the mentioned tendencies of human nature (increase of rational 
control over the world etc.) has reached its end, we have good reason to think that this 
norm is defi nitive. For the sake of brevity let us look at only one example, the prohibi-
tion of murder.9 Let us suppose that we have already established a norm, according to 
which the killing of an innocent human being is always a sin; we have made this on a 
speculative level with regard to the requirements of both the harm principle and the 
common good as well as to our anthropological features etc. Th en we are confronted 
with the fact that there had been societies that allowed or even required human sacri-
fi ce, anthropophagy, killing of newborn babies, old people, foreigners etc. How can we 
apply our above mentioned method to this case?
It is clear that permission of human sacrifi ce, cannibalism, infanticide, or the killing 
of old people is due partly to misbeliefs, partly to food shortage, and these factors ceased 
due to the growth of the rational domination over the world. (Th is process corresponds 
8 For a Christian thinker, these norms are given by Revelation. But as a philosopher, one cannot use re-
vealed contents and must proceed as if these contents did not exist. (Of course, the result of merely philo-
sophical argumentation, aft er this latter, must be compared to the revealed norms. But these in themselves 
cannot be convincing for a non-believer.)
9 I have to emphasize that the following train of thought is not a complete demonstration of a norm of the 
natural law (namely, the prohibition of murder). Th e argumentation is simplifi ed; I disregard some contro-
versial issues (e. g. abortion, euthanasia, suicide etc.). I only want to illustrate the method applicable to the 
problem of fi nding defi nitive norms.
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to the mentioned tendencies of our nature.) Th eoretically, the knowledge of mankind 
has already reached a level where everybody could be fed and freed from the misbeliefs 
in question. But if everybody is in this situation, where could we go on in this regard? Sim-
ilarly, the prohibition of killing foreigners is in harmony with a tendency of our nature, 
namely, with the widening of moral communities. In the beginning they are very small; 
norms bind the individual only in his relations to members of his tribe, village etc., and 
foreigners are oft en considered non-humans. Instead, now the whole of mankind is a 
unique moral community (at least theoretically). Now, this process also corresponds to 
the aforementioned tendencies of human nature. First of all, if the diff erent communities 
of the world do not consider one another potential enemies in a continuous state of war, 
and if no foreigner has to be afraid of becoming the victim of some act of aggression per-
mitted by some local morality, then this safety is an important component of the rational 
domination over the world. Secondly, exchange of cultural objectivations between dif-
ferent communities promotes a better knowledge of the world and the multiplication of 
specifi c human needs and activities, and these also correspond to a tendency of human 
nature; the more the safety of foreigners is protected, the easier that exchange becomes. 
We are at the end of a process here: where can we go further now when every member of 
mankind is already in the same moral community?10 So our rule in question (“the killing 
of an innocent human being is always a sin”) can be considered defi nitive.
But if my previous argumentation is wrong, and it turns out that there are no defi nitive 
concrete norms of natural law, the necessity of a bifunctional morality for the sustainment 
of society still remains true, since nobody can deny that without some norms concerning 
the harm priciple and some norms promoting mankind’s survival in a human way there is 
no human civilization. Th ere would be a natural law even then, although consisting only 
of these two general rules, and all the concrete situations would be regulated by norms of 
positive law in a wide sense (belonging partially to morality, partially to legal systems).
So we have a possible answer to relativism, one of the two main actual challenges to 
the natural law. But what about the other one, i. e. the “is-ought” problem?
Well, in the above model the eff ects of norms and values are the integrant elements 
of the mechanism of the human world. Seen from this aspect, the “is-ought” problem is 
quite senseless. Th e functioning of this human world requires acts corresponding to the 
10 Of course there are authors who want to extend the concept of a moral community to non-human living 
beings as well. However, this is a kind of arbitrary anthropomorphization of subhuman beings. If morality 
were (instead of being a specifi c human means for the sustainment of one species, namely of ours) a system 
of criteria to be applied to the whole biosphere, nature would be full of sins even in a world without humans, 
since killing is a normal part of its functioning. On the other hand, we can extend the concept of a moral 
community to extra-terrestrial civilizations, too. But this is not really an extension. If we defi ne “human 
being” correctly, in a philosophical sense, then it covers in advance all the set of “rational animals” in the 
universe, regardless of the fact that they belong to many diff erent species in a biological sense. So they all are 
defended by the norm that prohibits murder. (Our actual relation to extra-terrestrials is like that of Europe-
ans to American Indians before Columbus… or vice versa…)
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bifunctional morality, and this is what actually happens, since the majority of mankind 
really acts according to these norms, and that is why mankind functions at all. Th is is 
simply the normal way of functioning for this part of the universe called “mankind”, one 
of the three known levels of being (while the others are the inorganic world and the bio-
sphere). Our majority’s conscious obedience (motivated by sanctions and/or convictions) 
to norms is simply a specifi c way of causality, characterizing this level of being as normally 
as, e.g., immunoreaction or other unconscious processes do on the biological level of being. 
Would this mean that we have re-found a premodern conception of “cosmic order”, 
with a well defi ned place for man, and that our only task is to adapt ourselves to this 
order? Yes, at least in a certain sense.11 But the situation is not so simple, because seen 
from another aspect, the “is-ought” problem is not senseless.
As we have seen, the functioning of the human world presupposes the existence and 
acceptance of certain convictions about the objectivity of values. Th ese convictions, 
while being really indispensable for morality, constitute real theoretical problems. Al-
though people have regarded them, until recently, as self-evident, according to modern 
ethics we have good reasons to deny the existence of objective values (cf., in particu-
lar, Mackie 1981.). Th is means that the normal functioning of society in the past had 
been based on illusions (which, notwithstanding all this, have real causal roles in the 
functioning of mankind) and that truth (at least from this point of view) can be against 
the normal functioning of society. Th is statement is not scandalous, since such a situa-
tion corresponds completely to our methodological disanthropocentrism, according to 
which the universe is not automatically shaped according to the human point of view. 
So it is quite possible that the inner dynamism of the intellectual progress of mankind 
undermines that order by which this progress itself has been made possible.12 (Th is is 
nothing but an aspect of the historical process described by Adorno and Horkheimer in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment.)
11 Th at is why my conception is incompatible, e.g., with the two extremes of “green” thinking, mentioned in footno-
te n. 7. Th e existence of mankind is a part of the cosmic order, therefore, on the one hand, it is to be defended, on the 
other hand, this defence is not for the sake of the rights of future people, but for the integrity of that order itself.
12 But there are several other possibilities, too. Maybe the discovery of the non-existence of objective good-
ness will modify the order of the human civilization, so the present order (sustained until now by bifuncti-
onal morality, traditional convictions etc.) can be conceived of as only a part of a wider order, existing with 
the help of a new kind of mechanism, with a new form of morality, completely diff erent from that proposed 
by us; it is even possible that human nature itself will be changed (as posthumanists or transhumanists think) 
in a way unthinkable for us at the moment, perhaps making any kind of morality unnecessary etc. Th ere are 
many possible scenarios. Still, in a certain sense, all of them (my proposal included) are “overwritten” by our 
present knowledge about the impossibility of objective values. In the light of this every further human project 
will be equally contingent. Even if we can build some “posthuman” world where the problem of moral convi-
ctions, values etc. cannot even be formulated (or, on the contrary, if there will be a civilization with absolutely 
rigid convictions questioned by nobody), the decision to build it can be made only by today’s people who 
know that such-and-such a project has no greater “objective goodness” than any other possible scenarios.
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It remains a fact that the acts corresponding to the above mentioned bifunctional 
morality cause the preservation of a certain part of the universe, namely the human 
civilization. But the objective goodness of this latter cannot be demonstrated any more. 
If somebody (because of his contingently formed personal preference system) consid-
ers it good, then he has to follow that bifunctional morality, so this is only a hypothet-
ical natural law. Goodness is not an elementary property existing in a certain thing as 
it is the case with, e. g., its colour or shape. Goodness exists by the relation of a mind 
to a thing. Th e universe does not want the existence of mankind, since it does not want 
anything (it is completly indiff erent even towards its above mentioned own “cosmic 
order”). Only reasonable beings can attribute value to something. Now, the goodness 
of mankind or even that of the universe is not necessarily an evidence for everybody. 
Th ere are many historical and contemporary examples of negative or neutral attitudes 
towards the existence of the cosmos or the human species, from ancient Gnosticism to 
the actual Voluntary Human Extinction Movement. Th e more the indemonstrability 
of values becomes a common knowledge, the more the number of people with such at-
titudes can increase, which contributes to the crisis of our civilization. And, in the last 
analysis, we cannot even be indignant at this, if objective values are really non-existent.
Still, for the very same reason, the followers of the common good can similarly fi ght 
for it. Why not? Aft er all, the “objective value” of their goal is not more illusory than 
any other possible goal. And we can even say that the existence of human beings13 is, at 
least in a certain sense, objectively distinguished among all the possible subjective goals, 
since without a civilization of intelligent beings there is no mind creating values in the 
universe at all.14
But what can we substitute for convictions about objective goodness, if they cannot 
be believed any more while their function is necessary for the mechanism, since we 
have to use some motivations for the respect of the common good?
What happens if we reject the working hypotheses of atheism and of its corollary, disan-
thropocentrism? Let us suppose, from now on, that there is a God who wants to main-
tain the order of the universe, our common good included! What changes? Nothing – and 
everything! Nothing, because even then it remains true that the goodness of a thing is the 
relation of the mind to that thing. If there is a pro-cosmic and pro-human God, He is one of 
13 In the broad sense, like in footnote n. 10.
14 I. e. civilization of human beings is the ontological precondition of any value system, even those that deny 
the goodness of civilization or of the cosmos. Still, even this peculiarity of civilization is a fact, with no objec-
tive value. A universe with value-creating beings is neither “better”, nor “worse” than a universe without such 
beings. Th e same can be said about some other essential features of mankind: rationality, richness of needs 
and activities etc. It is a fact that mankind functions producing and using these features, one can even use 
them as criteria for measuring the degree of complexity of diff erent societies, of mankind and of the cosmos, 
too, but this complexity and the features themselves in question are also simply facts, and goodness is only 
attributed to them by us, while, of course, the fact of this attribution itself can play a real role in the causal 
mechanisms of mankind.
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those minds who have a positive attitude towards the universe and towards mankind. He 
can command us to preserve mankind, but we know very well that there are obdurate sin-
ners who do not obey, i.e. whose subjective preference system does not contain mankind 
(or even God) as a positive value. Of course, God can change the content of our preference 
systems through immanent causes, so He can assure that mankind would be a part of them 
as a positive value. But even so, He produces only an appreciating relation in the mind in 
question, and this is quite diff erent from the existence of some mysterious “objective good-
ness” in the appreciated thing itself. Still, in another sense, practically everything changes, 
since God punishes all sins, and they cannot be hidden. So even if there were no convic-
tions promoting the content of the bifunctional morality, the fear of divine sanctions could 
be a suffi  cient motivation to respect the natural law.
Would all this mean that belief in God (perhaps even without His real existence) is 
the only way to save the functioning of morality, if the “is-ought” problem makes the 
old moral convictions impossible? Maybe.
However, another possible solution needs to be mentioned as well: the “sentimental 
education” proposed by Richard Rorty that should take the place of the theoretical 
foundations of liberal democracies (Rorty 1993.); but I would use it, of course, in a dif-
ferent way; during education we should create positive attitudes towards the common 
good in the above-mentioned sense.
What would be the best solution? Should we use the former, the latter, their com-
bination or some other possibility? Th e answer needs further investigations, which, of 
course, I cannot pursue here and now.
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Two Kinds of Moral Relativism
ÁKOS SIVADÓ
Th e charge of moral relativism (used synonymously with cultural relativ-
ism) is frequently levelled against those who wish to deny the universal-
istic nature of moral codes and moral judgements – although the distinc-
tion between the incommensurability of confl icting moral systems and the 
universalizability of moral judgements within a single system is oft entimes 
left  unaddressed. Th e aim of this paper is to elaborate what this distinction 
amounts to, and to argue that relativism remains a tenable position even if 
we accept the universal nature of certain human characteristics.
Introduction
In both historical and contemporary accounts of morality, those approaches that seem 
to move our philosophical compass towards the vantage point of relativistic considera-
tions usually meet with disapproval and – to a lesser extent – various forms of outrage. 
It is not hard to understand why that seems to be the case: aft er all, individual human 
conduct and societal norms both need something to serve as their foundation, on the 
basis of which it is possible for us to distinguish between desirable and undesirable 
(or even contraindicated) actions. Th is foundation should ideally be universalistic: it 
should not matter to whom it is related to, in which time period or in which area of the 
world the populace under its guidance happens to exist. 
Should one attempt to advocate a position in the realm of morality that appears to 
deny these universalistic features of what is right and what is wrong to do, the backlash 
is rather predictable. Aft er all, the denial of such characteristics of our morality seem 
to undermine not only our moral evaluations, but our more-or-less clear-cut view of 
how to live together with others within the confi nes of a community as well. Th is seems 
to be a rather high price to pay for bringing attention to the fact that diff erent kinds 
of communities sometimes live by irreconcilably diff erent moral codes than our own. 
Regardless of the possible controversies relativist accounts may give rise to, moral 
relativism is not by any means an absolutely untenable position. Many philosophers and 
social scientists alike would qualify themselves as moral relativists, no matter how much 
their opponents would like to stigmatize the label of relativism. However, being a relativ-
ist in the matters of morality does not amount to the denial of the same universality in all 
cases. Broadly speaking, “moral relativism” is to be considered an umbrella-term, under 
which all kinds of various accounts fi nd their place in the arguments of their antagonists, 
irrefl ective of whether the proponents themselves wish to be so classifi ed or not. In the 
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following, the main aim of this paper is to diff erentiate between two rather dissimilar 
accounts in the fi eld of morality that both deny some kind of universalism, but both are 
indiff erent towards other features of morality that may or may not be universalistic in 
nature. Aft er elaborating both positions, I attempt to defend a moderate relativism on 
both accounts, showing how holding such views does not amount to adopting an “any-
thing goes” type of framework, or a libertarian but ultimately shallow background that 
renders discussion regarding moral duties and values inherently fruitless.
What is relativism? A working defi nition
Before moving on to the specifi c types of relativism I wish to address and defend, it is 
important to give a defi nition of what being a relativist actually amounts to. Th e core of 
the concept is all too easily confused with nihilism and limitless skepticism, therefore it is 
the relativist’s duty to show how such assessment of her position ultimately fails to depict 
it in a proper way. Arguing for the relativity of true statements in a given fi eld of inquiry, 
the proponent of relativistic claims usually tries to show how certain assertions in the 
specifi c fi eld cannot be held true without regard to the context in which they are made. 
Being a relativist therefore is not to be equated with saying that there are no possibly 
true statements to be made regarding the subject matter of our investigations (nihilism), or 
that even if there are some, we are not and will never be in the position to make them cor-
rectly (skepticism). Th ere is defi nitely no consensus among diff erent philosophical schools 
about, for example, the fundamental building blocks of empirical reality, and while a nihil-
ist would explicitly deny the existence of the building blocks themselves (i. e. “there are no 
such things as subatomic particles”) and a skeptic would deny our ability to ever justifi ably 
believe anything about them (i. e. “we cannot know anything about subatomic particles”), 
the ontological relativist would merely assert that these questions are best answered with 
regard to the position (the historical and cultural context) of the investigator.
Th at is, however, no small challenge in itself to a generally accepted view of Western 
physics that has the universal validity of scientifi c explanations as one of its constituent 
parts. Universality, the claim of something to be true, valid or trustworthy in all kinds of 
various contexts, is the main target of relativist accounts. Th e above example was taken 
from the fi eld of ontology, though relativist accounts have been formulated in epistemol-
ogy and ethics as well – the latter of which will be our present concern in the investiga-
tions that follow.1 Relativism, then, could best be viewed as a doctrine that simply denies 
the universal validity of certain knowledge claims, or, to borrow a phrase from David 
Bloor, relativism is simply the “denial of absolutism”. Th ere are no absolute truths regard-
ing certain states of aff airs, but there are contextually true statements to be made, and we 
1 Th e locus classicus of ontological relativism is, of course, Quine (1969), while for epistemic relativism, 
see Luper (2004) and Boghossian (2010).
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are in fact in the position to make them. Th e moral relativist applies these considerations 
to the fi eld of human conduct and moral evaluations – and does so in at least two diff er-
ent ways. Th e explication of this diff erence stands in the center of the next two sections.
Cultural relativism as moral relativism
Relativist accounts oft en target moral aspects of our social life that play a huge part in 
guiding and limiting our everyday conduct, but that obviously lack these kind of char-
acteristics when applied to communities diff erent from our own. Moral frameworks are 
not entirely homogeneous, they sometimes deal with specifi c modes of conduct, other 
times they provide more-or-less vague instructions regarding attainable goals, various 
ethical benchmarks every responsible member of a community should aspire to meet. 
Anthropological accounts of tribal life in foreign continents (African, South American 
and indigenous Australian tribes are the most frequently described societies) oft en di-
rect our attention to the ways in which everyday life in these communities is guided by 
fundamentally diff erent moral principles than the ones we ourselves build our activities 
around. Th e more extreme and shocking the examples, the more appropriate they are to 
highlight these diff erences. It would be highly controversial and morally objectionable 
in Western societies to, say, grind the bones of our deceased relatives into a powder and 
put it in a specifi c soup which we latern plan to eat.2 Th e fact that this act and countless 
others of its kin are not only permitted but mandatory in certain alien cultures generate 
magnetic storms around our moral compass; if it is a moral obligation in one community 
to do something that is considered to be morally reprehensible in another, we are met 
with a serious dilemma. One option is to state that our moral evaluations are in some 
way better than theirs, anchored more fi rmly in the correct foundations of morality. In 
this case, we are tasked with proving why that is so – why our way of life is more in ac-
cord with the ultimate principles of morality. Th e other option is to deny that there are 
ultimate principles of morality, and hold that it is perfectly natural for diff erent commu-
nities to have alternate, even radically diff erent views on ethics and proper conduct. 
Th is latter option is the fi rst kind of moral relativist’s (MR1) position: she argues 
that there is no “God’s eye view” on moral matters, from which it could be decided 
with absolute certainty what are and what are not ethical ways to act in all sorts of situ-
ations. Moreover, just as it is not possible to discover the fundamental principles of an 
universal morality, it is equally fl awed to think that there is a hierarchical structure of 
the various moral codes according to which one could be deemed inferior to the oth-
ers. Th ere is no hierarchical structure at all, the fabric of the world contains no moral 
“matters of fact” – universally valid moral statements are impossible to formulate. 
Proponents and opponents of such a view alike usually equate moral relativism 
with MR1, going so far as to use the label interchangeably with the term cultural rela-
2 Which is a custom of the Yanomami tribes of South America, see Iserson (1994).
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tivism. Upon fi rst sight this identifi cation seems justifi ed; all the examples that direct 
our attention towards these problems come from alien cultures, from modes of lives 
that have a strikingly diff erent grasp on reality than Western civilization. Since the 
moral evaluations of a community are strongly linked to the given community’s gen-
eral outlook on their social world, it is appropriate to use the notions of moral and cul-
tural relativism synonymously. Formulated this way, MR1 amounts to the following: 
diff erent cultural contexts give rise to diff erent moral evaluations, and it is not possible 
to defend one of these against the others on cross-cultural grounds, since what is and 
what is not appropriate to do in a given context depends fi rst and foremost on the con-
text itself. Should we choose to do away with that context, our comparative judgements 
would turn out to be empty, sometimes even unintelligible. 
Th is is the “regular” version of moral relativism that usually stands in the center of 
philosophical controversies.3 Th ere are, however, certain aspects of our moral lives that 
are left  out of this picture; aspects that are impossible to take into account based on a 
concept that places irreconcilable moral diff erences into the incommensurably diff erent 
cultural settings that serve as their bedrocks. Moral confl icts are not necessarily limited 
to the diff erent evaluations between people with diff erent cultural backgrounds; they can 
arise in the case of a shared cultural setting as well. Th is poses a problem for MR1, since it 
is specifi cally formulated to deal with diff ering moral judgements that are underpinned 
by diff ering ways of cultural life. If it could be shown that cultural diff erences are not 
necessary criteria for alternate and equally valid views on what one should do in a given 
situation, moral relativism as cultural relativism would fail to account for all the discrep-
ancies in our moral judgements. To illustrate how such problems could arise, let us take 
a look at Peter Winch’s example from the literary work of Herman Melville.
Moral relativism at home?
Melville’s fi ctional account of Billy Bud’s trials and tribulations tells us the story of a 
man who was tasked with performing military duties on an army ship (he was a fore-
topman, to be specifi c), where he quickly became the victim of one of his superior’s 
constant abuse and humiliation. In an especially impulsive moment, having been false-
ly accused of planning a mutiny, Billy Budd, reaching his emotional breaking point, 
shoves his superior so hard that he falls over, strikes his head, and dies on the spot. A 
court martial is promptly ordered, and the ship’s captain (Vere), who was present at 
the incident, and is supposed to be the judge in the subsequent trial, suddenly fi nds 
himself torn between two equally valid, and equally moral positions. 
On the one hand, the accused did in fact commit the crime he was being charged 
with; striking a superior offi  cer is a serious off ense in itself, and since the situation – 
3 For a comprehensive bibliography of the topic, see Tilley (2000).
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albeit inadvertently – culminated in the offi  cer’s death, Billy should be punished ac-
cordingly (in our case, sentenced to death). It is, following from his position as a man 
tasked with upholding the law at sea, Vere’s moral duty to act in accordance with the 
penal code. On the other hand, however, as a witness to Billy’s recurring mistreatment, 
and as a human being capable of empathy, he feels an equally persistent moral obliga-
tion to acquit the man of the charges, since what he did was a) not meant to cause fatal 
injuries to anyone, and b) it was a genuine reaction of someone who feels that he is 
being unjustly stripped of his dignity and moral worth. 
Here we have a moral conundrum that is essentially homegrown: no alien rational-
ities or cultural contexts play any part in its possible solution. As Winch puts it: 
I am interested in the position of a man who, ex hypothesi, is completely mor-
ally serious, who fully intends to do what he ought to do but is perplexed 
about what he ought to do. He feels the force of confl icting moral demands 
on him. ’On the one hand I ought to do this, on the other hand I ought to do 
that. So what ought I really do?’ I am interested here in the force of the word 
’ought’ in that last question and the answer given to it. (Winch 1972. 161)
Indeed, what are we ought to do when facing such contradictory options, both of 
which seems to be the right one? For it is not hard to sympathize with such an account: 
all of us have felt something similar – hopefully in less dire circumstances – to Vere’s 
dilemma at some point in our lives, where confl icts arose from multiple moral codes 
we attempted to apply to the same situation. 
An easy answer at the moral universalist’s disposal is the one that simply asserts the 
superiority of one of these codes over the other, but, interestingly enough, the reasons 
for such an answer can be used equally well to support a relativistic conclusion. Th e 
relativist insists on the denial of this superiority, claiming that no matter how someone 
fi nally answers the question of what she ought to do in such situations, it could never 
function as a recipe for others to follow in her footsteps. “When, in answer to such a 
question, a man says ’Th is is what I ought to do’, there is nothing in the meaning or 
use of the word ’ought’ which logically commits him to accepting as a corollary: ’And 
anyone else in a situation like this ought to do the same’” (Winch 1972. 161)
Th e reason for this lies in the identifi cation of the so-called “moral components” 
of the situation at hand. If I am bound to the view that our legal codes are to a large 
extent the formalizations of our general moral values, then my “moral perception”, so 
to speak, would let only those components of the situation through its fi lter that can 
stand up to such scrutiny. In Billy Budd’s case, these are the following: a crime has been 
committed and a man has been killed because of it. According to our legal codes, such 
and such a misbehaviour is punishable with such and such a sentence, and that is it. 
Th at is what I ought to do: condemn the accused, since he is indeed guilty. Any further 
considerations should fall out of the scope of my moral judgement. 
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Vere’s other option, however, sheds light on a diff erent kind of “moral perception”, 
one that, while perfectly capable of taking matters of legality into account, extends its 
visual fi eld to also include those circumstances that are hard to formulate as referring 
to exact matters of fact. Empathy towards the feeling of being ashamed, a general idea 
about human dignity and human nature itself (however non-theoretical these might 
be) are all parts of the moral domain in this case, and in specifi c instances they may 
also be able to overwrite judgements based solely on the former criteria. 
Th e moral universalist, should she claim that the penal code tells exactly what Vere 
ought to do, commits herself to the fi rst kind of moral perception, which practically 
guarantees that her position would be a universalistic one. What the relativist attempts 
to point out in such cases, however, is the functioning of precisely this perception: our 
moral judgements are dependent on what we take to be the case, morally speaking. But 
what we take to be the case, in turn, depends on what passes through our fi lters of mo-
rality, which can be (and regularly are) multi-dimensionally refi ned. Confl icting judge-
ments do not result in such severe consequences all the time, but that does not render 
them less interesting philosophically. Th is version of moral relativism (MR2) therefore 
asserts that discrepancies between our moral judgements can arise against shared cul-
tural backgrounds as well. Moreover, their tension could not be resolved with an appeal 
to apparent universalistic features, for these features are apparent in the sense that they 
merely appear to be universalistic for our moral perception, which could itself be relative 
to many diff erent things – our upbringing, our recent histories or our social status.
Note, however, that while MR1 is perfectly compatible with MR2, and one could 
easily occupy a relativist position on both accounts, it is not necessary to do so. Just as 
there is nothing in the usage of the word “ought” for Winch that would logically commit 
anyone else to apply it with the same force that somebody else attributes to it, there are 
no logical ties binding MR1 and MR2 together. Most accounts in favor of MR1 tell us 
nothing about individual judgements in the same cultural setting – and morally overde-
termined situations like Vere’s dilemma above do not refer us to cross-cultural problems 
of diff ering moral codes. It should also be clear that the term “cultural relativism” has 
nothing to do with the latter kind of considerations, as to consider something culturally 
relative presupposes that we are dealing with at least two diff erent cultures.
How to accentuate the diff erence?
While most proponents and opponents of moral relativism equate it with cultural rel-
ativism, it is misleading to take these notions to be identical. Ottfried Höff e (2010), 
upon arguing against relativism in its cultural sense, hints towards a distinction to be 
made between the two possible meanings of MR (see especially Höff e 2010. 20-29). In 
accordance with his proposed division, the following seems to be the most useful way 
to accentuate the diff erence:
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MR1 should be deemed “cultural relativism”, since it is mainly interested in high-
lighting (or denying) that there can be certain norms, laws or values that are not trans-
culturally valid. Th ese culture-specifi c instances of ways to live stand in the center of 
culturally relative accounts of social institutions, customs and practices. MR2 is to be 
called “moral relativism”, and it should be reserved for investigations into the nature 
of situations in which opposing sets of moral values prescribe confl icting moral judge-
ments within the same cultural setting. 
Showing how certain characteristics of human communities are necessary features to 
take them to be communities at all seems to show us a way out of the cultural relativist’s 
claims, and persuasively arguing that meeting these criteria of necessity also precludes 
confl icts on the level of judgements should be enough to convince us that moral relativ-
ism is untenable as well. Höff e attempts to provide such an argument – and if we wish 
to maintain that the cultural and the moral relativist remains justifi ed in upholding her 
position, it is important to answer the counterarguments at the universalist’s disposal.4
Universalist considerations
Höff e argues that when we emphasize the relative nature of certain culture-specifi c 
moral judgements, we fail to acknowledge the fact that we are not primarily criticizing 
fundamental moral values as such, but merely their applications to actual events. Re-
gardless of how alien and cruel a given ritual or punishment may appear to us, there 
could in fact be no functioning communities that do not attach some sort of moral sig-
nifi cance to the preservation of human life. What might be radically diff erent between 
cultures are therefore not the fundamental aspects of morality, but merely their cultur-
ally specifi c manifestations. MR1 suggests that the sources of these manifestations (the 
basic norms) are themselves relativistic, although upon closer inspection they turn out 
to be largely similar in all kinds of diff erent cultural settings. 
Höff e attributes such errors in our judgements to the relativistic nature of our per-
spectives, not of the moral codes in question: “Th e fi rst, relative interpretation of cul-
tural diversity turns out to be an illusion of perspective that is exaggerated to the degree 
that suppresses the elements held in common among cultures.” (Höff e 2010. 24) Once 
we take our eyes off  the so-called “surface-diff erences” between various processes of 
moral evaluation and look at the basic norms that give grounds to these evaluations, 
we will fi nd that certain circumstantial characteristics of the situation are to be blamed 
for a divergence of practice, not the norms themselves. Th e route to a restored belief 
4 Höff e’s account of a proposed universal morality is both recent and radical enough to serve the purpose 
of representing “the universalist”. Th ese practical considerations notwithstanding, there is a vast literature on 
debunking relativist claims – more voluminous than there are full-blown relativist accounts. See, for instan-
ce, Macklin (1999), Tilley (2000), Boghossian (2006).
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in universal morality is straightforward: should these circumstances be accounted for, 
moral judgements could retain their universalistic character. 
Th is line of reasoning, however, cannot include those conceptions of morality that 
attempt to account for what is morally right, what one ought to do, without respect to 
the circumstances – of which the categorical imperative is but the most well-known 
example. Besides that, once we take Höff e’s treatment of circumstantial diff erences se-
riously, we are left  with not much to make moral claims about: when the circumstanc-
es are accounted for, and ultimately made to be irrelevant, the diff erences are not so 
much explained as they are explained away.
Höff e further argues that if ethics is to inform us about what is and what is not right to 
do, it should do so based on the similarities of the “human condition”, not on specifi c su-
perfi cial norms.5 Or rather, what we take to be constitutive of the human condition, which 
also seems to depend on historical particularities and the worldview of a given time period:
“As long as one is convinced, for example, that nature is governed by the gods, 
whose anger can be appeased through animal or human sacrifi ce, one doesn’t hesitate 
in the face of a successful harvest or a natural catastrophe to provide the appropriate 
sacrifi ce.” (Höff e 2010. 24)
However universal our basic moral norms may be, these specifi c situations make it 
extremely hard either to perceive them to be such, or to categorically state that one ought 
to do x and not y in the given circumstances. Th e above scenario provides ample ground 
to argue that neither MR1, nor MR2 could be expelled from the moral discourse based 
on the human condition alone. It is probably best to address them separately.
MR1: cultures of confl ict
Th e situation described above leaves us with the following command: one life could 
(and indeed should) be sacrifi ced in order to preserve human prosperity in the long 
run. Because both the successful harvest and the occurrence of an earthquake depend 
on the gods, and we can exert some degree of infl uence over the transcendent realm, 
it is our duty to do everything in our power to avoid disaster. A conceptual framework 
that makes sense of the world by furnishing its various spheres with supernatural be-
ings controlling forces of nature can indeed settle on such a way to uphold the uni-
versal moral principle of the preservation of human life – not necessarily the life of a 
certain individual, but human life in general. 
Let us take a look now at a radically diff erent conceptual framework, that of contem-
porary Western civilization, which does not contain references to spirits controlling 
5 Th is line of reasoning is also common to most proponents of universal morality. For an earlier formula-
tion, see Gellner (1987). 
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the weather, but instead makes use of a large variety of meteorological phenomena in 
explaining why a harvest is successful or not, or why an earthquake happens. In this 
latter case, the preservation of human life is still taken to be a basic moral principle, 
but sacrifi ce could not be considered a viable option to uphold it: seismic waves and 
cyclones are neither moved by our off erings, nor off ended by their absence. Although 
the core principle in each case turned out to be the same (preservation of human life), 
the actions that these frameworks make possible (or mandatory) are drastically diff er-
ent. Guidelines to action (to what one ought to do) seem to be located exactly at the 
superfi cial level of surface-diff erences: in the various cultural manifestations of the 
multitude of similarities. Should we explain these away, we would be left  with nothing 
to say about why it is morally right to sacrifi ce someone in a given culture while it is 
morally wrong to do so in another.
MR2: judgements of confl ict
Looking at the picture from a slightly diff erent angle can also serve to illustrate how 
moral frameworks fail to single out exactly one way to act in a given situation. Grant-
ed, this should not be a problem in itself, but the apparent contradiction where doing 
both x and not-x could be considered equally moral (or immoral) can quickly arise 
once one inspects the possible actions a little more carefully. In our present example, 
appeasing the gods to preserve the community and preserving human life because of 
its intrinsic value can both be considered moral obligations. Let us suppose now that 
circumstances are to blame for the actual diff erences in the materialization of a univer-
sally valid moral principle, and that “the right to life and limb” is a basic ineliminable 
right throughout all communities. 
Our agent, who is determined to act in accordance with the basic moral principles, 
seems to have two options: she can either a) sacrifi ce another human being in order 
to appease the gods (a moral duty), or b) refuse to sacrifi ce another human being in 
order to preserve human life (another moral duty). Her fi nal choice notwithstanding, 
she is defi nitely facing a moral dilemma, as she is torn between two contrasting sets of 
values, both of which are there to tell her what she ought to do. She does not need to 
be confronted with Western civilization and its largely dissimilar ontology in order to 
feel the pull of two diff erent moral codes somehow encoded within the same system 
that she shares with fellow members of her community. Th is dual-faceted nature of 
the community’s own moral framework is enough to give rise to possible confl icts 
in judgements within the same cultural setting – underpinning the assumption that 
accounting for the diff erences between cultural contexts does not eliminate the threat 
of relativism altogether. While its success in dealing with MR1 is also doubtful (as I 
hope to have already shown), it is essentially powerless in confl icts generated by MR2.
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Conclusion
I have tried to illustrate how lumping together various types of relativistic objections to 
a universal morality could lead to the oversimplifi cation of the issue: when we are deal-
ing with moral frameworks that contradict one another, or with confl icting moral obli-
gations within the same framework, we should put some eff ort into distinguishing the 
two lines of reasoning from one another. Aft er an examination of how a recent attempt 
at overcoming relativistic charges could fare when faced with both MR1 and MR2, it 
is reasonable to suppose that while there are indeed certain basic moral principles that 
serve as the bedrock of human communities, the so-called surface-diff erences in their 
manifestations still leave room for MR1 to be formulated in a modifi ed version that 
takes into account transcultural similarities (see Wong 2006, for instance). My sugges-
tion would be to reserve the term “cultural relativism” for this alternative formulation, 
and leave “moral relativism” to refer to the way our moral judgements could be dif-
ferent within the same cultural context (MR2). Since, aft er all, transcultural similari-
ties may account for much of what is constitutive of the human condition throughout 
many diff erent cultures, they do not teach us anything about how to properly behave 
when we are faced with equally right (or equally wrong) ways to act within our own.
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Multiculturalism and Ethical Objectivism/Relativism
SZIL ÁRD TAT TAY
Th e Achilles heel of the political philosophy of multiculturalism is the prob-
lem of the oppression of ‘internal minorities’. What can we say if some mi-
nority cultures do not promote certain individualistic values, or reject the 
idea of universal human rights altogether? Does the repudiation of the group 
claims to internal restrictions inevitably presuppose a commitment to West-
ern, liberal values, and is it consequently tantamount to ethnocentrism? In 
this case, we would seem to deny the very principle of ‘equal recognition’ of 
cultures, and hence would arrive at an impasse. Or are there some objective, 
universally acceptable standards of value which do not violate this princi-
ple? I will argue in my paper that without at least some element of ethical 
objectivism as an implicit normative postulate, multiculturalism would be 
diffi  cult, if not impossible to be sustained and defended.
Introduction
We can approach the phenomenon of cultural diversity from many divergent perspec-
tives: from an empirical: sociological/anthropological/psychological viewpoint, from 
a normative: moral/legal/political philosophical standpoint, from a pragmatic: polit-
ical aspect, and so forth. Regarding the judgement concerning the status, foundation 
and universality of values, while recent scholarship of cultural anthropology, social 
psychology and intercultural communication is almost unanimously committed to the 
stand of cultural relativism (cf. e.g. Geertz 1984, Hofstede–Hofstede–Minkov 2010, 
Bennett 1993), moral and political philosophical doctrines providing a normative ba-
sis or framework for multiculturalism show a remarkable heterogeneity in assessing 
the nature of value systems and judgements.
On the one hand, James Tully clearly and emphatically professes the view that goods 
and values are internal to each culture and hence are incommensurable. In his book 
Strange Multiplicity, he argues that as a consequence of the irreducible diversity of val-
ue judgements, there is no comprehensive, “Platonic” viewpoint or “transcendental” 
standard beyond intercultural dialogue from which it could be measured (Tully 1995. 
24–29, 202–205).6
6 Similarly, many critiques of multiculturalism take for granted the assumption that ethical or cultural 
relativism is a constitutive element of the theory of multiculturalism. See e.g. Barry 2001, esp. 261–271 and 
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Charles Taylor, on the other hand, speaks of the “threat” and “risk” of relativism, 
and warns that cultural openness, while necessary for understanding other cultures 
and traditions, should not veer into the questioning of the idea of truth in human 
aff airs. He maintains that even though “it may seem impossible to combine objectivity 
with the recognition of fundamental conceptual diff erences between cultures”, still, “it 
is wrong to believe that accepting cultural diff erences requires abandoning allegiance 
to truth” (Taylor 2002, my emphasis).1
In my paper, I try to point out certain implicit normative postulates of multicultur-
alism without which a coherent and viable doctrine of multiculturalism, in my opin-
ion, could not work or even be conceived. I argue that without at least some element of 
ethical objectivism, the political and moral philosophy of multiculturalism would be 
diffi  cult, if not impossible to be sustained and defended.
Th e acid test of multiculturalism: the problem of ‘internal minorities’
Th e question of ethical objectivism/relativism arises most sharply in connection with 
the problem of the oppression of ‘internal minorities’ or ‘minorities within minorities’, 
which can be regarded, in a sense, as the Achilles heel of the moral and political philos-
ophy of multiculturalism. Mainly liberal and feminist critics raised the objection that 
the majority of a given cultural minority is able to abuse its collective rights in order 
to oppress the vulnerable members of that minority; it has become one of the most 
common objections against multiculturalism,2
Perhaps Will Kymlicka in his Multicultural Citizenship off ered the most infl uential 
solution to this problem, also on the ground of political liberalism. Kymlicka strictly 
distinguishes between ‘internal restriction’ and ‘external protection’ claims of minority 
groups. While the former type of claim is formulated by a cultural group vis-à-vis its 
own members, the latter is directed against the larger society.
Th e fi rst kind is intended to protect the group from the destabilizing im-
pact of internal dissent (e.g. the decision of individual members not to 
follow traditional practices or customs), whereas the second is intended 
to protect the group from the impact of external decisions (e.g. the eco-
nomic or political decisions of the larger society). (Kymlicka 1995. 35)
279–286.
1 In Hungarian scholarship Szabolcs Pogonyi sustains a similar point of view. See Pogonyi 2011, 8.
2 Th e classic formulation of this objection can be found in Green 1994. Cf. also e.g. Kukathas 1995, esp. 
247–50, and Cohen–Howard–Nussbaum 1999.
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Kymlicka insists that although both kinds of claims can be labelled as ‘collective 
rights’, they ought to be judged in a completely diff erent way. It is because the principle of 
inter-group equality cannot legitimize intra-group inequality, and the protection of mi-
nority cultures should not lead to the suppression of basic individual rights. As he states: 
liberals can and should endorse certain external protections, where they 
promote fairness between groups, but should reject internal restrictions 
which limit the right of group members to question and revise traditional 
authorities and practices. […] Liberals can only endorse minority rights 
in so far as they are consistent with respect for the freedom or autonomy 
of individuals. (Kymlicka 1995. 37, 75)
A delicate dilemma: ethnocentrism or value objectivism?
Kymlicka’s answer seems clear and theoretically well founded. But on the other hand, it 
leads to a delicate dilemma. What can we say if some minority cultures do not favour cer-
tain individualistic values, do not acknowledge certain fundamental rights, or even reject 
the idea of human rights altogether? Does the repudiation of the group claims to internal 
restrictions inevitably presuppose a commitment to Western, liberal values, and is it con-
sequently tantamount to ethnocentrism and cultural imperialism? In other words, is it 
equivalent with saying: “Th is is how we do things here”?3 In this case, we would appear to 
deny the fundamental principle underlying the theory of multiculturalism, that of ‘equal 
recognition’ of cultures, and hence would arrive at an impasse. Or are there any objective, 
universally acceptable standards of value that do not violate this principle? And if there 
are some, how can they be justifi ed in a neutral, cross-cultural perspective?
One possible answer to these questions is that liberalism off ers a neutral ground on 
which people of all cultures can meet and coexist. Th is view is not only problematic 
because liberal political philosophy, as we have seen, is largely divided on the issue 
of minority rights. I think Charles Taylor is right in insisting in his classic essay, Th e 
Politics of Recognition that liberalism does not constitute a potential meeting ground 
for all cultures, since 
it is the political expression of one range of cultures, and quite incom-
patible with other ranges. […] [T]his is to say that liberalism can’t and 
shouldn’t claim complete cultural neutrality […] the very idea of such 
a liberalism may be a kind of pragmatic contradiction, a particularism 
masquerading as the universal. (Taylor 1995. 249, 237)
3 I borrow this phrase from Taylor 1995, 249, 250.
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In a similar vein, Bhikhu Parekh maintains in Rethinking Multiculturalism that a 
multicultural society cannot be adequately analysed within the conceptual framework 
of any particular political doctrine, including liberalism, which 
is a substantive doctrine advocating a specifi c view of man, society and 
the world and embedded in and giving rise to a distinct way of life. As 
such it represents a particular cultural perspective and cannot provide a 
broad and impartial enough framework to conceptualise other cultures 
or their relations with it. (Parekh 2000. 13–14)
Th e question of the universality of the idea of human rights
So it seems that in order to escape our dilemma and the charge of ethnocentrism and 
cultural imperialism, we have to envisage a diff erent solution and fi nd another idea as 
a candidate for universalization, viz. that of human rights. However, here we encoun-
ter the very same diffi  culty as in the case of liberalism. Th e question inevitably arises: 
Were the classical rights theorists of early modern Europe merely artic-
ulating a doctrine that was implicit, if unacknowledged, in all societies? 
Or is the whole idea of human rights peculiarly a product  of Western 
culture? And if the idea did have a distinctively Western origin can it have 
any relevance for other peoples? (Tierney 1997. 1–2)
Th ere are good reasons, confi rmed by historical evidence, to think that the language 
of rights is of unmistakably Western provenance. Moreover, contemporary Western 
human rights discourse endorses certain characteristically individualistic views on hu-
man nature and society, and the term ‘right’ oft en connotates notions like ‘property’ and 
‘possession’ (Taylor 1999. 126–130). However, as Taylor stresses, it is essential to distin-
guish three levels of the concept of human rights: (1) legal forms, (2) norms of conduct, 
and (3) their underlying justifi cation or philosophy. He contends that although these 
levels are not unconnected, they ought to be analytically separated (Taylor 1999. 127, 
143); therefore, “we can easily imagine situations in which, for all their interconnections, 
the package could be untied, and either the forms or the philosophy could be adopted 
alone, without the other.” (Taylor 1999. 129) Th is is highly important in view of the fact 
that the “atomistic” and “possessive” elements of the Western rights model is a constant 
source of criticism on the part of not only communitarian political philosophy but also 
of non-Western societies. Accordingly, “the legal culture could ‘travel’ better, if it could 
be separated from some of its underlying justifi cations.” (Taylor 1999. 126)
If this is really possible, then it might be argued, as the historian of the idea of natural 
rights Brian Tierney does, that the Western origin of human rights does not a priori pre-
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clude the possibility that certain other underlying ideas inherent in right language may 
prove to have a universal signifi cance (Tierney 1997. 346).4 Th e prospects of the univer-
salization of human rights are further strengthened by the – sometimes-neglected – fact 
that the Western rights tradition is itself pluralistic and fl exible. As Tierney highlights:
We might learn from our history, for instance, to appreciate the variety of 
cultural contexts within which an ideal of human rights could fl ourish; […] 
the idea of natural rights in its earlier formulations was not one of ‘atomic 
individualism’; it was not necessarily opposed to the communitarian val-
ues of traditional societies. Nor was the idea dependent on any particular 
version of Western philosophy; rather it coexisted with a variety of philos-
ophies, including the religiously oriented systems of the medieval era and 
the secularized doctrines of the Enlightenment. (Tierney 1997. 347)
Th e principle of equal value of cultures
Now let us return to the initial question. Does not the rejection of minority claims 
to internal restrictions contradict the principle of ‘equal respect’ of cultures? I would 
answer the question in the negative, on the basis of Taylor’s distinction between the 
potential and actual worth of a given culture (cf. Taylor 1995, esp. 236). He argues that 
from the thesis that all cultures should enjoy the presumption that their traditions have 
equal value, it does not follow that all of them must in fact be judged of equal worth: 
“It makes sense to insist as a matter of right that we approach the study of certain cul-
tures with the presumption of their value. But it can’t make sense to insist as a matter 
of right that we come up with a fi nal concluding judgment that their value is great, or 
equal to others’.” (Taylor 1995. 253–254) Taylor adds that as an alternative to premature 
condescension, a favourable judgement – in general any real judgement of worth – re-
quires a Gadamerian ‘fusion of horizons’ of cultures and standards, which is a long and 
complex procedure (Taylor 1995. 252–253, 255–256).
Th e notion of ‘equal respect’ plays an important role in this respect in another sense too:
When we stand within the moral outlook of universal and equal respect, 
we don’t consider its condemnation of slavery, widow-burning, human 
sacrifi ce, or female circumcision only as expressions of our way of being, 
inviting a reciprocal and equally valid condemnation of our free labour, 
widow-remarriage, bloodless sacrifi ce, and sex equality from the socie-
ties where these strange practices fl ourish. (Taylor 1989. 67)
4 Tierney makes his meaning very clear: “Surely in all societies, humans have preferred life to death, free-
dom to servitude, suffi  ciency of food to starvation, dignity to humiliation. Th e rights language that grew up 
in Western culture was one way of addressing such universal concerns.” (Tierney 1997. 347)
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Th e thesis of incommensurability of cultural values
Th is statement brings us back to our central dilemma. It is certain that the sceptical 
view that cultures and values are incommensurable does not provide the best founda-
tion for the acknowledgement of cultural rights. For the thesis of incommensurability 
and uncombinability of cultural values can be abused to defend practices that mar-
ginalize, exclude, degrade or harm people; if cultures are incommensurable, then no 
neutral standards are available by which rival cultural claims could be assessed and 
measured. Th e criticism of whatsoever cultural practice qualifi es, by that very fact, 
as an imposition of alien values, i.e. a manifestation of cultural imperialism (Moore 
2005. 275, 277). But are there in fact any cross-cultural moral standards and universal 
human values? What if the divergent values and forms of life represented by diff erent 
cultures are, in the fi nal analysis, incommensurable? In the following I present three 
distinct strategies employed to meet this objection.
In Taylor’s view, the hypothesis that the various ways of being human are ultimately 
incommensurable is possible, but it is doubtful (Taylor 1989. 60–61, 67–68). Th us we 
can start from the presumption of the universality and commensurability of values:
It may be that our contact with certain cultures will force us to recognize 
incommensurability […] But we certainly shouldn’t assume this is so a pri-
ori. Until we meet this limit, there is no reason not to think of the goods we 
are trying to defi ne and criticize as universal, provided we aff ord the same 
status to those of other societies we are trying to understand. Th is does 
not mean of course that all our, or all their, supposed goods will turn out 
at the end of the day to be defensible as such; just that we don’t start with a 
preshrunk moral universe in which we take as given that their goods have 
nothing to say to us or perhaps ours to them. (Taylor 1989. 62)
Parekh contests moral relativism on the ground of ‘minimum universalism’ or ‘plu-
ralist universalism’, conceived as a middle ground between ‘relativism’ or ‘cultural de-
terminism’ on the one hand, and ‘moral monism’ on the other, saying that relativism 
mistakenly ignores cross-culturally shared human properties, which give rise to some 
constituents and basic norms of human well-being common and valid to all societies 
(Parekh 2000. 126–136).5 He insists that cultures “do not exist in a vacuum nor are 
they created ex nihilo. Th ey are embedded in, and limited by, the universally shared 
features of human existence including human nature.” (Parekh 2000. 124) Parekh con-
5 According to Parekh, common constituents of human well-being include, among others, survival, me-
ans of subsistence, physical wholeness, good health, a stable, stimulating and loving environment, access to 
cultural resources of the community, freedom from arbitrary exercise of power, self-expression, and a certain 
measure of privacy and control of life (Parekh 2000. 132).
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tends that cultural relativists also err in believing that “a culture is a tightly integrated 
and self-contained whole, can be neatly individuated, and determines its members.” 
(Parekh 2000. 127)
A much weaker claim is made by Margaret Moore: 
Th e ostensible relationship between plurality of values, radical cultural 
relativism and jurisdictional control over one’s own culture is quite ten-
uous […] radical cultural and moral relativism does not necessarily fol-
low from the recognition of multiple cultural values and the problems in 
ranking such values. (Moore 2005. 276, 277) 
She takes up the argument of Judith Shklar’s book Th e Faces of Injustice (Shklar 
1990) that even though it might not be possible to agree on what justice consists in, to 
specify all the values of good life, or to produce a full-scale ranking of diverse human 
values, it might be possible to identify what is morally evil. It is possible to acknowl-
edge that there are certain evils – e.g. unnecessary death, human suff ering and cruelty, 
degradation, humiliation and physical harm – that any moral system should recognize 
and prohibit (Moore 2005. 276–277).
Conclusion
Despite their obvious diff erences, all these claims point in essentially the same direc-
tion, namely to the conclusion that the thesis of incommensurability of cultures and 
values, which usually underlies the position of cultural relativism, is at least debatable. 
And this in turn appears to support the view that it is, aft er all, possible to identify 
certain cultures as more valuable – i.e. contributing more to general human well-be-
ing (or bringing about less evil) – than others, and to discredit moral relativism as an 
inappropriate foundation of multiculturalism, considering that it can tolerate some 
cultural practices that are unacceptable in terms of a basic minimum of human func-
tioning (Moore 2005. 277). Th us the die is cast, and a strong case is made for ethical 
objectivism as a hidden or implicit normative postulate of multiculturalism.
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Lift ing the Veil of Relativism
RENATA KATALIN SMITH –  JOSÉ C OLEN
Th is paper argues that relativism prevents discourse, positive interaction 
and the growth of understanding since relativism eliminates the possibility 
of doubt and, subsequently, reason. Conversely, pluralism supports the con-
cept of a universal moral claim in that we can only understand a fragment 
of the universe, but through dialogue, can advance towards greater under-
standing. Th is approach allows human beings in a multicultural society to 
move away from bigotry toward understanding and create a “we” rather 
than an “us” and “them” mentality. A continued claim of the validity of rel-
ativism would only hinder this process. In a more positive vein, we will also 
try to review some logical and pragmatic arguments that suggest how rela-
tivism can be overcome and universal moral rules can be defended without 
hindering pluralism.
Introduction: relativism defi ned 
In attempting to refute relativism, it has frequently been argued that relativism refutes 
itself. In other words, if relativism in a relative world can only be one of the many 
possible truths, it in eff ect renders itself relative. We argue here that this critique of 
relativism, although true, is by far neither the only nor necessarily the strongest refu-
tation that should be used. Th ere are several other challenges that relativism faces and 
a careful critique and consideration is therefore necessary to discuss these challenges.
First, we must consider what relativism is. Relativism, lato sensu, is not a singular 
philosophical doctrine. Instead, it encompasses a family of doctrines, all considering 
“that a central aspect of experience, thought, evaluation, or even reality is somehow 
relative to something else” (Swoyer 2014). Relativist doctrines depend on the individ-
ual’s perspective, because no object corresponds to judgments, preferences, emotions 
or worldviews of a man or a group, so it makes no sense to speak of truth or falsehood 
(Cf. Berlin 1990/2013. 80). 
A comprehensive set of categorical defi nitions can be found by breaking relativ-
ism down into two main categories, namely, that of a ‘moral doctrine’ and ‘metaethi-
cal doctrines’ (Tännsjö 2007. 124). Within the metaethical kinds of relativism, there 
are positive and negative forms of relativism. Th e negative forms are “nihilistic” since 
“there is no moral truth…there exist no moral facts…there are no moral proposi-
tions whatever” (Tännsjö 2007. 124). Th e positive forms include semantic, epistemic 
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and ontological moral relativism, all of which posit that there are many moral truths 
(Tännsjö 2007. 125). 
Relativist motifs oft en rely on the foundation of a “truistic” (Swoyer 2014) premise. 
Th is foundation claims that a thing may be true within a certain context – or frame-
work – and that the same thing may be false within another historical context, that it 
can be true or false for some groups and in some historical periods, but not for oth-
ers. Truth is relative to a framework of concepts, norms or practices: “truth is relative 
because meaning is contextual and being is relational” (Taylor 1978. 41). Diff erent 
individuals may still come to diff ering conclusions since they “inhabit diff erent moral 
(socially constructed) universes” (Tännsjö 2007. 125). Even the narrowing of relativ-
ism as an umbrella term to focus on modern relativism, it is still a broad term that 
encompasses many diff erent strands of thought and diff erent fi elds, including: cultur-
al relativism, political relativism, scientifi c relativism and moral relativism (Swoyer 
2014). Whether looking at positive or negative relativism, there is no universal ob-
jective truth. All forms of relativism rely on social construct and historical context as 
determinants of an individual’s perspective. 
Relativism is important in discussions across various disciplines today, because 
morals have become a part of a theory of good instead of belonging to the sphere of 
practical action of the agent. In the context of relativism, one’s own morals can only 
be accurately seen from his/her own fi rst-person perspective, like a policy from the 
viewpoint of the agent who created it and not an observation of the same policy from 
a politician in another hemisphere, or an observer from Mars. An individual decides 
what is right or wrong from the context of his/her own framework, but because there 
are many truths, he/she cannot accurately understand another’s moral framework. 
However, placing morals within a greater theory of good counters this agent-centered 
viewpoint. Debates concerning relativism have thus arisen in political science, ethics, 
theology, sociology and even philosophy. Across these disciplines several prominent 
challenges to relativism have become apparent.
Th ese challenges can be divided into three categories: logical, practical and un-
expected consequences. Firstly, analytic challenges dealing with self-refutation and 
empirical problems create dilemmas for the philosophical possibility of relativism. 
Secondly, relativism is impractical and virtually impossible in practice concerning 
policy-making in a multi-cultural society – for example, immigration can add to this 
impossibility. Th irdly, relativism can lead to unexpected consequences that pose a so-
cietal danger by creating a clash of irreconcilable diff erences between or among cul-
tures that may in fact hamper tolerance and deter peace.
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Logical challenges
A common critique of relativism, only briefl y touched on here, is that relativism sim-
ply refutes itself. If everything relies on social constructs and historical context then 
moral relativism as a theory is a product of Western society in a post-war, twentieth 
century historical framework. It follows that relativism might be true for post-war 
twentieth century society but cannot escape losing relevance in other contexts and 
eras. Relativism thus faces the problem of being relative. Th is historical context is in-
tegral to relativism and in this particular incarnation it is called historicism. German 
historicism maintains three conclusions that implicitly lead to complete relativism: 1) 
it is impossible to defi ne universal norms of conduct, 2) all ethics are expressions of 
social structures and 3) one cannot rationally defi ne duty, “what to do or want” (Aron 
1938/2006, 372). However, historicism is not an isolated declaration; it is a trans-his-
torical vision that exempts itself from the verdict on the precariousness of human 
thought. Instead it transcends the cycle (Strauss 1953. 25). 
A radical, existential historicism, like that of Heidegger, responded to Nietzsche’s 
denial of the trans-historical nature of the historicist thesis, rejecting any possibility of 
objective analysis, because all life is commitment. 
Philosophy […] presupposes that the whole is knowable, that is, intelligi-
ble. Th is presupposition leads to the consequence that the whole as it is in 
itself is identifi ed with the whole in so far as it is intelligible; […] it leads 
to the identifi cation of “being” with “intelligible” or “object”; […] Th e 
presupposition mentioned is said to have its root in the dogmatic identi-
fi cation of “to be” in the highest sense with “to be always,” […] Th e dog-
matic character of the basic premise of philosophy is said to have been 
revealed by the discovery of history or of the “historicity” of human life. 
[…] “to be” in the highest sense cannot mean – or, at any rate, it does not 
necessarily mean – “to be always” (Strauss 1953. 30-31).
It played a key role that radical historicism could deny the trans-historical char-
acter of its doctrine. Nietzsche’s attack on nineteenth century historicism shows that 
historicism devalues all global visions of the world. It creates impossibility because 
it would destroy the “protecting atmosphere within which life or culture or action is 
alone possible. […] Th e theoretical analysis of life is noncommittal and fatal to com-
mitment, but life means commitment” (Strauss 1953. 26). Followers of historicism de-
fi ne thinking as essentially subservient to life. Such arguments of self-refutation have 
sprung up again and again in opposing historicism and the various forms of twentieth 
century relativism.
Self-refutation is not the only problem inherent to relativism. A problem arises from 
the main root of cultural relativism itself: the conception stating that morality is relative 
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because it is contextual or a social construct. Th e radical relativist viewpoint describes 
the rigidity of frameworks and the paradigms that prevent meaningful communica-
tion with ‘Others’ considerably diff erent from ourselves: “we are prisoners caught in 
the framework of our theories; our expectations; our past experiences; our language” 
(Popper 1970. 56). Th e frameworks in which we are imprisoned are the individual’s 
environment, the historical context, cultural infl uences and innumerable other factors. 
Th is contextual element creates the framework for an individual to draw conclusions 
and make moral judgments as to what is right and what is wrong. An inherent problem 
exists in this framework, namely, “notions of incommensurability appear to rest on the 
assumption that frameworks are totally closed and unchangeable” (Young 1997. 499). 
Th is closed framework concept is paradoxical. By stating that an individual’s 
framework is subject to factors such as environment, language, religion and historical 
experience, cultural relativism admits that human beings are shaped and infl uenced 
by their surroundings and time period rather than by a genetically inherited frame-
work. Th is implies that a radical relativist would agree with the argument that there 
are in fact “no innate principles or ideas” (Locke 1690/2013. 27-85). By conceding to 
a tabula rasa notion of a newborn human being and that the individual subsequently 
builds a moral framework according to the surrounding environment and era, the rel-
ativist faces a fundamental contradiction. If individuals can be shaped, at what point 
does the social construction stop; at what point do individuals stop learning from each 
other? In countering ethnocentrism, moral and cultural relativism do so through a 
“postmodern retreat from any epistemic judgments. In such a view, it is not possible to 
speak of cultures ‘learning’ from each other” (Young 1997. 501). But this is inherently 
impossible if a human being’s moral framework is developed through exposure to oth-
er human beings in a specifi c society. 
Discoveries in anthropology and other social sciences – including history – sup-
port the idea that no single moral value was ever shared across tribes and civilizations. 
Strauss summarizes this view by expressing that no examples exist where principles of 
justice have not been denied in a certain society or culture1 (Strauss 1953. 9). Howev-
er, can one deduce the diversity of law from de facto diversity? (Aron 1938/2006. 370). 
Th e historicist argument impresses us because it presents itself as extremely plausible. 
Th e plausibility of historicism comes from the opposition of past dogmas: “No compo-
nent man of our age would regard as simply true the complete teaching of any thinker 
of the past. (…) It is reasonable to assume that what has invariably happened up to 
now will happen again and again in the future” (Strauss 1953. 20-21).
However, the “experience of history” at the base of historical relativism is nothing 
but a “bird’s-eye view of the history of thought” (Strauss 1953. 22) because historical 
knowledge is always fragmentary. Instead, rather than legitimizing historicism, history 
1 However, he objects that no one has shown this refusal to always be justifi ed or even reasonable.
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itself proves that fundamental themes and problems persist within all philosophical 
thought. Th is “unchanging framework” (Strauss 1953. 23) is incompatible both with 
diff erences in approach and with the diversity of solutions in diff erent epochs. Only 
if the responses to these problems were “essentially” (Strauss 1953. 23) contradictory 
and none of them were greater or more important than another might one infer that 
we cannot solve any problem in a universally valid manner.
Relativism claims that although natural right must be universally recognized by 
human reason, the social sciences show that an infi nite variety of conceptions of ‘right’ 
exists. Th erefore, there are no immutable principles of justice. An extreme consequence 
would be to assert that moral decisions are beyond the competence of reason and rea-
son allows for an equal defense of truth and good or misdeeds and atrocious conduct 
(Strauss 1953. 42). Reason loses its force. If we are capable of passing judgments only 
inside our own social framework, and all other actions outside of our social construct 
are relative to their own frameworks, we are unable to truly observe and evaluate these 
actions or even compare them to others. Th e basis of relativism is, in fact, more pro-
found, namely, a disbelief in the very possibility of knowledge of what is naturally true 
or right. Reason presupposes a chance for legitimacy and a possibility for falsehood 
and doubt. Reason implies that there is some element of doubt that allows us as human 
beings to observe, question and evaluate before drawing conclusions. 
Finally, a simple empirical observation reveals that nobody actually lives his life as 
if all of his life-choices were of equal moral value or truth-value. Reason and self-eval-
uation of our own moral frameworks infl uence our thoughts as to which moral goods 
or values we personally deem superior or inferior and we consciously or unconsciously 
rank their importance. Th is would suggest that even if relativism were logically valid, it 
was existentially impossible.
All these considerations may appear philosophical and abstract, but now we turn 
to some practical examples and to the consideration of real unexpected consequences 
that challenge relativism. 
Practical challenges 
It is true that relativists are right to challenge universalist claims and note that “there is 
value in recognizing that universalism is sometimes a cover for cultural imperialism, 
that agency is something we struggle for [and] that identity is not as simple as the sto-
ries we prefer to tell about our subjective formation” (Young 1997. 498). However, ap-
plying these notions to practical policy-making is unrealistic. Domestic policy-mak-
ing in diverse societies would be diffi  cult, if not impossible, if it relied on the validity of 
relativism. For example, immigration poses a problem for relativism, because diff erent 
cultures may clash.
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Although we mentioned above that no individual leads his/her life as a true relativ-
ist, relativism injects itself into Western discourse particularly through multicultural-
ism. Immigration today oft en becomes tied to multiculturalism. Th e West has become 
sensitive to multiculturalism due to the history of the fi rst half of the twentieth century. 
Th e legacies of the Holocaust, colonization, segregated America and apartheid have all 
added to the call for tolerance in an increasingly culturally mixed society. 
Th erefore, several questions arise when dealing with policy-making in diverse so-
cieties. First, is it possible to defi ne socially constructed boundaries or are they relative 
as well? For example, if socially constructed boundaries can be defi ned by a set of cri-
teria resulting in a variety of signifi cant minorities in a democracy, can legislation be 
draft ed to incorporate immigrant groups, and if it can be, then how? If the government 
decides that the native culture should determine which legislation should be adopted 
to enforce what is right in the native culture, cultural domination occurs and the rela-
tivist claim to multiple truths is thrown aside. However, without the option to compro-
mise, draft ing legislation must rely on the governing culture. If the government were to 
draft  loose legislation that could be interpreted by the various groups living within the 
state or city, the government would risk facing the problem of a minority group with 
practices and/or beliefs that were irreconcilable with the governing culture. In this 
situation, it cannot be upheld that “warrantable judgments across cultural boundaries 
can never be made, if only because the failure to act is itself an action that may have 
unacceptable consequences for other people – consequences which are unacceptable 
to us” (Hatch 1997. 374). Th at is evidenced that actual political and societal polemics 
about issues such as arranged or forced marriages, honor killings, acceptability of the 
physical punishment of children, child labor, headscarves, female driving and require-
ments of attending school have all been elements in debates in the West. Since there is 
much literature debating human rights issues as well as controversial actions such as 
honor killings or practices of female genital mutilation, we will not discuss these issues 
here. Rather, we have chosen to briefl y mention a topic that is possibly more far-reach-
ing and less controversial: education and education policy. Considering the concerns 
mentioned above, how can a state develop education curricula and policies in a diverse 
society, especially in minority dominated regions? 
By asking this question, it becomes apparent that diverse societies face this challenge 
even when it comes to less controversial issues like school curricula. We have chosen 
a mild example for the purpose of demonstrating how this challenge can even arise in 
something as basic as sports class requirements. For example, in Austria, all students 
are required to take swimming classes as part of the school sports curriculum and are 
typically co-educational. With an infl ux of immigrants from Muslim countries, espe-
cially from provincial areas of these countries, this aspect of the education curriculum 
is being challenged. Should Muslim girls be forced to partake in these swim classes if 
the co-educational element combined with the required clothing is problematic within 
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these cultures and moral frameworks? Rather than adopting a relativist viewpoint, the 
government opts for a compromise by holding that all students are required to learn 
how to swim and religious exemptions cannot be obtained, but that students can adapt 
their swimming dress to fi t Muslim standards2. Similar issues remain a point of debate 
in several EU countries and they only become more complicated if we are to consider 
discussing an educational subject such as history, especially as more and more cultural or 
moral viewpoints enter the spectrum. Th e more diverse the society is, the greater is the 
challenge in creating legislation. Relativism does not allow for debates and compromises, 
since an individual is locked into his/her own framework. Th erefore, relativism cannot 
off er a solution to challenges faced in policy making in diverse societies.
Relativism can result in unexpected consequences. If one is not able to distinguish the 
truth from what is false, justice from injustice, science cannot proceed to an instrumen-
tal analysis that we, generous liberals, decided to use to measure the service of democ-
racy. Th is leads to potentially disastrous consequences: the hypothesis that because we 
are not able to examine the ends (since all choices are only blind preferences) but solely 
the means leads to accepting existential commitment and facing absolute nothingness.
Why simply accept with relief that which leads us to deny what is true, good and 
just and to receive with respect all cultures that tolerate others? Th e arguments in fa-
vor of tolerance are weakened if the choice of tolerance is only a choice among other 
possibilities, as blind as any other.
Such a view is supported by three axioms that are seldom discussed: 1) the impos-
sibility of knowing goodness or justice, 2) the passionate rejection of all absoluteness, 
and 3) the equality of all cultures which have a respect for diversity, without qualifi ca-
tion. Th ese axioms apparently silence the voice of reason (Strauss 1953. 6-7).
How can anyone seriously assert that exclaiming that something “is simply part of 
a group’s culture” or “within their values” serves to further justice and continuity? In 
the nineteenth century the Maori of the North Island of New Zealand conquered the 
Chatham Islands, inhabited by the Moriori, people of the same origin from a thousand 
years before. Th e Maori had adopted a warring culture, whereas the Moriori had adopted 
a peaceful culture. Th e Maori, according to their custom, captured and killed the entire 
population, hunting down any that attempted to fl ee. Th e Moriori could have retaliated, 
but instead prepared a negotiation based on resource sharing. Th e result was greater 
carnage (Barry 2002. 253-254). Th is example brings into question the idea that a world 
in which all adhere to their own standards would necessarily be peaceful.
Th ere are situations in which ethical relativism is untenable, for it may 
lead to moral neutrality and inaction in situations that are intolerable. 
2 „Schwimmen, als Teil des Lehrplans, sei grundsätzlich verpfl ichtend, allerdings nur in der Volksschule. 
Geschlechtertrennung im Islam spielt jedoch erst ab der Pubertät eine Rolle. Wenn die Eltern dann ihre Töchter 
vom Turnen oder Schwimmen befreien wollen, reicht eine religiöse Begründung nicht aus.“ – Herrner
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Ethical relativism is mistaken when it calls for us to be nonjudgmental in 
relation to such issues as political executions, genocide, genital mutila-
tions, honor killings, and the like (Hatch 1997. 372).
Acceptance of moral relativism becomes more diffi  cult when claiming that acts of 
utter violence are simply ingrained within another culture’s practices and traditions. 
Pluralism
We argue that by turning to a critical pragmatist-pluralist approach we can address the 
concerns raised by the challenges to relativism mentioned above, while continuing to 
recognize that societal and individual diff erences do exist. Although the process is nei-
ther simple nor would we label it as easy, these diff erences can be bridged and the human 
learning process does not bluntly halt at some unspecifi ed point in an individual’s life.
We are “prisoners caught in the framework of our theories…” (Popper 1970. 56), 
but it is possible to break out of this framework if we try hard enough. We then fi nd 
ourselves in a yet bigger framework, out of which we can move with eff ort. Relativism’s 
claim that individuals cannot learn or talk to one another is absurd since 
[relativism] simply exaggerates a diffi  culty into an impossibility. Th e diffi  -
culty of discussion between people brought up in diff erent frameworks is 
to be admitted. But nothing is more fruitful than such a discussion; than 
the culture clash, which has stimulated some of the greatest intellectual 
revolutions (Popper 1970. 56-57).
Fruitful interaction does not have to be limited to a “culture clash” that results in a sci-
entifi c or “intellectual revolution” (Popper 1970. 56-7). In fact this concept can be – and has 
been – taken much further. Fruitful interaction, or dialogue itself, is an integral element of 
human reason. Whereas radical moral relativism leads to a breakdown of reason, 
Dialogue is always dialogue within and at the margins of a tradition, an institu-
tional order, a culture. Immanent critique is immanent to a historical process and its 
transcendental capacity is incremental. A process of trial and error and intelligent 
(Dewey’s favorite word) adaptation is the way we can transcend contemporary prob-
lematics, but this is a perennial process, and transcendence only relative, yet a way of 
life in a learning society (Young 1997. 500).
Critique and self-critique are necessary elements of human reason. However, en-
suring that the critiquing process is meaningful and not superfi cial requires mean-
ingful interaction. Dialogue does not imply disrobing relativism and replacing it with 
universalism. Quite the contrary, rather than disregarding cultural and moral diff er-
ences, a “pragmatic-pluralist” approach “acknowledges the relational – not relativist 
– character of cultures but allows for intercultural critique” (Young 1997. 501).
LIFTING THE VEIL OF RELATIVISM  ¨  233
Th is further applies to concepts of functioning communities, democracy and al-
lows for draft ing improved legislation. Dialogue becomes more important than fi nd-
ing a unifi ed social framework on which to base laws. Discourse towards a substantive 
common interest matters and unanimity will not be achieved. Instead, political deci-
sions will always be and should always remain contested (Pitkin and Shumer 1982. 
47-48). Although this notion is commonly accepted within democratic pluralism, and 
it is perhaps an obvious answer to draft ing legislation for a diverse society, the dia-
logical concept plays a role of growing importance in confl ict resolution and confl ict 
prevention, and is necessary for continued social learning and mutual understanding 
that both enable functional societies. 
Th e aim of a dialogue is to reach mutual understanding. Th is is what separates dia-
logue from simple conversation. Although many theorists who discuss dialogue would 
not agree on the details of one another’s theories, it is apparent that many can agree on 
using reason as the basis for dialogue to be able to reach greater understanding. Th is aim 
is the basis of all social reason and is supported in diff erent ways by various theorists 
(Berger 2011. 36, Bernstein 1987. 519, & Verkamp 1991. 103-115).3 Peter Berger off ers 
perhaps the most realistic theory of dialogue. He puts forth the needed pre-condition 
and conditions for meaningful dialogue among religious traditions. Although these con-
ditions require that one remain open to the possibility of changing one’s own beliefs in a 
dialogical encounter, this neither means that this is the goal nor the purpose of dialogue. 
Th e goal is to create better understanding, which can help bringing about a more sus-
tainable co-existence. Berger’s concept for interreligious dialogue can be used as a basis 
to create dialogue on diff erences in morals. Th e pre-condition remains true, in that an 
individual must be willing to enter into a dialogical exchange. However, some of Berger’s 
conditions only apply to interreligious dialogue. Th erefore, to create dialogue on morals, 
the conditions will slightly diff er. First, an individual has to accept the possibility of a 
change in personal perspective; in entering a dialogue, we might change our own minds. 
Secondly, it is important that you are able to diff erentiate the core of your own view from 
the diversity of peripheral interpretations. Th ird, much dialogue looks toward reaching 
areas of agreement. However, this agreement does not imply that an individual loses his 
faith or his moral framework. Agreement can occur in areas of commonality while still 
allowing for big diff erences in individuals’ morals4. Fourth, the ‘Other’ should not be 
3 For example, Hans-Georg Gadamer portrays dialogue’s aim as the basis of all social reason and despite 
the lengthy debate between the two, Jürgen Habermas agrees with the essential element of Gadamer’s defi ni-
tion of dialogue diff erentiating between “what he calls “communicative action” that is orientated to mutual 
understanding from the type of “purposive-rational” action that is orientated toward success” (Bernstein 
1987. 519). John Hick’s “Copernican Revolution”, although controversial and disputed, serves as yet another 
example of a scholar promoting a theory based on the pretext of human beings using reason to reach greater 
understanding (Verkamp 1991. 103-115 & Berger 2011. 36).
4 Dialogue serves to create understanding of the ‘Other’ and the ‘Other’s’ point of view to improve coexis-
tence. Th is oft en relies on fi nding common ground, but does not imply an implicit adoption of the ‘Other’s’ 
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seen as an enemy (Berger 2011. 50-82); however, we claim that this condition does not 
necessarily apply to confl ict prevention and resolution. Although the lack of condition 
four slows the process, thereby creating a smaller initial impact, impact is only achieved 
through persistence and continuous engagement over many years.
Some elements may, at fi rst glance, seem unsatisfactory to an idealist, namely, 
that religious fundamentalists and radical relativists will not be found at the dia-
logical table; fundamentalists and relativists “both embody a rejection of reason – 
for the pursuit of reason implies both the possibility of truth and the legitimacy of 
doubt” (Berger 2011. 42). However, the plausibility of dialogue under the conditions 
outlined above is considerably more realistic and applicable to society. Th is pluralist 
dialogical approach maintains an element of doubt while addressing the diffi  culties 
that relativism presents concerning social change and practical policy application as 
well as prevention of violence.
Finally, before turning to our conclusion, we will briefl y touch upon the possibility 
of a universal morality within pluralism. Relativism rejects the possibility of a univer-
sal morality and universalism because they defend that there are morals shared by all 
mankind, usually turning to basic human rights – the right to life, shelter, food, etc. 
Pluralism handles universal morality diff erently. Rather than claiming the unde-
niable existence or absolute impossibility of a universal morality, pluralism presup-
poses the existence of certain universal morals or values to work. Pluralism assumes 
respect for expressing one’s views and respect in listening to another’s. Pluralism in 
this form also assumes a desire to learn, reason and improve, as well as an acceptance 
of questioning one’s own values, a “belief ” in the possibility of doubting. To func-
tion, pluralism requires some form of a universal morality for individuals partici-
pating within a pluralist society. However, this does not mean that the existence or 
establishment of a universal morality is probable or even possible. Th e conditions of 
pluralism require a willingness of an individual to participate in dialogue and an ac-
ceptance of the fact that the individual might change as a result of this dialogue. Th is 
naturally eliminates the participation of dogmatists, radical relativists and anyone 
unwilling to participate in a society based on pluralism. Th ese individuals would not 
be included in any shared values or morals that are prerequisites for pluralism. As it 
would be virtually impossible to convince them or to impose on them the necessary 
elements of pluralism, if pluralism requires voluntary participation then a universal 
morality is logically impossible. 
culture or beliefs – e.g. in the context of religion, that there are similar passages to the Golden Rule in many 
religions, but that does not mean that these religions share all of the same beliefs or that they should do so. 
Despite looking for commonalities, it is equally important to recognize that “it is just as important to say no 
as it is yes” (Berger 2011. 76-78).
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Conclusion
Relativism encompasses many theories and holds a variety of specifi c defi nitions that 
stem from the weak and obvious fact that all things relate to something else. Radical log-
ical or moral relativism imply that there is no truth, no perennial questions, or anything 
good or evil to an individual, because everything depends on the individual’s framework. 
Th is claim is vulnerable to self-refutation, but we presented here additional challenges 
inherent to the logic of relativism. Rather than to summarize, we would like to reiterate 
the questions that these challenges pose: When and why does the social construction of 
an individual end? And how can we understand cultures outside our framework?
However, our main goal has been to present some practical problems that arise 
within a multicultural society by focusing on immigration and education. Globaliza-
tion has changed the reality of many places in the world today by increasing contact 
among diff erent cultures. Holding on to the relativistic claim that an individual’s mor-
als and values are ‘right’ only within his/her own framework can make policy develop-
ment and implementation impossible.
Th e most alarming is that unexpected consequences may follow from relativism, 
especially in its radical form because it can justify violence or atrocities as a moral 
element of a specifi c culture. Holding on to the relativist perspective also prevents 
societal improvement when cultures clash concerning irreconcilable diff erences, and 
it could possibly lead to unrest.
We have briefl y presented pluralism not only as a more sound, but also as a more 
realistic alternative to relativism. Pluralism heeds the notion that human beings have 
frameworks that are sociologically developed. However, these frameworks are neither 
necessarily fi xed nor left  unchallenged as ‘right’ in their own context. A pluralistic 
view solves some paradoxes in relativism since recognizing reason promotes commu-
nication and reconciliation and grants the possibility of discovery processes. Th is does 
not always make policy-making, confl ict prevention or confl ict resolution easy, but 
it creates a platform for compromise. In other words, dialogue is a path leading away 
from several dangers inherent to relativism. However, pluralism does not require a 
universally recognized morality, in fact, as a consequence, sometimes excludes those 
unwilling to participate in dialogue. 
Th e role dialogue plays is to better understand the ‘Other’ and the ‘Oth-
er’s’ point of view, to better be able to co-exist with diff erent cultures. Th is 
does oft en rely on fi nding common ground – e.g. in the context of reli-
gion, that there are similar passages to the Golden Rule in many religions 
– but that does not mean that these religions share all of the same beliefs 
or that they should (Berger 2011. 76-78).
236  ¨  RENATA KATALIN SMITH – JOSÉ COLEN
Th ere is no way to force individuals to engage in a dialogue about their convictions. 
Only people willing to do so and who accept the possibility of compromise can be 
brought to the table, but co-existence should not, in fact, depend on weakening peo-
ple’s faith or moral convictions. Aft er a dialogue encounter, an individual is still able to 
use reason to decide for him/herself. Without this inclusion of reason, truth and jus-
tice become merely a matter of taste: “I like my coff ee with milk and you like it without; 
I am in favor of kindness and you prefer concentration camps” (Berlin 1998/2013. 14).
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Morality and Empathy in the Digital Age
MIKLÓS  LEHMANN
A recurring element of theories concerning the origin of morality is that the 
human ability responsible for following rules is connected to empathy and 
solidarity towards others. Th e cognitive sciences reveal that this capability 
is largely dependent on social development, the gradual formation of so-
cial behaviour and of behavioural control; and the results of contemporary 
neuroscience show what are those neural structures that anchor the sense of 
empathy and describe their specifi c characteristics, their developmental pe-
culiarity. In addition to “moral sense”, empathy is a high priority in cultural 
togetherness, in elementary conditions of identifi cation with the community. 
Th rough the change of environmental parameters (through restructuring of 
social relationships, direct personal relationships split by media and the fun-
damental cultural changes resulting from it) the development occurs in other, 
imperfect ways. Th e presentation provides an overview of these changes and 
of their consequences, and attempts to defi ne the contemporary challenges of 
ethics with reinterpreting communication based on digital devices, empathy, 
and belonging to a community in a digital environment.
In the twenty-fi rst century’s societies, universal morality, that is, the issue of universal 
standards independent of culture may be raised in a diff erent form than it was dis-
cussed before in the history of ethics. Whether it is social contract theories, whether 
Kantian or utilitarian ethics, values had been defi ned based on preferences and ideals; 
in contrast, the evolutionary theories grounded in natural history – which were for-
mulated in various forms in the last decades –, examine normative behaviour based 
rather on its adaptive value. Th ese theories have to overcome diff erent obstacles than 
they had to in the past, such as naïve adaptationism or the confl ict of individual and 
group levels. Th is study focuses on two main issues: 1. Can the evolutionary theories 
of normative behaviour (and their psychological and neural foundations in cognitive 
science) provide a reasonable explanation for the issue of universal standards? 2. How 
are the universal standards to be kept when infl uenced by the environmental changes, 
the appearance and spread of the digital environment, the increasing migration of 
communication and social contact to the virtual medium?
Two main sources for universal norms open up in the history of philosophy: the 
revealed religions (and of course the associated theological interpretations), and the 
various theories of values. Th e novelty of evolutionary theory is the foundation of uni-
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versality in biology, in the history of human nature, broadly following the methodolo-
gy of science. Various descriptions of cultural evolution also fi t well into the series. Th e 
criterion for norms is the survival and reproductive success in a given environment 
(or otherwise: adaptive value), which can be examined on levels of the individual, 
the group, or the species. Th e biological foundation also means the neural aspects of 
behavioural features, that is, the detection of neural structures as basis for the various 
forms of behaviour in the light of values.
Perhaps the raison d’être of this approach needs no further arguments now (how-
ever, there still remain some important open questions). Nevertheless, the generaliza-
tions of Social Darwinism in its explanations of the social evolutionary processes are 
objectionable and rightly questioned – and they have shed a bad light on the overall 
evolutionary approach to social and cultural processes –, the theory of evolution off ers 
today a comprehensive option to explain the whole of human phenomena in a unifi ed 
framework. Th is means that the adaptive processes are discernible both in natural, 
social, cultural, and even in technical development. Th us, it is a plausible possibility to 
lay the foundations of moral behaviour in evolutionary processes as well.
Decades earlier, Konrad Lorenz was among the fi rst to suggest that observing the 
behaviour could lead to a better understanding of the norms and values as well – and 
interestingly and thought-provokingly, he comes to this conclusion even while argu-
ing with the Kantian ethics of duty. Th e consistency of Kant, the rigor of universal 
norm can lead to the thought that people helping others only out of obligation, not 
out of love (or aff ection, or emotion) can be virtuous. Lorenz draws attention to the 
fact that we would appreciate those of our fellowmen who make our lives easier not 
only out of cold duty, but whom we can count on unconditionally at any time through 
their emotional attachment (see Lorenz 1983, 1984). Th us the universality of moral 
judgments is to be explored not only in the philosophical-theoretical constructions, 
but also in human nature. Based on the behavioural foundations, the primatologist 
Frans de Waal develops this idea further, giving a remarkable description of the moral 
judgment by introducing three levels in the analyses of the diff erences between animal 
and human nature (de Waal 2006). Emotions that may impact moral decisions (which 
are also referred to by Lorenz), such as loyalty, reciprocity, fairness, compassion, or on 
the negative side, revenge, retribution, punishment, can be found on the lowest level. 
Th e second level consists of social pressures to follow the norms and rules, reinforcing 
the togetherness in the community through rewarding the positive and punishing the 
unfavourable behaviour. Finally, moral judgment can be found on the highest level, 
which contains the abstract norms of expected behaviour (of course also applied to 
their own behaviour), as well as the act of thinking about those norms. Th e bottom 
level can be found almost entirely in primates, the central level partly in primates and 
humans, but the top level can only be found in humans. Th e levels build on each other, 
so all of them should be taken into account in an explanation of the standards. Th ere 
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are many examples for the application of this view in evolutionary psychology, cogni-
tive ethology and cultural anthropology (see e. g. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1984).
Evolutionary explanation of the moral principles in the light of accelerating techno-
logical and social development, however, raises an interesting question. If we assume 
that our moral principles have a long evolutionary prehistory, so their change can only 
be achieved on the time scale of biological evolution, can they remain to be valid in 
the case of advanced mass societies? Evolutionary psychology identifi es the modern 
man’s mental features largely with those of their hunter-gatherer predecessors. Th at is, 
in essence, these characteristics can be seen as adaptations to the natural and social 
environment of that time. However, the present environment is far removed from it. 
Th e change seems even more crucial, if the specifi c features of the digital environment 
are also taken into account, since people today spend a signifi cant portion of their time 
in this particular environment. Are the psychological characteristics of the individual 
changing through the stimuli which are present here, and that are completely diff erent 
from its previous environment?
For an appropriate response it is necessary to investigate the neural structures on 
which these psychological properties are based. Th e evolutionary theories of social 
behaviour strongly argue that the “nature versus nurture” dilemma can be resolved 
if both sides are taken into account; that is, the mental skills shaped by evolutionary 
processes can develop fully only under the right social stimuli. On the neural level, it 
means that the neural structures defi ned by genes are able to build up the synapses and 
establish the processing paths only in the presence of the appropriate input (stimulus), 
which can be gathered in a social environment. Th is is the point where a signifi cant 
change in the environment can cause neural and, consequently, mental changes in the 
shaping of social behaviour.
When the news of the discovery of mirror neurons in the ‘90s spread in the scien-
tifi c community, many researchers immediately tried to use them to explain a number 
of issues and activities that they could not properly handle in the framework of earlier 
theories. Th is is what usually happens aft er a seemingly revolutionary scientifi c break-
through: the explanations are overstrained, and the discovery is also used in areas that 
are not strictly related to it. Th us, the mirror neurons quickly appeared in learning 
theories (imitation), in the coordination of social behaviour (the following of rules), 
in the theories of mind (abstraction), in the inter-subjective understanding, but only 
on some domains of neuropathology, such as the explanation of the neural bases of au-
tism. Th us arose the possibility that they can play an essential role in the development 
of empathy as the neural basis for the emotions – and for moral behaviour.
In a broader sense, the mirror neurons are perhaps the most important compo-
nents of being human, as they serve as the neural basis for the development of culture. 
Imitation, intentional teaching and learning, inheritance – and, of course, language – 
could not exist without culture (cf. Ramachandran 2011).
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It is known that the mirror neurons are nerve cells that are active both when per-
forming an action, and when seeing the action performed (see Iacoboni 2009). Con-
sequently, they can act in two important roles. On the one hand, they link perception 
to the action, allowing us to better imitate the acts or gestures of others as well as to 
form our own movements more effi  ciently; on the other hand, they link the individ-
ual to her/his fellows, lending support to understand the intentions of others, to bet-
ter predict their behaviour and to coordinate the actions and emotions of individuals 
– which means that they are essentially inter-subjective devices within the nervous 
system. Mirror neurons are located in several areas of the brain and do not form a 
single, spatially defi ned part (accounting for roughly 20 percent of the aff ected areas). 
Because mirror neurons are richly connected to each other, it can be assumed that de-
spite the spatial heterogeneity, they form a specifi c network within the brain between 
functionally more or less distinct parts. It may be relevant for research on morality that 
the discovery that the structures of the brain containing mirror neurons are in connec-
tion with the important emotional centers as the amygdala and the insula. As a result, 
it becomes possible to emotionally label events or actions (both our own actions and 
the actions of our peers): to show in an intersubjective manner all those emotions that 
are related to the actions and events.
If, therefore, the mirror neurons are really the key to empathy – because they en-
sure direct knowledge of the other person’s point of view, of the situation – then moral 
universality acquires a biological basis. Mirror neurons can help to defi ne a general 
property belonging to the basic features of human nature that largely determines social 
behaviour.
Empathy is the human feature that is the basis of moral judgments and moral behav-
iour – not only in philosophical theories but in a psychological sense as well. From the 
developmental viewpoint it already appears at an early age, but its full development takes 
time. Its fi rst signal is the imitation of facial expressions that has also been observed in 
infancy and can be evaluated as a fi rst step towards understanding the emotional expres-
sions of others. Mirror neurons play an important role as they help to link the other per-
son’s face (and emotional state) with the person’s own face. In addition to the imitation, 
this phenomenon can be seen as a form of simulation, as simulating the emotional state 
of the other individual (“I feel what you feel”) – and with its doing so, the setting of 
the appropriate neural pathways can occur at an early age. We could say that this is the 
development of the structure in nervous system, which is the basis for the application of 
the most common, formulated within many religions and theories as the fundamental, 
moral rule: “Do not do to others what you would not like to be done to yourself!”. If a 
person feels how bad the pain is, he will try to avoid it – and as he feels the suff ering of 
other people through the mirror neurons, he shall help them to avoid it as well.
Social stimuli have a great importance as the foundation of social skills already at 
an early age, an importance that gets even greater later in the processes of socializa-
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tion. Th e enriched social environment is a necessary condition for the development of 
neural structures, so that later the mirror neurons can be involved in the management 
of social behaviour, whether in the emotions, even in the meta-communication capa-
bilities, or in cooperation. In fact, probably it is not hyperbolism to root here the ability 
of self-determination that depends on the interconnection of the individual and her/
his partners and communities, as well as belonging to the group (community). Th e 
development of group consciousness and a higher level of cultural skills are also worth 
mentioning as those depend on a community and social environment as well.
To generalize the above remarks: in order to establish the social skills as the bases 
for moral judgment – or of the idea of the universal moral norm, in a philosophical 
sense –, an environment that is rich in social stimuli (in which people are in continu-
ous interaction with each other) is needed in the development of the individual.
However, due to social and technological development, this social environment 
is undergoing fundamental changes. One of the most obvious signs of this change is 
that aft er the millennium social contacts are increasingly shift ed to the digital envi-
ronment. Th e root of the problem is that the social skills have adapted in the course 
of biological evolution with regards to a small group, personal acquaintances and a 
social environment based on face-to-face relations; these skills now do not receive 
adequate and suffi  cient stimulation during the development. Th e digital environment 
drastically reduces the face-to-face forms of communication, which of course is far 
from unprecedented. Th e development of communication devices – mostly techno-
logical innovations – aims to extend human contacts beyond the limits of space and 
time. Consequently, some sort of a technical device always intervenes between the 
communicating parties, preventing the multimodal detection of the other individual 
possible in personal contact. Th e digital environment can be interpreted as an exten-
sion of this phenomenon. On the one hand, it off ers a universal tool that changes the 
communicating parties to users who have fewer barriers, who can almost constantly 
be in contact with each other anywhere in the world, any moment in time; on the other 
hand, as a universal medium it requires a permanent presence of the user, because it is 
the only way she/he is able to enjoy the benefi ts of the digital environment.
However, lack of personal, face-to-face communication is inhibiting the user from 
the use of non-verbal, meta-communicative channels – and it is not the only disad-
vantage of the digital environment. Th e application of technical devices aff ects the 
behaviour of the user too: in general, the more time someone spends on the use of 
digital channels, the less time remains for personal communication (researches had 
been conducted in this direction at Stanford University already from the early 2000s. 
For example, they have shown that using the Internet one hour longer reduces the 
time spent on personal communication by half an hour, cf. Nie – Erbring 2002). Using 
these technical devices, however, requires specifi c abilities and skills, and these skills 
reduce the chance and quality of the development of social skills. Th is is an observable 
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phenomenon: individuals showing great technical skills are less experienced in social 
skills than others. Of course, to talk about general social isolation for that reason alone 
is an obvious exaggeration. Th e problem is better defi ned by showing how the founda-
tions of moral behaviour could be learned in the absence of proper circumstances for 
the development of social skills.
Interesting signals are pointing to the extent to which social interaction has shift ed 
to the digital environment. A signifi cant number of young people are experiencing 
social isolation when they cannot be online for a long time, and must settle for the 
limited opportunities off ered by offl  ine communication. Actually present friends are 
only a small part of their community and they continue to demand that those who are 
not present stay in contact with them through some forms of communication.
However, this can only be a form of communication through a digital device with 
a graphical interface. Messages sent via the screen are much less tangible, less con-
crete, more abstract and therefore can be more easily misunderstood than personally 
communicated messages. Th e non-verbal modality that provides clues to the correct 
interpretation of what was said in the circumstances of physical presence is suppressed 
in these cases. On the moral side, these processes have some consequences that could 
be considered major obstacles; the non-ethical behaviour is easier to rationalize in the 
lack of a physical presence, the unethical attitudes are explained by self-justifi cation. 
Th e lack of physical presence also leads to the outcome that the communicating parties 
do not directly face the consequences of their behaviour, so they are oft en elusive to 
them. Th e asynchrony shift s the reaction in time as well, so they seem less and less ade-
quate and can be less and less associated with the earlier manifestations; it gets diffi  cult 
to decide what was off ensive or hurtful?
As a result, users in the digital environment feel much less moral inhibition regard-
ing what they can and cannot do to their chat partners. A signifi cant part of ethical 
problems amongst Internet users can be traced back to this; it is enough to mention 
the off ensive, sometimes personal, rough tone experienced in online forums, the com-
pletely insensitive harassment (cyberbullying) that oft en – stepping out of the digital 
environment – turns into a real tragedy. But it is not only the defi cit or reduction of 
moral inhibition; the social norms and rules are less binding for the users than they 
are in direct communication. Viding and his colleagues have also shown in a recent 
research that antisocial behaviour may be in close contact with the imperfect func-
tioning of brain areas that are important for empathy, which refers to developmental de-
fi ciencies (Viding et al. 2013). Th e insensitivity amongst young people can be explained 
from a psychopathological perspective, especially with the functional and structural ab-
normality of those areas that are involved in empathy (the perception of other person’s 
pain), in the moral decisions and in self-referential thinking (particularly the amygda-
la, the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex and the anterior insula, 
which are either closely related to mirror neurons or contain them in a higher rate).
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Th e lack of non-verbal and meta-communicative assets are tangible for the users, 
however, there are relatively narrow options for their replacement. Th e emoticons as 
characters transferred from the language of SMS and email are broadly suitable for the 
display of simple emotional attitudes, but they are not enough to communicate deeper 
emotional content or reactions; although they are now supplemented with visual ele-
ments for emotions (smileys). However, the graphical interfaces in the digital environ-
ment include other non-verbal signals, which are mainly trying to imitate or replace 
human gestures (the most common example is the symbolic ‘like’ gesture of Facebook).
Th e gestures and non-verbal signals of emotional attitudes are also important be-
cause as stimuli they activate the mirror neurons in a selective manner. Just like the 
‘like’ gesture, these expressions carry other information as well, information that is 
useful for communicating with partners: it modulates the understanding of the inter-
locutor’s thought. By the activation of mirror neurons in the perception of gestures, 
individuals are allowed to emotionally recognize the position of their communicating 
parties. Th e symbolic gestures of the digital environment could help with that, but 
their communicative value is by no means equal to the personal presence of gestures.
Th erefore, the feeling of empathy that could prevent unethical behaviour appears 
in a less strong version, since empathy needs nonverbal signals that refl ect the state of 
mind and emotions of another person. And what is even worse, the neural structures 
that function as grounds for the feeling of empathy are less eff ectively evolved in child-
hood, because of the absence of adequate stimuli in a digital environment. In addition 
to the lack of empathy, from the moral point of view, there is even a serious disadvan-
tage in account of the insuffi  cient performance of the mirror neurons: due to a defect 
in the rule-following behaviour, the social standards and norms are less compelling 
factors for the individual than they usually are for someone who has been socialized in 
face-to-face communications.
Is there a way out? It would be a mistake to think that the digital world constitutes an 
unavoidable barrier to morality or that it foreshadows the moral decline of communities. 
As with all technical innovations, it is also true in the case of digital devices that if we 
know their eff ects, we can properly use them. If communication is rich in personal, face-
to-face situations in the most sensitive age of socialization – and of the development of 
structures containing mirror neurons –, then the feeling of empathy can be transferred 
to the digital environment. On the other hand, if we can learn to read the signs of emo-
tional states of another individual that are included in the digital environment, empathy 
may also be applied just as well as it is in direct communication processes.
One way to achieve this goal is to distinguish between two types of empathy (al-
though, of course, no sharp line can be drawn between them). Aff ective empathy re-
quires personal presence; emotional reception of the other individual’s feelings is only 
possible in circumstances of face-to-face communication, since it is entirely depend-
ent on non-verbal, meta-communicative signs. Cognitive empathy, however, aims at 
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the understanding of the other person’s feelings (see Whittier 2013). In this sense, 
empathy can be learned; the goal is to get acquainted with the other person’s emotional 
attitudes, and to develop the ability that allow empathic, respectful responses by think-
ing of the emotions of others.
Obviously, we need a new ethical attitude to achieve the reading of those signals 
provided by the digital environment that refer to the emotional state of another indi-
vidual. Because of the distance between the communicating parties and the mediated 
interactions, these can also be quite strained, and there is an even greater need for the 
parties to act based on fi rm and general ethical standards. Th e skills that are the ba-
sis of empathy are bound in the biological evolution to communication that assumes 
personal presence (see Wallis in 2006) –, however, the necessary abilities are those 
that freely operate in the immaterial, indirect circumstances of digital environment, 
where the signs of emotions are mediated. On this basis, the Wellesley College faculty 
formulated the principle of charity, which (similar to the Kantian categorical imper-
ative) could be a general norm in the twenty-fi rst century’s communities: “Always try 
to interpret another’s statements in the most positive possible light, both in terms of 
content and motives” (quoted in Whittier 2013. 232). Th at is to say, we have to suppose 
the best intentions of others.
Th e acquisition of cognitive empathy may therefore be an essential tool to maintain 
morality in a digital environment. However, this does not mean that it is not equally 
important to ensure the necessary conditions to the development of aff ective empathy 
in education. Th e support of direct forms of communication, the face-to-face interac-
tion is needed through socialization – it can compensate the negative eff ects of digital 
environment and can also retain the weight of the non-verbal and meta-communica-
tive means of expression. Th is can be supplemented by the acquisition of cognitive em-
pathy. Th e learning of general ethical standards with full potential is possible through 
participation in interactions with others, with shared social experience and with im-
mersion in human relations. Th e social spaces of the digital world should therefore be 
involved, and it should be ensured that they are not only virtual, but real public spaces 
– so they will be eff ective means instead of obstacles to the development of empathy.
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Community and Morality in the Information Age
GÁB OR SZÉCSI  –  INEZ KOLLER
Traditional communities can be regarded as moral entities that transform 
the individual through group pressure. Communal existence allows the in-
dividual to transcend himself and fi nd partnership with humanity, and de-
terminates the individual’s moral decisions and judgements. A community 
is based on dynamic reciprocity and responsibility, and is a fountainhead of 
social capital, that is, of a common set of shared moral values, norms and 
expectations that can be described as social trust that facilitates cooperation 
for mutual benefi t. We argue that though the electronically mediated com-
munication contributes to the construction of new forms of communities 
which have some level of social capital, these new forms of communities 
cannot be regarded as moral entities. In other words, the appearence of new 
forms of communities leads to a new conceptualization of the relationship 
between community and morality in the information age.
Introduction
A community is a moral entity that allows individuals to transcend themselves and 
fi nd partnership with humanity, and it therefore possesses some level of social capital. 
As a common set of expectations and values, the social capital of a community is based 
on the fact that trust among individuals will allow a community to accomplish more 
with their physical and mental capacities than the individuals themselves would be 
capable of on their own. Th at is, the social capital of a community can be regarded as 
an ability of people to associate and work together for common communal purposes. 
Social interaction and communication, relations of trust, communal norms and values 
infl uence it and it describes the social networks of individuals along with the vari-
ous webs of reciprocity. As Robert Putnam notes: “social capital refers to connections 
among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness 
that arise from them” and “calls attention to the fact that civic virtue is most powerful 
when embedded in a dense network of reciprocal relations” (Putnam 2000. 19). 
Th us the well-developed social capital of a community is linked to a strong internal 
morality in which individuals balance their individual rights with collective responsi-
bility. Collective responsibility appears to be closely bound to an acceptance of moral 
norms and values. According to Amitai Etzioni (1996), moral order then rests on core 
values that are shared by a community and are embedded in its social structures. As 
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Etzioni (1996) suggests, communities oft en have strong “moral voices” that help to 
maintain social order in which members accept the shared values voluntarily rather 
than being forced to do so. Such a “moral voice”, therefore, should encourage indi-
viduals and communities to refl ect on their shared moral values and to refrain from 
behaviour that contributes to unsustainable development.
In the information age, the electronically mediated communication contributes to the 
construction of new, mediated forms of communities which have some level of a social 
capital, and the functions of which are to foster communities of interest, to spread informa-
tion, and to promote equality of status, all of which work to enhance social capital, despite 
the lack of direct physical orientation. Th e appearance of these new forms of communities 
leads to the new conceptualization of the relationship between self and community. In 
the age of electronically mediated communication, the essence of community is a kind of 
networked individualism in which individuals can choose their own communities, rather 
than being involuntarily fi tted into them with others. Th erefore the new mediated form 
of community implies an individual-centered existence and weaker social ties. New tech-
nologies foster communication links outside individuals’ immediate social surroundings. 
Accordingly, electronic communication creates a new context in which our notions 
of morality, community, society, and human interactions become more complex. Th ese 
more complex notions can be regarded as the bases of the idea of global and local infor-
mation communities, in which individuals’ communication attitudes are determined by 
their impression of their “self” as a permanently available individual whose communica-
tive acts are embedded in a special network of communicative interactions. In earlier 
eras, communal ties were based on what Durkheim (1984) termed mechanical solidarity 
and were contingent on spatial proximity. In the new forms of communities, however, 
human relationships have become organic, since communal ties are based more on com-
mon values, ideas, and interests. It seems, therefore, that social capital is enhanced when 
new forms of communities develop around and extend traditional forms of communities. 
Th e aim of this article is to highlight how the appearance of new forms of commu-
nities contributes to enhance social capital and how it leads to a new conceptualization 
of the relationship between morality and community. We argue that although the elec-
tronically mediated communication contributes to the construction of new forms of 
communities which have some level of social capital, these new forms of communities 
cannot be regarded as moral entities.
Social capital and virtual community
Our conceptualization of moral behaviour and our moral judgments are aff ected by 
our communal ties that represent some level of social capital along with technical con-
ditions. In the following, we wish to highlight how the social capital of communities 
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is enhanced when new forms of communities develop around and extend traditional, 
physical forms of communities. 
Our conceptualization of community, when transformed by the use of electron-
ic media, is strongly embedded in the associative system of conceptual relations that 
represent the network of various communicative acts, that is, the various situations 
of information exchange. With such a conceptualization, a mediated community is 
conceived as a network of communicative interactions. We argue that the way of un-
derstanding the interactions between virtual and physical communities moves beyond 
the traditional sociological conceptualization of community-as-interpersonal, and to-
wards a conceptualization of mediated communities based on the interaction or the 
operational synthesis of virtual and physical communities.
Just as traditional theories regard community and society as distinct forms, it is also 
easy to consider physical and virtual communities as mutually exclusive forms of so-
cial organization. In this view, a physical community can exist only by virtue of physi-
cal co-location in space, and is based on people’s natural association through sameness 
and residential solidarity. Virtual communities, created by electronically mediated 
communication, however, attempt to break some of the boundaries of geographic 
location, gender, and ethnicity established in physical communities. In other words, 
physical communities are based on shared social and physical boundaries, whereas 
virtual communities are based on shared social practices and interests. Th e functions 
of the new forms of communities (to foster communities of interest and equality of sta-
tus) all work to enhance social capital, despite their lack of direct physical orientation. 
Considering the infl uence of mediated communication on our conceptualization 
of community, many theorists believe that we need a synthesis of physical and virtual 
communities in order to truly inhabit our experiences. For example, Manuel Castells 
(2000) holds that we need a “bridge” between physical and virtual places in order to 
unify our experience, because virtual communities only deal in fragmented individu-
als as opposed to real life. Others, like Amitai Etzioni (2001) and James E. Katz et al. 
(2004), emphasize that the best communities are indeed the hybrids of physical and 
virtual communities as they have a higher level of social capital. Th ey see ideal com-
munities as virtual communities enhancing physical ones. If the mediated communi-
cation actually does increase social capital of communities, then it will be accompa-
nied by a rise in offl  ine contact, civic engagement, and other traditional forms of social 
capital. It seems that users of new communication technologies are more likely to be 
involved in community organizations, to be political involved, and to communicate 
with friends and family, than non-users.
According to Katz et al., since electronically mediated communication becomes 
inherently part of real life in today’s world, “we need an operational synthesis of vir-
tual and physical communities in order to have fulfi lling, embodied experiences all 
of the time” (Katz et al. 2004. 362). In this view, in the age of electronically mediated 
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communication, the dividing line between virtual and physical communities becomes 
increasingly indistinct. Th erefore, as Mark Poster (2001) shows, mediated individuals 
imagine their virtual communities as real. Th at is, the role of communication as mean-
ingful and value-based in virtual communities, works to construct physical commu-
nities as well. 
It is obvious that with this new synthesis of virtual and physical communities, elec-
tronically mediated communication contributes to a new construction of the self. Th e 
mediatization of communities leads to fractured and fragmented selves, because it 
opens up many other possible communities in which to participate. New communica-
tion technologies enable individuals to participate in many diff erent systems of values, 
beliefs, and desires. As Kenneth J. Gergen notes: 
Th e result is that the centered sense of a bounded self slowly gives way to 
a ‘multiphrenia’ of partial and confl icted senses of self. Identity becomes 
fl uid, shift ing in a chameleon-like way from one social context to another. 
(Gergen 2003. 111)
Th anks to these changes, the networked individual is less and less attached to the 
place and position appointed by his (or her) own social ties. Th rough his multi-chan-
nel communicative acts he can become acquainted with more and more communal 
forms, ways of life, traditions, moral norms, and values in the light of which he can 
choose more deliberately from among competing local communities. Th is more delib-
erate choice becomes a part of the increasingly complex and multi-layered identity of 
the networked individual. As Joshua Meyrowitz writes on the multiple, multi-layered, 
fl uid, and endlessly adjustable senses of the media-networked individuals’ identity: 
Rather than needing to choose between local, place-defi ned identities 
and more distant ones, we can have them all, not just in rapid sequence 
but in overlapping experiences […], we can attend a local zoning board 
meeting, embodying the role of local concerned citizen, as we cruise the 
internet on a wireless-enabled laptop enacting other, non-local identities. 
(Meyrowitz 2005. 28)
New localities–which are particular in many ways, and which are also infl uenced 
by global processes and global consciousness–are in the making. Th us, new local 
communities organized in the space of electronic communication, on the one hand, 
strengthen local attachments and local identity, and on the other, can be regarded as 
integrated elements of virtual communities created by global information exchange. 
Consequently, the global virtual community serves as a kind of comparative back-
ground for local communities organized in the age of electronic media. With glo-
balized communication space, electronic media give networked individuals external 
perspectives from which to judge and defi ne the norms, values, and traditions of their 
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own local communities. In other words, the twentieth century expansion of electronic 
communication technologies, as Meyrowitz writes, “have placed an interconnected 
global matrix over local experience” (Meyrowitz 2005. 23). 
Networked individuals in a new virtual social space
Th e networked individual determines the characteristics, norms and values of his own 
local community in the light of the information acquired in the global communication 
space. Th e global perspective created by electronic communication has transformed 
not only community-defi nitions, but the individuals’ relation to social rules and moral 
norms as well. In the space of electronic communication, there is a new possibility to 
change the rules of social perception and the national institutions of political and cul-
tural domination as a consequence of new global perspectives. 
One of the most characteristic features of the virtual space of electronic com-
munication is that it lacks the compulsory categorization system and the classifi ca-
tory forms and norms of a print society. In the media-networked global and local 
communities, it is diffi  cult to maintain several traditional categorical distinctions 
that characterized print societies. Th at is, as electronic communication technologies 
expand, the dividing line between several political and social categories becomes 
increasingly indistinct. 
Th e age of electronic communication is the age of opening categorical and classifi -
cational boundaries. In this new space of communication, the traditional distinctions 
between private and public, between children and adult experiences, and between 
male and female spheres, collapse and disappear. In the age of electronic media, as 
Meyrowitz suggests, we are experiencing “both macro-level homogenization of identi-
ties and micro-level fragmentation of them” (Meyrowitz 2005. 29). 
A new virtual social space is in the making, which strengthens the cohesion of 
competing local communities, and in which, therefore, the infl uence of traditional 
social and political institutes declines. Th e new communication situations created by 
the use of electronic technologies foster greater emotional attachment to local com-
munities that individuals choose from (among competing communities) deliberately 
without social and political restrictions. 
In this new social space, there is a fundamentally new possibility to change the 
rules of social perception and the conceptualization of the relation between local com-
munities and traditional political institutions. Th anks to these changes, the networked 
individual is less and less attached to the place and position appointed by his own so-
cial class. Th rough his multi-channel communicative acts, he can become acquainted 
with more and more communal forms, ways of life, traditions, and values, in the light 
of which he can choose more deliberately from among competing local communities. 
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Th is more deliberate choice becomes a part of the increasingly complex and multi-lay-
ered identity of networked individuals.
By using electronic communication technologies, a networked individual becomes 
part of a network of interactions between others who uniformly accept and apply set 
rules for the eff ective exchange of information. In other words, media-networked indi-
viduals become members of a virtual community determined both by global and local 
conditions for eff ective information exchange.
Regarding the conceptualization of this new virtual community, Nicola Green, for 
example, argues for a new view of community in which the signifi cance of locality and 
interpersonality recedes to the benefi t of symbolic processes. As Green points out: 
As is the case with internet and ‘virtual’ communities then, understand-
ings of mobile ‘communities’ should move beyond the conceptualisation 
of ‘communities-as-interest-groups’ (secured via the authentication of the 
embodied liberal individual and their ‘right to privacy’), and indeed be-
yond a traditional sociological conceptualisation of ‘communities-as-in-
terpersonal-and-co-located’ (secured via relations based on face-to-face 
interaction in kinship or social commonality). (Green 2003. 55) 
Th is new conceptualization moves beyond the traditional defi nition of community, 
according to which, as Green writes, 
[Community] as an ideal type of relation corresponding to ‘natural will’, 
is distinguished by an appeal to a totality of cultural history in the collec-
tive memory of tradition, is defi ned through common property, family, 
custom and fellowship, and is bound by consensus, language and ritual. 
(Green 2003. 53)
Th e basis of this conceptualization is a complex system of associative conceptual 
relations that includes our concept of community, and integrates the conceptual rep-
resentations of human interactions that determine the life of a community both in a 
direct and an indirect way.
Morality and values in new forms of communities
As we have seen above, computer-mediated communication has transformed our con-
ceptualization of community and our community life. Users of Facebook, MySpace or 
Twitter have started to build new forms of communities in the “global village” Marshall 
McLuhan dreamt of in the beginning of the 1960s (McLuhan 1962). Th ese new forms 
of communities, placed also in this global space, are characterized by quick information 
exchange, therefore everybody knows everything about everybody’s everyday life and 
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they do care to share these information with each other. Relationships are getting re-
shaped among people, social bounds and social roles are reinterpreted. As we mentioned 
above, these relations are not strictly face to face relations. Users take part in shaping 
social networks more or less virtually, depending on individual choices. Th ere are some 
who register on social networks only because she would like to tend to already existing 
relations of their families and friends easier, quicker and more eff ectively. On the other 
hand, there are many who venture beyond their existing circles and wish to form new 
relationships which, for example, never could be realised in real life because of physical 
or other constraints, or wish to join bigger communities formed to handle signifi cant is-
sues that they want to become parts of. Web 2.0 enables users to weave their online social 
presence together with their existing offl  ine nets in a process where the original func-
tions of the internet have changed and have become a shelter for mostly anonymous or 
pseudonymous identites, creating what we today call the social networks (Vallor 2012). 
Besides of their online and offl  ine community members, social network develop-
ers, maintaining institutions, companies, governments, civil organisations and other 
institutions, those who percieve social media as an advertisement surface opportunity 
also take part in relation-building and net developing through their joint complex web 
based interactions. Today, due to the internet, the individualist passive receiver con-
sumer culture (Putnam 2000; Riesman et al. 2001) is getting to be replaced by a new 
one which is more dedicated towards social values. 
But, why do we want to live in and to belong to communities that shape frames 
of our interpersonal relations? Why and how do we want to change our individualist 
perceptions of life that is based on centuries-old and expanded individual rights? Our 
communities put a stress on our ethical behavoiur through social media: they mediate 
on themselves through their virtual profi les what to think about the others, moreover, 
they do the same with how to design our profi les to show it to others or how to behave 
and how not to behave. 
Considering the infl uence of social media on our conceptualization of community, 
many theorists believe that we need a general theory of value confl icts and value prefer-
ences that can be regarded as consequences of the appearance of new forms of commu-
nities. For example, Shalom H. Schwartz (2012) holds that in the information age, we 
can experience universal confl icts between specifi c values (e.g. power vs. universalism, 
tradition vs. hedonism), and between pursuing self-transcendence or self-enhancement 
values. Th e appearance of these confl icts leads to several dynamic social processes that 
may show the way toward a unifying theory of human motivation. Focusing on these 
social processes, we can stress the importance, fi rstly, of tendencies of conformity, mean-
ing that online social networkers also need to orientate themselves to the opinions and 
behaviours of others; secondly, of hedonism which happens to appear as a general value 
involving openness and individuality (in this interpretation, a hedonist aims to feel good 
and satisfi ed); thirdly, we can register the users’ claims to be treated as important per-
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sonalities, to be honoured by others for their achievements and to have opportunities to 
show their particular skills to others; fi nally, for the fourth, we can name universalism as 
a tipical value among internet users: in recent years feeling responsibility for others and 
for the maintainable environment, caring and support of each other became more in-
tensive. Today, the strengthening of these values indicate that communities may become 
value-holding alternatives of the individualist approach. 
Being present on social networks is a characteristic feature of today’s young people, 
especially of the so called Y generation. During recent years we have conducted or led stu-
dent researches on social networks. Within the framework of these researches we tried to 
fi nd out whether in these technical conditions of social networks is it possible to fi nd real 
ethical communities. In ethical communities people care about each other and about their 
relationships. We have detected these motivations in Facebook communities. However, 
maintaining the same community is a more complex commitment. New forms of com-
munity-building and community-care are oft en regarded as quicker and easier supple-
ments of maintaining real relationships. But if the users have to choose about which thing 
is more important, they choose, for example, to meet a couple of friends personally than 
to send Christmas postcards to even a hundred of acquiantances, no matter how much 
easier and quicker the latter option might be. In contrast, regarding vulnerability and the 
ability to defend themselves, virtual community members are more active than they are 
in real life, which is also an ethical point of view. Th ey are more brave in asserting their 
opinion, in redressing off enses, and in defending their friends than they are in real life. 
Th is phenomenon can be explained by the absence of personal contact. In lack of 
direct personal contact they take confrontation easier. Although users may neglect 
or erase relations or hide their posts consequently form others, the high visibiliy and 
percieved values of online connections make these possible ways less attractive for 
social based common thinking. Th is is called the aff ordance of online technologies 
(Vallor 2010) so long as they provide a more attractive and more comfortable sample 
of usage (keeping alternative samples as well for the illuson of choice). In this regard, 
on social networks such as Facebook, users have to confront the purposes of the por-
tal to defend themselves from disliked opinions. Th is is why these portals are called 
moderately democratic social networks. Th e most important condition of maintaining 
online communities is that members are able to contact each other actively. 
Conclusions
Th is article holds, on the one hand, that community is a moral entity which has some lev-
el of social capital, and, on the other hand, that electronically mediated communication 
contributes to the construction of new, mediated forms of communities the functions 
of which are to foster communities of interest, to spread information, and to promote 
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equality of status, all of which work to enhance social capital, despite their lack of direct 
physical orientation. We argued that though these new forms of communties have some 
level of social capital, this social capital is not linked to an internal morality in which 
individuals balance their individual rights with collective responsibility. 
Th is conception is based on the assumption that meaningful communication, 
information-sharing can be regarded as a form and resource of the social capital of 
a community. Developments of key components of social capital (e.g. the norms of 
reciprocity and trustworthiness) are essential to meaningful communication. Th at is, 
communities are built around value-laden access of other people, the ability of trust-
worthy communication in the information age. 
For the present, however, we cannot take online social network communities as 
to be generally characterized by behaving responsible beyond interpersonal relations 
and interpersonal ethical bounds. Besides, there are many social initiatives based on 
primarily online presence, which do not become ethical communities. Th eir members 
are able to compel each other to exemplary behaviour, but they can hardly defend 
themselves from deviant conduct that does not venerate ethical norms, as people have 
the right to articulate their free opinion. Th ey involve numerous manipulative risks, 
one of which is that some opinion-leaders may induce increased emotions in their 
fellows. On this ground, for now it is hard to consider whether the Y generation has 
just taken the fi rst steps toward a new, responsible social life or is it merely an over-re-
fl ected dead end. 
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